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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis provides a critical legal analysis of the Australian Competition 
and Consumer Commission’s Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct. The Immunity 
Policy is touted as the ‘most effective anti-cartel enforcement tool in the world’ as it 
aims to increase cartel detection and deterrence by offering the first cartel participant 
full immunity from civil and criminal penalties. This thesis presents a detailed 
examination of the theory underpinning the policy’s design and intended operation to 
question whether the current model of assessing the effectiveness of the policy needs 
to be enhanced in light of more recent theoretical developments.   
Building upon this analysis, this thesis employs: a qualitative and cross-
comparative investigation into the eligibility and cooperation requirements of the 
policy; an analysis of how the policy intersects with public and private enforcement 
within Australia and how this impacts upon confidentiality and third party actions; 
and a critical examination of some alternative measures to increase cartel detection 
and deterrence in addition to immunity. 
Despite the lionised rhetoric that surrounds the use of immunity policies 
worldwide, these claims are largely untested. Given the nature of cartel conduct, 
many quantitative assessments of the Immunity Policy are generated from 
incomplete or unknown information about cartel conduct and heavily rely on 
overgeneralised conceptions of rationality to inform the economic modelling upon 
which these studies are based. As a result, the research in relation to the Immunity 
Policy is currently quantitatively skewed and in need of a comprehensive analysis 
using qualitative methods to provide valuable and unique insight into the design and 
actual operation of the policy. 
A qualitative and cross-comparative analysis was conducted to assist that 
analysis. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 16 prominent stakeholders 
in Australia to provide detailed insight into the current design and operation of the 
policy. This qualitative study helped inform the content and structure of the cross 
comparative research. To complement these empirical insights, the respective 
immunity policies in Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States were 
analysed and compared to the Australian version to develop a model of best practice. 
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As a result of this analysis, this thesis finds that the current approach to 
assessing the effectiveness of the Immunity Policy is narrow and outdated. To 
overcome these limitations, an enhanced model is developed, which is used to inform 
the recommendations produced by the research. The use of this enhanced approach to 
the assessment of the Immunity Policy will ultimately strengthen the Immunity 
Policy and the recommendations made are therefore commended for adoption by the 
ACCC. 
This thesis reveals that there are a number of limitations inherent in the 
design and operation of the Policy, including the approach most commonly used to 
assess its effectiveness in achieving cartel detection and deterrence. In light of this, 
the Immunity Policy should not be viewed as the single most effective anti-cartel 
enforcement tool but as one important component of the ACCC’s overall 
enforcement armory.  
Most importantly, in order for this claim to be truly tested, there is a need for 
the ACCC to implement viable alternative measures to Immunity, as outlined in this 
thesis, which can also achieve cartel detection and deterrence and prevent the 
overreliance on a single enforcement tool.  
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I THE ACCC IMMUNITY POLICY FOR CARTEL CONDUCT - AN 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This research will focus on a finite aspect of competition law, that being cartel 
conduct. Put simply, cartel conduct is conduct that is highly meditated, typically 
secretive and sophistically designed for personal profit at the expense of consumers 
and the economy. It generally occurs when two or more competitors in a market 
illegally collude to exploit the market for individual gain. In Australia, this conduct is 
regulated by the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth).1 
Cartel conduct was criminalised in Australia in 2009, in response to strong 
calls from the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission ('ACCC'), as well 
as a brief and incomplete report by the Dawson Committee released in 2003.2 The 
approach taken to make cartel conduct criminal has been to use the same physical 
elements as those used for the civil cartel prohibitions but require the fault elements 
of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) to be satisfied in order for a criminal cartel offence 
to be established. This cartel statutory framework has been criticised as broad and 
overly complex, creating considerable uncertainty in relation to the way these 
provisions will be interpreted and applied.3  
The focus of my thesis will be on the primary method used by the ACCC to 
detect this type of secret and deliberate behaviour, namely the Immunity Policy. 
The Immunity Policy operates as follows: a cartel participant will be offered 
immunity from suit by the regulator if they are the first member to come forward 
with information about a cartel that will assist the regulator in 'unveiling' the cartel.  
There has been global acknowledgement by the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the International Competition Network 
(ICN),4 and key competition regulatory agencies in the United States, Canada and the 
                                                
1 ss 44ZZRD-44ZZRK. 
2 Trade Practices Committee of Review, 'Review of the Competition Provisions of the Trade Practices 
Act' (Commonwealth of Australia, 2003) Chapter 10: Penalties and other remedies (‘The Dawson 
Report’). 
3 Caron Beaton-Wells and Brent Fisse, Australian Cartel Regulation: Law Policy and Practice in an 
International Context (Cambridge University Press, 1 ed, 2011) Chapter 5. 
4 OECD, 'Hard Core Cartels – Harm and Effective Sanctions' (Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, 2002); International Competition Network, 'Anti-Cartel Enforcement 
Manual: Chapter 2: Drafting and Implementing an Effective Leniency Policy' (International 
Competition Network, May 2009).	
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United Kingdom,5 that indicate that an effective immunity policy is essential for the 
encouragement of both businesses and individuals to disclose cartel behaviour. 
According to the competition authorities, immunity policies are designed not 
only to assist the regulatory agencies to prosecute participants, but also to provide a 
powerful disincentive for the formation of future cartels.6 The authorities argue that 
there is a greater risk of regulatory detection and enforcement where an effective 
immunity policy is in place.7  
It is important to note that a number of different terms are used to describe an 
immunity policy, including ‘Amnesty policy’ and ‘Leniency policy’ as commonly 
used in the United States and Europe. As these terms refer to essentially the same 
notion of an immunity policy, they will be used interchangeably throughout this 
research. 
In Australia, a cartel member must apply to the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (‘ACCC’) for immunity from suit, who will then decide 
whether immunity should be granted, according to the criteria outlined in its 
Immunity Policy.8 The Immunity Policy was revised by the ACCC during the time of 
writing this thesis; the discussion to follow reflects the current position.9  
In criminal proceedings, the ACCC will make recommendations to the 
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (‘CDPP’), and the CDPP will 
                                                
5 See, eg, Competition Bureau, 'Immunity Program under the Competition Act' (Competition Bureau, 
7 June 2010); Competition and Markets Authority, 'Applications for Leniency and No-Action in 
Cartel Cases - Detailed Guidance on the Principles and Process' (Competition and Markets Authority, 
2013) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284417/OFT1495.pdf
>; DOJ Department of Justice, 'Corporate Leniency Policy' (0091, Department of Justice - Antitrust 
Division, 1993); DOJ Department of Justice, 'Leniency Policy for Individuals' (0092, Department of 
Justice - Antitrust Division, 1993). 
6 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 'ACCC Immunity and Cooperation Policy for 
Cartel Conduct ' (2014) 1;International Competition Network, above n 4, s 2.2. 
7 International Competition Network, above n 4. 
8 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n 6, s C, ss 16, 28. 
9 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, ACCC Releases Discussion Paper in Cartel 
Immunity Policy Review (September 2013) <https://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/accc-releases-
discussion-paper-in-cartel-immunity-policy-review>. As part of this review, a number of submissions 
were put to the ACCC based on the research undertaken in this thesis: Pariz Marshall, 'Submission to 
the ACCC for the Review of the ACCC Immunity Policy 2013' (University of Wollongong, 2013); 
Pariz Marshall, 'Submission to the ACCC for the Review of the ACCC Immunity Policy 2013 - 
Response to the Discussion Paper on Cartel Immunity' (University of Wollongong 2013); Pariz 
Marshall, 'Submission to the ACCC for the Review of the ACCC Immunity Policy 2013 - Comments 
on the Draft Immunity Policy' (University of Wollongong, 2014). 
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ultimately determine whether or not to grant immunity to an applicant.10 This 
bifurcated model of cooperation between the ACCC and CDPP is outlined in a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the agencies.11 According to the 
MOU, cases will be referred to the CDPP where the conduct is deemed to be ‘serious 
cartel conduct,’ which is determined by reference to a number of factors.12  
According to the competition authorities, the immunity policy is thus 
designed to create a ‘race to the finish line;’ in terms of creating an atmosphere of 
distrust between cartel members, which in turn creates an incentive to apply for 
immunity. This is particularly important as full immunity is only available to the first 
cartel member to come forward to the regulator. There are a number of requirements 
that an immunity applicant must comply with before immunity is granted. Most 
significantly, a corporation will be eligible for conditional immunity from ACCC-
initiated proceedings where: 
(i) the corporation is or was a party to a cartel, whether as a primary contravener or in 
an ancillary capacity  
(ii) the corporation admits that its conduct in respect of the cartel may constitute a 
contravention or contraventions of the CCA  
(iii) the corporation is the first person to apply for immunity in respect of the cartel 
under this policy  
(iv) the corporation has not coerced others to participate in the cartel  
(v) the corporation has either ceased its involvement in the cartel or indicates to the 
ACCC that it will cease its involvement in the cartel  
(vi) the corporation’s admissions are a truly corporate act (as opposed to isolated 
confessions of individual representatives)  
(vii) the corporation has provided full, frank and truthful disclosure, and has cooperated 
fully and expeditiously while making the application, and undertakes to continue to 
do so, throughout the ACCC’s investigation and any ensuing court proceedings, and  
                                                
10 Commonwealth Department of Public Prosecutions, 'Prosecution Policy of the Commonwealth - 
Guidelines for the Making of Decisions in the Prosecution Process' (Australia's Federal Prosection 
Service, 2014) <http://www.cdpp.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/Prosecution-Policy-of-the-
Commonwealth.pdf> Annexure B.  
11 Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions and Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission, 'Memorandum of Understanding Between the Commonwealth Director of Public 
Prosecutions and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission Regarding Serious Cartel 
Conduct' (15 August 2014 ). See Chapter V: Eligibility and Cooperation – Relationship between the 
ACCC and CDPP, pg 194.  
12 Ibid s 4.2. 
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(b) at the time the ACCC receives the application, the ACCC has not received written legal advice that 
it has reasonable grounds to institute proceedings in relation to at least one contravention of 
the CCA arising from the conduct in respect of the cartel.13  
The requirements for individual conditional immunity are the same as outlined 
above except that individuals are not required to prove their admissions are a 
corporate act.14 
The Immunity Policy also provides for derivative immunity, where an immunity 
applicant can list all of its related corporate entities and/or current and former 
directors, officers and employees who will also be immunised from enforcement 
proceedings.15 
In the event that an applicant was not the first cartel participant to come forward 
for immunity, their application will be assessed in accordance with the cooperation 
section of the Immunity Policy: 
(a) did the party approach the ACCC in a timely manner seeking to cooperate  
(b) has the party provided significant evidence regarding the cartel conduct 
(c) has the party provided full, frank and truthful disclosure, and cooperated fully and 
expeditiously on a continuing basis throughout the ACCC’s investigation and any 
ensuing court proceedings  
(d) has the party ceased their involvement in the cartel or indicated to the ACCC that they 
will cease their involvement in the cartel  
(e) did the party coerce any other person/corporation to participate in the cartel has the party 
acted in good faith in dealings with the ACCC, and  
(f) (for individual cooperating parties only) has the party agreed not to use the same legal 
representation as the corporation by which they are or were employed?16  
Prior to recent court decisions, the ACCC would endeavor to reach an agreement 
with leniency parties as to joint submissions about penalties to be placed before the 
court for adjudication.17 As a result of these court decisions, the determination of 
penalties for leniency applicants now rests firmly with the court.18 
Whilst there has been widespread discussion and endorsement of the immunity 
policy by competition agencies worldwide who claim it to be the most effective anti-
cartel enforcement tool in the world, there has not been a comprehensive critical 
                                                
13 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n 6, s 16.	
14 Ibid s 28. 
15 Ibid s 21. 
16 Ibid s H. 
17 Martin Law and McMillan LLP, Getting the Deal Through – Cartel Regulation (Global 
Competition Review, 2011) 17; See Chapter VIII: Alternatives to Immunity – Cooperation, pg 277. 
18 See ChapterVIII: Alternatives to Immunity – Cooperation, pg 277. 
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analysis of the immunity policy that supports these claims. Importantly, there has not 
been a significant review of the theoretical model that underpins the policy’s design 
and operation or how this model has influenced the way the immunity policy is most 
commonly assessed. This calls into question the need to revise the criteria and 
approach currently used to assess the effectiveness of the policy. This thesis will 
demonstrate that the theoretical assumptions underpinning the Immunity Policy are 
flawed, and as a result the criteria and approach used to assess the Immunity Policy 
needs to be enhanced.  An overview of the main findings in relation to the policy will 
reveal the gaps in the current research that this thesis will address, thus emphasising 
the significance of this research. 
 
A Summary of Main findings in Relation to Immunity 
 
An immunity policy is claimed to be one of the primary and most effective methods 
in anti-cartel enforcement; designed to encourage cartel participants to come forward 
to the authorities and reveal their misconduct in exchange for immunity from 
prosecution or other enforcement action.19  
This policy was designed in the United States and has been commended by 
anti-cartel authorities worldwide for its effectiveness at ‘cracking secret cartels.’20 A 
substantial portion of the research in the past has involved comparative analyses of 
leniency policies, particularly the United States and the European Union.21 Much of 
this research has been carried out with the aim of harmonising immunity policies 
across jurisdictions. 
 Nicolo Zinglas provides a comprehensive critique of immunity policies in the 
United States and the European Union by assessing the relative effectiveness of each 
policy and how this is significantly influenced by the enforcement culture and 
antitrust perception of the respective jurisdiction. Zinglas observes that although the 
European Union and United States immunity regimes have come a long way in terms 
                                                
19 See eg, Scott D Hammond, 'Cornerstones of an Effective Leniency Program ' (Department of 
Justice, 2004) 2.	
20 Ibid; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n 6, 1. 
21 See eg, Nicolo Zingales, 'European and American Leniency Programmes; Two Models Towards 
Convergence?' (2008) 5 The Competition Law Review 5; William J Baer, Tim Frazer and Luc 
Gyselen, 'International Leniency Regimes: New Developments and Strategic Implications' (2005) 246 
Corporate Counsel's International Advisor 2.	
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of revising their leniency programs and improving them, the paper concludes by 
stating that many of the key differences in the immunity policies between the two 
regimes stem from the inherent differences in competition policy.22 
According to Zinglas, the United States is more deterrence focused and the 
European Union is more detection focused. He concludes that the United States 
program is nevertheless more effective due to its history of enforcement which 
(obviously) differs from the newly revised European Union regime. This kind of 
comprehensive comparative analysis has not been undertaken in the Australian 
context. There is a gap in the literature as to how the ACCC Immunity Policy 
compares internationally and how it has been shaped by the ACCC’s enforcement 
strategy and culture. 
One of the key issues emerging in the international cartel enforcement 
context relates to the opportunity for a cartel participant to be granted immunity in 
one jurisdiction and then denied it in another jurisdiction, based on the ‘first in, best 
dressed’ approach.23 Additionally, there is the added complexity involved with the 
issue of immunity confidentiality, whereby information provided by an immunity 
applicant in one jurisdiction can potentially lead to the proceedings or investigation 
in another jurisdiction where the cartel participant has not yet sought or been granted 
immunity.24 The approach taken to address this issue differs from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction, which creates a high level of uncertainty for potential immunity 
applicants that may dissuade them for applying for leniency altogether, in which 
event the cartel continues to operate.25 
In terms of designing the most effective immunity policy, much of the legal 
                                                
22 Zingales, above n 82, 5.2.	
23 See eg, Marc Hansen, Luca Crocco and Susan Kennedy, 'New Fault Lines In International Cartel 
Enforcement And Administration Of Leniency Programs - Disclosure Of Immunity Applicant 
Statements', Mondaq Business Briefing 30 January 2012; D. Daniel Sokol, 'Cartels, Corporate 
Compliance, and What Practitioners Really Think About Enforcement' (2012) 78 Antitrust Law 
Journal 201, 208; Thomas Obersteiner, ‘International Antitrust Litigation: How to Manage 
Multijurisdictional Leniency Applications’ (2013) 4 Journal of European Competition Law and 
Practice 16, 18.	
24 Kon Stellios and Caterina Cavallario, 'Immunity - A Dilemma for Both Whistleblowers and the 
ACCC' (2011) 19 Australian Journal of Competition and Consumer Law 1876; Michelle Chowdhury, 
'From Paper Promises to Concrete Commitments: Dismantling The Obstacles to Transatlantic 
Cooperation in Cartel Enforcement' (2011)  AAI Working Paper No. 11-09 ; European Competition 
Network, 'Protection of Leniency Material in the Context of Civil Damages Actions' (European 
Competition Network, Resolution of the Meeting of Heads of the European Competition Authorities 
of 23 May 2012, 2012). 
25 Christopher R Leslie, 'Editorial -Antitrust Leniency Programmes' (2011) 7 The Competition Law 
Review 175, 178-179, See also, Chapter VII, Confidentiality Across Borders, pg 261. 
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research in this respect has been produced by the United States authorities. The 
views of Scott Hammond, former Head of Antitrust Enforcement at the Department 
of Justice, are prominent and have been endorsed by many of the competition 
authorities internationally. The viewpoint has emerged is that the three key 
characteristics of an effective immunity policy are (1) Threat of Severe Sanctions (2) 
High Risk of Detection (3) Transparency and Predictability in Enforcement. 
1 Threat of Severe Sanctions  
It has been accepted in a number of jurisdictions that the threat of criminal 
sanctions provides the most effective deterrence of serious cartel conduct, making 
the incentive to apply for immunity even greater. In a simple cost-benefit analysis, 
the perceived benefits must outweigh the perceived costs.26 The criminalisation in 
Australia of serious cartel conduct has resulted in a maximum goal sentence of 10 
years.27 That reform brought Australia in line with other criminal penalties in other 
countries, with the maximum imprisonment terms in Canada and the United 
Kingdom and the United States, being 14 years,28 5 years29 and 10 years30 
respectively.  
2 High Risk of Detection 
According to the DOJ, a high risk of detection from regulatory enforcement 
agencies is another crucial element of a successful Immunity Policy and it is 
important that sufficient resources are allocated to these agencies to assist in 
achieving this end.31 Without a high risk of detection, cartel members will not be 
inclined to come forward to report their misconduct in exchange for immunity. 
Additionally, regulatory agencies must be given robust investigatory powers to 
ensure that there is a real perceived risk of action being taken by the authorities for 
those who engage in cartel conduct.32 
                                                
26 Ibid; Scott D Hammond, 'Cornerstones of an effective cartel leniency programme' (2008) 4 
Competition Law International 1, 3-4. 
27 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 44ZZRG (4). 
28 Competition Act RSC 1985, c C-34 s 45. 
29 Enterprise Act 2002 (United Kingdom) c. 40 s 188. 
30 Antitrust Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-237(2004), 118 Stat. 665 
(2004). 
31 Hammond, above n 19, 87. 
32 International Competition Network, above n 4, s 2.5; See, also: Competition and Consumer Act 
2010 (Cth) s 155.	
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3 Transparency and Predictability in Enforcement 
The third hallmark of an effective immunity policy is transparency and 
predictability. According to this view, an immunity applicant needs to be able to 
assess, with a sufficient level of certainty, that their application will be successful.33 
To achieve this there needs to be more than simply the publication of regulatory 
policies and education and compliance programs, but more significantly, the 
abdication of prosecutorial discretion.34 It is common for prosecutorial authorities to 
have wide prosecutorial discretion in relation to instigating criminal proceedings. In 
the context of an immunity policy, prosecutorial discretion can create a high level of 
uncertainty as to whether an immunity application will be successful. Such 
uncertainty is therefore undesirable. 
These three factors, as advocated by the DOJ, are the most commonly used 
criteria to assess the effectiveness of an immunity policy in achieving its aims of 
cartel detection and deterrence. These criteria rely heavily on quantitative methods of 
assessment and are predicated on the assumptions of the rational actor model. This 
neo-classical economic model presupposes that humans are rational actors as ‘the 
basis of an economic approach to law is the assumption that the people involved with 
the legal system act as rational maximizers of their satisfactions.’35 Despite these 
limitations, there has not been a comprehensive review of these criteria or their 
usefulness in providing insight into the design and operation of the immunity 
policies. 
Due to this reliance on quantitative methods of assessment, there appears to be a 
gap in the discussion of immunity policies from a qualitative and empirical 
perspective, including a detailed analysis of the theory underpinning such policies. 
The difficulties associated with researching this area have been acknowledged at an 
international competition law conference, which confirmed that the lack of 
transparency of competition agencies and also the secrecy/confidentiality of 
immunity applications pose a challenge to researchers in this area.36 
There has been limited discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of 
                                                
33 Ibid s 2.3.	
34 Hammond, above n 19, 7.	
35 Richard A. Posner, 'The Economic Approach to Law' (1974) 53 Texas Law Review 75724, 763. 
This will be explored further in Chapter II.  
36 Leslie, above n 25, 22.	
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immunity policies37 with Leslie providing a theoretical breakdown of the operation 
of an immunity policy based on an analysis of the prisoner's dilemma and economic 
game theory as applied to cartels. Leslie asserts that trust is the foundational element 
that ensures the continuing formation of cartel behaviour and as a corollary, in order 
for an immunity policy to be effective, it needs to create distrust between the cartel 
participants.38 
Leslie’s observations are largely based on the rational actor and classical 
deterrence theory associated with the Chicago School of thought, as will be further 
discussed in Chapter II. As will be outlined in Chapter III, there has been a shift 
away from these traditional perspectives, some of which have been critical of the 
assumptions that underpin the orthodox thinking on immunity policies and Leslie’s 
analysis.  
In this respect, the direction of this thesis will more closely resemble the 
approach of Wouter P.J Wils and Professor Caron Beaton Wells, whose 
commentaries consider some of the underlying social and moral implications of an 
immunity policy and are more comprehensive in this respect, as compared to other 
comparative studies.39 
Wils aims to analyse the immunity policy, primarily in the United States and 
European Union, with a view to assessing both its positive and negative effects on 
optimal antitrust enforcement.40 Through a theoretical discussion, Wils explores the 
concept of optimal deterrence (discussed above) in the context of an immunity policy 
before turning to consider both the positive and negative effects that may be 
produced by an immunity policy. Moreover, Wils' analysis extends to a consideration 
of some of the difficulties that may occur in the implementation of immunity 
policies, primarily objections of principle and institutional problems, which he 
believes can be overcome or reduced through an effectively designed immunity 
                                                
37 Christopher R. Leslie, 'Antitrust Amnesty, Game Theory, and Cartel Stability' (2005) 31 The 
Journal of Corporation Law 453; Wouter P.J Wils, ' Leniency in Antitrust Enforcement: Theory and 
Practice' (2007) 30 World Competition 25.	
38 Leslie, above n 37, 466-475. For a detailed examination of Leslie’s theory as applied to immunity, 
see Chapter II. 
39 See also, Caron Beaton-Wells, 'The ACCC Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct: Due for Review' 
(2013) 41 Australian Business Law Review 171; Caron Beaton-Wells, 'Immunity Policy: Revolution 
or Religion? An Australian Case-Study' (2013) 2 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 126. 
40 Wils, above n 37, 97. 
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policy.41 
In addition to his discussion of the framework of an immunity policy, Wils 
also considers a number of factors that can impact on the effectiveness of an 
immunity policy, namely: criminal penalties for individuals; follow on private 
damages actions; and penalties in other jurisdictions.42 
Wils discusses the positive and negative effects of the United States based 
‘Amnesty Plus' policy, which is essentially a policy ‘under which a cooperating 
company that does not qualify for immunity as to a first cartel being investigated but 
that uses the occasion of that first investigation to report a second, distinct cartel will 
receive, in addition to the immunity for the second cartel, a further reduction of the 
fine for the first cartel.’43 Amnesty Plus was recently introduced into the ACCC 
Immunity Policy and also exists in the Canadian regime.44 
Wils also discusses the policy of providing positive financial rewards or 
bounties to cartel informers. This policy has recently been introduced in South Korea 
and the United Kingdom.45 Wil's analysis is limited and the issues warrant more 
thorough and comprehensive examination. 
Professor Beaton-Wells, from Melbourne University, provides an Australian 
perspective on many of the issues outlined by Wils.46 Beaton-Wells' analysis focuses 
on four primary issues raised by the ACCC Immunity Policy: 
 
(1) Immunity Policy and Criminalisation: With the introduction of a criminalised 
cartel regime, Beaton-Wells discusses the potential problems associated with a 
bifurcated enforcement system between the ACCC and the CDPP and the adverse 
impact that this may have on immunity applications. 
 
(2) Immunity Policy and Private Enforcement: As mentioned previously, the issue of 
private enforcement of cartel activity has gained academic momentum. In her 
                                                
41 Ibid Part II, C.	
42 Ibid Part IV.	
43 Ibid 67.	
44 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n 6, s I; Competition Bureau, 'Immunity 
Program: Frequently Asked Questions' (Competition Bureau, 2013) Q 43. 
45 Wils, above n 37, 97, Part IV, E. See also, Chapter VIII: Cartel-Specific Financial Reward Systems, 
pg 320. 	
46 Caron Beaton-Wells, 'Forks in the Road: Challenges Facing the ACCC's Immunity Policy for Cartel 
Conduct (Part 1)' (2008) 7 University of Melbourne Law School Research Series 75.	
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analysis, Wells questions the level of information disclosure needed to facilitate 
private cartel actions, comparing the newly implemented cartel protection provisions 
in Australia with the approach adopted in the United States and more recently in 
Europe. 
 
(3) Immunity Policy and Settlement: In this section, Beaton-Wells contends that the 
Canadian approach to cartel settlement could benefit ACCC enforcement efforts and 
suggests ways in which the ACCC’s Cooperation Policy could be improved upon in 
this respect. 
 
(4) Immunity Policy and Alternative Informant Rewards: Beaton-Wells explores the 
more controversial concept of implementing an informant reward system for cartel 
behaviour, similar to the policies adopted in South Korea and in the United 
Kingdom. 
 
This research is directly relevant to this thesis, as many of the issues canvassed by 
Beaton Wells' require further cross-comparative analysis and supplementation by 
empirical evidence.47 Despite the comprehensiveness of Beaton-Wells' research in 
this area there appears to be a "gap" in the literature surrounding the design and 
operation of an immunity policy from a qualitative and cross-comparative 
perspective. 
More importantly, whilst Wils alludes to the notion of negative moral effects of 
an immunity policy, he does not extend his analysis to a deeper probing of what 
impact this may have on the detection or deterrent capabilities of an immunity 
policy, despite the fact that detection and deterrence is advocated to be one of the key 
aims of an immunity policy.48  A critical study of the theory underpinning the policy 
and how this may have influenced the criteria most commonly used to assess the 
effectiveness of the policy is also absent from the work of Beaton-Wells. 
During the writing of this thesis, another study emerged conducted by Professor 
Andreas Stephan and Ali Nikpay that seeks to question the theoretical assumptions 
                                                
47 Beaton-Wells has since conducted further research into the Immunity Policy, which will be 
discussed in Chapter III. 
48 International Competition Network, above n 4; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 
above n 6, 1. 
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underlying immunity policies using data derived from the European Commission.49 
The research indicates that the decision to apply for immunity is not as simplistic as 
the rational actor model would predict and this is compounded by the complexities 
inherent within the decision to apply.  
Stephan and Nikpay present empirical data to refute the theoretical assumptions 
underlying the decision to apply for immunity by demonstrating that the incentives to 
apply may not be as strong as the competition regulators would suggest. This is 
evidenced by data that suggests cartels in the European Union ceased to operate prior 
to the firm self-reporting in return for immunity and also evidence that the policy 
may be used strategically.50 The authors conclude that immunity may not destabilise 
cartels as much as the theoretical literature would suggest. They outline three key 
areas that may strengthen immunity policies (1) the need for individual sanctions to 
create a ‘tangible deterrent effect on those responsible’51 (2) the recognition of the 
need for competition regulators to be equipped with appropriate resources and 
powers to detect cartel conduct without the use of leniency in order to maintain a 
credible threat and (3) the importance of strengthening compliance programs for 
corporations. 
The existence of this study reflects both the relevance and importance of the 
research conducted in this thesis. The fact that other researchers, such as those 
outlined above, are beginning to question the theoretical assumptions underpinning 
the immunity policy and how this impacts on the policy’s operation, serves to 
strengthen the arguments within this thesis. It reinforces the need for a 
comprehensive breakdown of both the theoretical and practical components of the 
immunity policy, including a cross-comparative analysis and recent empirical data to 
test the claim that the immunity policy is the most effective anti-cartel enforcement 
tool in the world. 
 
                                                
49 Andreas Stephan and Ali Nikpay, 'Leniency Theory and Complex Realities' (University of East 
Anglia & Centre for Competition Policy - CCP Working Paper 14-8, 2014) 
<http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/8158338/8199490/CCP+Working+Paper+14-
8.pdf/3a273397-457c-4109-8920-d79c6709774b>.	
50 Ibid 14. 
51 Ibid 20.	
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B Theoretical Approach and Aims of Thesis 
 
As previously stated, the immunity policy is designed with the aim that it will 
lead to the detection of cartel conduct. The ultimate policy goal is this sense is 
deterrence, based on the assumption that greater detection will result is more 
effective deterrence.  As demonstrated by the summary of main findings above, there 
has not been a comprehensive study conducted into the theory underpinning the 
immunity policy, which has been designed through an adaptation of game theory and 
the prisoner’s dilemma. Both of these theories are based on economic theoretical 
models, which presuppose that humans are rational actors.  
As Chapter II will demonstrate, Richard Posner has been a leading advocate of 
these economic models of behaviour, pioneering the Chicago school of thought, 
which has had a significant impact on the development of competition policy and 
specifically the design of the Immunity Policy. This theoretical model has also 
influenced the way in which the policy’s effectiveness is assessed, through the 
adoption of the DOJ’s three effectiveness criteria: (1) Transparency and 
Predictability (2) Threat of Sanctions (3) Fear of Detection.  
This thesis will demonstrate that the rational actor assumptions underpinning the 
immunity policy are flawed, and as a result the criteria used to assess the ACCC 
Immunity Policy needs to be enhanced. This is the first gap that this research will fill 
by critically analysing the current theoretical model underpinning the Policy with a 
view to outlining an enhanced set of criteria that can be used to assess the 
effectiveness of the Immunity Policy. 
The second gap relates to the overreliance on quantitative methods to assess the 
policy’s effectiveness. As previously stated, there are many difficulties associated 
with researching cartel conduct, given the extensive number of ‘unknowns’ in this 
research area, where reliance is placed on the data available from ‘discovered’ 
cartels.  
Despite these limitations, the research conducted in relation to cartel conduct and 
immunity policies specifically, is predominantly quantitative.52 This thesis will seek 
                                                
52 Many studies into the immunity policy are predominantly economic and explore themes such as the 
effect of cartel ringleaders on leniency programs; the impact of cartels on the market; the desirability 
of granting leniency to more than one cartelist; the effectiveness of a single informant leniency model; 
the impact of financial incentives on whistleblowers; leniency programs as a tool for cartelists to 
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to enhance the way the immunity policy is currently assessed by utilising qualitative 
methods to investigate the way the policy operates in reality, and reveal the nuances 
in its design and operation that cannot be captured by quantitative studies. 
To this end, the aim of the project is to provide a comprehensive legal and cross-
comparative analysis of the ACCC Immunity Policy in order to formulate 
recommendations for its improvement. Importantly, this thesis will critically analyse 
the viability of alternative methods to immunity, and whether these alternatives can 
also achieve the ACCC’s aims of detection and deterrence.  
C Significance of Research 
 
This thesis will contribute to original knowledge by firstly formulating an 
enhanced set of criteria to assess the immunity policy and secondly by using a 
qualitative and cross-comparative method to inform these recommendations. This 
will be the first comprehensive analysis of the ACCC Immunity Policy that includes 
a theoretical breakdown; formulation of new criteria to assess the policy; empirical 
insight and a cross-comparative analysis of its kind. Such an analysis is critical given 
the strong claims from competition regulators of the policy’s detection and 
deterrence capabilities and endorsement of the policy as the most effective anti-cartel 
enforcement tool in the world. It is necessary to pierce the rhetoric that surrounds the 
policy in order to assess its true strengths and limitations. This will ultimately reveal 
that the policy is but one enforcement tool in the ACCC’s arsenal and that more is 
needed to combat the overreliance on immunity, which will be addressed by this 
thesis. 
                                                                                                                                     
punish each other; and the deterrence effect of leniency programs and the effect of cartel survival 
rates: See, eg, Jeroen Hinloopen and Adriann Soetevent, 'Laboratory Evidence on the Effectiveness of 
Corporate Leniency Programs' (2008) 39 The RAND Journal of Economics 607; Gordon Klein, 'Cartel 
Destabilization and Leniency Programs – Empirical Evidence' (Discussion Paper No. 10-107, Centre 
for European Economic Research, 2010); Jose Apesteguia, Martin Dufwenberg and Reinhard Selten, 
'Blowing the Whistle' (2007) 31 Economic Theory 143; C´ecile Aubert, Patrick Rey and William E. 
Kovacic, 'The Impact of Leniency and Whistleblowing Programs on Cartels' (2005) 24 International 
Journal of Industrial Organization 1241; Julien Sauvagnat, 'Prosection and Leniency Programs: A 
Fool's Game' (Discussion Paper, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) 2011); Andrea Pinna, 'Optimal 
Leniency Programs in Antitrust' (Working paper 2010/18, Centre for North South Economic Research 
& Queen Mary, University of London, 2010); Margaret C Levenstein and Valerie Y Suslow, 'What 
Determines Cartel Success' (2006) 44 Journal of Economic Literature 43; Iwan Bos and Frederick 
Wandschneider, 'Cartel Ringleaders and the Corporate Leniency Program' (CCP Working Paper 11-13 
- Masstrict University and the University of East Anglia, 2011). 
 
15 
 
D Methodology 
 
The purpose of this research is to conduct a policy analysis using a 
combination of summative and formative evaluation. The focus will extend beyond 
the goals of the immunity policy to also consider the strengths and weaknesses of the 
policy, which will ultimately be useful for those who engage with the immunity 
policy, including applicants, their legal counsel, the regulators and policymakers.  
Firstly, an analysis of the origin, design and policy objectives of the 
immunity policy will be conducted focusing specifically on the United States 
immunity policy, as this is where the policy was first designed and implemented. 
Secondly, the theory underpinning the immunity policy will be examined, namely 
game theory and an adaptation of the prisoner’s dilemma, to determine how the 
Chicago school of neo-classical economic thought has specifically influenced the 
design and operation of the Immunity Policy. The analysis will turn to recent 
theoretical developments that shed light on the limitations of the rational actor 
model, and the criteria currently used to assess the effectiveness of the Immunity 
Policy. 
This analysis will involve conducting classical legal research (narrowly 
defined) in order to locate policy statements, media statements, second reading 
speeches, international legal materials and other related policy documents. This will 
also include examining the enforcement, compliance and prosecution practices of 
relevant competition authorities.  
The third step in the research design will involve an analysis of the practical 
components of the immunity policy with a view to critically evaluating the ACCC 
Immunity Policy as an anti-cartel enforcement tool. This stage of the research will 
involve a cross-comparative analysis of the immunity policies from the United 
States, Canada and the United Kingdom. The utility of comparative methodology has 
been described in many academic studies, with its core value not only in 'suggesting 
a foreign legal institution or solution as a model or guide, but also in showing what 
solution to avoid.' This step of the research method will adopt the theoretical 
framework espoused in the work of Kamba 'Comparative Law - A theoretical 
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framework,'53 which structures a comparative framework into three key phases: 
1. The Descriptive Phase 
2. The Identification Phase 
3. The Explanatory Phase. 
The first step involves the selection of the jurisdictions for the comparative study. 
The three main criteria that were used for the selection of the jurisdictions for 
comparison were as follows: 
1. A jurisdiction that is a developed nation, based on a system of the common 
law; 
2. A jurisdiction that has an active anti-cartel regime. Importantly this 
includes the criminalisation of cartel behaviour; 
3. A jurisdiction that has, as part of its anti-cartel regime, adopted an 
immunity policy that is designed for the detection of cartel conduct. 
Based on these criteria, the United States was chosen for comparative study 
of the Immunity Policy. This is largely due to the fact that the United States is 
deemed to be the 'Father' of the Immunity Policy, having designed the idea in 
response to its growing enforcement against cartels. The United States will therefore 
provide the basis for researching the impetus for the design of an immunity policy, 
its theoretical underpinnings and its implementation and effectiveness in the United 
States pursuit of serious cartel conduct. 
Secondly, the United Kingdom was selected, in accordance with the 
abovementioned criteria, primarily due to its historic similarities in law and policy to 
Australia. An examination of the operation of the immunity policy in the United 
Kingdom will provide valuable insight into the way in which the policy will 
potentially operate in the recently criminalised Australian cartel regime. The United 
Kingdom will be especially useful in this respect, as their anti-cartel enforcement 
record is more akin to that of Australia, in contrast to the United States, which has 
had an active criminal cartel regime for several decades.  
The cartel regime in the United Kingdom is governed by Section 2 of the 
Competition Act 1998 (United Kingdom) c. 41 (‘The Competition Act United 
Kingdom’), which is principally concerned with the civil prohibition against cartel 
                                                
53 W  Kamba, 'Comparative Law: A Theoretical Framework' (1974) 23 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 485. 
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conduct; and Section 188 of the Enterprise Act 2002 (United Kingdom) c. 40 (‘The 
Enterprise Act’), which creates the criminal cartel offence. The Competition and 
Market Authority (CMA) first introduced its immunity policy in 2000.54 The CMA 
has had a solid civil penalty regime in place since the introduction of the civil 
offence in 1998. The United Kingdom’s first, and only, contested criminal cartel case 
has been generally deemed to be a failure, as it collapsed five days into the trial.55 
The immunity applicant played a significant role in the demise of this case and has 
led to criticism directed at the overreliance by the authorities on immunity programs 
for cartel enforcement in the United Kingdom.56 This criticism has ramifications for 
the use of immunity policies across the globe, and will be particularly pertinent to the 
Australian regime. 
In Canada, cartel law is governed primarily by section 45 of the Competition Act 
RSC 1985, c C-34. In 2012, the Competition Bureau has updated its immunity 
program'57 alongside a comprehensive FAQ's bulletin58 that is designed to answer 
questions relating to the operation of the immunity regime. Additionally, the 
Competition Bureau released its competitor collaboration guidelines in December 
2009,59 which describe the general approach of the Bureau in applying sections 45 
and 90.1 of the Act to collaborations between competitors. 
Importantly, like the United Kingdom and Australian regimes, the Canadian 
cartel regime is divided between that of the Competition Bureau (‘The Bureau’) for 
investigation and civil offences, and in the event of a criminal prosecution, the matter 
is referred to the Canadian Director of Public Prosecutions (‘DPP’).60 An analysis of 
the bifurcated immunity system is one of the crucial components of the practical 
operation of the immunity policy, and will therefore be pertinent to the ACCC 
Immunity Policy. 
                                                
54 Competition and Markets Authority, above n 5. 
55 See R v George, Burns, Burnett and Crawley (unreported) 7 December 2009; (2010) 174 JP 313; 
(2010) EWCA Crim 1148. 
56 See eg, Julian Joshua, 'DOA: Can the UK Cartel Offence be Resuscitated?' in Caron Beaton-Wells 
and Ariel Ezrachi (eds), Criminalising Cartels: Critical Studies of an International Regulatory 
Movement (Hart Publishing, 1 ed, 2011) 129.  
57 Competition Bureau, above n 5. 
58 Competition Bureau, above n 44. 
59 Competition Bureau, 'Competitor Collaboration Guidelines' (Competition Bureau, 2009). 
60 Competition Bureau and Department of Public Prosecutions, 'Memorandum of Understanding 
between the Commissioner of Competition and the Director of Public Prosecutions' (Competition 
Bureau Canada, 2010) <http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/vwapj/Protocole-
entente-Memorandum-of-Understanding.pdf/$file/Protocole-entente-Memorandum-of-
Understanding.pdf>.	
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The use of these three comparative jurisdictions will provide a comprehensive 
account of the operation of an immunity policy, and will further provide a platform 
for discussion of some of the more innovative immunity policy developments, as 
well as identify and explain the challenges that have occurred overseas and its 
potential impact on the Australian regime. Given the focus on the specific practical 
design and operation of the immunity policy, the use of three different models of the 
immunity policy from three selectively chosen jurisdictions will be necessary to 
channel the appropriate scope of research and the potential breadth of this research. 
The analysis however, will be confined mostly to the immunity  
policy itself, as opposed to an overview of each of the anti-cartel enforcement 
regimes within each jurisdiction.  
First, the descriptive phase of comparison will largely involve obtaining the 
immunity policy in each chosen jurisdiction and outlining the cartel regime and 
process for immunity. This will require gathering secondary material from 
competition authorities, international bodies, journal articles and the respective 
governments for analysis. 
Secondly, the identification phase will be primarily focused on identifying the 
similarities and differences inherent within the immunity policy design and operation 
across the respective jurisdictions. 
Once these areas have been identified and examined, the final explanatory phase 
will involve evaluating the perceived failures and successes of the immunity policies 
in each jurisdiction and how they compare with the ACCC Immunity Policy. These 
areas of examination will be grouped and form respective chapters in this thesis in 
order to develop recommendations that will improve the design and operation of the 
immunity policy and the likelihood of their implementation. 
Most importantly, the explanatory phase will be complemented by qualitative 
empirical research in the form of interviews with carefully selected competition 
lawyers, high profile scholars and ACCC representatives. These qualitative findings 
will help inform the structure of the remaining thesis chapters.  Due to the universal 
design of the immunity policy, the fact that empirical data will be conducted in 
Australia will not adversely affect the research findings, as it is intended that the 
comparative analysis of Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States will 
supplement these research findings.  
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Finally, the results from the critical legal analysis of the immunity policy, 
including those obtained from the empirical data, will be collated with a view to 
formulating recommendations for the improvement of the design and operation of the 
ACCC Immunity Policy and the likelihood of any action being taken to implement 
these recommendations. 
E Outline of Chapters 
 
This thesis will begin by providing an overview of the origins and design of the 
immunity policy, focusing predominantly on the influence of neo-classical economic 
theory on competition law in the United States and how this led to the policy’s 
inception. The chapter will provide a theoretical breakdown of the immunity policy, 
as an adaptation of game theory and the prisoner’s dilemma. Christopher Leslie’s 
theoretical analysis of the immunity policy will be critically analysed with a view to 
revealing the assumptions underpinning the operation of the policy are largely 
speculative and over-generalised. 
Chapter 3 will be discussed in three parts. The first part will build upon the 
analysis in Chapter 2 by focusing on the development of the rational actor model and 
the theoretical developments that have dominated competition law development, 
most notably, the Chicago neo-classical economic school of thought, and briefly 
Post-Chicago and the newly devised Neo-Chicago theory. The second part will 
provide an overview of the Behavioural Economics (‘BE’) literature and questions 
whether this model provides a more accurate account of human behaviour than the 
rational actor model. Whilst the limitations of the rational actor model are clearly 
exposed by the BE movement, the BE approach is still in its infancy, and thus it does 
not provide cogent criteria that can be used to assess the effectiveness of the 
immunity policy. The third part of this chapter will focus on enhancing the existing 
criteria used to assess the immunity policy to reflect more broadly the principles of 
public policy. This allows the policy to be viewed in the wider enforcement context 
in which it operates and its impact on and interactions with other areas of the law. 
These enhanced criteria will then inform the recommendations made in relation to 
the ACCC Immunity Policy. 
Chapter 4 is the key empirical chapter. This chapter will first outline the 
methodology used to conduct the semi-structured qualitative interviews. This is 
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followed by an outline of the key empirical findings in relation to the design and 
operation of the Immunity Policy. The issues are divided into four main themes 
based on the level of importance attributed to these issues, which informed the 
structure of the remainder of the thesis: 
1. Perceptions of & Attitudes towards the Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct 
2. Eligibility & Cooperation Requirements of Immunity 
3. The Tension between Public & Private Enforcement – Confidentiality and 
Third Parties 
4. Alternatives to the Immunity Policy 
Chapter 5 analyses the key features in relation to the eligibility and cooperation 
requirements of the Immunity Policy based on the empirical data and a cross-
comparative analysis of the respective policies in Canada, the United Kingdom and 
the United States. The issues explored include: whether recidivists should be granted 
immunity on multiple occasions; how the ‘coercion’ test as an automatic exclusion 
should be defined; the relationship between the ACCC and CDPP in the bifurcated 
system of cartel enforcement; and the process of revocation of immunity, including 
an assessment of the legal basis of the policy. These requirements will be assessed in 
light of the enhanced criteria in order to formulate recommendations that strengthen 
the policy, both as a tool of cartel enforcement and also regulatory public policy. 
The focus of Chapter 6 will be on how the Immunity Policy intersects with the 
role of public and private enforcement. The key issue centres upon the confidentiality 
afforded to immunity applicants and: (1) how this must be balanced against the 
interests of third parties seeking compensation; and (2) how multijurisdictional 
applications can impact on the level of confidentiality that can be guaranteed by the 
regulators to these applicants and the consequences of such disclosure. This chapter 
will be divided into two parts.   
The first section of this chapter will analyse the position in Australia regarding 
the disclosure of immunity information, before turning to the recent developments in 
the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada which have significantly 
impacted upon the issue of disclosure of immunity information on a global scale and 
pose a threat to the effective operation of immunity policies. The analysis will then 
focus on restitution as a potential solution to balance the competing interests of 
private and public enforcement.  
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The second section of this chapter will focus on the information provided to 
foreign regulatory agencies pursuant to international formal and informal 
information-sharing mechanisms. The focus of this section will be upon the waiver 
of confidentiality agreements in Australia and the aforementioned jurisdictions and 
its impact on the confidentiality assurances of an immunity policy.  The chapter will 
then advocate for a more streamlined approach to international immunity 
applications and briefly analyse the proposed avenues for this to be achieved through 
an analysis of the enhanced criteria. 
Given the number of limitations of the Immunity Policy that will have been 
exposed throughout this research, the final substantive chapter will outline some 
viable alternatives to immunity that may serve to complement the aims of the 
existing Immunity Policy.  This will include an analysis of the cooperation section of 
the Immunity Policy and the treatment of second and subsequent applicants who fail 
to secure immunity. This approach will be compared to the respective policies in 
Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States to reveal that the current method 
is unsatisfactory and in a state of flux given recent case law developments. 
Secondly, this chapter will outline the current whistleblower protection 
provisions that exist in Australia pursuant to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and 
analyse its effectiveness in providing protection for private corporate whistleblowers. 
Given that this Act does not apply specifically to cartel conduct, these provisions will 
be compared to the whistleblower protection frameworks that exist in the above 
jurisdictions. This comparative analysis will demonstrate that these whistleblower 
protection frameworks are generally insufficient at providing adequate protection for 
corporate whistleblowers. 
Given these inadequacies, this chapter will analyse the more controversial notion 
of introducing a cartel informant scheme aimed at encouraging third parties who are 
not directly involved in the cartel to reveal pertinent information to the regulator in 
exchange for financial incentives. This analysis will draw upon the extensive 
experience of the United States in relation to these bounty-type arrangements and 
will also focus on the specific cartel informant systems in the United Kingdom, 
South Korea and Hungary in order to formulate a workable model for Australia. 
This thesis will conclude by reinforcing the number of limitations inherent within 
the design and operation of the Immunity Policy, including the approach most 
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commonly used to assess its effectiveness in achieving cartel detection and 
deterrence. In light of this, this thesis argues that the Immunity Policy should not be 
viewed as the single most effective anti-cartel enforcement tool but as one important 
component of the ACCC’s overall enforcement arsenal. Most importantly, in order 
for this claim to be truly tested, there is a need for the ACCC to implement viable 
alternative measures to immunity, which have been developed in this thesis, that are 
also aimed at achieving cartel detection and deterrence.  
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II THE HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF 
THE IMMUNITY POLICY 
 
The aim of this chapter is to theoretically deconstruct the cartel immunity 
policy to analyse the policy's origins, its history and to critically examine the 
theoretical underpinnings that have dominated the policy's design and use in 
jurisdictions worldwide, since its inception in the United States in 1978. This will 
involve outlining the context in which the immunity policy was designed in the 
United States to demonstrate how the United States DOJ has shaped and influenced 
the immunity program to create a policy that is in line with United States 
enforcement norms and culture.  The focus will be on the United States as this 
country has had the greatest impact on the design and operation of the immunity 
policy.1  
This chapter will outline the influence that neoclassical theory, based on a 
combination of game theory and the prisoner’s dilemma, has had on the design of 
cartel immunity policies and how these theories inform the policy’s design and 
operation. This is an important area of focus. Despite the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission’s (“ACCC”) recent review of the ACCC Immunity Policy,2 
there remains a significant theoretical void in relation to the assumptions that 
underlie the policy’s design and operation. There have been very few investigations 
into the theoretical design of the immunity policy and how this may influence its 
operation or the anomalies surrounding its effectiveness, particularly in Australia.3 In 
particular, the criterion commonly used to assess the Immunity Policy has been 
developed within a neo-classical economic framework and presents a very limited 
                                                
1 An example of the influence held by the DOJ in relation to the immunity policy’s design and 
operation is the criteria most commonly used to assess its effectiveness: Scott D Hammond, 
'Cornerstones of an Effective Leniency Program ' (Department of Justice, 2004).  
2 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, ACCC Releases Discussion Paper in Cartel 
Immunity Policy Review (September 2013) <https://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/accc-releases-
discussion-paper-in-cartel-immunity-policy-review>. 
3 See, generally: Christopher R. Leslie, 'Antitrust Amnesty, Game Theory, and Cartel Stability' (2005) 
31 The Journal of Corporation Law 453; Wouter P.J Wils, ' Leniency in Antitrust Enforcement: 
Theory and Practice' (2007) 30 World Competition 25; Caron Beaton-Wells, 'Immunity Policy: 
Revolution or Religion? An Australian Case-Study' (2013) 2 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 126; 
Andreas Stephan and Ali Nikpay, 'Leniency Theory and Complex Realities' (University of East 
Anglia & Centre for Competition Policy - CCP Working Paper 14-8, 2014) 
<http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/8158338/8199490/CCP+Working+Paper+14-
8.pdf/3a273397-457c-4109-8920-d79c6709774b>. 
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means of assessing the policy’s effectiveness.4 
The recent review of the Immunity Policy conducted by the ACCC did not 
review the theoretical underpinnings or criteria used to assess the effectiveness of the 
Policy. The discussion paper released in September 2013 outlined a very confined 
area of review. This included: 
• streamlining the processes of granting civil and criminal immunity by utilising a letter of 
comfort from the CDPP regarding criminal immunity; 
• clarification of the terms ‘clear leader’ and ‘coercion’ in assessing a party’s eligibility for 
immunity; 
• clarification of how cooperation by second and subsequent parties to the cartel will be 
assessed by the ACCC; 
• simplifying the format of the policy.5 
The review was concluded in September 2014 and a revised Immunity and 
Cooperation Policy was released.6  
In order to fill this theoretical void, this chapter will analyse the theory 
underpinning the immunity policy to reveal that it suffers from significant limitations 
in its ability to accurately predict the immunity policy’s operation. This will pave the 
way for a critical analysis of the way in which the policy should be assessed in the 
following chapter. 
 
A The Birth of the Immunity Policy 
 
The immunity policy was first designed and implemented in the United States in 
1978. Cartels by their very nature are difficult to detect, so the immunity policy was 
designed as a method of detection, by providing an incentive for the cartel 
participants to reveal the cartel to the authorities themselves. The original United 
States leniency policy was announced by John H Shenefield on the 4th of October 
1978 at the 17th Annual Corporate Council Institute and was designed for cases of 
horizontal anticompetitive conduct such as price-fixing, bid rigging, output 
                                                
4 For an overview of the way in which the Immunity Policy is commonly assessed, please see: 
Hammond, above n 1. This aspect will be discussed in Chapter III, pg 83.	
5 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n 2. 
6 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 'ACCC Immunity and Cooperation Policy for 
Cartel Conduct ' (2014). 
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restrictions and market allocation. 7 
The decision to grant leniency by the United States DOJ under the original 
leniency policy for corporations was based on an evaluation of the following factors:  
• Whether the party was the first to come forward; 
• Whether the confession was a truly corporate act; 
• Whether the DOJ could have reasonably expected it would become aware of the activities in 
the near future if the corporation had not reported them; 
• Whether the corporation promptly terminated its involvement in the activities; 
• The candor and completeness with which the corporation reported the wrongdoing and 
assisted the DOJ in its investigation; 
• The nature of the violation and the party's role in it; and  
• Whether the corporation had made or intended to make restitution to injured parties.8 
Originally, the policy left almost all discretion with the DOJ as to whether 
leniency would be granted, meaning that the DOJ had ultimate discretion to grant 
leniency, even if all the leniency requirements were met. Therefore, unlike the 
current incarnation of the policy, the granting of immunity was not automatic.9 More 
significantly, leniency would not be granted if the DOJ had already commenced an 
investigation. Obviously, many companies were not in a position to know what 
investigations the DOJ had underway. Thus, in theory, they would have been more 
reluctant to reveal their misconduct without any guarantee that they would have 
received leniency.  
This version of the leniency policy was deemed largely unsuccessful, with the 
DOJ receiving only one request for leniency a year, and only 17 applications for 
leniency in total for the period 1978-1993.10 During this period, the policy failed to 
uncover a single international cartel.11 It was clear that the policy was not achieving 
its aims of cartel detection and deterrence.12 This resulted in the announcement of a 
revised leniency policy by the Assistant Attorney General Anne Bingaman of the 
DOJ in August 1993 at the Annual American Bar Association Spring Antitrust 
                                                
7 See John H Shenefield, 'The Disclosure of Antitrust Violations and Prosecutorial Discretion' (17th 
Annual Corporate Council Institute, October 4 1978). 
8 Ibid 466. 
9 Scott Hammond, 'The Evolution of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement Over the Last Two Decades' 
(Department of Justice - ABA Criminal Justice Section and the ABA Center for Continuing Legal 
Education, 2010) 2. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 See, eg, Gary Spratling, 'Making Companies an Offer They Shouldn't Refuse' (U.S Department of 
Justice - Antitrust Division, 1998) 1.	
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Meeting.13 These changes are reflected in the United States leniency policy as it 
stands today. 
 
The United States Corporate Leniency Policy Incarnate 
 
The DOJ Corporate Leniency Policy is tiered in order to induce the first person to 
come forward and claim leniency, but also to encourage members who may not be 
the first member to cooperate and receive a discount. In order to qualify for Type A 
leniency, the corporation must comply with the following:  
1. At the time the corporation comes forward to report the illegal activity, the Division has not 
received information about the illegal activity being reported from any other source; 
2. The corporation, upon its discovery of the illegal activity being reported, took prompt and 
effective action to terminate its part in the activity; 
3. The corporation reports the wrongdoing with candor and completeness and provides full, 
continuing and complete cooperation to the Division throughout the investigation; 
4. The confession of wrongdoing is truly a corporate act, as opposed to isolated confessions of 
individual executives or officials; 
5. Where possible, the corporation makes restitution to injured parties; and 
6. The corporation did not coerce another party to participate in the illegal activity and clearly 
was not the leader in, or originator of, the activity.14 
If a corporation does not meet any of the six criteria, then the corporation 
must apply for Type B leniency, which will be judged in accordance with the same 
six criteria. However, to qualify for Type B leniency, an additional condition is 
required to be satisfied namely that 'the Division determines that granting leniency 
would not be unfair to others, considering the nature of the illegal activity, the 
confessing corporation's role in it, and when the corporation comes forward.'15 This 
is determined on a case-by-case basis. According to the DOJ, this condition will be 
assessed by factors such as the timeliness of the application and whether the 
corporation coerced another party to participate in the illegal activity or clearly was 
                                                
13 See Anne K Bingaman, 'Antitrust Enforcement, Some Intial Thought and Actions' (0867, Antitrust 
Section of the American Bar Association, 1993). 
14 DOJ Department of Justice, 'Corporate Leniency Policy' (0091, Department of Justice - Antitrust 
Division, 1993); DOJ Department of Justice, 'Leniency Policy for Individuals' (0092, Department of 
Justice - Antitrust Division, 1993).	
15 Department of Justice, above n 14, s B(7).  
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the leader in, or originator of, the activity.16 
One of the policy's most innovative revisions was the abdication of 
prosecutorial discretion. If a cartel participant was the first to come forward to the 
DOJ and fulfilled the leniency criteria, then it could be certain to receive leniency.17 
This removed the previous uncertainty in relation to the granting of leniency by the 
DOJ on a discretionary basis. The revisions also included the creation of a process to 
assess applications of cartel participants who were not the first to come forward so 
that the value of their contribution to the investigation could be assessed by the DOJ 
in exchange for lenient treatment.18 
The DOJ also introduced the concept of vicarious immunity, where all 
directors, officers, and employees who come forward with the corporation and agree 
to cooperate also receive automatic immunity, dubbed Type C leniency.19  
Pursuant to the individual leniency policy, an individual can seek leniency, 
independent of their employer, before an investigation has commenced, if they meet 
the following criteria: 
1. At the time the individual comes forward to report the illegal activity, the Division has not 
received information about the illegal activity being reported from any other source; 
2. The individual reports the wrongdoing with candor and completeness and provides full, 
continuing and complete cooperation to the Division throughout the investigation; and 
3. The individual did not coerce another party to participate in the illegal activity and clearly 
was not the leader in, or originator of, the activity.20 
If an individual satisfies the above criteria, then they will be granted leniency from 
criminal prosecution. 
In addition, executives of a corporation seeking immunity after an 
investigation has begun will be given serious consideration for lenient treatment – in 
the form of individual leniency – in exchange for their full cooperation.21  
Another significant development that accompanied the introduction of the 
revised United States leniency policy, and a global first, was the creation of the 
                                                
16 Ibid; Department of Justice, above n 14, 3. 
17 Department of Justice, above n 14, s A. 
18 See eg, Scott Hammond, 'Measuring the Value of Second-In Cooperation in Corporate Plea 
Negotiations' (U.S Department of Justice, 2006). 
19 Department of Justice, above n 14, s C. 
20 See, Department of Justice, above n 14, s A.	
21 Department of Justice, above n ; Department of Justice, above n ; Scott Hammond and Belinda 
Barnett, 'Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the Antitrust Division's Leniency Program and 
Model Leniency Letters ' (Department of Justice, November 19 2008). 
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‘marker’ system. Essentially, this system allows a leniency applicant to secure a 
place in the leniency ‘queue.’ This innovation is said to add to the creation of the 
‘race to the finish’ line.  22 In 2008, the DOJ published its ‘Frequently Asked 
Questions’ (FAQ) document outlining the marker process and how it is intended to 
operate.23 
According to this guidance, in order for a potential applicant to obtain a marker, their 
counsel must:  
1. Report that he or she has uncovered some information or evidence indicating that his or her 
client has engaged in a criminal antitrust violation;  
2. Disclose the general nature of the conduct discovered;  
3. Identify the industry, product, or service involved in terms that are specific enough to allow 
the Division to determine whether leniency is still available and to protect the marker for the 
applicant; and  
4. Identify the client.24 
The ‘marker’ system has largely been considered by the international 
competition community law as a ‘success,’ as outlined by the International 
Competition Network in its document titled 'Drafting and implementing an effective 
leniency policy.'25 A component of leniency that is unique to the United States 
concerns the civil liability of leniency applicants. Prior to 2004, a cartel participant 
who was granted full leniency could be sued by victims of the cartel and be liable for 
‘treble damages.’26 This factor would have placed a heavy burden on the decision to 
come forward for leniency in the first place, as it was almost certain that a 
corporation would need to pay treble damages to those adversely affected by the 
cartel.  
To resolve this issue, on 22 June 2004, the Antitrust Criminal Penalty 
Enhancement and Reform Act27 was introduced. This Act sought to limit the total 
private civil liability of corporations that have entered into leniency agreements with 
the Antitrust Division, including their officers, directors and employees, to actual 
damages ‘attributable to the commerce done by the applicant in the goods or services 
                                                
22 Hammond and Barnett, above n 21, 2. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid 3. 
25 International Competition Network, 'Anti-Cartel Enforcement Manual: Chapter 2: Drafting and 
Implementing an Effective Leniency Policy' (International Competition Network, May 2009) s 3.	
26 Clayton Act 15 U.S.C. § 15(a).  
27 Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-237, 118 Stat. 
661, 665-69. 
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affected by the violation.’28 This limits damages for corporations who have met the 
requirements and obtained leniency to ‘single’ as opposed to ‘treble’ damages, and 
also makes them no longer jointly and severally liable for damages suffered by their 
co-conspirator’s customers. If a corporation does not obtain leniency, then they may 
be held jointly and severally liable for thrice the actual damages suffered by 
customers of the leniency applicant.29 The legislation also significantly increased the 
potential criminal penalties for price-fixing by introducing higher fines and up to ten 
years gaol.30  
The purpose of outlining the basic requirements of the Antitrust Division's 
leniency policy in this chapter is to provide the context in which the policy was 
designed and developed, given that many countries around the world have 
uncritically adopted a similar policy in their own competition regimes. This outline 
will set the scene for the development of the succeeding chapters, as many of the 
elements surrounding the design and operation of the policy will be critically 
analysed by comparing the immunity policies in Australia, Canada and the United 
Kingdom, in addition to the United States. 
 
B The Influence of Economics on Cartel Enforcement 
 
The role of economists in the decision to prosecute cartels in the Antitrust 
Division of the United States DOJ was elevated in the 1970s, which altered the way 
in which competition authorities used their enforcement powers. The Antitrust 
Division is responsible for enforcing the Sherman Act;31 the primary act that 
regulates competition in the United States. The Antitrust Division serves an advisory, 
as well as prosecutorial function, and is structured in a hierarchical fashion.32   
The Division is invested with wide investigatory powers, where the division 
can issue civil investigative demands, which are the equivalent of administrative 
                                                
28 Ibid s 213 (b). 
29 Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. § 15a.   
30 Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-237, 118 Stat. 
661, 665-69, § 215. 
31 Sherman Act, July 2, 1890, ch 647, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. 1-7. 
32 Department of Justice, About the Division US Department of Justice - Antritrust Division 
<http://www.justice.gov/atr/about/index.html>. 
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subpoenas, in the case of a formal civil investigation.33 Criminal investigations are 
more often dealt with through the grand jury investigation, which are inherently 
broad in both scope and nature, as the scope of inquiry is virtually unlimited.34 In 
terms of its advisory functions, the Division regularly informs businesses in relation 
to the legality of proposed activities in the hope of serving a preventative function; 
this has mostly come to effect under the Merger Guidelines with the passage of the 
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.35  
The Antitrust Division’s history of enforcement did not gain traction until the 
appointment of Thurman Arnold, a Yale professor and social critic appointed to lead 
the division in 1938. Arnold significantly expanded and transformed the division.36 
During this time, there was a growing reliance on economic evidence as a source for 
determining which cases the Division would pursue and an increasing belief in the 
credibility of economic expertise.37 Donald Turner’s appointment as Assistant 
General for Antitrust in 1965 can be seen as influential in this respect, which began 
with the employment of a small group of special economic assistants in order to 
review existing and proposed cases.38  
During this period, the use of economics in the policy process was 
significantly enhanced, and the annual number of investigations conducted more than 
doubled.39 Underpinning this shift towards economic analysis were two sources of 
underlying tension; the first relating to the intellectual battle between the structural 
economists and the emerging Chicago School of neo-classical economics during this 
period.  
At a basic level, within the Chicago School, the ‘fundamental assumption 
underlying this position is that the most efficient level of activity is the market. 
                                                
33 For an overview of the U.S Department of Justice’s investigatory powers, see: Department of 
Justice, 'Antitrust Division Manual' (US Department of Justice, 2015) 
<http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/divisionmanual/atrdivman.pdf>. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976) (codified 
in 15 and 28 U.S.C. (2000)). 
36 See, eg, Spencer Waller, 'The Antitrust Legacy of Thurman Arnold' (2004) 78 St. John's Law 
Review 569. 
37 Those who advocated support for these changes included Richard Posner, see: Richard A Posner, 'A 
Program for the Antitrust Division' (1970) 38 University of Chicago Law Review 500. 
38 For an overview of the impact of Donald Turner’s work on antitrust enforcement. See: Oliver 
Williamson, 'The Merger Guideliness of the U.S Department of Justice - In Perspective' (US 
Department of Justice, 2002) <http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/11257.htm>. 
39 Ibid 5-7. Unsurprisingly, Richard Posner was employed in the Solicitor’s Generals Office during 
this time. 
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Managers tend to act rationally, seeking out new and greater efficiencies as a means 
of maximizing profits.’40 On the other hand, Economic Structuralism places its 
emphasis on barriers to entry.41 These subtle but important differences between the 
two schools of thought fuelled the tension between the Structural Economists and the 
Chicago Economists within the Antitrust Division, whereby the appointed 
economists viewed the Division’s policy from different perspectives, creating 
inconsistencies in the Division’s activities.42 
The second source of tension related to the division between the economists 
and the lawyers, where the lawyers saw cases through the paradigm of the law, 
whilst the economists wished to pursue cases based on their economic credibility, 
and in many cases, regardless of the state of the law. This tension reverberated in the 
Division over a number of years, leading to a shift in the goals of the Division from 
‘winning cases’ to targeting practices that harm consumers.43 By that time, it became 
more apparent that the role of economists in the Division had in many instances 
circumvented the opinion of the lawyers, and became more fully integrated into the 
culture and practice of the Division.44 Accompanying this shift were initiatives such 
as the establishment of the Economic Policy Office, which served the purpose of 
forming an economic staff that were assigned to every case at an early stage and who 
acted as independent analysts, as opposed to technical assistants.45  
Furthermore, the Assistant Attorney General in the 1970s only brought cases 
that had economic merit.46 Not surprisingly, the growing influence of the Chicago 
School in the ranks of the Division was marked by the subtle shift towards 
deregulation of competition within this era, under the neo-classical assumption that 
markets are efficient and self-correcting and that less state invention would result in 
                                                
40 Marc Allen Eisner, Antitrust and the Triumph of Economics - Institution and Policy Change (The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1st ed, 1991) 116.	
41 For a general discussion of Economic Structuralism, see: Joseph Love, 'The Rise and Decline of 
Economic Structuralism in Latin America: New Dimensions' (2005) 40 Latin American Research 
Review 100; see also: Joe Bain, Barriers to New Competition (Harvard University Press, 1st ed, 1956). 
42 Eisner, above n 40, 116-117. 
43 See, eg, Patrice Bougette, Marc Deschamps and Frederic Marty, 'When Economics Met Antitrust: 
The Second Chicago School and the Economization of Antitrust Law' (GREDEG Working Paper No. 
2014-23, 2014) <http://www.gredeg.cnrs.fr/working-papers/GREDEG-WP-2014-23.pdf> 22. 
44 Lawrence White, 'The Growing Influence of Economics and Economists on Antitrust: An Extended 
Discussion' (2010) 5 Economics, Management and Financial Markets 26, 33-35. 
45Williamson, above n 38, 6. 
46 White, above n 44, 34. 
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better results for competition.47 Not all members of the Division unequivocally 
accepted the influence of the Chicago School assumptions, with John Shenefield 
noting that whilst antitrust was important, populist traditions, as well as popular 
suspicion of large corporations, could not be ignored.48 
A majority of the institutional change that had occurred in the 1960s-1970s 
was cemented by the Reagan Administration in the 1980s.49 This was exemplified by 
cuts in the Division’s budget which resulted in the number of economists almost 
doubling the number of lawyers employed at the Division, as the reliance on 
economic expertise continued to grow.50 It seemed by the time of the Reagan 
Administration, and the appointment of William Baxter, the Chicago School had 
reached its peak of influence over the Antitrust Division’s enforcement agenda.  
It was within this context that the United States leniency policy was born. 
From this prevailing historical account, it is clear that at the time of the policy’s 
announcement in 1978, there had been a dramatic shift in the status of economics in 
the Division, and with it the rise of the Chicago School of neo-classical economics. 
Therefore, there is clear indication that the immunity policy is a creature of neo-
classical economic thought and is based on the presumption that humans are rational 
profit maximisers.  The policy is essentially an embodiment of the economic ideals 
within the Division that existed at the time of its inception.  
On a broader level, the shift towards deregulation within this period and a 
laissez-faire approach to market regulation during this period is evidenced within the 
policy itself. At its most basic level, the immunity policy is not interventionist nor is 
it a product of proactive investigation or regulation, rather it is a system whereby the 
market participants are able to come forward and reveal their anticompetitive 
misconduct, if they believe it to be in their best interest. This is not to say that it is 
not an effective policy, but instead, it sheds light on the fact that the policy is 
extremely conducive to the non-interventionist deregulation position that 
characterised the Division during that period. ‘Organisation, not division leadership, 
came to play the central role in the definition of priorities – policy became an 
                                                
47 See, eg, Bougette, Deschamps and Marty, above n 43. 
48 Eisner, above n 40, 149. 
49 George  Krause, A Two-Way Street: The Institutional Dynamics of the Modern Administrative State 
(University of Pittsburgh Press, 1st ed, 1999) 54-55. 
50 See, eg, Albert Foer, 'The Federal Antitrust Commitment: Providing Resources to Meet the 
Challenge' (The American Antitrust Institute, 1999) 11. 
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institutional artifact.’51 
It was not until 1993 that the Division introduced its revised policy. The then, 
Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division was said to have ‘woken the 
DOJ from its 12 year nap’52 by moving away from the Republican Administration’s 
laissez-faire approach to market regulation and taking on larger-concentration issues. 
It is no surprise then that this more aggressive approach to antitrust regulation saw 
the introduction of the current incarnation of the leniency policy, which theoretically 
makes it economically appealing for companies to come forward and cooperate with 
the DOJ. Bingham lauded the revised policy as an immediate success.53 This 
aggressive attitude towards the prosecution of cartel activity in the United States is 
prevalent and endures to the present day. 
 
The United States Culture of Enforcement 
 
One prominent feature of the United States cartel enforcement record is that it 
is supported by a strong culture of cartel condemnation. Although the Sherman Act 
was enacted in 1890, according to the previous Chairman of the United States 
Department of Justice Antitrust Division, Professor Donald Baker, the moral 
wrongfulness of antitrust conduct did not gain public traction under the 1950s, 
largely due to the egregious conduct by corporate executives in the Electrical 
Equipment cases.54 This momentum was built over his time as the Chairman, which 
placed an increasing emphasis on seeking gaol sentences for cartel conduct in the 
mid-1970s. As a result, the Sentencing Guidelines were passed in 1987. These made 
imprisonment a readily available remedy for the sentencing court.55  
These measures reinforced the perception of the moral wrongfulness of 
antitrust violations in the United States judiciary and legal community, despite the 
                                                
51 Eisner, above n 40, 149.	
52 See, Stephen Labaton, Profile: Anne K Bingaman: Rousing Antitrust Law from Its 12-Year Nap 
(July 25) The New York Times <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/25/business/profile-anne-k-
bingaman-rousing-antitrust-law-from-its-12-year-nap.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm>.  
53 Department of Justice, '60 Minutes with Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust 
Divison, US Department of Justice' (1994-1995) 63 Antitrust Law Journal 323, 330.  
54 Caron Beaton-Wells and Ezrachi Ariel, Criminalising Cartels: Critical Studies of an International 
Regulatory Movement (Hart Publishing, 1 ed, 2011) 63.  
55 Ibid 30; US Sentencing Commission, 'Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual' (US Sentencing 
Commission, 1987). 
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mandatory use of the Sentencing Guidelines being found to be unconstitutional in 
United States v Booker.56  From 1981 through to 1988, the United States DOJ 
initiated more criminal prosecutions than during the period 1890 to 1980.57 
According to Baker, this increase in criminal prosecutions may have contributed to 
the public perception that cartel violations were akin to covert theft, and thus were 
perceived by the United States public as immoral and wrong.58  
In Baker’s view, this moral condemnation of cartel conduct has permeated 
American culture, whereby regular prosecutions and imprisonments are deemed 
necessary to deter a serious proportion of the potential antitrust wrongdoers and are 
generally favoured and accepted practices.59 William Kovacic, a former 
Commissioner of the United States Federal Trade Commission, notes that the 
strategic enforcement of industry areas that the public finds most morally 
reprehensible, such as public procurement cases, which dominated cases in the 1980s 
and early 1990s, was and continues to be a key factor for increasing public support 
for criminalisation and prosecution of antitrust violations.60 The United States DOJ is 
proud of its aggressive enforcement efforts in securing imprisonment for cartel 
members, with 78 per cent of individuals sentenced in 2012 for cartel related 
offences. The average prison term has increased since that time from just less than 
two years to 25 months.61 This is a stark increase from the period between 1990 and 
1999, where only 37 per cent of sentenced individuals went to gaol and the average 
prison term was only eight months.62  
The DOJ has consistently emphasised the importance of harsh penalties and 
increased individual gaol sentences, as one of the crucial measures in achieving 
cartel deterrence in anti-cartel enforcement, and advocates that this is one of the 
                                                
56 United States v Booker 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
57 Beaton-Wells and Ariel, above n 54, 65.	
58 Donald I Baker, 'Punishment for Cartel Participants in the US: A Special Model?' in Caron & Ariel 
Beaton-Wells & Ezrachi (ed), Criminalising Cartels: Critical Studies of an International Regulatory 
Movement (Hart Publishing, 1 ed, 2011) 27, 65: Baker argues that ‘populists frustrations have 
generated key political support for the creation and enforcement of antitrust laws in the United States 
at various critical times.’ Due to this long history, Baker believes the antitrust laws in the United 
States have a strong moral dimension, which is less apparent in other areas of the world.  
59 Beaton-Wells and Ariel, above n 54, 33. 
60 Ibid.  
61 Department of Justice, Criminal Program Update - Division Update Spring 2015 U.S Department 
of Justice - Antitrust Division <http://www.justice.gov/atr/division-update/2015/criminal-program-
update>. 
62 Department of Justice, Antitrust Division 2013 Criminal Enforcement Update Department of Justice 
- Antitrust Division <http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/division-update/2013/criminal-program.html>. 
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cornerstones of an effective immunity policy.63 Many countries have criminalised 
cartel conduct in recent years,64 often at the behest of DOJ advocates. But the 
significant increases in fines and imprisonment terms for cartel offenders has not 
escaped criticism65 and this criticism has resonated with many who question the 
appropriateness of the criminalisation of cartel conduct.66   
Aggressive enforcement of cartel conduct in the United States is thus deeply 
engrained within United States enforcement culture and norms, creating an 
environment where enforcement policies, such as the immunity policy, are seen as a 
crucial component of the overall enforcement regime. However, it is questionable 
whether Australia is an appropriate fit for an immunity policy given that very 
different enforcement norms and culture exists.  
It is not the purpose of this chapter to outline a comprehensive account of all of 
the institutional and cultural differences between the DOJ Antitrust Division and the 
ACCC but to make mention of the key differences that have a significant bearing on 
the way the immunity policy is administered and enforced.  
Firstly, the ACCC, as opposed to the DOJ, is an independent statutory authority 
charged with the administration of the Competition and Consumer Act 2011 (Cth) 
(formerly the Trade Practices Act 1975 (Cth)) on the 1st of January 2011. The 
ACCC’s functions are not as wide as those of the DOJ, in that the ACCC cannot 
order grand jury investigations.67 The grand jury has been described as in Blair v. 
United States, 250 United States. 273 (1919): ‘...a grand inquest, a body with powers 
of investigation and inquisition, the scope of whose inquiries is not to be limited 
narrowly by questions of propriety or forecasts of the probable result of the 
                                                
63 See Hammond, above n 1.  
64 See generally, Beaton-Wells and Ariel, above n 54, Gregory C.  Shaffer and Nathaniel H. Nesbitt, 
'Criminalizing Cartels: A Global Trend?' (2011) 12 Sedona Conference Journal 1. 
65 See eg Caron Beaton-Wells and Brent Fisse, 'US Policy and Practice in Pursuing Individual 
Accountability for Cartel Conduct: A Preliminary Critique' (2011) 56 The Antitrust Bulletin 277. 
66 See eg, Christine Parker, 'Criminal Cartel Sanctions and Compliance: The Gap Between Rhetoric 
and Reality' in Caron & Ariel Beaton-Wells & Ezrachi (ed), Criminalising Cartels: Critical Studies of 
an International Regulatory Movement (Hart Publishing, 2011) 239; Chris Platania-Phung and 
Christine  Parker, 'The Deterrent Impact of Cartel Criminalisation: Report of a Survey of Australian 
Business People' (University of Melbourne, 2012); Christopher Harding, 'Cartel Deterrence: The 
Search for Evidence and Argument' (2011) 56 The Antitrust Bulletin 345; Caron  Beaton-Wells, 
'Capturing the Criminality of Hard Core Cartels: The Australian Proposal' (2007) 31 Melbourne 
University Law Review 37; Caron Beaton-Wells and Fiona Haines, 'Making Cartel Conduct Criminal' 
(2009) 42 The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 218.  
67 For an overview of the functions and powers of the grand jury see: Department of Justice, 'U.S 
Attorney's Manual - Title 9: Criminal - Grand Jury' (US Department of Justice, 2012) 
<http://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-11000-grand-jury#9-11.010>. 
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investigation, or by doubts whether any particular individual will be found properly 
subject to an accusation of crime.’ 
A grand jury has extensive powers to compel witnesses to attend the grand jury 
to give evidence, to issue subpoenas and to pursue other investigatory leads. 
Moreover, the grand jury does not need to have a strong basis for pursuing a 
particular investigatory lead and the grand jury’s deliberations are conducted in 
secrecy.68 Whilst the ACCC has wide investigatory powers,69 it has much less 
experience in conducting criminal investigations, which could have significant 
implications for its first criminally contested cartel case. 
Furthermore, the legislation dealing with the cartel provisions in Australia are 
more lengthy and complex than the Sherman Act cartel provision.70 The Australian 
provisions have been criticised on this basis, with calls for greater clarity and 
simplification of the provisions to aid understanding of their operation and effect.71  
Secondly, in Australia, the criminalisation of cartel conduct did not occur until 
2009, whilst it has been in operation in the United States since the enactment of the 
Sherman Act in 1890. In contrast to the United States, the ACCC system of civil and 
criminal cartel enforcement is bifurcated, meaning that any granting of criminal 
cartel immunity must be decided by the CDPP:72 a body that has yet to prosecute a 
criminal cartel case.73  
Of particular importance is the way that cartel conduct is viewed generally in the 
United States. As mentioned previously in this chapter, the DOJ has had a long 
history of criminal cartel enforcement, which has reinforced the public’s moral 
condemnation of the conduct and increased support for the DOJ’s vigorous 
enforcement over a significant period of time. By contrast, in Australia, there is yet 
to be a criminal cartel trial and many qualitative and quantitative studies have 
revealed that there is no such unequivocal condemnation of cartel conduct in the 
                                                
68 Ibid. 
69 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 155.	
70 Ibid ss 44ZZRD-44ZZRK: This refers to Australian cartel provisions. 
71 See eg, Caron Beaton-Wells and Brent Fisse, Australian Cartel Regulation: Law Policy and 
Practice in an International Context (Cambridge University Press, 1 ed, 2011) Ch 4. 
72 Commonwealth Department of Public Prosecutions, 'Prosecution Policy of the Commonwealth - 
Guidelines for the Making of Decisions in the Prosecution Process' (Australia's Federal Prosection 
Service, 2014) <http://www.cdpp.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/Prosecution-Policy-of-the-
Commonwealth.pdf> Annexure B.   
73 For more on the potential issues associated with a bifurcated system, see Chapter VI, The 
Relationship between the ACCC and the CDPP, pg 194. 
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business community or within the public body more generally.74 This may be partly 
explained by the relative infancy of the criminal cartel provisions. However, the 
absence of the same degree of condemnation does call into question whether the 
Immunity Policy is an appropriate cultural fit for Australia. 
This is not necessarily to say that the Immunity Policy should or will be revoked 
by the ACCC, but to cast light on the limitations of the Policy’s operation in 
Australia, given its very different enforcement environment from that of the United 
States.  
C A Theoretical Breakdown of the Immunity Policy 
 
In addition to a cultural and historical discussion of the immunity policy, it is 
important to analyse the theory upon which the policy was founded. Christopher 
Leslie provides one of the most comprehensive breakdowns of the theoretical 
components of the immunity policy, by investigating how game theory informs the 
policy’s design through an application of the ‘prisoner’s dilemma.’75 
Game theory is a tool used for predicting the possible reactions to the actor’s 
own decisions of other actors.76 It is a model of human decision-making where there 
are several decision-makers (called players) who each have different goals that are 
interdependent: the decision of each affects the outcome for all of the decision 
makers.77 Essentially, Leslie observes that the prisoner’s dilemma in the context of 
                                                
74 See eg, Caron Beaton-Wells et al, 'Report on a Survey of the Australian Public Regarding Anti-
Cartel Law and Enforcement ' (The University of Melbourne, 2010) 
<http://cartel.law.unimelb.edu.au/go/project-news/project-survey>; Platania-Phung and Parker, above 
n 66; Christine Parker, 'Report on Interviews with Civil Respondents in Cartel Cases' (Centre for 
Regulatory Studies and Law Faculty, Monash University, 2011) 
<http://cartel.law.unimelb.edu.au/go/project-news/project-outputs>; Andreas Stephan, 'Survey of 
Public Attitudes to Price-Fixing and Cartel Enforcement in Britain' (2008) 5(1) The Competition Law 
Review 123; D. Daniel Sokol, 'Cartels, Corporate Compliance, and What Practitioners Really Think 
About Enforcement' (2012) 78 Antitrust Law Journal 201. 
75 Leslie, above n 3. 
76 See generally, Martin Shubik, 'Symposium - Just Winners and Losers - The Application of Game 
Theory to Corporate Law and Practice - Game theory, Law and the Concept of Competition ' (1991) 
60 University of Cincinnati Law Review ; Sims, Stephen W and Theodore S Salant, 'Law and 
Economics: Game theory and the law: Ready for Primetime? ' (1996) 94 Michigan Law Review ; Ian 
Ayres, 'Playing Games with the Law' (1990) 42 Stanford Law Review ; Bruce H Kobayashi, 'Product 
Differentiation: Game theory and Antitrust: A Post-Mortem ' (1997) 5 George Mason Law Review 
411; Paul Mahoney and Chris William  Sanchirico, 'Norms, Repeated Games, and the Role of Law' 
(2003) 91 California Law Review 1281; Pamela Bucy, 'Games and Stories: Game Theory and the 
Civil False Claims Act' (2004) 31 Florida State University Law Review 603. 
77 The foundations of game theory were laid down in John Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory 
of Games and Economic Behaviour (Princeton University Press, 1st ed, 1947). 
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immunity is misses a crucial ingredient – leverage. In the basic prisoner’s dilemma 
model, the prosecutors have sufficient evidence to convict both prisoners of a minor 
crime, meaning that both prisoners will serve some gaol time even if neither 
confesses to the major crime.78 However, in the context of immunity, prosecutors 
generally do not have a provable minor crime to hold over the decision-maker. Leslie 
proposes there are three ways in which price-fixers can overcome or solve the 
prisoner’s dilemma; through contract, force and/or trust.79  
In relation to contracts, Leslie points out that contracts of an illegal nature are 
unenforceable.80 Whilst this is true, outside the realm of legally binding contracts, 
Leslie’s analysis does not consider that industry practice or custom may be a factor 
that has equally compelling force as an agreement in a legally binding contract. 
There is common law support for the notion that cultural norms and practices can be 
as equally forceful as a contractual agreement.81 If a norm or custom is so prevalent 
in a particular industry for a long period of time, it can in fact be held to have a 
legally binding nature, where the custom is ‘well known and acquiesced in’ that 
‘everyone making a contract in that situation can reasonably be presumed to have 
imported that term into the contract.’82  
It is significant that Leslie has overlooked the possibility that custom could 
serve a similar purpose as ‘enforceable contracts’ in perpetuating the trust amongst 
the cartelists. Japan is a prime example of this, where businesses often have colluded 
in order to price-fix, despite the introduction of penalties for price-fixing.83  In Japan, 
a cartel is known as a keiretsu that means ‘grouping’ or ‘affiliation’. These cartels 
have been justified as a reflection of Japan's group-oriented culture and business 
system. The cartel activity was not seen by these businessmen as a ‘contract’ as such, 
                                                
78 John Shepard Wiley, 'Reciprocol Altruism as a Felony: Antitrust and the Prisoner's Dilemma' 
(1988) 86 Michigan Law Review 1906, 1915. 
79 Leslie, above n 3, 461.  
80 Ibid; See also, Anatol Rapoport and Albert Chammah, Prisoner's Dilemma: A Study in Conflict and 
Cooperation (University of Michigan Press, 1965) 25. 
81 See, eg, Con-stan Industries of Australia Ltd v Norwich Winterthur Insurance (Australia) Ltd 
(1986) 160 CLR 226. 
82 Ibid 236-238. 
83 See for example, a discussion by the Secretary-General, Fair Trade Commission of Japan of the 
culture of cartels in Japan and the difficulties associated with its enforcement: Akinori Uesugi, 'How 
Japan is Tackling Enforcement Activities Against Cartels' (2005) 13 George Mason Law Review 349. 
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but simply ‘a way of doing things’ in business, which was deeply embedded in their 
cultural norms and customs to have contract-like force.84 
Secondly, Leslie is quick to discount force, such as a threat to kill someone 
unless they conform to the cartel’s activities, as a criterion that may help solve the 
prisoner’s dilemma, simply stating that ‘it is probably not relevant to price-fixing 
conspiracies.’85 However there are still instances where duress short of a threat to kill 
may force cartel participants to cooperate where confession should be their dominant 
strategy.   
This is particularly the case where duress does not necessarily involve ‘mob 
hits’ but where the circumstances are more significant than Leslie’s description of 
‘public shaming devices.’86 The possibility of duress is reflected in the use of 
‘ringleader’ or ‘coercion’ tests of exclusion, such as the coercion test that exists in 
Australia and many other jurisdictions.87 The existence of these tests indicates that 
circumstances of duress or coercion are possible ways in which members may feel 
compelled to join and remain in a cartel when their dominant strategy should be 
confession. This possibility of duress casts further doubt on Leslie’s arguments that 
attempt to solve the prisoner’s dilemma within the immunity context.  
Furthermore, empirical evidence conducted by researchers from the 
University of Melbourne suggests that small businesses are often coerced to enter 
into cartels or risk being driven out of business: a form of economic duress that 
might otherwise compel a cartel member to participate in and continue a cartel.88 
This research also revealed that many small businesses operating in a cartel are 
unaware that the conduct is illegal, that it is criminal and that an immunity policy 
                                                
84 Ibid 364.	
85 Leslie, above n 3, 461. 
86 Ibid 462.  
87 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n X, s16 (iv), s 28 (iv), s 77; Department 
of Justice, above n 14, sA(6), Department of Justice, above n 14, sA(3); Competition Bureau, 
'Immunity Program under the Competition Act' (Competition Bureau, 7 June 2010) s 14; Competition 
and Markets Authority, 'Applications for Leniency and No-Action in Cartel Cases - Detailed 
Guidance on the Principles and Process' (Competition and Markets Authority, 2013) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284417/OFT1495.pdf
> s 2.7(e). For further information regarding the Coercion test, see Chapter VI, Cartel Coercion, pg 
186. 
88 Parker, above n 74, 13; See also, Jeffrey Sonnenfled and Paul Lawrence, 'Why Do Companies 
Succumb to Price Fixing?' (1978) 56 Harvard Business Review 145. 
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exists.89 Being unaware of the existence of the immunity policy would affect the 
essence of the ‘game,’ as Leslie describes it.90  
Leslie also neglects consideration of the tools of punishment often used by 
cartelists against other members of the cartel. Competition regulatory authorities 
around the world have acknowledged that cartels, as sophisticated organisations, will 
often incorporate methods to punish cartelists who cheat on the cartel and this 
method is used to ensure the cartel’s intended operation.91 Therefore, if cartelists 
incorporate their own methods of ensuring consensus amongst cartel individuals, this 
will also affect the nature of Leslie’s game of trust and the cartel’s operation.  
Furthermore, Leslie’s analysis is not helpful in revealing how the treatment of 
the second and consequent participants who come forward to the authorities under 
leniency or cooperation policies (eg the ACCC’s cooperation policy) can affect the 
nature of the game.92 
In general, Leslie’s arguments supporting and analysing the tenets of the 
theoretical underpinnings of the immunity policy through the prism of neo-classical 
economics is largely speculative and unconvincing. Many of his assertions are highly 
questionable, including his assertion that a cartel ‘is essentially a game of trust.’93 
Given that many different factors impact on the operation of cartels in addition to 
trust, it would appear that Leslie’s analysis is incomplete. 
Moreover, Leslie frames the options available to cartel participants in his 
analysis as being two-fold: either confess to the authorities or maintain the cartel.94 
These are not the only two options available. Silence may also be another strategy 
employed by a cartelist in the event the cartel is discontinued or dismantled. The 
credibility of this as a strategy is apparent from the fact that without the immunity 
policy there is little chance of the authorities being able to detect the cartel. For 
instance, the ACCC stated that, as at 30 September 2013, that there were 20 in-depth 
cartel investigations underway, and out of that number only 6 were discovered 
without an immunity application. Thus, absent the immunity policy, the ACCC’s rate 
                                                
89 Parker, above n  s 2.3. 
90 Ibid; Parker, above n 66.	
91 See, eg, Ian Ayres, 'How Cartels Punish: A Structural Theory of Self-Enforcing Collusion' (1987) 
87 Columbia Law Review 295. 
92 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n 6, s H. 
93 Leslie, above n 3, 462; See also; Robert Wright, Nonzero: The Logic of Human Destiny (Vintage 
Books, 1st ed, 2000) 341; Rapoport and Chammah, above n 80, 56. 
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of detection would be around 30 per cent.95 Given the low risk of detection, there is a 
real possibility that, in the event a cartel ceases to exist, all parties to the cartel may 
choose to remain silent and not apply for immunity.96  
Leslie’s analysis does not consider the possibility that discontinuing the cartel 
(or dismantling the cartel altogether) may be a viable option. This is especially the 
case when considered in conjunction with the potential follow-on damages an 
immunity applicant may be required to pay in all jurisdictions that the cartel may 
have affected or operated within.97 This argument runs counter to Leslie’s analysis 
where he argues that ‘a cartel member may simply become more risk averse and 
wish to end its participation in a criminal enterprise in the most cost-effective manner 
possible, which is confession.’98 Therefore, the very premise on which Leslie bases 
his prisoner’s dilemma arguments fails to take account of a potentially more cost-
effective third strategy.99 
Another factor that Leslie fails to consider in his theoretical analysis is that 
cartelists may intentionally ‘game’ the policy, meaning there is potential for 
cartelists, being sophisticated organisations, to set up cartels with the very intention 
of applying for immunity and evading liability.100 Given that there is no condition of 
immunity, at least in Australia, that prevents a cartel recidivist from making 
successive applications of immunity, there is a real possibility that gaming the policy 
can happen, and on a continuing basis.101  
The very notion of ‘gaming’ the policy was acknowledged by the ACCC in 
the October release of the discussion paper and the prospect informed a number of 
                                                
95 Marcus Bezzi, 'The ACCC Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct: Due for Review?' (Paper presented 
at the Competition Law Conference, Shangri-La Hotel, Sydney, 4 May 2013). 
96 For empirical data that supports this proposition, see Chapter V, Silence as a Strategy, pg 129. 
97 For a detailed discussion of the issues associated with multi-jurisdictional immunity applications, 
see Chapter VII, Confidentiality Across Borders, pg 261. 
98 Leslie, above n 3, 472. 
99 Moreover, firms need not report a cartel immediately upon leaving it, see: Dennis Gartner and J 
Zhou, 'Delays in Leniency Application: Is There Really a Race to the Enforcer's Door?' (University of 
Bonn & Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC), 2012) 
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recommendations the ACCC considered for review.102 A key economic study 
conducted by John Connor in 2010 also suggested that cartel recidivism on an 
international scale is increasing.103 The potential for cartelists to intentionally exploit 
the immunity policy in this way is another consideration absent from Leslie’s 
analysis of the theory underpinning the immunity policy. Therefore his analysis 
provides a very limited view of the policy’s operation. 
If Leslie’s analysis of cartels as essentially a ‘game of trust’ were viewed in a 
vacuum, it would seem to present a compelling analysis of how an immunity policy 
is intended to operate through the application of the prisoner’s dilemma. However, as 
this chapter has demonstrated, there are a number of other important considerations 
that perpetuate the ‘trust’ amongst cartelists, or complicate the decision-makers 
choice to apply for immunity. Moreover, a cartelist is presented with a third viable 
alternative in addition to continuing the cartel or confessing, where they may 
discontinue the cartel and remain silent.  
There are a number of other theorists, in addition to Leslie, who have used 
game-theoretical analysis in relation to the immunity policy.104 These papers give 
only a brief descriptive account of how game-theoretical analysis applies to 
immunity policies and in much less detail than Leslie. In many of the papers, the use 
of the game-theoretical model and the assumptions underpinned by the prisoner’s 
dilemma are not explicitly explained but are implicit from the economic models 
employed by the theorists in their analysis of leniency programs.105  
                                                
102 Ibid; RC Marshall and LM Marx, 'Section 1 Compliance from an Economic Perspective' in Nicolas 
Charbit, Elisa Ramundo and William E Kovacic (eds), An Antitrust Tribute Liber Amicorum (Institute 
of Competition Law, 2014) 293, 300-301. 
103 See, eg, John Connor, 'A Symposium on Cartel Sanctions: Recidivism Revealed: Private 
International Cartels 1990-2009' (2010) 6 Competition Policy International 101; For a detailed 
analysis on cartel recidivism and immunity, see Chapter VI, Recidivism, pg 170.	
104 See eg, Amedeo Arena, ‘Game Theory as a Yardstick for Antitrust Leniency Policy: the United 
States, European Union, and Italian Experiences in a Comparative Perspective’ (2011) 11 Global 
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and Whistleblowers in Antitrust' in Paolo Buccirossi (ed), Handbook of Antitrust Economics (MIT 
Press, 1st ed, 2008) ; Paolo Buccirossi and Giancarlo Spagnolo, 'The Effects of Leniency on Illegal 
Transaction: How (Not) to Fight Corruption' (SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and 
Finance, 2001) <http://swopec.hhs.se/hastef/papers/hastef0456.pdf>; C´ecile Aubert, Patrick Rey and 
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In defence of the game-theoretical model, Spagnolo suggests that ‘rational 
choice analysis is particularly well-suited to analyse cartels and policies against 
them, as wrongdoers are well-educated, calculating firm managers, used to 
evaluating costs and benefits and to react to incentives, rather than to rage, passions 
or instinct.’106 However, there are numerous psychological studies in cognitive 
behaviour that contradict the notion that humans are in control of their emotions or 
that human decision-making is as simple as the rational actor model predicts and as 
Spagnolo suggests.107  
This chapter has demonstrated that the theoretical basis upon which the 
immunity policy has been modelled provides a narrow and limited means of 
assessing the immunity policy’s operation. In particular, it provides no cogent means 
for assessing the policy’s effectiveness as a tool of cartel enforcement. Exposing the 
limitations of the rational actor model as a means to predict human behaviour and 
developing criteria that can be used to more comprehensively assess the immunity 
policy’s effectiveness will be the task of the following chapter.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
policies, see: Ulrich Blum, 'On the Rational of Leniency Programs: A Game-Theoretical Analysis' 
(2008) 25 European Journal of Law and Economics 209; See, also, Ellis and Wilson, above n 52; 
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106 Spagnolo, above n 104, 271. 
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III THE IMPACT OF RATIONALITY ON IMMUNITY POLICY 
DEVELOPMENT  
The purpose of this chapter is to historically trace the concept of rationality to 
contextualise the meaning of the concept within the field of economics and 
competition law before discussing the ‘rational actor model’, recent theoretical 
developments in relation to human behaviour and the implications for the immunity 
policy.  
This chapter will be divided into three parts. The first part will discuss the 
concept of rationality, its application to law and economics, including the Chicago 
School’s development of the rational actor model. This section will also touch upon 
other theoretical developments that also draw upon the assumptions underlying the 
rational actor model. It is not the purpose of this section to provide a comprehensive 
historical account of the concept of rationality, as this has been achieved in other 
works.1 Nor does there seem to be any unity amongst economists as how to define 
the rationality, given there are many prevailing views.2  
It is also not the intention of this section to provide an extensive historical 
account of the developments of the Chicago School of neo-classical economic 
theory, as this work has been canvassed in other research.3 Rather the focus will be 
on providing a contextual understanding of the origins of the rational actor model 
and how they ultimately fostered the development of an immunity policy. This part 
will also review the primary criticisms levelled at the rational actor model to shed 
light on its limitations as a theory of human behaviour. The aim will be to cast doubt 
on the model’s ability to provide a sufficient basis upon which public policy should 
be designed and assessed. 
                                                
1 See, eg, K Manktelow and D Over, Rationality - Psychological and Philosophical Perspectives 
(Routledge, 1st ed, 1993). 
2 See, eg, Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise - Principle and Execution (Harvard 
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Economics (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2010). 
 
45 
 
The second part of this chapter will analyse the theoretical developments that 
refute the rational actor assumptions, focusing on the Behavioural Economics 
Approach (thereafter ‘BE Approach’). It will question whether the BE Approach has 
emerged as a more appropriate model to adopt in public policy design and 
assessment in an attempt to more adequately reflect human behaviour and decision-
making, compared to the rational actor model. This part will conclude that despite 
elements of usefulness within the BE approach, the theory is still limited in its ability 
to provide guiding criteria that can be used to assess the Immunity Policy’s 
effectiveness. 
The final part of this chapter will then develop a new approach to assessing 
the immunity policy. Recognising the drawbacks of the United States DOJ criteria 
currently used to assess the immunity policy’s effectiveness, derived from neo-
classical economic theory, this part will outline an enhanced method and set of 
criteria to more comprehensively assess the design and operation of the policy in 
light of the limitations of the rational actor model. 
 
A An Exploration of the Development of the Rational Actor Model 
 
One prevailing view of rationality is that it entails the ability to be logical, to 
reason or to draw conclusions properly, to be reasonable, sensible and judicious.4 
The concept dates back to Aristotle’s notion of rationality, who deems the defining 
characteristic of the human species as the ‘rational animal.’5 In his view, rationality 
is a man’s ability to think about the world and his role in it in terms of scientific or 
other propositions, who can recognise that pairs of propositions having a term in 
common sometimes allows a conclusion to be drawn in the form of another 
proposition that follows logically from them as premises.6 
Jeremy Bentham’s work was influential on the field of economics through his 
‘Principle of Utility.’7 This principle dictates that pleasure and pain lie at the heart of 
all actions of sentient creatures. According to Bentham, motives consist in a desire 
                                                
4 Rationality ‘Psychological and Philosophical Perspectives’ Manktelow and Over, above n X, 2. 
5 See, eg, Aristotle Taylor, Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, Books II--IV : Translated with an 
Introduction and Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2006). 
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7 See Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1907). 
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for pleasure and an aversion to pain, meaning that actions are motivated by the 
prospect of obtaining some pleasure or of averting some pain. In Bentham’s view, a 
right and proper action is one that promotes the greatest happiness of the greatest 
number.8 This theory is more commonly referred to as Utilitarian Theory and the 
assumptions that underpin this theory have been incorporated into criminal and 
enforcement policies for decades.9 The critics of Bentham’s notion of utilitarianism 
assert that the concept is unduly narrow, as it requires that an individual acts in the 
‘right way’ when he attempts to maximise his own happiness, without regard to the 
happiness of others. In other words, the theory is criticised for being too simple and 
generalised to adequately reflect human behaviour.10 Furthermore, it is said that the 
theory does not adequately reflect other non-utilitarian values, such as the concept of 
‘just dessert.’11  
Gary Becker is another leading pioneer in the field of economics and rational 
action. His early work postulated that all human behaviour is economising in nature 
and amenable to analysis through economic modelling.12 Becker liberally applied his 
rational actor model in his economic analysis of human behaviour to areas as varied 
and diverse as: how many children one would have; the decision to marry or divorce; 
criminal activity; altruism; suicide; social interaction; and the allocation of time.13 
Becker extended his analysis to criminal behaviour in further work and outlines an 
economic model he proposes is useful in determining how to combat crime in an 
‘optimal’ fashion through the consideration of a number of factors, namely: 
‘(1) the number of crimes, called "offenses" in this essay, and the cost of offenses, (2) the 
number of offenses and the punishments meted out, (3) the number of offenses, arrests, and 
convictions and the public expenditures on police and courts, (4) the number of convictions 
                                                
8 Ibid s III. 
9 See, eg, Darryl K Brown, 'Criminal Law Theory and Criminal Justice Practice' (2012) 49 American 
Criminal Law Review 73; Miriam Baer, 'Linkage and the Deterrence of Corporate Fraud' (2008) 94 
Virginia Law Review 1295, 1329; Assaf Hamdani and Alon Klement, 'Corporate Crime and 
Deterrence' (2008) 61 Stanford Law Review 271; Matthew Haist, 'Deterrence in a Sea of Just Desserts: 
Are Utilitarian Goals Achievable in a World of Limiting Retibutivism' (2009) 99 Journal Criminal 
Law & Criminology 789. 
10 For an overview of primary criticisms, see: Hanna Pitkin, 'Some Neglected Cracks in the 
Foundation of Utilitarianism' (1990) 18 Political Theory 104. 
11 See, eg, Alana Barton, Just Deserts Theory (2012) SAGE Publications 
<http://www.sagepub.com/hanserintro/study/materials/reference/ref3.1.pdf>. 
12 Gary S Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behaviour (The University of Chicago Press, 
1990). 
13 Ibid; For an overview of Becker’s work in relation to social welfare, see: John McDonald, 'Crime 
and Punishment: A Social Welfare Analysis' (1987) 15 Journal of Criminal Justice 245.  
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and the costs of imprisonments or other kinds of punishments, and (5) the number of offenses 
and the private expenditures on protection and apprehension.’14 
 
Becker’s use of neo-classical economic analysis and the ‘rational man’ had a 
significant impact on the view of many sociologists; many of whom were affronted 
by the notion that many dearly held normative factors central to studies in sociology 
should be replaced by utilitarian concepts introduced by Bentham, and reinforced by 
Becker’s work in the field of economics.15 As a result, at least in the field of crime 
and criminology, the focus of research went from being based on normative and 
moral terms to a rational choice frame of reference within the field of positive 
science.16  
This was represented by a change in focus by criminologists from 
rehabilitative studies to research directed towards the deterrent effect of punishment 
and the effect of incentives on crime.17 Bentham and Becker’s prevailing impact on 
the study of human behaviour is exemplified by the vast number of economic based 
studies in the field of cartel conduct that seek assess the effectiveness of the 
immunity/leniency programs across the world by using rational choice methods.18  
                                                
14 Gary S Becker, 'Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach' 76 Journal of Political Economy 
169, 174. 
15 See generally, Philomila Tsoukala, 'Gary Becker, Legal Feminism and the Costs of Moralizing 
Care' (2007) 16 Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 357. 
16 See eg, Edward Lazear, 'Gary Becker's Impact on Economics and Policy' (2015) 105 American 
Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 2015 80. 
17 See, eg, Shawn Bushway and Peter Reuter, 'Economists' Contribution to the Study of Crime and the 
Criminal Justice System' (2008) 37 The University of Chicago Crime and Justice 389; Julie Clarke, 
'The Increasing Criminalization of Economic Law – A Competition Law Perspective' (2012) 19 
Journal of Financial Crime 76. 
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rates: See, eg, Jeroen Hinloopen and Adriann Soetevent, 'Laboratory Evidence on the Effectiveness of 
Corporate Leniency Programs' (2008) 39 The RAND Journal of Economics 607; Gordon Klein, 'Cartel 
Destabilization and Leniency Programs – Empirical Evidence' (Discussion Paper No. 10-107, Centre 
for European Economic Research, 2010); Jose Apesteguia, Martin Dufwenberg and Reinhard Selten, 
'Blowing the Whistle' (2007) 31 Economic Theory 143; C´ecile Aubert, Patrick Rey and William E. 
Kovacic, 'The Impact of Leniency and Whistleblowing Programs on Cartels' (2005) 24 International 
Journal of Industrial Organization 1241; Julien Sauvagnat, 'Prosection and Leniency Programs: A 
Fool's Game' (Discussion Paper, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) 2011); Andrea Pinna, 'Optimal 
Leniency Programs in Antitrust' (Working paper 2010/18, Centre for North South Economic Research 
& Queen Mary, University of London, 2010); Margaret C Levenstein and Valerie Y Suslow, 'What 
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Wandschneider, 'Cartel Ringleaders and the Corporate Leniency Program' (CCP Working Paper 11-13 
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The Economic Approach to Law - Competition Law and Economics: An 
Introduction 
 
The basis of an economic approach to law, as advocated by Richard Posner, 
is the assumption that people act as rational maximisers of their satisfactions.19 As 
there have been many conceptions of rationality over the course of history, the focus 
in this chapter will be on the concept of rationality as derived from normative 
decision theory, which is rooted in economic game theory. As previously described, 
this concept of rationality presupposes that people make choices based on 
maximising their utility or minimising the cost to themselves.20 
At a basic level, a decision maker is faced with a number of alternatives with each 
choice being given a certain probability, which therefore equates to a utility for the 
decision maker. The equation that computes the highest expected utility is the one 
chosen.21  
Posner, whilst describing the benefits that an economic mind, with economic 
tools can bring to the analysis of the law, stated that quantitative analysis and 
statistical compilation would prove to be extremely useful in identifying patterns and 
causes of legal and administrative issues.22 Generally, his economic theory of law 
follows on from Bentham’s and Becker’s work of the application of economics in the 
context of non-market legal regulation. 
In applying the economic approach to criminal behaviour, Posner adopts the 
utilitarian concepts developed by Bentham and Becker, stating that when assessing 
whether criminal penalties are optimal to deter criminal behaviour, he assumes that 
most potential criminals are sufficiently rational to be deterred. He states that such an 
assumption has the support of extensive literature.23 Similarly to Becker, Posner 
believes that there can be an ‘optimal’ level of deterrence, whereby after the 
appropriate punishment has been set; it is adjusted with the appropriate level of 
                                                
19 Richard A. Posner, 'The Economic Approach to Law' (1974) 53 Texas Law Review 757, 763. 
20 Ibid 761.	
21 For an application of this model to crime and punishment, see Becker, above n 14, 172. 
22 Posner, above n 19, 765. 
23 Richard A Posner, 'An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law' (1985) 85 Columbia Law Review 
1193,1205. 
 
49 
 
probability and severity ‘to bring that cost home to the would-be offender.’24 He 
published a number of articles with William Landes, writing primarily about 
economics and law including issues relating to private enforcement,25 the notion of 
an independent judiciary,26 and the use of legal precedent;27 all of which have been 
said to be the most productive and important contributions to law and economics.28 
Specifically related to this research, Posner believes that the assumption of 
rationality can be applied in the analysis of law, and that ‘lawyers can apply the 
theory perfectly well without the help of specialists.’29 He finds that his economic 
analysis can be applied to law through the economic representations of ‘goods’ and 
‘price,’ even though the law is traditionally viewed as a non-market setting. The 
‘goods’ for example represent the ‘crimes’ to the criminal and the ‘price’ represents 
the term of imprisonment, discounted by the probability of conviction.30  
In Posner’s model, the legal system is treated as a given and therefore the 
question is directed towards how individuals or firms within the system react to the 
incentives they are presented. He refers to the possibility that many academic 
lawyers may be ‘repulsed’ by the prospect that economists are attempting to ‘wrest 
their field from them.’31  
Generally, the work of Posner and those from the Chicago School enjoyed its 
heyday in the late 1970s, which was categorised by a shift of interventionist policies 
in the Supreme Court in the 1950s and 1960s to a more laissez faire set of permissive 
rules.32 The influence of the Chicago School on antitrust policy was essentially two-
fold: (1) it advocated that the best tool available to maximise economic efficiency 
was by way of the neoclassical price theory model (2) the primary goal of antitrust 
enforcement policy should be economic efficiency.33 
                                                
24 Ibid 1206. 
25 Richard Posner & Robert Landes, ‘The Private Enforcement of Law’ (1975) 4 Journal of Legal 
Studies 1. 
26 Robert Landes & Richard Posner, ‘The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective’ 
(1975) 18 Journal of Law and Economics 875. 
27 Robert Landes & Richard Posner, ‘Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis’ (1976) 
19 Journal of Law and Economics 249. 
28 Lloyd Cohen and Joshua Wright, Pioneers of Law and Economics (Edward Elgar Publishing, 1st ed, 
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29 Posner, above n 19, 762. 
30 Ibid 763.	
31 Ibid 764. 
32 See, eg, Nicholas Mercuro, 'How the Chicago School Overshot the Mark: Antitrust Law and Policy 
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The ‘victories’ of the Chicago School of economics that are widely viewed as 
successful include fixing economic welfare as the primary objective of antitrust; 
‘rejecting no-fault deconcentration as a plausible policy option and giving positive 
regard to productive efficiency’ – meaning that despite many of its criticisms – 
overall economic efficiency have benefited significantly from these changes in 
antitrust policy stemming from Chicagoan analysis.34 This was a significant change 
from the normative analysis of the 1950s and 1960s in which government agencies 
were aggressively interventionist.35 
There have been a number of other ‘waves’ of economic thought since the 
Chicago neo-classical economic paradigm – most notably the Post-Chicago and Neo-
Chicago schools. Both Post-Chicago and Neo-Chicago utilise economics as a form of 
analysis. However, there are a number of differences between the three schools of 
thought. The Post-Chicago school is said to be based on newer and more 
sophisticated forms of economic analysis than the Chicago school of neo-classical 
economic thought, and places a much heavier emphasis on game theoretic models of 
firm behaviour that help to identify anticompetitive behaviour.36  
Advocates of the Post-Chicago analysis claim that the theory is based on 
specific testable hypothesis and empirical testing of these models.37 However, many 
question the usefulness of Post-Chicago theory and whether it does indeed go beyond 
a pure Chicago analysis, particularly given that many of the underlying assertions of 
the school are untestable38 or fail to rule out viable alternative theories.39 It has been 
suggested that the real value of Post-Chicago is reflected in its recognition that 
markets are actually far more complex and varied than the Chicago school advocates 
                                                
34 Richard Schmalensee, 'Thoughts on the Chicago Legacy in US Antitrust' in How the Chicago 
School Overshot the Mark: The Effect of Conservative Economic Analysis on U.S Antitrust (Oxford 
University Press, 2008) 22. 
35 Daniel Rubinfeld, 'On the Foundations of Antitrust Law and Economics' in How the Chicago School 
Overshot the Mark: The Effect of Conservative Economic Analysis on U.S Antitrust (Oxford 
University Press, 2008) 53.	
36 See, eg, Bruce Kobayashi and Timothy  Muris, 'Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Beyond: Time to Let 
Go of the 20th Century' (2012) 78 Antitrust Law Journal 147, 151. 
37 Ibid 150. 
38 Ibid; Daniel A Crane, 'A Neo-Chicago Perspective on Antitrust Institutions' (2012) 78 Antitrust Law 
Journal 43, 48.  
39 Herbert Hovenkamp, 'Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique' (2001)  Columbia Business 
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are willing to admit. However, the benefits of Post-Chicago theory, like Chicago, 
may be oversold.40 
In contrast, the Neo-Chicago school is in its infancy as a theoretical school of 
thought and is likely to be a narrower and more cautious approach than its 
predecessor.41 This is demonstrated in the Neo-Chicago approach to predatory 
pricing, where in contrast to the Chicago school, Neo-Chicago would acknowledge 
that predatory pricing may occasionally happen but claim that the vast majority of 
predatory price claims are overstated, particularly by competitors.42 The Neo-
Chicago school insists upon basing its antitrust interventions on evidence-based 
justifications, which will focus on the operation of the market in a real-world 
context.43  
The Neo-Chicago school also claims to be more diplomatic in its approach to 
the role of institutions in antitrust policy. Whilst the Chicago school insisted upon a 
non-interventionist role by the State, in the belief that markets will self-correct, the 
Neo-Chicago school recognises the positive role that institutions can play in order to 
intervene to correct competitive market failures.44 
Although this is a very brief description of the schools of thought that have 
dominated antitrust policy since the 1970s, the most important aspect in relation to 
the analysis of the immunity policy is that the rational actor model underpins all of 
these theories. As demonstrated by the previous chapter, the rational actor model, as 
derived from the Chicago School of Economics, was central to the development of 
the immunity policy and currently informs its intended operation. However, the 
rational actor model is limited in its ability to accurately predict human behaviour. 
To demonstrate this, it is necessary to outline the key empirical findings that refute 
the assumptions underlying the rational actor model with a view to exposing its 
inadequacies as a model of human behaviour and therefore an insufficient basis upon 
which the immunity policy should be assessed. Many of these empirical studies have 
been conducted by advocates of the BE Approach. 
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B The Evolving Concept of Rationality and the Behavioural Law and 
Economics Approach – A Limited Theoretical Approach to Regulatory Policy 
and Design 
 
One of the most significant theoretical developments in relation to the 
concept of rationality was the introduction of the concept of ‘Bounded Rationality’ 
by Herbert Simon.45 Simon contends that people reason and choose rationally, but 
only within the constraints imposed by their limited search and computational 
capacities.46 He uses the analogy of a computer to illustrate the concept of Bounded 
Rationality, whereby the human mind is compared with that of a computer with 
limited processing capacity. In this analogy, the human mind will engage in effort-
saving subroutines that sometimes provide reasonable but imperfect solutions which 
can seem particularly appealing and compelling.47 Simon was awarded a Nobel Prize 
in 1978 for his work on the rational decision-making in business organisations.48 He 
recognises the attraction of the rational actor model but argues that Bounded 
Rationality does not possess that kind of simplicity and that the ‘assumptions about 
human capabilities are far weaker than those of the classical theory.’49  
Simon’s work acknowledges that one of the central failures of classical 
theory is that it was never designed to examine situations involving decision-making 
under uncertainty and imperfect competition. He asserts that the neo-classical 
rational actor model requires an individual to be aware of or have full knowledge of 
the choices available to him and also the full knowledge and/or ability to compute 
the consequences that will follow from each different choice.50 The rational choice 
model also requires that the decision-maker will be able to evaluate these 
consequences with certainty and have the ability to compare consequences that flow 
from different choices, no matter how diverse they may be. In contrast, Bounded 
Rationality assumes that the consequences of choosing particular alternatives will 
                                                
45 See, Herbert Simon, 'Nobel Memorial Lecture - Rational Decision-Making in Business 
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only be imperfectly known to the individual decision-maker ‘both because of limited 
computational power and because of uncertainty in the external world, and the 
decision maker did not possess a general and consistent utility function for 
comparing heterogeneous alternatives.’51 
Simon’s draws upon psychological research into ‘information processing 
psychology,’ which explains the process of human decision-making as involving a 
very selective search in the human mind based on ‘rules of thumb.’52 These ‘rules of 
thumb’ guide the search into promising regions, where solutions will generally be 
found, even though all possibilities may not be fully explored or imputed.53 During 
this search process, there is much latitude for the decision maker to form a solution, 
which is far different from the process of searching for the ‘optimum’ solution that 
the rational actor model mandates. 
Another important implication for the purposes of the immunity policy is that 
Simon believes that firms or business corporations do not act consistently with the 
predictions of the rational actor model. Despite the fact that one of the primary 
purposes of a corporation is profit-maximisation, a firm may suffer from what is 
called ‘organisational slack,’ which Simon claims will result in decision-making 
capabilities that are far from optimal.54 This organisational slack may be the result of 
a magnitude of motivational and environmental variables, which ‘serves as a buffer 
between the environment and the firm’s decisions.’55 
Simon’s research is widely cited in numerous fields and research projects.56 
Many have come to accept that Bounded Rationality may provide a more accurate 
account of the process of human decision-making then the neo-classical model. This 
has been validated by empirical evidence.57 For instance, Kunreuther and his 
colleagues conducted a qualitative study into the insurance industry, where they 
surveyed 2055 homeowners living in flood prone areas throughout the United States 
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and 1006 homeowners in eighteen earthquake areas in California.58 The aim of the 
study was to determine the key factors that influence the voluntary purchase of 
insurance against the consequences of low-probability events, such as floods or 
earthquakes. 
The advocates of rational actor theory assume that risk-averse individuals 
would favour a strategy to protect them against rare catastrophic losses that they 
would not be able to cope with on their own, however the study indicated that 
‘people preferred to insure against relatively high-probability, low-loss hazards and 
tended to reject insurance in situations where the probability of loss was low and the 
potential losses were high.’59 Kunreather attributed this to the fact that people have a 
‘finite reservoir of concern,’ meaning that generally people do not have the time or 
energy to worry about low-probability hazards because if they did they would be 
overburdened by the number of decisions they would need to consider and this would 
adversely affect productive life.60 
In an attempt to overcome some of the limitations said to be inherent in the 
rational actor model, a new scientific method has been developed that builds upon 
and incorporates Simon’s concept of Bounded Rationality and seeks to enhance the 
rational actor model. This field is known and referred to in this research as the BE 
Approach. No consensus has been reached regarding the definition of behavioural 
economics. This may be due to the fact that the task of explaining human behaviour 
requires attention to many intellectual disciplines including psychology, cognitive 
psychology, neuroscience, sociology, philosophy and marketing science. Economics 
is only one relevant field of research that assists in understanding human behaviour, 
which is a highly interdisciplinary field of inquiry.  
One view of BE states that it is an approach that incorporates psychological 
insights into the study of economic problems, whilst another defines the concept in 
relation to psychological phenomena that targets the assumptions underpinning the 
rational choice model.61 It has also been said that humans exhibit systematic biases in 
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the way both the world and the market are perceived.62 Due to this lack of consensus, 
in lieu of providing a refined definition, this chapter will outline a number of key 
findings that categorise the BE approach.63 
Leading pioneers of this field include Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman 
who received the Nobel Prize for their work on BE. However, the seeds of the BE 
movement can be traced as far back as to Adam Smith’s ‘Theory of Moral 
Sentiments.’64 In addition to Herbert Simon’s widely cited theory of Bounded 
Rationality, Kahneman and Tversky have developed an alternative theory to 
expected utility theory, called ‘Prospect theory.’65 Prospect theory states that neo-
classical economics bases many of its assumptions on the fact that the individual is 
acutely aware of all of the options available to him at the time in which a decision 
needs to be made. But as the research by Kahneman & Tversky suggests, humans are 
not generally in a position to know of all of the options that are available to them at 
the time of making a decision and therefore base decisions on incomplete 
information.66 In contrast, the neoclassical model is generally based on the 
assumption that an individual has access to complete or ‘perfect’ information.  
The first violation of expected utility theory, or the rational actor model, that 
Kahneman & Tversky discuss relates to certainty, probability and possibility and 
indicates that people place a greater amount of weight on outcomes that are 
considered certain, in comparison to those outcomes that are merely probable. This 
they call the ‘certainty effect.’67 When asked to choose between a sure gain over a 
larger gain that is merely probable, the research indicates that people were more 
likely to choose the sure gain, and are therefore risk averse when it comes to gains. 
However, the opposite phenomenon is witnessed in the realm of losses, meaning that 
people are generally risk seeking for a loss that is merely probably over a smaller 
loss that is certain. This Kahneman and Tversky call the ‘The Reflection Effect.’68  
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Kahneman and Tversky have developed an alternate theory to the rational 
actor model that posits individual decision making as a two-stage process. The first 
stage is the editing phase, where an individual conducts a preliminary analysis of the 
prospects on offer and the second is an evaluation phase, where the individual 
evaluates the prospects and chooses the one with the highest value.69 
Prospect theory also suggests that many prospects or decisions may be made 
in combination or segregation or through a process of cancellation, whereby an 
individual will effectively ‘cancel out’ prospects, such as outcome-probability 
pairs.70 It is asserted that within this editing phase, the process by which the editing 
occurs may be different amongst different individuals, which therefore creates 
anomalies in choice and this could be dependent and influenced by the context in 
which the decision is made. These factors are also prevalent in the evaluation phase 
where many individuals will evaluate the value of the prospect in different ways.71 
Kahneman and Tversky’s findings have consistently been used to refute the 
assumptions that underpin the rational actor model and have been used widely as 
support for the BE Approach.72 Most notably, the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 has 
led many economists to question the assumption that the market is self-correcting 
and that humans and firms are perfect maximisers.73 It is asserted that the recent 
crisis has raised important issues of market failure, regulation of markets, moral 
hazard and a lack of understanding of how markets actually operate and therefore 
now, more than ever, it is important to analyse how the BE Approach might help 
overcome the limitations of the rational actor model by asking questions about 
whether the neoclassical assumptions are still valid, if they ever were.74 
Richard Posner appears to have retracted some of his earlier arguments about 
the utility of neo-classical paradigms and has questioned some of his earlier held 
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beliefs about the nature of the free-market.75 Posner has recognised the role that 
individual greed may have played in the global financial crisis of 2008. He criticises 
the economic profession as being ‘asleep at the switch’ with an overreliance on 
‘mathematical models’ that blinded them to the ensuing crisis. He also acknowledges 
the role that institutions such as the government should have played in helping avoid 
market failures.76 These positions fly in the face of his traditional Chicago neo-
classical ideologies that markets are self-correcting. Gary Becker, on the other hand, 
has remained wedded to the rational choice model. In an interview in 2009, he 
argued that incorporating ‘more realistic assumptions’ about human behaviour would 
not have helped to avoid the global financial crisis, and will not solve the problem.77 
It is important at this stage to emphasise that the rational actor model has 
served, and continues to serve, an important purpose in analysing human decision-
making but that this purpose is very limited, and mostly confined to simple decisions. 
Increasingly, however, governments, economic organisations, academics and various 
stakeholders around the world have begun to recognise the value of the BE Approach 
by starting to take account of BE findings in policy making.78  
 
1  Behavioural Economics Research – Key Findings 
 
There is a vast array of empirical data related to the BE movement which 
applies to many different fields. This chapter will focus on a selection of BE research 
findings, specifically on those that are likely to have implications for the immunity 
policy, namely: 
- Complex Decision-Making 
- The Availability and Representativeness Heuristics 
- Overconfidence Bias 
- Context of Decision Making 
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- Habit and Traditions 
 
(a) Complex Decision Making 
 
The first finding relates the complexity of a problem and its ability to affect 
an individual’s ability to maximise their utility. This aspect of the BE Approach is 
closely related to Simon’s notion of bounded rationality, discussed above.  
Essentially, when a decision-maker is faced with a complex problem, it 
requires a significant amount of cognitive effort to comply with the predictions of 
rational choice theory; so instead, studies have shown that a decision maker will 
employ simplified strategies in order to minimise effort to make selections.79 The 
notion that decision makers simplify complex scenarios in order to make decisions 
contradicts the rational actor model, as this does not necessarily maximise their 
utility. In particular, as choices become difficult, consumers naturally tend to defer 
decisions, often indefinitely.80 For example, one study found that individuals were 
less likely to select a house that maximised their utility (defined by questions the 
subjects were earlier asked about their preferences) from among five alternatives, as 
the number of attributes presented to the subjects was increased beyond ten.81 
If this idea is accepted, then it would seem that complexity affects an 
individual’s ability to maximise their utility. If this concept is applied to the context 
of a decision maker in the process of deciding whether or not to apply for immunity, 
a rational actor model would predict that the decision maker would compute all the 
possibilities available, with the assumption that the decision maker is in fact aware 
of all of these possibilities and then will systemically undertake a cost-benefit 
analysis to find the solution with the greatest utility.  
                                                
79 See Charles Schwenk, 'Cognitive Simplication Processes in Strategic Decision-Making' (1984) 5 
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Simplication in Acquisition and Divestment' (1985) 10 The Academy of Management Review 287. 
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However, immunity related decisions are not a straight forward exercise and 
the decision to apply often involves competing and complex considerations.82 For 
example, if a cartel participant is involved in an international cartel across a number 
of jurisdictions, then the decision to apply for immunity becomes multi-
jurisdictional. Not only will an immunity applicant need to identify each jurisdiction 
that the cartel may have affected, but also there is no guarantee that if the applicant is 
successful in one jurisdiction it will be granted immunity in any other jurisdiction.  
This could mean that the evidence provided by the immunity applicant in one 
jurisdiction where they are granted immunity could be used against the immunity 
applicant in another jurisdiction, in which the cartel participant did not seek or was 
not successfully granted immunity. This could also lead to a number of civil claims 
lodged by third parties who have also been affected by the operation of the cartel in 
all of the affected jurisdictions.83 Therefore, as this example shows, the options 
available to the cartel participant are significantly more complex and varied than the 
rational actor assumptions predict. 
 
(b) Availability and Representativeness  
 
Representativeness refers to the situation in which probabilities are evaluated 
by the degree to which A is representative of B by the degree to which A resembles 
B.84 An example can be derived from the research of Cornell psychologist Tom 
Gilovich, who in 1991 conducted research on the experience of London residents 
during the German bombing campaigns of World War II. When newspapers released 
pictures on where the bombs had landed, they evidently appeared to depict ‘clusters’ 
around the River Thames and also the northwest sector of the map.85  
This generated great concern among London residents who believed that this 
cluster pattern indicated that the Germans were able to aim their bombs with great 
                                                
82 See Chapter V, Motivations for Seeking Immunity, pg 126; see, eg, Andreas Stephan and Ali 
Nikpay, 'Leniency Theory and Complex Realities' (University of East Anglia & Centre for 
Competition Policy - CCP Working Paper 14-8, 2014) 
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83 See Chapter VII, Confidentiality Across Borders, pg 261.	
84 Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, above n 66, 4. 
85 Howard Kunreuther, 'The Changing Societal Consequences of Risks from Natural Hazards' (1979) 
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precision. However, a detailed statistical analysis revealed that the distribution of the 
bomb strikes was indeed random.86  Kahneman and Tversky assert that this approach 
to the judgment of probability can lead to serious errors, because similarity, or 
representativeness, is not influenced by several factors that should affect judgments 
of probability, according to the rational actor model.87 
The Availability Heuristic refers to the way in which people assess the 
likelihood of risks by asking how readily examples come to mind. The more readily 
these relevant examples are to the individual, they are far more likely to be 
concerned then if they cannot recall such examples. For instances, an individual may 
assess the risk of heart attack among middle aged people by recalling the number of 
heart attacks that have occurred in people they know.88                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Closely related to this heuristic are the concepts of Accessibility and 
Salience, meaning that if you have personally experienced a heart attack then you are 
more than likely to believe it will happen then if you saw a story on the news about a 
person having a heart attack, and the likelihood of this happening again would be 
affected by how recently the heart attack occurred. Therefore, the Availability 
heuristic in risk assessment can have a substantial impact on the way the public 
perceives and reacts to risk and taking precautions. For instance, a person is more 
likely to purchase flood insurance when they know someone who has experienced a 
flood.89 
In the context of criminal enforcement, according to the rational actor model, 
and the predictions of Gary Becker, criminals will maximise their utility by 
committing crimes only if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs. 
According to this theory, in order to deter crime, society must raise the expected 
costs above the expected benefits of the crime.90 This is usually achieved by 
increasing the severity of the punishment, such as lengthening gaol terms or 
imposing higher monetary fines.91  
                                                
86 Thaler and Sunstein, above n 72, 28. 
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89 Thaler and Sunstein, above n 72, 25.  
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However, if the Availability heuristic is applied, when calculating the 
anticipated costs of crime, the types of events that are more salient to these potential 
criminals could significantly impact the analysis conducted by these criminals.92 
Therefore, in order to determine which deterrence mechanism will be the most 
effective, it must be understood whether the criminals are likely to over or 
underestimate the frequency and the severity of punishment that is actually imposed.  
In Australia, there is yet to be a criminal cartel case but the potential gaol 
sentence for cartel conduct is a maximum of 10 years.93 Therefore, at least at the time 
of writing, cartel participants are likely to underestimate the severity of punishment, 
due to the lack of criminal prosecutions in Australia. The situation could be much 
different in the United States, where individual imprisonment sentences have been 
increasing over the past decade, and along with it, the length of the gaol sentences.94 
Because the severity of the punishment for cartel conduct is not yet a 
significant factor in Australia, at least for criminal cartel activity, increasing the 
frequency of punishment is likely to be more effective, ‘under the assumption that if 
a criminal knows or knows of someone who has been imprisoned for a particular 
crime, this information is likely to be available and to cause him to overestimate the 
likelihood that he will be arrested and convicted if he commits the same crime.’95 As 
mentioned, this cannot yet be assessed in Australia, but in the civil context at least, 
increasing the frequency of punishment, ie the number of cartels that are discovered 
and prosecuted is likely to cause potential cartel participants to overestimate the 
likelihood that they will be detected and held liable.  
However, the discovery of cartels rests very heavily on the use of the 
immunity policy; hence the perception of the immunity policy and its use is likely to 
have a significant bearing on a potential cartel participant’s estimation of the 
likelihood of conviction. This consideration becomes even more critical when there 
is speculation that the authorities are placing too much reliance on the immunity 
policy as its sole source of cartel detection. That could suggest to potential cartel 
                                                
92 Korobkin and Ulen, above n 2, 1068.	
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participants that if you do not come forward on your own accord, then there is a 
strong likelihood that the cartel will not be detected at all.96  
 
(c) Over Confidence Bias  
 
Even when people may be aware of the actual probability distribution of a 
particular event occurring, their predictions as to the likelihood of that particular 
event happening to them are subject to what is called ‘Over Confidence’ bias. This 
encompasses the belief that good things are more than average likely to happen to us 
and consequently, bad things are less likely than average to happen to us.97  
 Related to the Over Confidence bias is the ‘confirmatory’ or ‘self-serving’ 
bias; the term used to describe the observation that actors often interpret information 
in ways that serve their interests or preconceived notions.98 For instance, studies have 
shown that within the corporate context, managers exhibit ‘undue confidence in their 
firms’ ability to overcome obstacles and a self-serving perception of information that 
might objectively signal future problems’ which could potentially mislead those who 
would invest in their firms’ securities.99  
In applying this research to the position of a cartel participant, it is likely that 
an individual involved in a cartel will exhibit Over Confidence bias in relation to the 
success or predicted success of the operation of the cartel, and therefore this would 
adversely affect their decision to apply for immunity. Closely related to this 
argument is the prospect that even if a cartel member is aware that other cartels have 
failed, the Over Confidence bias will lead them to believe that the cartel they are 
involved in will not fail. This is also supported by evidence that many cartel 
                                                
96 Megan Dixon, Ethan Kate and Janet McDavid, 'Too Much of a Good Thing?: Is Heavy Reliance on 
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members do not apply for immunity unless the cartel has already failed.100 Although 
it has been acknowledged by those conducting the studies of BE that the Over 
Confidence bias is not a universal phenomenon, it is argued that the bias is prevalent, 
often massive and difficult to eliminate. This is particularly challenging because 
confidence controls action.101  
 
(d) Context of Decision Making 
 
As discussed previously,102 advocates of the rational actor model base their 
assumptions on a decision-maker maximising their utility in a lacuna, devoid of any 
context that may affect their decisions. In contrast, BE studies acknowledge that 
decisions are often inextricably bound to the context in which they are made, and can 
affect the decision that the decision-maker ultimately makes.103 
One of the most important findings to emerge from the BE Approach relates 
to the way in which individuals view gains and losses. These concepts fall within the 
category of ‘Framing’ and ‘Reference Points.’ As mentioned previously, the studies 
conducted by Kahneman & Tversky have shown that when a decision is framed in 
terms of ‘losses’ then an individual is more likely to exhibit ‘risk seeking’ behaviour, 
whilst if a decision is framed in terms of ‘gains’ then an individual is more likely to 
be ‘risk averse.’104   
Applying these findings to the immunity policy, it would seem that the way 
in which the immunity decision is framed is crucial in influencing decision-making 
behaviour. If the decision to apply for immunity is seen as a ‘gains’ decision, 
presumably in the form that the applicant will ‘gain’ immunity and thus are not 
prosecuted, then cartel participants are likely to be risk-averse, meaning that they are 
more likely to decide to apply for immunity then risk being exposed and prosecuted. 
However, if the decision to apply for immunity is seen as ‘loss,’ due to the possibility 
                                                
100 See, eg, Andreas Stephan, 'An Empirical Assessment of the European Leniency Notice' (2009) 5 
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of diminished cartel profits or potential civil or criminal liability, including possible 
follow-on damages actions, then the immunity applicant is more likely to exhibit 
‘risk-seeking’ behaviour. It has been argued by some commentators, such as Jeffry 
Rachlinski, that plaintiffs are likely to perceive litigation options as ‘gains’ since they 
stand to receive money, whereas defendants are likely to perceive their options as 
‘losses.’105 
Therefore, it is possible that cartel participants are likely to view the decision 
to apply for immunity as a loss decision, which is likely to make them more risk-
seeking, ie ‘take their chances.’ This finding contradicts the rational actor model, 
which would predict a decision maker’s decision as being independent of the framing 
and reference effects propounded by the BE Approach. 
 Studies have shown that mood and emotion can also affect individual 
decision-making. According to Schwarz, our feelings ‘may influence which 
information comes to mind and is considered in forming a judgment, or serve as a 
source of information in their own right.’106 The impact that thoughts, feelings or 
moods can have on human decision-making is yet another consideration that is 
absent from the rational actor model. As mood can change the way an individual 
processes information, either positively or negatively, it can be argued that a cartel 
participant seeking immunity, is likely to not be acting within the assumptions of 
rational actor theory, and this could significantly impair their capacity to make a 
decision that maximises their utility.107 
 
(e) Habits & Traditions 
 
According to the predictions of rational choice theory, individual decision-
makers base their decisions on a complete set of information, which is independent 
of behaviours, meaning that it is based on the assumption that the way an individual 
has acted in the past will not affect their current preference structure.108 However, BE 
advocates argue against this and claim that the way an actor has performed in a 
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certain way in the past can increase the likelihood that they will act in a similar way 
in the future.  
This is most effectively illustrated by the notion of ‘sunk costs’ and how it 
affects an individual’s decision-making process, despite the fact that it does not 
accord with the rational actor model. Many BE studies have shown how people 
regularly cite ‘sunk costs’ as a reason that they are pursuing a certain type of action, 
for instance in the decision to undertake an activity that they would prefer not to, on 
the basis that they had already bought a ticket to the particular sporting event or 
theatrical performance.109 In the context of a cartel, it is obvious that a cartel 
participant would have ‘sunk’ time, energy and presumably capital (at least at the 
outset) throughout the duration of the cartel and this could be another relevant factor 
in determining whether or not to seek immunity and potentially affect their 
willingness to give up on the cartel.  
In addition, the ‘power of tradition’ is cited as having a powerful effect on 
human decision-making.110 The concept is derived from the notion that the utility 
individuals gain from conforming to a shared family, group or community practice, 
can outweigh the inherent value of the behaviour.111 In the context of cartels, there is 
the existence of group behaviour or mentality that is more likely to influence the 
decision making process, such as the decision to join a cartel, remain in a cartel or 
apply for immunity. According to behavioural economists, habits, traditions and 
addictions are much more difficult to manipulate than the rational actor model 
predicts. 
This would help to explain scenarios where people engage in forms of self-
blackmail, such as writing incriminating letters that may be sent in the event that 
something happens, in order to force them to make a particular decision and stick 
with it. This could explain why cartel participants tend to keep pieces of 
incriminating evidence of the cartels operation – almost like leverage or blackmail to 
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ensure compliance- that cannot otherwise be explained by rational choice theorists.112 
 
2 Implications Of BE Research Findings  
 
The selected BE findings discussed above have a significant bearing on the 
way the immunity policy is intended to operate, and does in fact, operate. These 
empirical results have been replicated in multiple contexts using different subjects to 
produce a convincing body of evidence. The BE Approach should therefore be 
seriously considered by the ACCC and competition authorities worldwide to reassess 
common assumptions of the immunity policy’s operation. As this chapter has shown, 
there are many circumstances where individuals are unlikely to act in accordance 
with the rational actor model on which the policy is currently based. 
There is a growing recognition of the significance of the BE Approach and 
particularly how it will help shape competition policy in the future. Calls for 
recognition of the BE Approach have been made by influential figures, such as the 
Former Head of the United States Fair Trade Commission, William Kovacic; 
members of the Competition and Markets Authority in the United Kingdom, and 
various commentators including Maurice Stucke, Cass Sunstein & Richard Thaler.113 
Recently, a report published by the OECD114 recognised the utility of the BE 
Approach. Behavioural principles have been used in the design of the Credit Card 
Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act,115 which was signed into 
United States law by President Obama in May 2009 and was targeted at regulating 
credit cards; the Affordable Care Act,116 which reformed United States health care; a 
number of  
‘MyData’ initiatives that seek to supply consumers with information to help inform 
their decisions; the promotion of behaviourally informed occupational pension 
schemes and the replacement of the Food and Drug Administration’s ‘food pyramid’ 
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for communicating nutritional balance with a simple ‘food plate.’117 
A report issued by the former United Kingdom Office of Fair Trading in 2010 
detailed a number of instances where behavioural findings have had an important 
impact on competition policy.118 The report recognised both the significance and 
limitations of implementing these findings into anti-cartel enforcement policy.119 The 
report did not discuss the impact that BE findings may have on the United Kingdom 
leniency policy but concluded that the BE movement can impact on the way the 
market behaviour is perceived. It noted that BE findings may not represent the 
fundamental shift in economic thinking that some advocates assert it to be, but 
recognised that the BE movement ‘is an incremental advance in our 
understanding.’120 
The recognition of the behavioural findings and their significance for antitrust 
was mirrored by the remarks of J. Thomas Rosch, as the Commissioner of the United 
States Federal Trade Commission in 2010.121 These comments recognise that our 
reliance on neo-classical assumptions of rationality as the basis for antitrust 
enforcement, ‘may be costing us too much in the form of aggressive antitrust law 
enforcement.’122 
The BE Approach thus has a strong foothold in policymaking around the 
world, and this influence continues to grow.123 However, the approach is limited in 
its ability to provide established principles in which the effectiveness of the 
immunity policy can be assessed, which is exemplified in many of the criticisms 
directed at the BE Approach. We now turn to these criticisms. 
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3 Criticisms of the Behavioural Economics Approach  
 
The prime criticism of the BE Approach is that, in contrast to the rational 
actor model, there is no unified theory of BE findings that can help policymakers 
formulate policy in any predictable or potentially useful way.124 These criticisms 
stem from the assertion that the increasing proliferation of BE findings have led to an 
inconclusive and broadly inconsistent model of human behaviour, and that even if 
some of the findings hold true, these are not sufficient to constitute an alternate 
theory of human behaviour.125 These criticisms have some force as the BE findings 
are much more complex and diverse than the simple assumption that underpins the 
rational actor theory (that humans are profit maximisers of their utility). The BE 
Approach claims ‘to greater realism in their behavioural models and more accuracy 
in their behavioural predictions will be empirically dubious and incomplete at best 
and empirically false and misleading at worst.’126 In this way, the BE Approach does 
not proscribe where their predictions will occur and where they will not127 and thus 
fails to offer any clear policy implications for competition law.128  
However, as mentioned previously, this has not stopped policymakers around 
the world from heeding the B.E findings to varying degrees when formulating policy. 
The reason that a universal theory of human behaviour has not yet been formulated is 
likely to be attributed to the fact that human behaviour is inherently complex; a fact 
that tends to be overlooked by many rational actor proponents. It may be that such an 
alternate theory may never be developed. This is not a sufficient reason to disregard 
the BE Approach, particularly when these findings have consistently refuted the 
basic assumptions underpinning the rational actor model.  
Secondly, critics of the BE Approach argue that the behaviour of individuals 
varies widely, depending on particular differences in education, training, cognitive 
capacity, sex and cultural background, and thus these cognitive biases do not affect 
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humans consistently.129 This criticism is directed at the fact that BE theorists fail to 
comprehend that human behaviour is neither constant nor uniform ‘but rather 
variable and heterogeneous’ and relies on an assumption of a set of deviations from 
the rational actor model that does not exist.130 Furthermore, it is contended that the 
incorporation of the BE Approach will add to the complexity of policy regulation as 
‘the state of the literature is such that there appears to be too many ways in which 
consumers stray from the rational actor model, often in ways that conflict with each 
other.’131 
The fallacy in this argument is that it assumes that the BE approach attempts 
to provide a ‘meaningful overall characterisation of the quality of human judgment 
which is neither possible nor sought after.’132 This is not to say that this approach is 
the only credible view of human decision making capabilities but it is one that 
provides a more accurate reflection of reality and presently can play a role in certain 
fact specific contexts, such as merger review.133 This criticism of the BE approach is 
thus unpersuasive. 
However, these claims have been disputed by many economists and 
proponents of the rational actor model, who assert that the BE findings are equally 
empirically flawed as those conducted by economists employing the rational actor 
assumption.134 In this respect, the proponents of the rational actor model assert that 
the BE findings are conducted using similar methods and therefore BE advocates 
cannot criticise them on this basis.135 Moreover, there are claims that the BE findings 
are a product of misleading questions where people believe that they are giving the 
right answer to a different question than the one the experimenter believes they are 
answering.136 Critics of the BE Approach thus claim that the findings of BE are as 
unreliable and inconsistent with human decision making as the rational actor model.  
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These criticisms have not been accepted by those who endorse the BE 
Approach who respond that their findings have been consistently replicated in real-
life situations and are thus more accurate than the generalised assumptions 
underpinning the rational actor model.137 For example, much BE research is based on 
actual market transactions, including field experiments and data.138 
A more credible criticism relates to the way that the BE findings are currently 
published, as there is no established means of careful peer review nor are the BE 
findings subject to a well-recognised standard of measurement, such as the 
psychological standard.139 On this basis, it is difficult to investigate and assess the 
credibility of each of the BE findings as they continue to emerge. Like any new area 
of research, there is a need for each new finding to be carefully reviewed, and the BE 
approach is no exception. The reason that this chapter focuses on the findings that are 
well known and generally accepted is to help overcome these credibility issues. The 
way in which the BE research should be standardised is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, but it is nevertheless important that any research in its infancy is approached 
carefully.  
A third criticism is that even if behaviour appears to be irrational facially, 
more often than not, there is a rational explanation for the behaviour.140 Christopher 
Leslie gives the example of predatory pricing in the market to show that behaviour 
that would seemingly appear irrational may be in fact directed towards a more 
rational long-term business strategy.141 Where one firm engages in dangerous 
predatory pricing, it is not necessarily because the firm wants to, but by acting 
irrationally, that firm may be able to drive out the other competitors in the monopoly, 
in a similar way to the game of ‘chicken.’142 Leslie provides many other examples 
that illustrate this point.143  
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For those who endorse the BE approach, Leslie’s argument may be true for 
some aspects of human behaviour, but it does not justify the general assertion that all 
irrational behaviour is rational. Leslie in many ways contradicts himself by calling 
upon some of the findings from the BE approach to justify the rational actor model. 
He speaks of judicial bias as having a significant bearing on the way that rationality 
is constructed.144 Unbewittingly, it seems, he is trying to explain that irrational 
behaviour is rational by drawing upon concepts of the BE approach. 
Another criticism directed at the BE approach is that it acts as a restriction on 
individual liberty and is paternalistic in nature.145 This aspect has been extensively 
debated and discussed in forums such as the OECD146 and the Australian 
Productivity Report into behavioural economics and policy,147 which centres upon 
the issue of the potential negative impacts of incorporating BE findings into policy.  
Liberty is one of the key values in our society as ‘the capacity to live one’s 
life in an autonomous way is one of the most central of all social values in modern, 
democratic societies.’148 The concepts of liberty and autonomy rest on the notion that 
everyone in our society is free to make their own choices, and to also make their own 
mistakes, and to learn from them. Paternalism, particularly in its most extreme form, 
poses a direct threat to our notions of liberty and autonomy of decision-making 
through State intervention into individual choices, oft referred to as the ‘Nanny 
State.’149  
It is claimed that by incorporating BE findings into policy-making, 
particularly consumer policy, which directly influences individual decision-making, 
the state is removing the autonomy of individuals, and in most cases, without their 
awareness or consent.150 If it is accepted that liberty and autonomy of the individual 
is an important value of our democratic society, then any infringement of this value 
should be treated very carefully.  
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One of the most prominent responses to this criticism has been the development 
of the theory of ‘Nudge’ by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein.151 This approach 
seeks to influence the choices of individuals without constraining these choices. The 
acronym NUDGE stands for the following: 
- iNcentives – does not at any point try to discredit supply and demand theory 
of traditional economic theory – looks at key questions such as: Who uses? 
Who chooses? Who pays? Who profits? 
- Understand mappings – ‘A good system of choice architecture helps people 
to improve their ability to map and hence to select options that will make 
them better off.’ 
- Defaults – based on the premise that humans will often chose the path of least 
resistance152  
- Give feedback – ‘the best way to help Humans improve their performance is 
to provide feedback.’ Examples include warning labels etc 
- Expect error – humans are susceptible to making errors. 
- Structure complex choices – ‘People adopt different strategies for making 
choices depending on the size and complexity of the available options.’ 
Sustein and Thaler dub this form of policy making as ‘libertarian paternalism,’ 
which strikes at the core of the assumptions that underpin classical economic theory 
that people always make decisions in their best interest.153 They argue that in most 
forms of policymaking, paternalism is unavoidable and as long as it is libertarian 
paternalistic, then individuals still have the freedom of choice in decision making and 
this is therefore acceptable.  
As a theory in its infancy, the BE approach does provide useful insights into 
human decision-making in an attempt to more accurately reflect a model of human 
behaviour. The theory is subject to wide criticism and debate, despite its foothold in 
policy-making circles around the world. One view is that the approach relies on 
outdated psychological testing that was appropriate for the time in which it was 
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developed, yet it does not account for the significant developments in neurological 
science that have occurred since the 1980s.154  
Professor Jones advocates for a convergence of fields to broaden and enrich 
the BE analysis, such as the incorporation of research involving disciplines such as 
evolutionary biology that will ‘blend the many virtues of BE with virtues of other 
disciplines.’155 There are others who also recognise the value of the BE approach but 
remain cautious of the way it should be incorporated into public policy and adopt the 
view that the BE approach should ‘supplement not substitute’ the existing rationality 
model, given its current limitations.156 
As this section has demonstrated, there is much further development needed 
within the BE approach in order for it to provide a cogent model or set of criteria that 
can be used in policy making. This research is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Instead, what can be gained from this discussion is the recognition of the flaws 
inherent within the rational actor model. Whilst no alternative theory exists to replace 
this theory, the focus must be on supplementing and enhancing the existing model. 
The next part will outline a model that attempts to achieve this within the context of 
the immunity policy. 
 
C A New Approach to Assessing Cartel Immunity   
 
This chapter has demonstrated that the neo-classical rational actor model is limited in 
its ability to predict human behaviour. There have been a number of alternative 
theoretical developments, most notably the BE Approach, which seek to overcome 
these limitations. Whilst some of the main findings of the BE Approach potentially 
impact the immunity policy’s operation, the most significant limitation with this 
approach is that it does not provide an overarching theory or a cogent set of criteria 
that can be used to assess the policy. As demonstrated in Chapter II,157 the immunity 
policy was designed within the neo-classical framework as part of the DOJ’s anti-
cartel enforcement agenda. The criterion most commonly used to assess the policy’s 
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‘effectiveness’ was also designed by the DOJ using this classical deterrence 
framework.158  According to the former Director of Criminal Enforcement at the 
DOJ, Scott Hammond, the three ‘cornerstones’ of an effective immunity policy are: 
 
1. Threat of Severe Sanctions 
2. High Risk of Detection 
3. Transparency and Predictability of Enforcement 
 
1 Threat of Severe Sanctions 
 
It has been accepted in a number of jurisdictions that the threat of criminal 
sanctions provides the most effective deterrence of serious cartel conduct, making 
the incentive to apply for immunity even greater.159 These assumptions are based on 
the classical deterrence theory that presumes that the ‘rational actor’ will be deterred 
from committing crimes when the risk of detection is high and the sanctions are 
severe.160 According to Hammond, the threat of severe sanctions is premised on two 
considerations: 
(a) The perceived risks must outweigh the potential rewards: In a simple cost-
benefit analysis, the perceived benefits must outweigh the perceived costs.  
(b) Criminal sanctions provide the greatest inducement to cooperation: The 
DOJ believes that the threat of criminal sanctions is the greatest threat to 
an individual and this is the primary reason that many companies will not 
engage in cartel conduct in the United States.161 
 
2 High Risk of Detection 
 
According to Hammond, a high risk of detection from regulatory enforcement 
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agencies is another crucial element of a successful immunity regime and it is 
important that sufficient resources are allocated to these agencies to assist in 
achieving this end.162 Without a high risk of detection, cartel members will not be 
inclined to come forward to report their misconduct in exchange for immunity. In 
order to induce cartel participants to come forward, Hammond states that there is a 
need to create a culture that condemns white-collar crime. He also believes it is 
necessary to introduce individual immunity to create distrust between corporations 
and their employees. Additionally, regulatory agencies must be given robust 
investigatory powers to ensure that there is a real perceived risk of action being taken 
by the authorities for those who engage in cartel conduct.163 
 
3 Transparency and Predictability in Enforcement 
 
The third hallmark of an effective immunity program, according to Hammond, is 
transparency and predictability. An immunity applicant needs to be able to assess, 
with a sufficient level of certainty, that their application will be successful. To 
achieve this, the DOJ has published its standards and policies in relation to leniency 
and also provides an explanation as to how the DOJ will exercise its prosecutorial 
discretion in its application of these standards and policies: 
The Division has sought to provide transparency in the following enforcement areas: (1) 
transparent standards for opening investigations; (2) transparent standards for deciding whether to 
file criminal charges; (3) transparent prosecutorial priorities; (4) transparent policies on the 
negotiation of plea agreements; (5) transparent policies on sentencing and calculating fines; and 
(6) transparent application of our Leniency Program.164 
The DOJ has also published a number of model conditional immunity 
templates that are publicly available for potential applicants to review.165 Hammond 
believes that the sacrifice of prosecutorial discretion through the granting of upfront 
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immunity is necessary to create the high level of certainty necessary for potential 
applicants to come forward.166 
The above three criteria have been widely endorsed in the competition 
community as the primary method to assess the effectiveness of an Immunity 
Policy.167 It is clear that these criteria are premised on the neo-classical assumptions 
that humans are rational actors, based on classical deterrence theory. They are based 
on the rational actor model, which has been shown in this chapter to be severely 
limited in its ability to predict human behaviour. By employing the rational actor 
model to assess the effectiveness of the Immunity Policy, the policy is viewed in a 
vacuum, isolated from the wider enforcement context in which it operates, including 
its interactions or impact on other areas of the law.168   
Professor Caron Beaton-Wells recognises the limitations of the current 
effectiveness criteria to assess cartel immunity.169 Beaton-Wells points to recent 
figures released by the ACCC that indicate that the initial signs of the introduction of 
criminal sanctions for cartel conduct appear to contradict the impact that severe 
sanctions would have on immunity applications.170 In fact, Beaton-Wells states that 
the introduction of criminal sanctions may have had the opposite effect than the 
ACCC intended, with a reduction in the overall number of immunity applications.171 
This could be attributed to a number of factors, such as the newly forged relationship 
between the ACCC and the CDPP, where the processing of immunity applications in 
a bifurcated system may not be as timely and consistent as initially anticipated.172 
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Despite these factors, the decline in overall immunity applications directly contrasts 
with the predictions of the rational actor model. 
In relation to the ‘fear of detection’ criterion, Beaton-Wells outlines empirical 
work that suggests that fear of detection is not necessarily a highly material factor in 
seeking immunity.173 In this vein, she suggests that corporate culture and the flow-on 
effects of immunity applications made overseas in respect of conduct potentially 
affecting Australian markets may be factors that lead to applications, as opposed to 
simply a fear of detection.174  
Finally, Beaton-Wells states that the ACCC and immunity practitioners do 
not perceive the abdication of prosecutorial discretion as beneficial. This is 
particularly in the case of determining the penalty for ‘second-in’ immunity 
applicants, where the ‘ACCC relies heavily on the non-transparent, highly 
discretionary nature of the (Cooperation Policy) to provide cooperating parties that 
are ineligible under the AIPCC with the same degree of immunity as is available 
under that policy.’175 
In light of her analysis, Beaton-Wells suggests that the current criteria 
employed to assess the effectiveness of the immunity policy are of limited utility in 
real-world application. She suggests there is a more nuanced, qualitative approach 
needed to assess how such policies work in practice in specific jurisdictions. This is 
reflected most notably in the context of private cartel enforcement, where the 
ACCC’s focus is primarily on the threat that disclosure might pose to future 
immunity applications, rather than on providing any opportunity to facilitate redress 
for cartel victims.176 
Beaton-Wells analysis has two important implications: the first relates to the 
recognition that the immunity policy operates within a wider administrative and 
enforcement context then the current criterion accounts for. Therefore, the DOJ 
effectiveness criterion needs to be extended to accommodate the limitations of the 
neo-classical model and assess it according to wider public policy principles. The 
second implication relates to the method employed to assess these criteria and how 
the adoption of a qualitative empirical approach can help produce more nuanced 
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understandings of the operation of the immunity policy, then purely quantitative or 
numerical studies.177 
As a result, the current criteria used to assess the effectiveness of the immunity 
policy need further development. Therefore, in accordance with wider public policy 
principles, the current criteria would be extended to include an assessment of the 
following factors in relation to the immunity policy: 
- Threat of sanctions 
- Fear of detection 
- Transparency 
- Accountability 
- Consistency  
- Proportionality 
This section will briefly outline the meaning of each criterion with the aim of 
formulating key questions that can be used to assess the immunity policy. The first 
three of these criteria have been described above as they form the DOJ’s criteria 
most commonly used to assess the policy’s effectiveness. The purpose of this section 
is to introduce the most important considerations related to each of the criteria rather 
than to provide an extensive historical analysis of each of the terms. The above 
criteria were chosen because of their extensive use in many areas of the law to assess 
policy, including criminal law, constitutional law, administrative law and 
international law.178 Similar criteria are often used by law reform bodies, such as the 
Australian Law Reform Commission, to guide their assessment of a particular area of 
the law and to establish standards that can be measured.179 A number of these 
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principles are also enshrined in legislation or form part of legislative principles.180 
These examples illustrate that these principles are widely accepted in Australia as 
guiding and informative in the design and administration of public policy. For this 
reason, it is not necessary to provide a comprehensive historical account of each of 
the principles, but rather to provide an overview of each of the concepts and pose key 
questions that can be used to assess the immunity policy. 
Through the employment of wider principles of public policy, it is possible to 
assess the immunity policy with reference to its interaction with other aspects of the 
law and the enforcement context, such as private enforcement181 or the international 
anti-cartel enforcement context.182 Although the examples used to support the new 
criteria will be primarily Australian, many of these principles are internationally 
significant and are therefore capable of wider application.183 
 
4 Transparency 
 
In addition to the threat of sanctions and fear of detection (described above), the 
concepts of transparency and predictability already form part of the criteria currently 
used to assess the effectiveness of the immunity policy.184 However, the DOJ does 
not provide a clear definition of ‘transparency’. According to the ACCC’s 
Compliance and Enforcement Policy, transparency involves two primary 
considerations:185 
• the ACCC’s decision-making takes place within rigorous corporate 
governance processes and is able to be reviewed by a range of agencies, 
including the Commonwealth Ombudsman and the courts  
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• the ACCC does not do private deals—every enforcement matter that is dealt 
with through litigation or formal resolution is made public 
 
These considerations do not constitute a definition of ‘transparency’ that can be 
used to assess the Immunity Policy. The OECD outlines a number of relevant 
definitions that have been used in the international community that demonstrate the 
broad nature of the term.186 PriceWaterhouseCoopers defines transparency as ‘the 
existence of clear, accurate, formal, easily discernible and widely accepted 
practices’187 whereas the World Trade Organisation believes the terms involves three 
core requirements:  
1) to make information on relevant laws, regulations and other policies 
publicly available;  
2) to notify interested parties of relevant laws and regulations and changes to 
them; and  
3) to ensure that laws and regulations are administered in a uniform, impartial 
and reasonable manner.188 
Whilst there is no universally accepted definition of ‘transparency’ there are three 
key considerations that are central to its definition that can be employed to assess the 
immunity policy, that serve the basic democratic principle of openness.189 These are: 
(a) Publication of relevant information 
This entails the availability of a clear, detailed and user-friendly 
description of the immunity policy’s requirements and 
implementation process.190 The DOJ criterion supports this by stating 
the importance of publishing relevant policy documents is crucial to 
the consistent and predictable operation of the policy.191 
                                                
186 OECD, 'Public Sector Transparency and the International Investor' (Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, 2003) 20. 
187 Ibid. 
188 Ibid. 
189 OECD, above n 183, 66-71; see generally, Robert Vaughn, 'Transparency in the Administration of 
Laws: The Relationship Between Differing Justifications For Transparency and Differing Views of 
Administrative Law' (2011) 26 American University International Law Review 969.  
190 OECD, above n 186, 39. 
191 Hammond, above n 158. 	
 
81 
 
Key Question/s: Is there clear, detailed and user-friendly 
publication of the immunity policy requirements and 
implementation processes by both the ACCC and the CDPP? 
(b) Prior Notification and Consultation 
A report published by the OECD on regulatory reform stated that 
‘prior notification and consultation of regulatory proposals to the 
public could enhance both the legitimacy and the effectiveness of 
regulatory measures.’192 In this vein, the design and operation of the 
immunity policy should be subject to public consultation that should 
be comprehensive, timely, transparent and accessible. When 
determining which public recommendations to take on board, the 
regulatory body should be accountable for their decisions by 
disclosing the comments received and react to or publish the reasons 
for taking them into account or not.193 The report published by the 
OECD warns that regulatory agencies should be acutely aware of 
becoming ‘captive’ to special interests and avoid consultation 
fatigue.194 
Key Question/s: Has there been a comprehensive, transparent, 
timely and accessible public consultation in relation to the 
immunity policy? Are these consultations publicly available? 
Has the regulatory authority provided reasons for the 
inclusion/exclusion of the recommendations? 
(c) Procedural Transparency 
The regulatory authority must administer its policy in a uniform, 
impartial and reasonable manner.195 This concept is intrinsically tied 
to the accountability of the regulatory authority and therefore this 
consideration is likely to overlap with the discussion of reviewability. 
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However, procedural transparency also relates to the inclusion of 
‘review rights’ such as the ‘right to appeal.’196 
Key Question/s: Does the ACCC and the CDPP administer its 
policy in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner? Does 
the policy list any procedures for review or ‘review rights’? 
 
5 Accountability 
 
The concept of accountability broadly refers to the notion that elected officials are 
accountable to citizens for governmental performance which forms a key component 
of democratic governance.197 In the context of regulatory authorities, these agencies 
should be accountable to their principals for the manner in which they exercise the 
powers and discretions given to them.198 The principle of accountability is 
intrinsically linked to the concept of legitimacy, where democratic ideals mandate 
that the regulators who exercise government or public powers that are not directly 
elected should be held accountable for their decisions in other ways.199 
Professor Nicolaides from the European Institute for Public Administration in 
the Netherlands believes that accountability involves two dimensions: the first is 
democratic, and the other more procedural, relating to the justifications of a 
regulator’s decisions.200 The focus here will be on the second dimension of 
accountability, as this research is not concerned with the overall democratic 
accountability of regulators, but primarily with how the regulator can be held 
accountable for their decision in relation to the Immunity Policy.  
A number of measures have been identified that ensure accountability. These 
include: consultation, access to information and due process rules when making 
individual decisions or sanctions.201 The first two factors have been discussed in the 
context of transparency and therefore demonstrate the overlapping nature of the 
proposed criteria.  
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The due process rules largely refer to the reviewability of regulatory 
decisions. Administrative review refers to the opportunity for a complaint to be heard 
by an independent administrative body or judicial body.202 The reviewability of 
administrative decisions ‘can be seen as the ultimate guarantor of transparency and 
accountability.’203Administrative law accountability, such as through the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal, provides a strong form of accountability, as it 
involves a response to the regulator’s failure to the meet the required standard.204 On 
the other hand, the opportunity for judicial review is generally limited on the basis of 
ultra vires or lack of procedural fairness. The ACCC recognises the importance of 
accountability in the administration of its policies and sets out a comprehensive list 
of mechanisms in its aim to ensure its fair and transparent operation.205  
Key Question/s: What are the accountability mechanisms that assure 
the effective implementation of the Immunity Policy? Do these 
accountability mechanisms apply to both the ACCC and the CDPP? 
More specifically, are decisions made in respect of the Immunity 
Policy subject to administrative or judicial review? 
 
6 Consistency 
The concept of consistency is rooted in the English law tradition through the doctrine 
of precedent.206 The proposition that laws are to be applied equally, without 
‘unjustifiable differentiation’ is cemented in the rule of law.207 The principle requires 
that the justice system should be consistent in the application of laws and in 
practice.208 The term has often been used in the criminal law context in relation to 
sentencing: 
Just as consistency in punishment – a reflection of the notion of equal justice – is a 
fundamental element in any rational and fair system of criminal justice, so inconsistency in 
punishment, because it is regarded as a badge of unfairness and unequal treatment under the 
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law, is calculated to lead to an erosion of public confidence in the integrity of the 
administration of justice.209 
 
The CDPP also states that consistency is one of the principles upon which the 
Prosecution Policy is based, where one of the main aims of the policy is to ‘promote 
consistency in the making of the various decisions which arise in the institution and 
conduct of prosecutions.’210 
Inherent within the principle of consistency are two competing 
considerations: the fettering of discretion given to public bodies and the requirement 
that they act consistently in the interests of fair administration.211 It is important that 
decision-makers retain a degree of discretion so that they can depart from their own 
policies where the circumstances require it.212 However, the policy needs to be 
‘consistent with the statute under which the relevant power is conferred.’ In this vein, 
the decision-maker should not be precluded from ‘taking into account relevant 
considerations’ but should also not take account of irrelevant considerations.213 
Related to consistency is the principle of certainty in that issues of 
uncertainty may lead to inconsistency.214 This is reflected to some extent in the 
criteria currently used to assess the immunity policy, where the DOJ believes that a 
high degree of certainty is necessary to ensure that potential applicants know how 
they will be treated in accordance with the policy and the consequences if they fail to 
do so.215 
The publication of policies, reporting of outcomes and the requirement to 
disclose the reasons for the decision are key ways to measure consistency.216 These 
methods can help guard against ‘arbitrary decisions and reliance on erroneous 
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notions’ and ensure that decisions are determined on a case-by-case basis.217 In this 
way, there is significant overlap with the principles of transparency and 
accountability. 
It must be noted that the Immunity Policy operates in a multi-dimensional 
capacity. In Australia, the policy is administered in a bifurcated system, meaning that 
there is a need for consistency in the processes and decision-making across both the 
ACCC and the CDPP.218 The policy also operates in an international context, where 
various regulators across the world have enacted similar policies into their anti-cartel 
enforcement regimes.219 Therefore, the issue of consistency is relevant to multi-
jurisdictional immunity applications. 
Key Question/s: Are there currently sufficient ways to assess whether 
the Immunity Policy is being applied consistently? Are the ACCC and 
CDPP consistent in their administration and operation of the 
Immunity Policy? Does the policy operate consistently in the context 
of multi-jurisdictional applications at an international level? 
 
7 Proportionality 
The meaning of proportionality is largely tempered by the context in which it 
is used. Historically, the concept can be traced back to German constitutional and 
administrative jurisprudence.220 The use of the principle spread to the European 
Community, where it is widely used in relation to human rights discourse and 
judicial decisions.221 An example is the freedom of speech rights under Articles 10 
and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights.222 
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The principle is now endorsed on many levels in the international 
community, particularly in relation to the law of armed conflict223 human rights 
treaties and constitutions and international documents around the world.224 On a 
domestic level, the principle is often referred to in the context of criminal law, 
administrative law and constitutional law.225 For instance, the High Court has 
affirmed the use of proportionality as a basic principle of criminal sentencing,  as ‘a 
sentence of imprisonment imposed by a court should never exceed that which can be 
justified as appropriate or proportionate to the gravity of the crime considered in light 
of its objective circumstances.’226 
Furthermore, the concept has been widely used in the context of 
administrative law; as Justice Kirby has observed: 
Under European law it is now well-established that a public authority (including the 
Executive Government) may not impose legal obligations except to the extent that they are 
strictly necessary in the public interest to attain the purpose of the measure authorised by the 
legislature. If the burdens imposed are clearly out of proportion to the authorised object, the 
measure will be annulled. There must therefore exist a reasonable relationship likely to bring 
                                                
223 Enzo Cannzzaro, 'The Role of Proportionality in the Law of International Countermeasures' (2001) 
12 European Journal of International Law 889, 915-16; James Crawford, Jacqueline Peel and Simon 
Olleson, 'The ILC's Articles on Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts: Completion 
of the Second Reading' (2007) 12 European Journal of International Law  963-991.  
224 See eg, Nicholas Emililou, The Principle of Proportionality in European Law: A Comparative 
Study (Kluwer Law International, 1996); Evelyn Ellis, The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of 
Europe (Hart Publishing, 1999); David Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (Oxford University Press, 
1st ed, 2004); E Sullivan and Richard Frase, Proportionality Principles in American Law: Controlling 
Excessive Government Actions (Oxford University Press, 2009) 6: provides an overview of the 
longstanding acceptance of proportionality in Western countries and argues that ‘every intrusive 
government measure that limits or threatens individual rights and autonomy should undergo some 
degree of proportionality review.’ 
225 See, eg, The Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5(1)(a); Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 6(1)(a); Crimes 
(Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 5(1)(a); Sentencing Act (NT) s 5(1)(a); Penalties and Sentences Act 
1992 (Qld) s 9(1)(a); Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 10(1)(k); Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 
16A(2)(k); Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 3A(a); Zecevic v Director of Public 
Prosecutions (Vic) (1987) 162 CLR 645 at 662; Johnson v The Queen (1976) 136 CLR 619 at 636; 
Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357 at [69]; See, eg, Legal Services Directions 2005 (Cth), 
Appendix B; Legislative Standards Act 1992 (Qld) s 4; Susan Kiefel, 'Proportionality: A Rule of 
Reason' (2012) 23 Public Law Review 85; McCulloch v Maryland (1819) 4 Wheat 316 at 421; 
Commonwealth v Tasmania (Tasmanian Dam Case) (1983) 158 CLR 1 at 260; Australian Capital 
Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106; Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 
177 CLR 1. 
226 See, eg, Hoare v R (1989) 167 CLR 348 at 354; Veen (No 1) v R (1979) 143 CLR 458 at 467; Veen 
(No 2) v R 143 CLR 472; R v Channon (1978) 20 ALR 1;Mirko Bagaric and Athula Pathinayake, 'Jail 
Up; Crime Down Does Not Justify Australia Becoming an Incarceration Nation' (2015) 40 Australian 
Bar Review 64, 68. 
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about the apparent objective of the law. The detriment to those adversely affected must not 
be disproportionate to the benefit to the public envisaged by the legislation.227 
In light of its widespread use as a guiding principle, proportionality can be 
seen as a ‘trade-off’ device that aids in resolving conflicts between norms, principles 
and values by acting as a legal standard by which individual or state actions can be 
assessed.228 The modern conception of the principle in administrative law emphasises 
that ‘proportionality requires the administration to balance all relevant interests at 
issue and then to use its discretionary powers in light of this balancing exercise.’229 
More specifically, the assessment of proportionality generally involves a three-stage 
test: (1) Suitability; (2) Necessity; and (3) Proportionality stricto sensu, meaning 
proportionality in the narrow sense.230 These factors are assessed cumulatively but 
more emphasis is placed on the factors in ascending order: 
(a) Suitability 
With respect to the measure at question, the means adopted by the government 
need to be rationally related to the stated policy objectives.231 On this basis it is 
necessary to ascertain whether the adopted measure is suitable or appropriate to 
achieve the objective it pursues.232 
(b) Necessity 
This step entails the use of a ‘least-restrictive’ means test to ensure that the 
measure does not curtail individual rights any more than is necessary to achieve 
stated public policy goals.233 This test requires two important considerations. The 
first relates to whether there are less restrictive or milder measures that could be 
utilised, and secondly, whether the alternative measures are equally effective in 
                                                
227 Peter Johnson, 'Proportionality in Administrative Law: Wunderkind or Problem Child?' (1996) 26 
Western Australian Law Review 138, 147; New South Wales v Macquarie Bank (1992) 30 NSWLR 
307, 323-324. 
228 Mads Andenas and Stefan Zleptnig, 'Proportionality: WTO Law: In Comparative Perspective' 
(2007) 42 Texas International Law Journal 371, 375. 
229 Johnson, above n 227. 
230 See, eg, Andenas and Zleptnig, above n 228, 388-399; Matt Meir, 'Let the Press and Government 
Grapple: The Constitutional Question Posed by a Statutory Right of Reply' (2012) 17 Media and Arts 
Law Review 368, 374; Pnina Alon-Shenker and Guy Davidov, 'Applying the Principle of 
Proportionality in Employment and Labour Law Contexts' (2013) 59 McGill Law Journal 375, 378-
379. 
231 Christopher Michaelsen, 'Reforming Australia's National Security Laws: The Case for a 
Proportionality-Based Approach' (2010) 29 University of Tasmania Law Review 31, 41. 
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achieving the pursued objective. The basic objective of this test is that ‘the measure 
adopted by the state should do minimal harm to citizens or the public interest.’234 
(c) Proportionality stricto sensu 
This final step is the most complex and requires an analysis as to whether the 
effects of a measure are disproportionate or excessive in relation to the interests 
affected.235 This is the stage that requires the true balancing of the competing 
objectives.  
The Australian Law Reform Commission cautions against placing too much 
emphasis on the proportionality principle, as the importance and complexity of the 
issues under consideration is likely to involve value judgments and subjectivity.236 In 
light of these remarks, and other limitations of the principle237 the principle of 
proportionality will be used as an overall guiding principle. This use of 
proportionality as a guiding principle has been legislatively adopted in Australia. For 
example the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) stipulates in section 
37M(2)(e) that: ‘the resolution of disputes (must be) at a cost that is proportionate to 
the importance and complexity of the matters in dispute.’ Moreover, the ACCC itself 
incorporates proportionality as a guiding principle by emphasising that the ACCC’s 
enforcement response must be ‘proportionate to the conduct and resulting harm.’238 
Key Question/s: In conjunction with the assessment of the other 
guiding criteria, do the measures taken in relation to the Immunity 
Policy satisfy the three-stage proportionality test? If not, what other 
alternatives exist that may better satisfy this test? 
These criteria do not seek to replace the current criteria used to assess the 
Immunity Policy but are aimed at enhancing the existing model. The use of this 
enhanced criterion allows the policy to be assessed within the enforcement context in 
which it operates, where its interaction with other areas of the law can be critically 
analysed. It carries with it the importance of recognising that the Immunity Policy 
                                                
234 Andenas and Zleptnig, above n 228, 383-384.	
235 Ibid. 
236 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 179, [2.75]-[2.76]. 
237 See, eg, Tom Hickman, 'Problems for Proportionality' (2010)  New Zealand Law Review 303; 
Kiefel, above n 225, 91-92. 
238 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n 185: ‘The ACCC’s enforcement 
response is proportionate to the conduct and resulting harm, and the implementation of the ACCC’s 
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cannot continue to be assessed in accordance with traditional neo-classical economic 
assumptions, as the policy does not operate in a vacuum. The assessment of the 
Immunity Policy’s operation has largely been conducted with reference to numerical 
or quantitative economic studies that seek to assess the policy’s effectiveness.239  
Examples of methods employed to assess the policy’s effectiveness in this 
respect have included numerical examinations of immunity applications and 
outcomes; the number of proceedings brought versus the number of those 
proceedings that have resulted in a finding or liability and the quantum of penalties 
that have been imposed.240 The use of such quantitative methods provides an 
extremely narrow view of the immunity policy’s operation and is limited in what it 
can reveal about the policy’s effectiveness. This is due to the fact that these 
assessments heavily rely on the information provided by the competition authorities, 
which is often not forthcoming.241 The limited means of assessing the proportion of 
cartel activity that may be taking place at any given time is another significant factor 
that distorts the quantitative assessment of the policy’s effectiveness. 
It is for these reasons that this thesis will adopt a qualitative, empirical 
assessment of the Immunity Policy as an alternative method to assess its 
effectiveness, in conjunction with the enhanced guiding criteria. The next chapter 
will outline the methodology that will be employed to execute this empirical 
assessment. 
This chapter has illustrated that the Immunity Policy was born within the 
context of US cartel enforcement under the influence of neo-classical economics. At 
its core lies the assumption of the rational actor model. Whilst the assumption of 
rationality has strong support, particularly in the Chicago economics school of 
thought, this chapter has analysed more recent theoretical developments that cast 
light on the limitations of the rational actor model.  
Empirical research and advancements in studies such as psychology, 
sociology and neuroscience have shown that humans do not often conform to the 
predictions of the rational actor model. This has important implications for the way 
that the Immunity Policy was designed, given that there are limitations in the theory 
upon which the policy was originally based. Therefore, there are strong indicators 
                                                
239 See, eg, the economic studies referenced at above n 18. 
240 Beaton-Wells, above n 169, s IV; Ibid. 
241 See, eg, Beaton-Wells and Fisse, above n 4.	
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that the rational actor model does not provide a sufficient theoretical model for the 
Immunity Policy.  
In this vein, this chapter argued that the Immunity Policy should be subject to 
the same public policy principles that inform other areas of the law, particularly in 
the international law context. It is the aim of this thesis to apply these public policy 
principles in relation to the Immunity Policy, to strength, enhance and reconcile the 
aims of the Immunity Policy with those of public and private cartel enforcement law 
and the other areas of law with which it intersects. 
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IV RESEARCH DESIGN 
This Chapter will outline the research design used to gather, analyse and interpret the 
empirical data obtained from the conducting of semi-structured qualitative interviews 
in relation to the Immunity Policy. The results of this data analysis will be used to 
supplement the main research findings obtained from secondary research and 
generate the final recommendations aimed at strengthening the existing Immunity 
Policy. 
It was decided that the most appropriate qualitative research tool to gain an 
in-depth insight into the design and operation of the Immunity Policy was to conduct 
semi-structured qualitative interviews. There were several reasons for this decision. 
Firstly, quantitative data is inherently unreliable in the field of cartels, as it is 
significantly difficult to tell how many cartels are operating at any time or what the 
nature of the cartel conduct is. The difficulty faced by researchers in this area is well 
documented.1 When the research was first conceived in 2012, there was very limited 
statistical information available as to the number of cartel immunity applications 
made to the ACCC since the policy was revised in 2005.2 Furthermore, the 
information that was available was highly generalised. For example, the ACCC made 
a bold assertion that it has received over 100 ‘approaches’ in relation to immunity 
since 2005.3 However, the word ‘approaches’ did not indicate how many of these 
approaches actually resulted in immunity applications, and how many actually 
progressed into civil proceedings or settlement. These statistics also did not reveal 
whether these immunity ‘approaches’ were generated by domestic or international 
cartels.  
However, more detailed immunity information was later provided by the 
ACCC in 2013, presumably due to criticism in relation to the lack of transparency 
                                                
1 See eg, John Connor, 'Cartels Portrayed: Detection' (2011)  AAI Working Paper No. 11-05 23; 
Gregory Werden, Scott Hammond and Belinda Barnett, 'Deterrence and Detection of Cartels: Using 
all the Tools and Sanctions' (2011) 56 The Antitrust Bulletin 207; OECD, Cartels and Anti-
Competitive Agreements Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
<www.oecd.org/competition/cartels>;  Australian Competition & Consumer Commission, 'Updated 
Immunity Policy to Uncover Cartel Conduct' (Media Release, MR 225/14, 10 September 2014). 
2 Australian Competition & Consumer Commission, 'Revised 'first in' Immunity Policy for Cartel 
Conduct' (Media Release, MR 210/05, 29th August 2005). 
3 Rod Sims, 'Opening Address: IBA Competition Conference' (Paper presented at the International Bar 
Association 9th Competition Mid-Year Conference, Sydney, 21 March 2013).	
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surrounding this information.4 Even with the publication of more statistical 
information in relation to the Immunity Policy, the ACCC acknowledges that it is 
still difficult to ascertain the percentage of immunity ‘approaches’ out of all the 
cartels currently operating. These factors make it very difficult for researchers to use 
quantitative data as a tool in this field of research. This is compounded by the fact 
that the use of statistical data provides a very limited and generalised description in 
relation to the immunity policy’s current operation.  
Secondly, the use of surveys was seriously considered as another possible 
option which could be used to gather information relating to the immunity policy.5 It 
was thought that an online short response questionnaire could be sent to individuals 
who directly deal with the Immunity Policy, which could potentially allow for a 
greater sample of individuals to be captured, as opposed to the number of people who 
could be interviewed.  
It was ultimately decided that the use of qualitative surveys would be too 
limited for the scope of research that was necessary for a comprehensive analysis of 
the design and operation of the Immunity Policy. This is due to the fact that the 
breadth of the research questions could only be sufficiently answered through very 
sophisticated and comprehensive responses that could not be accommodated by 
qualitative surveys.6 Even if the surveys were to be conducted with an option for 
long-response questions, the value of the information provided in an interview is not 
only derived from what has been said, but how it has been said.7  
In line with the framework analysis methodological approach, which will be 
explained below, it was necessary to conduct interviews to construct and develop 
knowledge surrounding the Immunity Policy, which was a crucial component of 
learning the themes and patterns that underpin the discussions within the interview 
                                                
4 Marcus Bezzi, 'The ACCC Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct: Due for Review?' (Paper presented 
at the Competition Law Conference, Shangri-La Hotel, Sydney, 4 May 2013); Caron Beaton-Wells, 
'The ACCC Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct: Due for Review' (2013) 41 Australian Business Law 
Review 171. 
5 See eg, Harrie Jansen, 'The Logic of Qualitiative Survey and Its Position in the Field of Social 
Research Methods' (2010) 11 Qualitative Social Research 11; Research Sage Publications, 
'Introduction to Survey Methods' (1998) 46 Current Sociology 1, 1-6; James W Chesebro and 
Deborah J Borisoff, 'What Makes Qualitative Research Qualitative?' (1997) 8 Qualitative Research 
Reports in Communication 3. 
6 Michael Quinn Patton, Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods (Sage Publications, 3 ed, 2002) 
341. 
7 Ibid; Tony Greenfield, Research Methods for Postgraduates (Arnold, 1996) 169. 
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data.8 This approach provided the opportunity to understand the Immunity Policy and 
its associated issues, without being foreclosed by the strict confines of an 
unresponsive set of data. It was also important to clarify some of the more complex 
and controversial questions in relation to issues that generated strong moral 
responses. Many examples of these responses were found in the discussions relating 
to whether cartel informants should be paid to provide information to the regulators.9 
Many of the opinions and emotions tied to these issues cannot be captured by a 100 
words or less response of the kind commonly found in survey studies.  
Finally, the use of semi-structured interviews as a research tool is a flexible 
research method and this is generally aided by the use of open-ended questions. It is 
an effective way of ‘finding out from them things we cannot directly observe.’10 The 
use of open-ended questions was most suited to answering the research questions, as 
it provided the opportunity to learn from the most primary source of information, that 
being those who directly deal with the immunity policy, as opposed to deriving 
information from the overgeneralised and limited published information.  
At the time of commencement of this research in 2012 there were no other 
published empirical studies related to the Immunity Policy that had been conducted 
through semi-structured interviews. However, during the time of this research, Dr 
Caron Beaton-Wells commenced a similar project in relation to the Immunity Policy, 
titled ‘The Immunity Project.’ In conjunction with the recent review of the Immunity 
Policy, Beaton-Wells conducted a similar study of stakeholder opinion using semi-
structured qualitative interviews. While Beaton-Wells has not published all of the 
findings in relation to her research, many of her findings have informed recent 
academic papers in relation to the immunity policy.11 Her findings enrich the debate 
in this field, as her research is both recent and relevant to this thesis. Thus, the 
existence of other empirical work in relation to the immunity policy has strengthened 
the relevance of the research undertaken in this thesis.  
                                                
8 Mary C Lacity and Marius A Janson, 'Understanding Qualitative Data: A Framework of Text 
Analysis Methods' (1994) 11 Journal of Management Information Systems 137, 139. 
9 See also Chapter V, Cartel Informant System, 161.  
10 Patton, above n 6, 341-342. 
11 Beaton-Wells, above n 4; Caron Beaton-Wells, 'Immunity Policy: Revolution or Religion? An 
Australian Case-Study' (2013) 2 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 126.  
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A The Interviews 
 
The primary study involved semi-structured qualitative interviews with a total of 16 
individuals. These interviews were conducted for between one and two hours each. 
Each interviewee was asked questions relating the design and operation of the 
immunity policy derived from a set of pre-determined questions to ensure an 
adequate level of consistency.12 These open-ended questions allowed for greater 
flexibility with responses, and opportunities to follow a tangent or new idea that may 
have not have been initially anticipated. It also allowed for the tailoring of certain 
aspects of the questions to the particular interviewees’ interests or experience.  These 
interviews were conducted primarily in Sydney, with others conducted in Melbourne.  
 
B The Logistics of the Project 
 
1 Recruitment 
The participants were selected on the basis of their current professional position. 
Contact details were accessed through publicly available records.  The interviewees 
were either: 
• identified through contact details of individuals in publicly 
available records, or alternatively;  
• Identified through contact details of employers from publicly 
available records and then the employer was asked for access 
to the person in the appropriate professional role.   
The individuals identified were initially contacted, primarily via email, 
depending on whether my supervisors had prior contact with the person. Prior 
contact between a person and my supervisor/s existed in some cases, for instance, 
because of professional associations, such as involvement in special interest groups 
connected with competition law or legal practice. Where there was an existing 
relationship between the person and my supervisor/s, I was required to make 
                                                
12 See eg, Clive Seale, 'Quality in Qualitative Research' (1999) 5 Qualitative Inquiry 465. 
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personal contact with the person to provide initial information about the research and 
request an interview.  
A draft email template was devised that outlined a brief description of the 
thesis, the aims of the research and sought an opportunity to meet with the 
participant at a time that was suitable to them. Within this email, it was also 
important to emphasise how the interviewees’ knowledge would be useful to the 
project and how the researcher had come to know of their knowledge and/or 
experience in working with the Immunity Policy. In some cases, where the 
researcher had been referred to contact a particular participant, the name of the 
person who recommended them would be included in the email, in order to create 
authenticity and increase the likelihood of the interviewee’s acceptance in taking part 
in the interview. A total of 36 potential participants were contacted, with a total of 16 
taking place. Many of the interviewees who declined did so on the basis of busy 
schedules. There was also an extensive process of follow-up via email for those who 
indicated they wished to participate but either had to cancel or never responded. 
After the initial contact, potential participants who wished to proceed to the 
next step were sent the Participant Information Sheet and were provided with 
information about confidentiality. Confidentiality was discussed and agreed upon 
with each potential participant on an individual basis, as confidentiality requirements 
varied slightly between the interviewees. All potential participants were invited to 
ask any questions and discuss the research at any time. For participants who agreed 
to an interview, the time and place was discussed and agreed upon. Before each 
interview was conducted, the agreed confidentiality details were recorded in the 
consent form and signed by the participant and researcher conducting the interview.  
2 Sample Selection 
In order to select and recruit a number of individuals, the advice of my 
supervisors, colleagues within the competition law sector and extensive research into 
those individuals was relied upon to determine those individuals who were at the 
forefront of dealing with the Immunity Policy and thus had extensive knowledge and 
expertise. This process was therefore highly selective and was not intended as a 
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random sample.13 In order to improve the quality of the research, it was necessary 
that each interviewee had been personally involved with the immunity policy. This 
access is restricted to high-level legal personnel within a law-firm, as these are the 
individuals who most commonly interact with the Immunity Policy and are therefore 
best placed to describe the design and operation of the policy from a first-hand 
perspective.  
In addition to this factor, it was also important to consider representativeness 
in the research.14 After considerable research, it was found that those individuals who 
most commonly deal with the Immunity Policy are generally partners in law firms 
from large corporate firms. As a result, the perspective of a smaller law firm is likely 
to be neglected. This is one limitation of this research, as this factor could potentially 
skew the research results. The reason for this is because large corporate law firms 
often advise large business in relation to the Immunity Policy and are thus likely to 
be in favour of the policy, as it potentially allows their client to be immune to civil 
and criminal proceedings. Therefore, in order to overcome this lack of 
representativeness, it was imperative to include interviewees from academia, the Bar 
and members of the ACCC itself.  
However, one of the perspectives that is clearly missing from this research is 
the perspective of class action law firms. These are the firms that generally represent 
third party claimants who have been adversely affected by cartel conduct who wish 
to initiate court proceedings against the cartel members. Despite many attempts to 
contact various individuals with this particular experience, it was not possible to 
secure an interview. This was also hindered by the fact that there is currently only 
one active class action firm acting for third parties adversely affected by cartels, 
which made it more difficult to secure an interview with members of this firm. For 
the purposes of this thesis, this limitation has been overcome by undertaking further 
research published by class action firms and individuals to ensure this perspective is 
properly considered in this research.  
The number of interviews conducted was not a primary concern, given that, 
as explained above, the empirical data is intended to be used as a supplement to the 
research of secondary sources. Nonetheless, the amount of data generated by these 
                                                
13 Nicholos Mays and Catherine Pope, 'Rigour and Qualitative Research' (1995) 311 BMJ 109, 110-
111. 
14 Ibid.	
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interviews was extensive. An officially accredited transcriber employed by the 
University of Wollongong transcribed each of the interviews. Over 100 pages of 
transcribed data, totalling over 70 000 words resulted. Therefore, the number of 
interviews that were conducted was appropriate for the time and resources available 
for this research.  
 
3 Setting 
In order to accommodate the interviewees and to ensure that as many 
interviews were secured as possible, it was necessary to travel to the various 
locations in which the interviewees were employed. A majority of these interviews 
were conducted in the Sydney CBD, but it was also necessary to travel to Melbourne 
to conduct three interviews. The amount of travel and availability of the interviewees 
influenced the number of interviewees that were selected, as it would have been too 
burdensome to continue recruiting and interviewing participants, when extensive 
data had already been collected.  
Travelling to the offices of the interviewees was the most ideal way to accommodate 
the very busy workload of all of the interviewees. This also helped to ensure that 
they were comfortable and willing to be able to discuss the matters in relation to the 
Immunity Policy. 
 
4 Outline of the Interview 
At the commencement of each interview, each interviewee was provided a 
general introduction and a brief outline of my thesis. Each interviewee was then 
provided with an overview of the aims and purpose of the interview, by 
acknowledging their intimacy with and knowledge of the immunity policy. The 
interviewees were informed that their knowledge could help formulate 
recommendations for the Immunity Policy, which was a key component of this 
thesis. 
Each interviewee was asked whether they consented to an audio recording of 
the conversation to allow the interviewer to concentrate on the interview and elicit as 
much information as possible. All but three of the interviewees consented to the 
audio recording. Handwritten notes were also taken in addition to the audio 
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recordings. It was also explained to the interviewees that, if they wished to provide 
any comments ‘off the record,’ that information would be handled discreetly and in 
confidence. The interviewer would then be able to research these additional and 
unofficial comments independently. This ensured that the interviewer was able to 
gain as much information as possible from the interviewees.  
It was explained to the interviewees that the approach to the interview was 
objective and neutral, which meant that the interviewer was open to learning as much 
about the immunity policy as possible. It was also mentioned that the research had 
not received any funding, apart from the University of Wollongong itself, and 
therefore the research was undertaken in an independent capacity.  
In line with Michael Quinn Patton’s qualitative interviewing style, it was 
decided that an open-ended semi-structured interview scaffold would be the most 
appropriate model to structure the interview.15 Those who requested that a copy of 
the interview questions be sent to them prior to the interview-taking place were sent 
this scaffold.16 The questions were deliberately designed to be broad and general at 
the beginning before more specific points were explored.  
Generally, the discussion would diverge into other areas, previously 
unknown, and this style of interview allowed for this type of divergent discussion to 
develop. This meant that any new ideas and concepts that were discussed with one 
interviewee could be later added to the interview scaffold and discussed in 
subsequent interviews with other interviewees. A core set of scaffold questions were 
used in each interview to ensure consistency throughout the interviews. Additionally, 
if an interviewee had experience and knowledge in one particular area, then the 
scaffold questions were modified to accommodate this so that a greater amount of 
time could be spent on that particular area. 
 
5 Informed Participants 
With any research that involves human subjects, it is necessary that the 
ethical risks are recognised and addressed and that informed consent is granted. As 
part of this responsibility, Human Research and Ethics Approval was required before 
                                                
15 Patton, above n 6, 344-380. 
16 See Appendix A: Interview Questions.	
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the commencement of my empirical research to ensure that the research complied 
with University policy; that the researcher was well-aware of the risks involved in 
the project and that the steps had been taken to ensure these risks were minimised or 
eliminated. 
 
(a) Risks  
Confidentiality and anonymity were the primary ethical considerations relevant to 
conducting qualitative interviews and these issues were managed effectively. On an 
individual level, each potential interviewee was contacted in advance and provided 
with a consent form, and their confidentiality was assured, both in writing and 
verbally, prior to the interview taking place. This also applied where the participant 
requested to remain anonymous, although anonymity was not requested by any of the 
interviewees.  On a collective level, data was kept in the researcher’s custody; the 
exception being during the transcription of audio recordings where the transcription 
service was bound by contractual obligations of confidence. 
 
(b) Informed Consent 
As mentioned above, the broad nature of this research was outlined to potential 
participants when first approached, and more complete details of the aims of the 
project and expectations of participants were provided (both verbally and via the 
Participant Information Sheet) when they agreed to participate in the interview or 
upon request. Once the project had been fully explained, all of the interviewees had 
the opportunity to ask questions to clarify their involvement, and capacity to consent 
was acknowledged formally by way of a signed consent form. This form provided 
written information about the project, and an assurance of confidentiality. The 
consent form was signed and dated by the participant and stated that the participant 
had received full explanation.17   
 
                                                
17 See Appendix B: Participant Information Sheet; Appendix C: Interviewee Consent form. 
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(c) Withdrawal of Consent 
Participants were advised verbally and in writing on the consent form that they could 
discontinue participation at any time and that there would be no adverse effects on 
any participant who chose to withdraw their consent. Participants were advised that if 
they chose to withdraw their consent during the course of the interview they would 
be able to have their data withdrawn by requesting that the data be deleted or by 
instructing the transcriber to omit that participant’s contributions in the transcription. 
(d) Confidentiality  
Confidentiality was one of the primary ethical considerations relevant to conducting 
qualitative interviews and this issue was managed carefully. On an individual level, 
each potential interviewee was contacted in advance and provided with a consent 
form, and their confidentiality was assured, both in writing and verbally, prior to the 
interview taking place.  
In light of the fact that the data from this research project is published in a 
thesis and potentially will be used in journals and presented at conferences; the 
identity of the participant was kept confidential and published only with permission. 
All participants provided consent. There were no special requests to maintain 
anonymity by any of the interviewees. As part of reporting this research, direct 
quotations from the interview were utilised. However, each interviewee was given 
the option of being given a pseudonym, and all identifying information (including 
relevant possibilities such as the name of the institution, the participant’s position, 
etc.) could be removed from the published material. No interviewees requested the 
use of a pseudonym. 
On a collective level, the student investigator undertook the conducting of the 
interviews and analysis of the data only. Data is and will always be in the custody of 
the student investigator with the only exception being during the transcription of 
audio recordings when the transcription service was under contractual obligations of 
confidence. 
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C Method  
 
The method used to analyse the interview data is referred to as ‘Framework 
analysis’ or the ‘Framework approach.’18 Given the diverse range of qualitative 
methods available to analyse participant interviews, it was important to select a 
methodology appropriate to the research style and questions. This research is a type 
of applied policy research and framework analysis is a tool often used with this type 
of research, as it involves a coherent and systemic approach.19  
This process involves an examination of ‘constant comparison’ whereby each 
item in the data is checked or compared with the rest of the data in order to establish 
analytical categories.20 After the interviews are transcribed, researchers using this 
method are required to immerse themselves in the data with the aim of gaining a 
thorough and in-depth understanding of the phenomena in question.21 Through this 
process, the data is analysed with the aim of developing a categorical system to 
reflect the many nuances of the data, instead of reducing the data to a few numerical 
codes, as is the aim of many quantitative studies.22  
This method is aptly suited for the analysis of semi-structured interviews and 
policy relevant qualitative research, particularly where the objectives of the 
investigation are set in advance and the timescale of the research tends to be 
relatively short.23 Although the research is deduced from pre-set aims and objectives, 
the framework approach also reflects the observations of the people studied and in 
that way is ‘grounded’ and inductive.24 
The deductive elements of the method distinguished it from a purely 
inductive approach, such as grounded theory, where the research develops in 
response to the data obtained through an ongoing analysis and iterative process.25 In 
contrast to many inductive methods, the primary aim is not to generate a theory, 
                                                
18 This approach was first developed by Ritchie & Lewis, see: J Ritchie and J Lewis, Qualitative 
Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers (Sage Publishers, 2003). 
19 Catherine Pope, Sue  Ziebland and Nicholas  Mays, 'Analysing Qualitative Data' (2000) 320 BMJ 
114. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Bruce L Berg, Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences (Allyn and Bacon, 4th ed, 
2001) 7.	
22 Pope, Ziebland and Mays, above n 19.  
23 Ibid 116. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Joanna Smith and Jill Firth, 'Qualitative Data Analysis: The Framework Approach' (2011) 18 Nurse 
Researcher 52, 52-53. 
 
102 
 
rather it is to describe and interpret what is occurring in a particular setting, in 
accordance with a set of pre-determined research questions.26 
 
The Process 
(a) Stage 1 - Transcription of Interviews 
Due to the overwhelming amount of data generated by the interviews, it was 
appropriate to outsource the transcription of this data. The risk involved with 
outsourcing this process is that a researcher will not be as familiar with the data then 
if it were self-transcribed, which is an integral component of the process of 
understanding the phenomena in question. To minimise this risk, the audio from each 
of the interviews were listened to against the transcripts to ensure its accuracy and 
validity. The interviews were also transcribed verbatim to ensure that the original 
meaning was not altered by the transcriber.  The transcription resulted in over 70 000 
words of raw data. 
(b) Stage 2 – Familiarisation with the Interview Material 
This process required complete immersion in the interview data, through the 
act of reading and re-reading the transcripts to gather an in-depth understanding of 
the research. This is also referred to as understanding the ‘narrative’ of the data, by 
searching for the ‘story’ that the interviews reveal.27 During this process, note taking 
was extremely important. Large margins were deliberately created to allow for 
analytical thoughts, feelings and impressions about the data to flow freely.28 A 
separate document was created to note patterns and themes that were generated by a 
reading of the data, which allowed for the development of and creative engagement 
with the material. The important of ‘memo-taking’ is a well-documented tool for the 
development of theories and ideas.29 
                                                
26 A Srivastava and S Thomson, 'Framework Analysis: A Qualitative Methodology for Applied Policy 
Research' (2009) 4 Journal of Administration and Governance 72, 76. 
27 See eg, Terry Locke, Critical Discourse Analysis (Bloomsbury Academic, 1st ed, 2004); Bryan 
Jennar, Methods of Text and Discourse Analysis (SAGE Publications, 1st ed, 2000); Berg, above n 21. 
28 Nicola Gale et al, 'Using the Framework Method for the Analysis of Qualitative Data in Multi-
Disciplinary Health Research' (2013) 13 BMC Medical Research Methodology 117, 120. 
29 Memo-taking is particularly well-documented in the methodological approach of Grounded Theory, 
where a crucial component of the analytical process is the development of new ideas and theories, and 
this is achieved on an on-going basis by writing down thoughts as the analysis progresses. See eg, 
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(c) Stage 3 – Coding 
A line-by-line analysis was carried out on the interview material, and a 
paraphrase or label (otherwise known as a ‘code’) was attached to the sections that 
were deemed to be of particular importance. These codes can refer to substantive 
aspects of the data, such as particular behaviours or structures; values, such as those 
that underpin certain statements, such as a belief in the criminalisation of cartel 
conduct; emotions (or lack thereof), such as happiness or frustration, or more 
methodological elements, such as where interviewees became agitated or 
uncomfortable with certain areas of discussion.30  
The identification of these codes was then inputted into a ‘coding matrix,’ 
where the data was assigned to different themes and categories in the coding 
matrix.31 The primary aim of coding is to allow for the systematic comparison of the 
data sets, also known as the method of ‘constant comparison.’32  
One of the most significant aspects of this step was that it allowed for the 
development of a full and comprehensive understanding of the material. More 
importantly however, this type of analysis revealed aspects of the data that were 
originally hidden, in the sense that some issues did not seem to be meaningful when 
a cursory analysis the data was conducted. It was only after the in-depth line-by-line 
analysis was conducted upon the completion of the interviews that many valuable 
underlying themes emerged. It was by analysing and reconciling these anomalies that 
the analysis was made stronger.33 
 
(d) Stage 4: Developing and Applying a Working Analytical Framework 
During this process, the codes were finalised to form the working analytical 
framework, which was added to and changed until the last transcript was coded. The 
first stage of summarising and synthesising the range and diversity of coded data 
took place, as the initial themes and categories began to be refined. Each of the 
subsequent transcripts were then applied to the analytical framework through the 
                                                                                                                                     
Melanie Burks and Jane Mills, Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide (SAGE Publications Ltd, 2011);  
Kathy Charmaz, Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide Through Qualitative Analysis 
(SAGE Publications, 2006) Chapter 4.	
30 Gale et al, above n 28. 
31 Smith and Firth, above n 25, 4-5. 
32 Gale et al, above n 28, 119. 
33 Ibid 4.	
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assigning of each code, which was abbreviated for ease of identification, and each 
code was noted directly on the transcripts. 
 
(e) Stage 5: Charting Data into the Framework Matrix 
A table was designed to create a matrix where the data could be inputted, 
which involved the process of summarising the data by category from each 
transcript. During this process, it was paramount that there was an appropriate 
balance between retaining the original significance and meaning of the data, as well 
as reducing it to a manageable level.34 It was important to also include key references 
and illustrative quotations in the framework matrix, which could then be used in the 
published findings. 
 
1st and 2nd Level Coding - Table 1 
 
1st Level Coding 2nd Level Coding 
Restitution to third parties Roles/Purpose of Public/Private Enforcement 
 
Derivative immunity for 
employees 
 
Vicarious immunity 
Carve-out policy 
On-going disclosure/cooperation 
 
Mentions recidivism 
Multi-jurisdictional issues 
 
Immunity as negotiation (power imbalance) 
Sovereignty  
Cartel Whistle-blower Proposal 
 
Necessity (or lackthereof)  
Good Samaritan  
False/vexatious claims 
Alternatives to immunity 
(“Bounty”) 
Cross-over with whistleblower   
Morality/ethical considerations 
Cross-over with credibility 
                                                
34 Ibid 5. 
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Opinion on cartel project survey Moral/Ethical considerations 
Culture clash 
Concept of “justice” 
Lack of knowledge/public perception 
Credibility in criminal cartel trials “Too early to tell” (criminal)  
 
General views of the immunity 
policy 
Impact of criminalisation 
Necessity/effectiveness 
U.S influence 
Cross-over with motivations for seeking immunity 
Off-setting immorality 
ACCC transparency 
Cross-over with overreliance 
Recording of oral proffers 
Knowledge of law/ cartel provisions 
Silence as a strategy 
Immunity as negotiation v confession 
Criteria to refer if criminal 
Overreliance on immunity policy Cross-over with motivations for seeking immunity 
Loss of skill of detection 
Effectiveness/necessity 
Alternative methods of detection (s155/Dawn 
Raids/Education/Market analysis) 
BA CASE 
ACCC as criminal investigators  
The ACCC Cooperation Policy Responsive regulation 
Certainty v Flexibility (Principles and substance v black and 
white rules) 
“Playing the game” (lawyers) 
Certainty & wait and see approach  
Silence as strategy 
Relationship between the 
ACCC/CDPP 
“Too early to tell” 
Transparency 
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Sufficiency of proffer/information for criminal immunity/ 
Criteria to refer as criminal 
Difference in process versus difference in culture 
Time lag 
Certainty 
Confidentiality – PCI – Scheme PCI in Criminal context 
Roles/Purpose of Public/Private Enforcement 
Certainty/Effectiveness/ Impact on immunity applications 
Transparency 
Third party “victims” 
Administration of justice 
Morality (MD) 
Too early to tell 
Revocation of immunity Certainty  
Legal character of policy – reviewability of ACCC decision 
“Trust/confidence in regulator” (GF) 
Pragmatic approach (NM) 
 
Enforcement culture (as compared 
to U.S) 
Influence & power of United States 
Cross-over with ACCC/CDPP relationship 
Perception of cartel conduct (cross-over with criminalisation) 
Dibber dobber culture of Australia 
Criteria to refer as criminal 
Public lack knowledge 
Ringleader Exclusion Practically/necessity 
Slight cross-over with recidivism 
“Above the law” mentality  
 
Cartel Recidivism Gaming immunity policy 
Moral/Ethical considerations 
Crossover with ringleader 
Organisational structure 
Amnesty Plus crossover 
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Certainty 
Off-setting immorality 
Theory v Practice 
Definitional disputes (certainty v flexibility) 
Omnibus question 
Crossover with restitution/revocation (GS) 
Theory underpinning policy ‘Rationality’ 
‘Certainty’ – crossover with restitution 
Corporations as rational actors – company structure 
Utilitarian notions of 
justice/morality 
Restorative/responsive regulation versus utilitarianism  
Cross over with bounty (CBW) 
“Effectiveness”/”Necessity” outweighs immoral aspects 
Lack of public knowledge 
Use for other areas –such as insider trading 
Small business experience Large companies ‘using’/”playing” the system 
ACCC as unskilled criminal investigators 
Lack of knowledge 
Cross-over with criminalisation 
Recording of oral proffers 
Miscellaneous issues  Company structure in immunity applications 
“Shifting the blame to rogue employee” 
Policy use for insider trading 
BA CASE/criminalisation 
Legal character of the immunity policy 
Vicarious immunity 
Silence as an alternative to immunity 
Cross-over with restitution (Michael Gray) 
“Gaming policy” 
Cross over with recidivism (ACCC) 
ACCC as unskilled criminal investigators 
Criteria to refer as criminal 
Amnesty Plus/Cooperation 
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The 1st level codes were colour-coded to reflect the importance of the issue 
based on the level of consensus reached in relation to that particular issue. The red 
highlighted sections indicate the most controversial issues; the yellow indicates 
pertinent issues; and the green indicates non-pertinent information. 
 
(f) Stage 6: Interpreting the Data 
This stage of the analysis is designed to allow for the development of 
associations and patterns within concepts and themes; interpreting meaning in the 
concepts and themes that emerge from the data and generally garnering a holistic 
impression of the meaning of the interviews.35 This was the stage where each of the 
categories and codes were reflected upon and links were formed between the 
categories to formulate the key findings emerging from the data. This required a 
rearranging of the matrix in some places to pull the most controversial and important 
ideas into groups, and arrange them by theme and importance to the research 
questions. At all stages, the data was cross-checked with the original source to ensure 
that the participant accounts were accurately presented and to avoid 
misrepresentation. Each of the key empirical findings is outlined in the next chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
35 Smith and Firth, above n 25. 
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V EMPIRICAL INSIGHT INTO THE IMMUNITY POLICY: KEY 
FINDINGS  
 
This chapter is intended to provide a descriptive account of the responses from 
the interviewees in relation to four key areas outlined below. The proceeding 
chapters will then provide a critical analysis of these responses, and the issues that 
arise, in conjunction with further research, to formulate final recommendations in 
relation to these important areas of the immunity policy’s design and operation.  
The key findings derived from the analysis of qualitative data can be divided into 
four primary categories. These are: 
- Perceptions of & Attitudes towards the Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct 
- Eligibility & Cooperation Requirements of Immunity 
- The Tension between Public & Private Enforcement – Confidentiality and 
Third Parties 
- Alternatives to the Immunity Policy 
 
A Perceptions of & Attitudes Towards the Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct 
1 The Concept of ‘Effectiveness’ 
When interviewees were asked about any particular issue in relation to the Immunity 
Policy, they generally responded in reference to the ‘effectiveness’ of the program: 
 
Interviewee: So, let me first address the effectiveness question. Has the policy allowed better 
detection and prosecution of cartels? I think it probably has. Ours is quite early in its 
deployment and so maybe too early to say, but from my observation of the last 7 years that 
we’ve had a policy there’s a much higher level of reporting then there otherwise would be. 
So therefore certainly as far as detection is concerned it has been effective, more effective 
than not having it.1 
 
The way that the term ‘effectiveness’ was described throughout a majority of 
the interviews, and most notably from the lawyers and partners of larger law firms, 
was through a ‘cost-benefit’ analysis, expressed in utilitarian terms, in terms of the 
                                                
1  Interviewee 4 (Sydney, 17th June 2013) 4. 
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Immunity Policy serving a ‘greater good’ for society.2 When questioned about any 
issues that might involve assessments of ‘morality’ in relation to Immunity, many 
interviewees quickly deferred to these utilitarian precepts of effectiveness as a means 
of justifying any moral ambiguity or controversy. This I have termed ‘off-setting 
morality.’  
According to the interviewee responses, the ‘effectiveness’ of the Immunity 
Policy is primarily assessed in terms of its ability to achieve cartel detection and 
deterrence. This consideration is given precedence over all other more nuanced or 
normative factors that may arise within the policy’s design and operation or its 
interaction with other areas of the law. In this way, many of the interviewees framed 
the concept of ‘effectiveness’ in purely neo-classical economic ‘cost-benefit’ terms, 
without reference or regard to other relevant or normative factors, such as 
transparency, accountability, consistency and proportionality. 
There were some interviewees, namely academics, who recognised this 
emphasis on utilitarianism but disagreed with its value, advocating instead for a more 
restorative, responsive type of regulation: 
 
Interviewee:  That’s basically what I think you have; well…see… that idea, that was more of 
a restorative, responsive sort of idea. That was more from the earlier philosophy, the sort of 
Allan Fels philosophy of how to do regulatory enforcement, I think, whereas the current one 
is much more utilitarian.3   
 
One of the questions put to the interviewees was in relation to the survey 
results generated by the Cartel Project from the University of Melbourne, which 
indicated that over half of the general public surveyed disagreed with the concept of 
an immunity policy. These negative views of the Immunity Policy existed even 
though the survey described to them that the purpose of the policy was for the overall 
detection of illicit conduct that may not have otherwise been detected.4 The reason 
behind the public’s response to the policy may be attributed to the fact that one 
person in the cartel is escaping ‘scot-free’ from prosecution when they have admitted 
                                                
2 See also, Matthew Haist, 'Deterrence in a Sea of Just Desserts: Are Utilitarian Goals Achievable in a 
World of Limiting Retibutivism' (2009) 99 Journal Criminal Law & Criminology 789.	
3 Interviewee 1 (Sydney, 9th July 2013) 8. 
4 Christine Parker, 'Report on Interviews with Civil Respondents in Cartel Cases' (Centre for 
Regulatory Studies and Law Faculty, Monash University, 2011) 
<http://cartel.law.unimelb.edu.au/go/project-news/project-outputs>. 
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to participating in a crime. The idea of ‘full’ immunity is unique, in contrast to other 
prosecution policies around the world, as cartel immunity is guaranteed ‘upfront’ and 
is often given to a person/or company who is likely to be viewed as equally culpable 
to the other participants.5  
When questioned as to why the public may not necessarily agree with an 
Immunity Policy, many of the interviewees could not understand how the policy 
could possibly be seen as ‘immoral’ in the eyes of the public, in the sense described 
above. It was not until the interviewees were prompted or an explanation was 
provided that this point was fully understood. One interviewee went as far as to 
suggest that companies are sophisticated organisations, which may therefore exclude 
them from the morality question altogether: 
 
PM:  …that it’s immoral to let somebody who was the ring leader to stay in the cartel. 
 
Interviewee:  But these are companies. I mean these are global companies. I mean this isn’t 
like the situation where you’ve got a gangs of kids and the 16 year kids getting the 14 year 
olds to throw rocks at the bus. This is like multi-national corporations with boards and 
governance structures. 6 
 
Other interviewees’ first reaction was to laugh at the fact that some people 
perceive the policy as immoral, whilst others targeted the reliability of the 
methodology employed to conduct the Cartel Project survey. Some were opposed to 
engaging with the essence of the question, comparing the Cartel Project study to a 
‘Herald sun type activity.’7 
Thus, a clear theme emerged from the interviewees that separated the 
‘effectiveness’ of the policy with its potential ‘immoral’ characteristics. Most 
interviewees claimed that the former factor was of more importance in their 
assessment of the policy’s current operation. To this end, many interviewees quickly 
dismissed any question relating to the moral aspects of immunity.  
In stark contrast however, when the interviewees were asked about other 
more controversial developments relating to immunity, they tended to drawn upon 
the same ‘morality arguments’ they initially opposed or could not understand to 
support their arguments. One scenario in which this arose was within the discussions 
                                                
5 Chapter VI, The Credibility Of Accomplice Evidence, pg 203.	
6 Interviewee 2 (Sydney, 22nd July 2013) 11. 
7 Interviewee 7 (Melbourne, 26th April 2013) 18. 
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relating to the introduction of a cartel informant system. This system refers to the 
concept of financially rewarding those who are not directly involved in the cartel to 
come forward and provide cartel information to the competition authority. When 
questioned about the possibility of introducing a financial rewards system in 
Australia, many interviewees found this proposition morally ‘uncomfortable’ or a 
‘bit distasteful’8: 
 
Interviewee: I don’t really like the idea of it just instinctively; it’s not something that appeals. 
 
PM: On sort of a moral level? 
 
Interviewee: On a moral basis, yeah.9  
 
Most notably, when the interviewees were questioned about the morality of 
the Immunity Policy, which is essentially a policy rewarding people who have 
admitted to cartel conduct, these moral elements were often disregarded or not fully 
understood by the interviewees. But when asked about a cartel informant policy, 
which is essentially a policy rewarding those not involved (or ‘innocent’) in relation 
to cartel conduct, many of the interviewees were against this policy on the basis that 
it goes ‘against gut instinct.’10 
This inconsistent treatment of morality was also illustrated within the 
discussions relating to the introduction of whistle-blower provisions. These 
provisions serve to protect third parties who were not directly involved in cartel 
conduct from employer retaliation upon revealing pertinent information to the 
authorities. There was a strong sense from some of the interviewees that there is no 
need for these additional provisions, ‘It’s just a further level of irksomeness that I’d 
prefer to avoid. You know, it’s bad enough as it is’11 (emphasis added). There was 
another suggestion that instead of those not involved in the cartel being protected 
through whistle-blower provisions, that these individuals should simply ‘do the right 
thing’ by coming forward to the regulators, without reward or protection: 
 
Interviewee: No, I don’t believe in paying whistle blowers even in tax. My gut reaction is 
against it in any field. 
                                                
8 Interviewee 13 (Sydney, 22nd July 2013) 22. 
9 Interviewee 9 (Sydney, 15th July 2013) 23.	
10 Interviewee 10 (Sydney, 29th July 2013) 21. 
11 Interviewee 8 (Sydney, 15th July 2013) 20.	
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PM: Why is that? 
 
Interviewee: A bit like your comment on the United Kingdom case that failed. Encourages 
exaggerated and overblown claims, allegations and I suppose I think people should be more 
abiding anyway when it happens. 
 
PM: Yeah, the idea of a Good Samaritan? 
 
Interviewee: Mmm.12 
 
However, in the discussions relating to the actual Immunity Policy there was 
no indication that immunity applicants should come forward to the authorities and 
‘do the right thing.’ From the language used in these discussions, there was also no 
indication that the interviewees believed that their clients had committed any ‘wrong-
doing.’ There was certainly no suggestion that seeking immunity is akin to a 
confession, or any language of that nature.    
These inconsistencies were also found in other areas of discussion. For 
instance, when discussing the credibility issues potentially faced by immunity 
applicants, this seemed to be a ‘manageable’ issue for many of the interviewees, 
particularly because the immunity applicant’s evidence is so imperative to the 
ACCC’s case. In contrast however, when questioned about the cartel informant 
system, many interviews were quick to state that paying people to come forward and 
reveal cartel information would essentially lead to false claims. These interviewees 
claimed that whistle-blowers are likely to have ulterior motives and be unreliable 
witnesses as a result.13  
Therefore, whilst it appeared that credibility is not a significant issue for the 
interviewees in the context of immunity, it was a central theme in the discussions 
about the alternatives to immunity. Many of the arguments levied against these 
alternative propositions, such as whistle-blower protections or a cartel informant 
system, were directed to the credibility of those revealing cartel conduct outside of 
an immunity application. The use of negative terms used in these contexts further 
compounded these observations, where the term ‘bounty hunters’ was used to 
describe ‘innocent’ whistle-blowers but no such negative terms were used to describe 
the immunity applicants by a majority of interviewees. 
                                                
12 Interviewee 10 (Sydney, 29th July 2013) 21. 
13 Ibid; Interviewee 7 (Melbourne, 26th April 2013) 41.	
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These inconsistencies in the discussions were also evident in relation to the 
ringleader requirement. Prior to the recent review of the policy, a cartelist would be 
ineligible for immunity if they were deemed to be the key instigator of the cartel 
activity.14 This requirement was designed to prevent a cartel member who instigated 
or coerced other members to join or continue in the cartel from receiving immunity. 
These ‘ringleaders’ are thought to be more culpable than other cartel members, and 
thus should be precluded on this moral basis. However, many interviewees did not 
understand why the ringleader provision may have existed to serve this moral 
purpose. Instead, many interviewees preferred to focus on the pragmatic aspects of 
the ringleader requirement or lack thereof, believing ‘it is not a sensible concept.’15 
 
2 General Opinions about the Current Operation of the Policy 
(a) ‘Overreliance on the Immunity Policy’ 
Given that the immunity policy is often lauded as the ‘single most effective cartel 
detection tool in the world’, it is pertinent to question whether such a heavy emphasis 
being placed on one tool of enforcement has led to an overreliance on the policy by 
competition authorities worldwide. The interviewees were divided on this issue. 
Those who agreed that too much reliance is placed on the Immunity Policy believed 
that this has resulted in a loss of skill on the part of competition authorities: 
 
Interviewee: Yeah, I would agree with that for sure. I think that one of the casualities of the 
immunity policy has been a loss of skill amongst the regulators in detection as cartels used to be 
detected in a variety of ways. There’s always been whistle-blowers and disgruntled participants 
that have come forward, even without immunity, but, and there’s anonymous tip-off’s and stuff 
for generations, but what’s tended to happen is now almost all enforcement activity is generated 
by immunity applicants. Certainly that’s been my experience, and the Commission very rarely, 
not in the this Commission (meaning the ACCC), but DOJ and the European Commission, the 
other anti-trust authorities very rarely have to actually uncover one for themselves through market 
surveys or price monitoring or other forms of policing, it’s mostly brought to them. It’s not only 
brought to them, it’s brought to them in a box by the applicant with a proffer, a suite of 
                                                
14 The ringleader requirement has been modified in the most recent draft release of the immunity 
policy, and replaced with a coercion requirement. The coercion requirement essentially serves the 
same purpose as the ringleader requirement, in that it is designed to prevent a member of the cartel 
who instigated or ‘coerced’ other members to join or continue in the cartel to be eligible for 
Immunity: See Chapter VI, Cartel Coercion, pg 186. 
15 Interviewee 4 (Sydney, 17th June 2013) 17. 
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documents, a statement, it’s almost pre-packaged, so I think it’s good in a sense that it’s led to 
enforcement but it’s bad in a sense that it’s reduced the level of non-participant generated 
activity. I think there’s been a loss of skill amongst some of the regulators.16 
 
Another argument raised in this context tended towards the suggestion that the 
immunity policy is not as ‘effective’ at detection as the regulators currently claim.17 
According to these interviewees, there are a number of reasons why cartel conduct 
may have come to light, which may not necessarily be attributed to the Immunity 
Policy.18 These situations could include, where ‘somebody who has been pushed out 
of the group or somebody’s has an affair with somebody’s secretary,’ or there may 
have been ‘some sort of hotline where people can be reported.’19 There were other 
interviewees that agreed with the proposition that regulators may over-rely on the 
immunity policy as an enforcement tool, but felt this does not mean that they do not 
also use other enforcement tools.20 
On the other hand, there were some strong assertions against the overreliance 
question, believing that the ‘effectiveness’ of the policy, in terms of the benefits it 
provides for greater detection of cartel conduct, outweighs any potential claims of 
overreliance: 
 
PM: … you know, looking for lessons there and perhaps there was sort of widespread 
discussion about perhaps because of the secrecy of cartels that we are over relying on the 
immunity policy. 
 
Interviewee: No, no. 
 
PM: You don’t agree with that? 
 
Interviewee: Absolutely not. And you know, because of their secrecy you need the immunity 
policy to be able to break the secrecy. You know, it leaves… the cartel operators in a position 
where they go to sleep at night wondering are they going to be too late if they ring the ACCC 
in the morning at 7 o’clock and so why not ring them now at 9 o’clock this night before, then 
I can sleep easier.21 
 
                                                
16 Interviewee 2 (Sydney, 22nd July 2013) 6. 
17 Ibid; Interviewee 1 (Sydney, 9th July 2013) 12. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Interviewee 1 (Sydney, 9th July 2013) 12; Interviewee 3 (Melbourne, 26th April 2013) 27. 
20 Interviewee 6 (Not recorded, Sydney, 23rd July 2013).	
21 Interviewee 7 (Melbourne, 26th April 2013) 15. 
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There were also arguments in support of the notion that we should not ‘fix 
what is not broken,’ given that the ACCC has finite resources. These interviewees 
felt that if the policy is supposedly ‘working,’ ‘then that seems to me to put an 
efficient use of their resources.’22 A majority of the interviewees who were against 
the proposition of overreliance generally relied on these types of effectiveness 
arguments to support their views, or were quick to indicate that there lacks an 
alternative method of cartel detection: 
 
Interviewee: Well then how do you measure it (LAUGHS) whether they’re over relying? I 
mean what other detection tools do they have?23 
 
Many of the interviewees spoke about the lack of alternative methods for 
detecting cartel conduct, due to its inherently secret and deliberate nature. There was 
a suggestion that even if the ACCC does use other methods of cartel detection, there 
is a lack of disclosure by the regulator as to what these methods may be.24 When 
asked about these alternate methods, it was interesting that many interviewees, 
including the ACCC itself, were quick to indicate that they are ‘proactive’ with the 
Immunity Policy.25 By ‘proactive’ it was suggested that one of the alternate methods 
of detection of cartel conduct, was to ‘raise awareness’ and ‘educate’ people about 
the existence and purpose of the Immunity Policy: 
 
Interviewee: So I think, you know, when you look at the term ‘over reliance’ you sort of 
sometimes think that you’re just sort of sitting back and waiting for people to come to you 
but it’s not like that. There’s an element of proactive in there.26 
 
When questioned further about other methods that regulators can use for the 
detection of cartel conduct, many interviewees could not provide clear or definitive 
answers. There was reference made to the fact that the ACCC Cooperation Policy 
exists,27 although this is a policy designed for those who are not ‘first in’ and still 
                                                
22 Interviewee 9 (Sydney, 15th July 2013) 5. 
23 Interviewee 13 (Sydney, 22nd July 2013) 7. 
24 Interviewee 3 (Melbourne, 26th April 2013) 27. 
25 Interviewees 12 (Sydney, 19th August 2013) 15, 17. 
26 Ibid 15.	
27 Interviewee 11 (Sydney, 19th August 2013) 15; The ACCC Cooperation Policy has now been 
combined with the ACCC Immunity Policy as part of the recent revision: Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission, 'ACCC Immunity and Cooperation Policy for Cartel Conduct ' (2014) s H.  
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requires the applicant to come forward to the regulator if they feel this is in their best 
interest.  
There were divided opinions about the use of dawn raids for greater cartel 
enforcement. Dawn raids refer to the situation where competition authorities globally 
coordinate raids of company headquarters to seize pertinent cartel information. 
Whilst some interviewees felt that the number of dawn raids the regulator conducts 
could be increased, others held strong opposition to this on the basis that they are 
inordinately expensive to the regulator and intrusive to the company, whose entire 
internal documents and processes are subject to the raid: 
 
Interviewee: And I wouldn’t want our Federal regulator to be rushing around the economy, 
you know, on the smell of a suspicious rag, you know, undertaking dawn raids here and 
there, they’re massively intrusive, they really disrupt the economy, you know, if taken too 
far…28 
 
As per the general theme throughout the interviews, the discourse was again 
heavily concentrated on the ‘effectiveness’ of the policy; with a sense that if the 
Immunity Policy is truly an effective method of cartel detection, then there is no real 
need for other methods of detection to be used. This perspective though, does not 
account for the s 155 powers of investigation that the ACCC regularly uses to gather 
evidence to prove its cartel cases.29 When asked what would be the second most 
effective tool for cartel detection, the ACCC could not indicate ‘off the top of my 
head’ what this method may be, as the immunity policy is ‘by far the one.’30 
 
(b) Motivations for Seeking Immunity  
(i)  Corporate Structure 
It was important to garner a sense of the motivations surrounding immunity 
applications to analyse whether the motivations exhibited a straightforward cost-
benefit analysis, as the rational actor model would predict, or whether there were 
more nuanced considerations that influenced the decision to apply for immunity. 
                                                
28 Interviewee 8 (Sydney, 15th July 2013) 6. 
29 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 155. 
30 Interviewee 11 (Sydney, 19th August 2013) 17.	
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Interestingly, when questioned about these motivations, a number of the lawyers 
immediately indicated that those who were directly involved in the cartel are not 
generally involved in the application for immunity: 
 
Interviewee: Yeah. Well I think, I mean it also comes down to, you know, just as a lawyer 
and your professional responsibilities, in these sorts of cases you should not be taking 
instructions from the person who’s engaged in the conduct. There needs to be someone at a 
very senior level.31 
 
In line with these suggestions were assertions by some interviewees that 
senior management had no knowledge of the cartel’s operation and that most 
instances of cartel conduct occur at the ‘middle management’ level. One of the 
interviewees believed that there were two key reasons that middle management cartel 
members would keep the cartel ‘strictly confidential’ and therefore not apply for 
immunity (1) they do not want to be seen to be participating in a cartel and (2) they 
want to receive the praise, reward and recognition for having a stellar sales 
performance.32  
Other interviewees believed the knowledge of the board members would vary 
depending on the size of the corporation and the type of management system in 
place. When questioned further about this lack of knowledge at a senior level and 
how this is possible, many interviewees tended to qualify their statements, indicating 
that it would depend on the circumstances of the particular corporation and whether 
there were any ‘red flags’ to indicate cartel activity to senior management.33  
There was also strong dissenting opinion in relation to this discussion. One 
interviewee in particular thought that the suggestion that ‘middle management’ being 
involved in cartel activity without the knowledge or consent of the board was part of 
a larger corporate strategy to blame ‘rogue employees.’34 Within this was the 
suggestion that as long as the company is ‘making all this money’ then there is a 
sense of ‘wilful ignorance’ on behalf of the company: 
                                                
31 Interviewee 9 (Sydney, 15.07.2013) 10. 
32 Interviewee 8 (Sydney, 15.07.2013) 13. 
33 These opinions neglect the fact that directors owe a duty of care to the company to ensure that 
adequate mechanisms are in place to properly monitor management: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 
180. See, eg, Re One.Tel Ltd (in liq); Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich (2003) 
44 ACSR 682; Sheahan (as liquidator of SA Service Stations) (in liq) v Verco (2001) 79 SASR 109; 
Cashflow Finance Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corp (1999) NSWSC 671.  
34 Interviewee 1 (Sydney, 9.07.2013) 14.	
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Interviewee: Yeah. It was in their interest to have this person making all this money and 
bringing in all these contracts and they just don’t want to know how they’re doing it and then 
when they find out its illegal then they go, oh you’re a rogue and we’re going to sack you, 
but before that they weren’t doing that.35 
 
(ii) Immunity as a Negotiation  
 
When analysing the discourse surrounding the immunity application, it became 
evident that coming forward to make an immunity application to the ACCC was 
treated by a majority of the interviewees as a ‘negotiation’ as opposed to a 
‘confession’ with the ACCC. This was reflected in the language used when 
describing the interviewee’s general views surrounding the Immunity Policy. Many 
interviewees described the decision to make an application as being based on a 
number of relevant factors, primarily in relation to the risks to the applicant and the 
costs involved.  
The language used during the interviews was clear, concise and portrayed in a 
way that suggested that an immunity application is made as of right or entitlement, as 
opposed to a situation of revealing unlawful conduct. When questioned about the 
motivations that cartel members have when applying for immunity, there was no 
suggestion that applicants were coming forward to ‘confess’ their crime, or 
expressing any element of contrition, or acknowledging any wrong-doing, as ‘it’s a 
pretty hard sell to say you’ll only spend a few weeks in goal… you need to get 
people comfortable.’36 Instead, the language tended to focus on the burdens and 
‘risks’ surrounding cooperation and the immunity ‘prize’: 
 
Interviewee: It involves years of cooperation. It involves huge expense to cooperate and so 
it’s not done lightly and there are down sides because you‘re also exposing yourself to 
customers in a class action liability. So in making your decision to come forward in 
Australia, as an advisor to companies who have done so, it’s not just a straight forward 
matter of saying, well you know, there’s the prize, go in.37 
 
                                                
35 Ibid. 
36 Interviewee 2 (Sydney, 22nd July 2013) 5. 
37 Interviewee 4 (Sydney, 17th June 2013) 14. 
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The interviewees were also well aware of the fact that without the immunity 
application and therefore the immunity applicant’s evidence, the ACCC would 
potentially have a very weak case for enforcement action or even no case at all. 
There was even some suggestion that the ACCC will ‘water-down’ the policy 
requirements to ensure that the immunity application is secured as ‘the ACCC…are 
very loathe to let go of their immunity applicant.’38 
The ACCC itself recognised that immunity applicants may treat an immunity 
application as a negotiation but attributed it to cases where applicants do not fully 
understand the Immunity Policy: ‘but the down side is there are particularly first time 
applicants who may not fully understand the process or the requirements of the 
policy itself, particularly the criteria for immunity. So sometimes, for example, when 
they come in a proper meeting they may see it almost like a negotiation…’39  
(iii) Silence as a Strategy 
Some interviewees indicated that remaining ‘silent,’ in lieu of applying for 
immunity, may be a strategy used by cartel participants that the ACCC has not 
considered. As discussed in Chapter 2, the decision to apply for immunity is 
generally presented as a two-pronged strategy.40 This is reflected in the discussions 
surrounding the supposed operation of the policy, through the application of game 
theory and the prisoner’s dilemma.41 In the context of cartel conduct, decision-
making is generally posited as (1) remain in the cartel and not seek immunity or (2) 
apply for immunity. However, there were interviewees who suggested a third 
possible scenario: (3) Cease all involvement in the cartel and adopt a ‘wait and see’ 
approach: 
 
Interviewee: Well, you’ve got three choices right. Well sorry; there are three forks in the 
road. One is you blow the whistle, OK, no penalty but depending on the nature of the 
industry and so on, follow-on class action, damages, all the publicity, all the distraction and a 
lot of legal expense but you avoid the penalty. Option two is you sit back, see what happens 
                                                
38 Interviewee 8 (Sydney, 15th July 2013) 17.	
39 Interviewee 11 (Sydney, 19th August 2013) 2: This counters the assumption that the ACCC would 
hold all of the bargaining power in relation to the granting of Immunity. Presumably, if the applicant 
does not want to agree to cooperate in way specified in ACCC cooperation agreement then the ACCC 
can then proceed to grant immunity to second or later applicant that is prepared to enter into the 
standard cooperation agreement. 
40 See Chapter II, A Theoretical Breakdown of the Immunity Policy, pg 47. 
41 Ibid. 
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and then there’ll be two forks in the road. One is it does come to the light. You immediately 
cooperate and you get half the penalty. You get a discount for cooperation. 
PM: But they’re only two of the perspectives. 
 
Interviewee: Third option is it never comes to light. 
 
PM: And then nothing happens. 
 
Interviewee: And then nothing happens. So it seems to me the size of the discount for 
cooperation is the price between blowing the whistle and a chance that it never comes to 
light.42 
 
If this were another option that cartelists are choosing to make in the context 
of a cartel, then this would change the way the Immunity Policy is intended to 
operate, in the sense that it deviates from the current prisoner’s dilemma model. 
There were interviewees who believed that this third scenario is unlikely to occur due 
to the fact that there is the risk that the other cartel members or ‘competitors’ may 
change their mind and apply for immunity. More importantly, however, one 
interviewee mentioned that there is no statute of limitations in relation to criminal 
liability, thus you would have to ‘go to your grave on it’ and this would mean that 
the ‘wait and see’ approach still leaves cartelists ‘fully exposed.’43 
 
(c) Factors Influencing Perception 
(i) ‘Us and them’  
There were many different perceptions that the various stakeholders exhibited 
toward each other when discussing issues related to the Immunity Policy, including 
the relationship between the ACCC and members of the legal profession on the one 
hand and the perception of the interviewees towards the general public on the other.  
The most obvious was the relationship between the ACCC and the members of 
the legal profession who were interviewed. Generally the interviewees were 
supportive of the ACCC, and expressed ‘confidence’ and ‘trust’ in the regulator. This 
was reflected in the positive dialogue between the regulators and members of the 
legal profession. When the interviewees criticised the ACCC, they were often quick 
                                                
42 Interviewee 10 (Sydney, 29th July 2013) 2.	
43 Interviewee 8 (Sydney, 15th July 2013) 8. 
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to qualify their statements or to offer explanations as to why the issue may be 
occurring.  
For instance, the interviewees were directed to the recent case example in the 
United Kingdom44 where the CMA was criticised for its overreliance on the 
immunity applicant’s evidence, which resulted in the collapse of its first criminal 
cartel case. When questioned whether this scenario might occur in Australia, due to 
the similarities with the bifurcated system of enforcement, many of the interviewees 
felt that there was no significant risk that this will occur in Australia’s first criminal 
case, as they attributed the CMA’s failure to ‘negligence’.45 There was a strong belief 
by some of the interviewees that the ACCC and CDPP will ‘get it right’, because it 
will be crucial that they do so, in the wake of the CMA’s handling of their first 
criminal cartel case.46  
A clearer level of division throughout the discussions existed between the 
perceived knowledge levels of the general public in comparison to the interviewees 
themselves. Generally there was a sense that, in the eyes of the interviewees, the 
‘public does not know what is good for them.’ This was most evidently reflected in 
the discussions surrounding the Cartel Project Survey conducted by the University of 
Melbourne, outlined above, where the question of morality seemed to be correlated 
with the level of knowledge of the individual in question. When asked about the 
survey results, and why over 50 per cent of the people surveyed may have disagreed 
with the Immunity Policy, many of the interviewees attributed this result to the 
public’s general lack of knowledge of the policy’s operation or of its importance to 
the overall anti-cartel enforcement scheme: 
 
Interviewee: Well there were only 50 per cent who were in favour of the immunity policy, 
I’ve got to tell you, I suspect that of the 50 per cent that were not in favour, 95 per cent had 
no idea what is was that was being discussed.47 
 
Many of the interviewees expressed concern in relation to the methodology of 
the survey, and were of the belief that if the nature and operation of the immunity 
                                                
44 See R v George, Burns, Burnett and Crawley (unreported) 7 December 2009; (2010) 174 JP 313; 
(2010) EWCA Crim 1148.  
45 Interviewee 8 (Sydney, 15th July 2013) 5.	
46 Interviewee 4 (Sydney, 17th June 2013) 24. 
47 Interviewee 7 (Melbourne, 26th April 2013) 19. 
 
123 
 
policy had been accurately described to the members participating in the survey, this 
knowledge would result in them agreeing with the concept of an immunity policy.  
Other interviewees were simply surprised or confused as to why members of the 
public would not agree with it, given the policy’s overall benefits to cartel detection 
and the fact that ‘they’re sort of a very well sort of established set of policies 
because, you know, they’re used here and around the world so I’m surprised that 
people don’t approve of it so to speak.’48 There were some who went as far as to 
imply that public opinion regarding this matter is of little significance in the overall 
scheme of things, and the fact that ‘general people’ may not agree with it should not 
affect the Immunity Policy or that the fact that it exists: 
 
PM: … it wasn’t interviews, it was a survey, like a random survey and basically… 
 
Interviewee: Oh, just people?49 (emphasis added) 
 
When these observations were put to the one of the authors of the survey, it 
was suggested that people answer questions from a moral rather than an economic or 
pragmatic perspective and tend to base their answers on ‘gut instincts’ and 
conceptions of ‘right and wrong.’50 Moreover, the interviewee defended the design of 
the questions in the survey stating that the respondents ‘were given scenarios that I 
think were probably sufficient for them to understand what the conduct was that we 
were asking about and what might be its effects on them as consumers.’51 
 
(ii) A Difference in Culture 
Another important factor influencing the perceptions of the Immunity Policy 
was the perceived cultural differences in Australia, as compared to the United States. 
Many of the interviewees commented on the influence that the United States had in 
compelling other jurisdictions, namely Australia, to adopt the Immunity Policy and 
that it was ultimately adopted unquestionably and unequivocally, as ‘No, no 
question, I think, that we tended to follow what the United States had done. They 
paved the way. Scott (Hammond) was a strong advisor to us as to how we’d adapt 
                                                
48 Interviewee 9 (Sydney, 15th July 2013) 4. 
49 Interviewee 12 (Sydney, 19th August 2013) 9.	
50 Interviewee 3 (Melbourne, 26th April 2013) 14. 
51 Ibid. 
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it.’52 A number of interviewees felt that despite the adoption of the leniency policy in 
the United States, Australians may not have the same moral condemnation towards 
cartel conduct, and are not as inclined to see white collar crime as criminal.53  
The dominant influence of the United States is seemingly reflected in global 
cartel enforcement, where the DOJ holds significant power and sway over the cartel 
enforcement agenda. In contrast, the ACCC does not have the same level of 
influence: 
 
Interviewee: I don’t think that Australia occupies that level of prominence and influence and 
so if it was suggested that the sort of, sanctioned consequence for a foreign offender was that 
they wouldn’t be allowed to travel to Australia again in their lives, well, I don’t think they 
would care.54 
 
A more significant theme to emerge from these discussions was the fact that 
the Immunity Policy may not be an appropriate cultural fit in Australia. A number of 
interviewees commented on the fact that in Australia there is a cultural norm that 
dictates that ‘one does not dob in one’s mate, so to speak.’55 This cultural norm 
would then seemingly be in direct conflict with the prospect of a cartel member 
coming forward to the regulator at the expense of all the other members of the cartel. 
One interviewee in particular acknowledged this ‘cultural resistance’ to the 
Immunity Policy but felt this resistance could be overcome over time, particularly 
when people realise the ‘effectiveness’ of the Policy: 
 
Interviewee: To me, I mean Australians are a bit resistant to it because culturally it is, it is 
unusual. Australians pride themselves on not giving up a mate and all that kind of, it’s part of 
the sort of ethos of, it’s pretty hard-grained into the Australian psyche that you don’t dob 
people in, so I think it did take some getting used to and but when you look at what’s at stake 
and you know, keeping suppressed illegal activity is, I think these days people have 
overcome those kind of, that cultural resistance to it.56 
 
Another interviewee felt that this cultural resistance could never be overcome, as 
it signifies a fundamental divide between people who have different ethical 
                                                
52 Interviewee 7 (Melbourne, 26th April 2013) 4. 
53 Interviewee 11 (Sydney, 19th August 2013) 11; Interviewee 12 (Sydney, 19th August 2013) 11. 
54 Interviewee 4 (Sydney, 17th June 2013) 7. 
55 Interviewee 5 (Sydney, 25th July 2013) 9.	
56 Interviewee 2 (Sydney, 22nd July 2013) 3. 
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principles, where ‘some people think that it’s OK to do something for a greater good, 
which would be it’s OK to let some people get off free because they give the 
evidence about the other people, whereas other people think it’s always wrong to do 
the wrong thing regardless of whether there’s a greater good, which would be it’s 
always wrong to let somebody get off Scot Free if they’ve done something wrong.’57 
There were others who thought the question was one of balance.58  
 
B Eligibility & Cooperation 
1 Cartel Recidivism  
The interviewees were asked a hypothetical question in order to gauge how 
they felt about cartel recidivists. A scenario was put to them that involved: a cartelist, 
namely a corporation, who had been involved in cartel conduct and was granted 
immunity by cooperating with the regulator. The case went ahead, the private 
litigation ensued, and then the case was ‘done and dusted.’ That same corporation, 
with the same individuals, later decides to seek immunity again. The interviewees 
were asked whether these recidivists should be entitled to immunity for a second, or 
subsequent, time. 
Cartel recidivism was the most significantly divided issue discussed in the 
interviews. There was no general consensus as to whether cartel recidivists should or 
should not be entitled to seek immunity for a second time, or anytime thereafter. 
Many interviewees commented on how interesting this question was, as it was one 
that many had not put their minds to, and believed that much more time and effort 
needed to go into formulating their final opinion on the matter.59  
Those interviewees against the position that recidivists should be entitled to 
immunity for a second time, indicated that cartel recidivism is a ‘significant 
problem’60 and there is ‘no way they should get immunity’ for the second time.61 On 
the other hand, there were many interviewees who could see the issue from a more 
diplomatic perspective, acknowledging that the concept of recidivism operates as an 
                                                
57 Interviewee 1 (Sydney, 9th July 2013) 7. 
58 Interviewee 12 (Sydney, 19th August 2013) 10; Interviewee 2 (Sydney, 22nd July 2013) 4.	
59 Interviewee 3 (Melbourne, 26th April 2013) 14; Interviewee 9 (Sydney, 15th July 2013) 14. 
60 Interviewee 3 (Melbourne, 26th April 2013) 13. 
61 Interviewee 10 (Sydney, 29th July 2013) 11. 
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‘aggravating’ factor in other criminal contexts and that the idea that recidivists 
should be excluded from subsequent immunity applications is ‘good in theory but 
difficult in practice.’62 There were others who believed that recidivism does not 
occur often enough for the Immunity Policy to be prescriptive about it.63  
The concept of ‘moral consciousness’ featured prominently in this discussion, 
with interviewees being divided as to what role morality should play in policy 
development: 
 
Interviewee: It’s an interesting question. It depends on whether you approach it from a 
perspective of what you consider is morally right or what you consider is pragmatically 
justifiable and you can see the arguments on both sides.64 
 
There were those who felt that ‘we have already walked over that line’ in 
terms of the question of morality, and others who felt that ‘recidivists don’t deserve 
immunity.’ 65 (Emphasis added). During these discussions, the interviewees were told 
of the possibility that cartelists, as primarily sophisticated corporations, may learn to 
‘play’ the Immunity Policy once they realise it is possible to apply for immunity a 
number of times, for different cartels, without being prevented.  
The ACCC recognised this possibility and indicated that there have been 
scenarios where corporations, who have been savvy to the policy’s operation, have 
deliberately set up cartels with the purpose of driving out their competitors from the 
market.66 However, there were those who opposed this contention, stating that other 
cartelists would start to become wary of a ‘serial offender’: 
 
Interviewee: I think again like you know, I don’t think you can sort of be a serial offender 
and immunity applicants can just sort of move from one cartel to the next and cash your 
chips. I think the other cartels are going to start to get a little bit wary. I mean would you join 
a club with someone who dobs you in? I don’t know. I don’t know.67 
                                                
62 Interviewee 8 (Sydney, 15th July 2013) 17. 
63 Interviewee 11 (Sydney, 19th August 2013) 27; Interviewee 12 (Sydney, 19th August 2013) 27; See 
Chapter VI, Recidivism, pg 170. 
64 Interviewee 3 (Melbourne, 26th April 2013) 12. 
65 Interviewee 8 (Sydney, 15th July 2013) 16-17: The most obvious argument against allowing a 
recidivist to get immunity twice or more is the utilitarian argument that such an approach encourages 
cartel conduct by corporations that are adept at playing the game “Enter cartel, get immunity”.	
66 Australian Competition & Consumer Commission, 'Review of the ACCC Immunity Policy for 
Cartel Conduct' (Discussion Paper, ACCC, 2013) 7. 
67 Interviewee 2 (Sydney, 22nd July 2013) 12. 
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There was much discussion surrounding the difficulties associated with the 
definition of recidivism. Many interviewees were concerned as to how recidivism 
would be defined if it were ever to form part of the Immunity Policy.68 Their concern 
had clear ties to the notion of ‘certainty,’ as it was observed that lawyers, in 
particular, would have difficulty advising their client as to whether they would be 
ineligible for immunity if the concept of recidivism was poorly drafted or overly 
ambiguous in the policy. However, many of these concerns can be alleviated through 
careful drafting and the proper exercise of discretion from the ACCC.69  
There were also concerns as to how recidivism would be determined by the 
ACCC in a large multi-national corporation, where there exists the possibility that a 
parent company could be excluded from immunity based on a subsidiary’s 
involvement in a cartel in another part of the world.70 There was also the possibility 
that a corporation could be excluded from immunity based on recidivism where there 
were different individuals controlling the cartel at the time in which the first cartel 
offence was committed.71  
Most of these concerns were levelled towards the suggestion that excluding a 
cartel recidivist from receiving immunity for a second or subsequent time will reduce 
the rates of cartel detection, as these recidivists would lose the incentive to report to 
the regulator.72 There were also those that believed that other aspects of the policy, 
such as the Amnesty Plus regime, would be adversely affected: ‘so if you said, well, 
you’re not eligible for immunity for a second cartel if you’ve been in a first cartel, 
that would really cramp the style of the Amnesty Plus program.’73 
Therefore, whilst there was not an overall consensus as to how the issue of 
recidivism should be dealt with, many of the interviewees agreed that recidivists 
should have ‘limited options,’ in the sense that their prior involvement should be part 
of the assessment of immunity but were against it becoming an automatic 
                                                
68 Chapter VI discusses how a workable model of cartel recidivism can be achieved. See Chapter VI, 
Recidivism, pg 170. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Interviewee 4 (Sydney, 17th June 2013)18; Interviewee 9 (Sydney, 15th July 2013)16; Interviewee 
10 (Sydney, 29th July 2013)12. 
71 Cf In the Australian legal system corporations are the subject of rights and liability and the 
corporate veil is pierced only in exceptional cases. Changes in a corporation’s personnel is not such an 
exceptional case. See Chapter VI, Recidivism, pg 170. 
72 Interviewee 8 (Sydney, 15th July 2013) 17.	
73 Interviewee 4 (Sydney, 17th June 2013) 19. 
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exclusionary provision.74 These interviewees could not elaborate on how this would 
be achieved. There was one suggestion that if recidivism were to be implemented 
into the policy, then there should not be ‘black and white rules’ but the concept 
should be defined fairly generally, leaving the concept open to flexible interpretation. 
The precision about the meaning, according to one interviewee, should be developed 
through precedent.75  
Another observation in the context of this discussion was the cross-over 
between cartel recidivism and the ringleader requirement. The ringleader 
requirement refers to the exclusion of a cartel member from immunity, who is 
believed to have instigated the cartel or operated as the clear leader of the cartel.76 
Some interviewees suggested that a recidivist would likely already be excluded from 
the Immunity Policy by virtue of the former ringleader requirement.77 There was one 
interviewee in particular who asserted that the ‘most simple’ way to deal with the 
issue of recidivism would be to expand the definition of the clear leader requirement 
to include recidivists: 
 
Interviewee: Now there’s a lot of debate about who’s the clear leader in a cartel but the very 
simple solution, and I wouldn’t make a big deal of it in your thesis, I’d just say, you know, 
the concept of clear leader should be expanded to include recidivists.78 
 
Another possible solution put forward by one of the interviewees was to 
exclude recidivists from immunity but to allow them to be assessed in accordance 
with the ACCC’s cooperation policy.79  
When the ACCC was questioned about recidivism, it was suggested that the 
ACCC is generally reluctant to put up ‘barriers’ for immunity, especially any 
proposals that involve automatic exclusion.80 As to whether the ACCC had 
experienced cases of recidivism before, there was a suggestion that they have ‘never 
seen anything like that.’ However, as discussion progressed, it was also indicated by 
                                                
74 Interviewee 2 (Sydney, 22nd July 2013) 12; Interviewee 4 (Sydney, 17th June 2013) 18. 
75 Interviewee 10 (Sydney, 29th July 2013) 12. 
76 This requirement has been replaced by the coercion test in the most recent version of the Immunity 
Policy: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n 27, ss 16 (a) (iv), 22 (a) (iv). 
77 Interviewee 8 (Sydney, 15th July 2013) 16. 
78 Interviewee 10, (Sydney, 29th July 2013) 11. 
79 Interviewee 9 (Sydney, 15th July 2013) 14.	
80 Interviewee 11 (Sydney, 19.08.2011) 26. 
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the ACCC that ‘the same applicants have had more than one go.’81 The ACCC’s 
current position, according to the representatives, is consistent with the suggestion 
that if a cartel recidivist does come forward for immunity, the ACCC ‘wouldn’t say 
no.’82 
 
2 Ringleader Exclusion 
Prior to the ACCC’s recent review of the Immunity Policy, an immunity 
applicant could be excluded from immunity if it could be shown that the applicant 
was the ‘clear leader’ of the cartel.83 A majority of the interviewees supported the 
removal of the ringleader requirement. For those in favour of removing the 
requirement, the most common argument made in support of this was the difficulty 
associated with determining who the cartel ringleader is, particularly in a two-party 
cartel: 
Interviewee: I’d get rid of it. I don’t think it adds anything. Personally I’d get rid of it. I’ve 
been in two party cartels but you know it’s pretty hard to sort of work out who the ring leader 
is when there’s only two. Even when there is, it’s sort of not real world. People aren’t, there 
might be somebody who writes more emails or someone that’s more active but you’re all in 
it... Like I just think it’s an unnecessary requirement and in practice that doesn’t work. 
Someone might start off as the ringleader and then someone else may assume the captain’s 
armband and then it moves through a continuum. I just don’t see it being a useful aspect.84   
 
Consistent with the concept of ‘effectiveness’, many of the interviewees who 
supported the removal of the requirement claimed that it was ‘impractical and 
unnecessary’85 or that there was no ‘utility’ in keeping it.86 There were those who felt 
that they had never been asked in practice about whether their client was, or could 
potentially be, the ringleader when applying for immunity or at least it was never 
formally investigated.87 Due to the fact that the ringleader question is often never 
asked or properly investigated, some interviewees felt that there was no need for it, 
                                                
81 Ibid 27. 
82 Ibid 28. 
83 This requirement has been replaced by the coercion requirement: Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission, above n 27, ss 16(a)(iv), 22 (a)(iv). 
84 Interviewee 2 (Sydney, 22nd July 2013) 10. 
85 Ibid; Interviewee 4 (Sydney, 17.06.2013) 17. 
86 Interviewee 5 (Sydney, 25th July 2013) 4. 
87 Interviewee 4 (Sydney, 17.06.2013) 17; Interviewee 7 (Melbourne, 16th April 2013) 10; Interviewee 
5 (Sydney, 25th July 2013) 4.	
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as it does not serve a function or purpose. This did not hold true for all the 
interviewees, as one interviewee in particular indicated that they had been asked the 
ringleader question in a two-party cartel and had ‘to give the ACCC satisfaction that 
our client wasn’t the ringleader.’88 
When questioned about whether the ringleader requirement may serve a 
‘moral’ purpose, in terms of excluding a particularly culpable cartel member from 
being granted immunity, there was one interviewee who felt that they all cartel 
members are ‘essentially equally culpable’89 and therefore maintaining the 
requirement will not be serving any ‘moral’ purpose. Another interviewee felt that 
even if the requirement does serve a moral purpose, the requirement can also lead to 
the maintenance of cartels: 
 
Interviewee: Going back to that moral culpability perspective, there’s a real push back on 
maintaining it, I think. I tend to think that hanging onto it can actually keep cartels going 
because everybody in the cartel that’s a ringleader will know that they won’t necessarily get 
immunity if they go through the door so there’s more trust… 
 
PM: … that’s very true. 
 
Interviewee: Whereas if you didn’t have that scenario then the ring leader could go through 
the door at any time and do great harm to its competitors.90 
 
Overall, the general support for the removal of the requirement is consistent 
with the fact that the ACCC is reluctant to put up any barriers that may prevent an 
applicant applying for immunity.91 As one interviewee suggested, this may be at the 
expense of cartel recidivism rates rising.92 
For those who opposed the removal of the ringleader requirement, it was felt 
that as long as it is not acting as a disincentive to immunity applicants, then there is 
no harm in keeping it. There was also one interviewee who opposed the removal of 
the requirement on moral grounds:  
 
Interviewee: … if you go back to sort of all the underlying moral issues about someone being 
able to escape liability for this sort of conduct, if you’re dealing with a situation where one 
participant has sort of bullied or coerced other participants into this illegal arrangement then I 
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think morally I would say it’s wrong for that person to be able to obtain full immunity for 
what they’ve done.93 
 
One of the interviewees also indicated that even though the ringleader 
requirement may not seem to be enforced seriously by the ACCC, there is a 
likelihood that the CDPP will take the issue of a ringleader involved in the cartel 
applying for immunity more seriously, which could potentially affect the CDPP’s 
decision to grant immunity.94  
The interviewees were also asked whether a ‘coercion-style’ test, such as that 
adopted by the Canadian Competition Bureau or the United Kingdom CMA, would 
provide a more suitable alternative to the ringleader requirement.95 From the 
responses, there were those who felt that the element of ‘coercion’ was not a 
distinguishing element, as cartels are by their very nature consensual.96 Therefore, it 
was stated that the coercion test could potentially encounter the same difficulties as 
the ringleader requirement and thus is not a suitable alternative.  
On the other hand, there were interviewees who felt that the coercion test 
would be more useful as long as it identifies the coercer as the ‘driving force in 
relation to the conduct.’97 Another interviewee felt that the Canadian influence in this 
regard would be positive, and that the ACCC should consider the coercion test in lieu 
of the ringleader requirement.98 Overall, there was no general consensus as to 
whether coercion is a viable alternative to the ringleader requirement. Despite this 
lack of consensus, the coercion test replaced the ringleader requirement in the revised 
Immunity Policy.99 
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3 Relationship between the ACCC and the CDPP 
With the introduction of criminal penalties for cartel conduct at the end of 
2009, it become apparent that the cartel enforcement regime in Australia would be 
bifurcated: with the ACCC being required to refer to the CDPP in the event of 
criminal cartel conduct for the granting of criminal immunity.100 In light of this, the 
interviewees were asked about their experience with this new relationship, and the 
challenges associated with this bifurcated system. 
This issue generated an extensive amount of discussion, and the responses 
were diverse and comprehensive. There was a general sense amongst the 
interviewees that we must ‘wait and see’ what will happen with this new 
relationship, as there is yet to be a criminal cartel trial. It was pointed out that the 
relationship between the two agencies is only relatively new and needs adequate time 
to develop. The ACCC felt that the relationship between the ACCC and the CDPP 
was an important part of their recent review of the Immunity Policy but not the most 
important.101 
There was a mixture of positive and negative views of this new relationship. 
For those who felt positive about the current bifurcated system, one interviewee 
stated that they were aware of the major criticisms associated with the current 
process of referring criminal immunity to the CDPP. However, the interviewee felt 
that in one or two years it will all ‘start to settle down,’ at least when the timing 
differences are sorted. The interviewee felt confident in the ‘structural design’ of the 
system, and would prefer this current design over the idea of a ‘one-stop’ shop.102 
There were others who agreed with this perception, believing the bifurcated system 
to be an ‘efficient allocation of resources.’103 
The former Chairman of the ACCC, Graeme Samuel, felt that the relationship 
between the two organisations has always been ‘really good’ from his experience as 
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Chairman. According to Samuel, the different enforcement culture of the CDPP had 
‘never been a problem’ and that it would be a ‘rare case where the (CDPP) would act 
contrary to the ACCC in relation to immunity.’104 He also believes that the ACCC 
has had sufficient time to prepare for the introduction of criminal immunity and to 
start working with the CDPP in relation to criminal evidence gathering and 
investigation. According to Samuel, by the time the legislation was implemented ‘we 
were ready to go.’105 Despite these comments, over five years has passed without a 
criminal cartel case. 
There were also compelling negative views of the current relationship, one of 
the key issues related to the ‘sufficiency of information’ required for the granting of 
criminal immunity. One of the strongest arguments in this context was that the CDPP 
requires more information than the ACCC in order to assess and grant a proffer, as 
the CDPP is ‘coming from an enforcement perspective.’106 The CDPP may not be 
satisfied with the information outlined in the proffer and generally requires more 
specific information than the ACCC in this respect.  
One interviewee provided an example in support, where it was stated that for 
a proffer to be granted by the ACCC, the ACCC generally requests the names of 
individuals involved in the company, including current and former employees. 
However, where the CDPP is required to assess this information in order to grant 
criminal immunity, this initial general information is not sufficiently comprehensive 
or specific for the CDPP to carry out their assessment. For instance, the CDPP would 
additionally need to know ‘who they are, over what period and what did they do.’107 
The ACCC also acknowledged that the CDPP may require more information in this 
context. 
Many of the interviewees had also experienced significant delays of ‘many 
months’108 whilst awaiting the CDPP’s decision regarding criminal immunity, with 
back and forth discussions taking place between the ACCC and the CDPP during this 
deliberation process. Some of the interviewees believed this delay was the direct 
result of the ‘sufficiency of information’ issue.  
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The interviewees acknowledged the inherent difficulties associated with the 
bifurcated design, where on the one hand the CDPP requires more information 
initially in order to grant criminal immunity, and on the other, the immunity 
applicant being reluctant to cooperate and provide that information until such time as 
criminal immunity is granted, as the CDPP ‘is protective of its discretion.’109  
During this time, some of the interviewees were concerned that the delay may 
adversely impact upon the investigation: 
 
Interviewee: So in that period, if there’s a delay of a month, 2 months, 6 months, a year, that 
investigation is basically stalled for that period. Meanwhile, in other countries, it’s 
proceeding at different paces, things are becoming public, targets of the investigation are 
becoming aware, people are leaving employment, natural processes of email hygiene are 
occurring, all that’s happening, so it’s bad for the investigation to be stalled.110  
 
When questioned about this difficulty, the ACCC acknowledged that this 
delay does create a considerable degree of uncertainty.111 Some of the interviewees 
also pointed to the risk that the CDPP may not accept the ACCC’s recommendation 
for immunity, which can create an additional level of uncertainty for potential 
immunity applicants.112 Another interviewee confirmed that sufficiency of 
information was a ‘significant’ issue but believed that the issue of more importance 
was the lack of information surrounding the criteria used by the ACCC in order to 
determine whether they will seek criminal immunity with the CDPP.113   
When prompted for an explanation to explain the delay, there was one 
suggestion that CDPP personnel may not have the ‘experience to really understand 
cartel matters.’114 This would be due to the fact that the CDPP has never prosecuted 
cartel conduct before, and therefore does not have the requisite experience to 
understand the nature of a proffer, and the role of upfront immunity in this context. 
Differences in the enforcement agenda and priorities between the ACCC and 
the CDPP were thought by some interviewees to contribute to the delay. On the one 
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hand, the ACCC views cartel conduct as a very serious crime, as opposed to the 
CDPP, who has extensive and varied priorities, along with stretched resources and 
man power that results in a ‘we’ll get around to it attitude.’115 Other interviewees 
agreed that the notion of granting criminal immunity ‘upfront’ is antithetical to the 
traditional enforcement strategies of the CDPP, as the granting of immunity has 
traditionally been used by the CDPP as a ‘last card’ strategy. At the time of 
interview, the ACCC itself could not provide an explanation regarding the delay.116 
There was a general consensus amongst the interviewees that the process of 
granting criminal immunity needs to be carried out by the CDPP in a more timely 
fashion in order to reduce the uncertainty associated with the delay. Many of the 
interviewees were not able to offer constructive solutions as to how this delay could 
be reduced, except to put it down to the CDPP’s current lack of experience. 
A unique solution put forward by one interviewee was the suggestion that an 
immunity applicant should be able to directly liaise with the CDPP in the 
determination of granting criminal immunity. The interviewee was concerned that 
the information exchanged between the immunity applicants, the ACCC and the 
CDPP could otherwise become ‘lost in translation.’117 The interviewee felt that it was 
in the interests of ‘natural justice’ that the immunity applicant be able to make 
representations to the decision maker (the CDPP), particularly because this is a 
common practice in all other areas in which a decision maker has the ability to affect 
an individual’s interest: 
 
Interviewee: If you look at any other area of decision-making on the part of a State or 
Commonwealth authority, if the decision maker has the ability to affect your interest as an 
individual, as a citizen, you have the ability to make representations to that decision maker 
before they make a decision or if a decision has been made which is adverse to your interests, 
you have a right of appeal.118 
 
The interviewee believes that if the CDPP has the capacity to sue the 
immunity applicant directly, then this should be met with the opportunity for the 
immunity applicant to make representations to the CDPP directly. Moreover, the 
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interviewee was critical of the fact that there is currently no right of appeal for an 
immunity applicant if an adverse criminal immunity decision is made. The 
interviewee did not wish the bifurcated system to be changed, in that the ACCC 
should still refer the granting of criminal immunity to the CDPP, however, it was 
asserted that as soon as the decision is referred, this should open a direct line of 
communication between the CDPP and the immunity applicant.119 
4 Revocation of Immunity 
Pursuant to the Immunity Policy, if an immunity holder breaches one of the 
conditions stipulated in the policy, the ACCC or the CDPP have the right to revoke 
immunity.120 It is not indicated in the policy what process of review an immunity 
applicant should take in the event the applicant wishes to appeal the ACCC’s or 
CDPP’s final revocation decision.121 Presumably, an applicant would seek judicial 
review of the ACCC’s and/or the CDPP’s decision in the first instance, through the 
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (‘ADJR Act’), or seek an 
action for breach of contract, or merits review through the Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal.122 The interviewees were questioned about this issue of revocation and the 
possible avenues for appeal. 
Many of the interviewees had experienced instances in which revocation had 
been threatened.123 One interviewee could envisage a number of situations where the 
issue of revocation may be prevalent: 
 
Interviewee: One is that the immunity holder just becomes fatigued by the process, so I think 
the regulator has to be mindful that they can approach this pragmatically to ensure they get 
what they need. The second is that the immunity holder likely, they could be sold, they could 
be taken over and there’s not the appetite on the enquirer to carry on with it. You know these 
things come up in due diligence processes before a manager. That’s a possibility.124 
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Although a number of interviewees may have been aware of or experienced 
instances of threatened revocation, it is important to note that revocation has never 
occurred in the experience of the interviewees.125 One of the interviewees found it 
particularly difficult to comment on this issue, as they had trust and confidence in the 
regulator to not make hasty or irrational decisions. It was the interviewees’ belief that 
the client should be aware of all of their rights and obligations under the policy and it 
would need to be particularly egregious conduct to warrant revocation.126  
  Whilst many of the interviewees recognised the potential for revocation to 
occur, the main concern was that there was no clear process stipulated in the policy 
with regards to dispute resolution or a formal appeal process.127 As one interviewee 
stated: ‘I think the broader question is not whether or not it allows for dispute 
resolution but the question of whether there’s any scope for an immunity applicant to 
seek reviewed decisions by way of judicial review, which there doesn’t appear to 
be.’128  
Many of the interviewees speculated as to what may occur in the event that 
an immunity applicant sought to appeal an immunity decision made by the ACCC 
but none were able to provide a definite or clear response, particularly as to whether 
the decision could be reviewed by a court.129 One interviewee believed it would be 
‘interesting’ to see what would come from a review pursuant to the ADJR Act.130 In 
light of these vague and varied speculations, there was a general consensus that if a 
provision were inserted into the policy that outlined the process of dispute resolution 
or appeal in the event of revocation, that this would increase certainty for potential 
immunity applicants.131 
Given that revocation of immunity has not yet occurred in Australia, the legal 
character of the policy has not been formally tested in the Australian court system: 
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Interviewee: No, I don’t think so.  It is discretionary.  It’s an administrative policy; it has no force 
of law.  It’s a prosecution discretion whether to grant or not grant and it’s a prosecution discretion 
whether to withdraw it or not, so it’s not really enforceable in a sense, it’s just a policy, 
prosecution policy.  So it’s not a contract.  It’s not a legislative instrument so what its character is 
has never been tested in Australia actually.132 
 
This does much to explain why there is such uncertainty about the dispute 
resolution process and the reviewability of ACCC decisions within this context. This 
issue brought into question whether the Immunity Policy should be legislated during 
discussions with one interviewee.133 Although legislating the policy in itself would 
not resolve the question of what rights or processes of appeal are available, it may 
strengthen the possibility of review pursuant to the ADJR Act or provide a platform 
for a designated dispute resolution body to be stipulated. The interviewee thought 
that legislating the Policy would be ‘very difficult’ politically, as such proposals have 
been suggested in other areas of competition law, for example merger review, and 
have not been successful.134 
 
C The Tension between Public and Private Enforcement – Confidentiality and 
Third Parties 
1 Confidentiality 
As part of the process of applying for immunity, an immunity applicant will 
provide evidence, in the form of written statements, witness accounts and various 
forms of documentation of the conduct to the ACCC, in order to fulfil their ongoing 
disclosure requirements under the policy and to aid in the prosecution of the other 
cartel members. As a result of these proceedings, the immunity applicant is exposed 
to third party litigation, as the applicant has admitted to being involved in cartel 
activity. In order to commence proceedings against the immunity applicant, a person 
or corporation who has been adversely affected by the cartel’s operation will need 
evidence to support their case for civil damages.  
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Given the covert nature of cartels, the primary source of evidence to support 
the third party litigant’s claim is the immunity applicant’s evidence. The third party 
litigant will need access to this evidence and will seek to obtain it from the ACCC. In 
2010, the legislature enacted specific provisions that deal with the confidentiality of 
cartel information, in s 157 and related provisions of the Competition and Consumer 
Act 2010 (Cth) (The ‘Protected Cartel Information’ or ‘PCI’ regime). The PCI 
regime invests the ACCC with broad discretionary powers to prevent the disclosure 
of immunity information. It outlines a system by which third parties can seek 
information from an immunity applicant through the ACCC. The interviewees were 
questioned about their opinions in relation to the current system of granting access to 
immunity evidence and related confidentiality issues.135 
Some of the interviewees believed that confidentiality, in the context of cartel 
immunity, was a particularly interesting and significant issue that strikes at the core 
of almost all of the issues associated with the  
policy.136 This opinion was not shared by all, as one interviewee felt that the 
emphasis placed on the importance of confidentiality was overstated, and that other 
considerations, such as transparency of the ACCC, should trump it.137 There was a 
general consensus that the disclosure of immunised information was a very delicate 
issue and requires a careful balancing exercise.138 
Those who were against the disclosure of immunised information to third 
parties felt that the roles of public and private enforcement should be kept separate; 
and that the aims of public enforcement should not ‘deliberately frustrate the 
availability of private enforcement.’139 There was a sense that a public regulator 
should not facilitate private enforcement claims because it will act as a disincentive 
to future immunity applicants. As one interviewee described the issue, ‘you’re happy 
to stick your head in one noose but not two.’140  
In stark contrast to this opinion was the view that whilst the ACCC has the 
power to initiate proceedings on behalf of a whole range of people who have suffered 
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loss, it will not initiate these proceedings in the context of cartel conduct. One 
interviewee expressed this view: ‘I actually find it quite offensive that basically the 
regulator is being used as a cloak in the sense that this confidentiality regime, of 
which the regulator is an intrinsic part, is assisting a cartel from being sued 
subsequently.’141 Even if the ACCC does not initiate proceedings on behalf of those 
who have suffered loss as a result of the cartel, this interviewee strongly felt it was 
‘repugnant that the ACCC might have a folder of critical information in its 
possession that a private litigant can’t use.’142 When the ACCC was questioned about 
this response and the fact that their role as the ACCC is also for the protection of 
consumers, the ACCC felt that the policy’s effectiveness outweighed the concerns 
about access to immunised information for affected third parties: 
 
PM: As the ACCC though, you’re walking a very fine line because your role, your aim as an 
organisation is for the protection of consumers and then essentially it’s you guys that block 
the information as well to the so-called, you know, consumers you’re supposed to protect. 
 
ACCC 1: So, I as an officer of the ACCC…I think, you know, the immunity policy is 
effective because of certain things and applicants need to have confidence in the policy so 
that they can come in and disclose things with us and I think our view is… 
 
ACCC 2:  They need certainty. 
 
ACCC 1: Yeah.143 
 
Many of the interviewees agreed with these arguments about certainty, stating 
that certainty should take precedence over access to information for third party 
litigants. One interviewee declared that they did not have much sympathy for private 
litigants in this context; that the private litigants, and presumably those acting for 
them, should ‘work just as hard as any other litigator’ and that they don’t need a ‘free 
leg up.’144 In response to this comment, the interviewee was asked whether the 
ACCC ‘got a free leg up’ and the interviewee replied that they did, but the immunity 
regime is a ‘different scheme’ with ‘different objectives.’145  
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Some interviewees felt that third parties will have access to the information 
that is made publicly available as a result of the proceedings initiated on the basis of 
the immunised information, such as ‘the benefit of the findings and the agreed 
statement of facts.’146 The interviewee asserted that this publicly available 
information would be enough to initiate proceedings against cartel members, and on 
this basis the current system strikes the appropriate balance. It was also suggested 
that there are other ‘practical, forensic ways of getting information’ to aid third party 
actions, although these methods were never elaborated upon.147 
Other interviewees were concerned that greater access to immunised 
information by third parties would act as a disincentive to future immunity applicants 
and result in an overall reduction of immunity applications, ‘if they can’t move on 
because they’re having to do all these other things I think it’s just another thing to 
say, oh we might just take our chances.’148 This disincentive is much greater where 
the damages paid in third party actions far exceed the penalty imposed, which is 
‘probably the biggest disincentive for people to go in.’149 
When asked about the current operation of the PCI scheme, the ACCC stated 
that the disclosure of immunised information is a decision that ultimately rests with 
the court, where the court will carry out a careful balancing exercise. The provision 
relating to the ‘interests of justice’ was discussed, and it was felt that this factor is 
likely to be interpreted quite broadly by the courts, which would result in the 
granting of disclosure in more cases.150 The ACCC was unable to provide a definite 
view on this point. 
The former Chairman of the ACCC, Graeme Samuel, reflected upon the time 
where the ACCC had to take an ‘extraordinary position’ in siding with Visy151 in the 
resulting third party proceedings, in opposing the disclosure of immunised evidence. 
The former Chairman was personally uncomfortable with this decision, as his 
philosophical view was that ‘I would bend over backwards to facilitate a third party 
action’ but he had to be mindful about setting a precedent for future cartel cases, ‘if 
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we’d given up that quickly it would have then been a sign in future cartel 
prosecutions to witnesses, be very careful of what you say because the evidence will 
be given up by the ACCC to third parties.’152  
On the other hand, there were many interviewees who felt positively towards 
allowing third parties access to immunised information but acknowledged that this 
was a ‘very significant challenge.’153 There was one interviewee that felt that these 
challenges were attributed to the fact that the ACCC is not a ‘leader’ in this area, in 
terms of being open to critical discussion about the issues associated with disclosure, 
in contrast to the United States and the European Union.154 In the interviewee’s view 
these challenges were exacerbated by the fact that in Australia there is no active 
plaintiff bar, only ‘one law firm’ that can potentially initiate proceedings on behalf of 
those who have suffered loss as a result of the cartel.155 Other interviewees felt that 
the private enforcement landscape was changing and that in the next 10 years or so, 
there will be a greater and more active plaintiff bar in Australia.156 
When questioned about the current operation of the PCI scheme, there were 
many interviewees who felt that the scheme tips in favour of non-disclosure of 
immunised information and that it had ‘gone too far in protecting the cartel 
member.’157 One interesting observation in this context was the suggestion that those 
who are in favour of non-disclosure should be mindful that the ‘shoe may be on the 
other foot someday’ and that they may one day find themselves attempting to gain 
access to immunised information.158  
One of the strongest arguments used by those who support non-disclosure 
was that it will create a significant disincentive for future immunity applicants, which 
will result in reduced detection of cartel conduct by means of reduced immunity 
applications. However, there were many interviewees who plainly did not agree with 
this argument and felt that the disclosure of immunised information is not likely to 
adversely affect immunity applications at all. The primary reason for this is that the 
information is likely to become accessible anyway: 
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Interviewee: I think the whole argument about exposure to private enforcement and its 
capacity to deter or disincentify immunity applications is vastly overstated. There is no 
evidence to support it in the United States because, well there may be several reasons for that 
but one would be that the severity of the public sanctions are such that there’s just very little 
prospect of an immunity applicant deciding to face the spectre of criminal fines and goal time 
in order to limit exposure to private follow on actions.159 
 
Further to this, was the belief that the cartel participants are likely to be aware 
that the information they provide to the ACCC will eventually surface and thus this 
factor ‘does not weigh heavily in the balance’ when deciding whether to come 
forward for immunity.160 As one interviewee put it, the follow-on actions are the 
‘price you pay for the immunity prize.’161 
The interviewees were also questioned about the criminal discovery 
provisions in the Federal Court Act of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) Part III, Subdivision 
C. These provisions allow a court to override the PCI scheme in a criminal 
proceeding through the granting of criminal discovery.162 One interviewee 
acknowledged that the PCI scheme has no effect in criminal proceedings but 
indicated that we must have faith and confidence in the judiciary to make the right 
decision regarding disclosure, particularly because ‘the stakes are much higher.’163 In 
this way, it was implied that the interviewee had full confidence that the court will 
make the appropriate decision regarding disclosure in the context of criminal 
proceedings. 
When asked about the potential impact these criminal discovery provisions 
could have on the Immunity Policy, the ACCC were not able to provide an answer at 
the time of interview. Instead it was suggested that the criminal discovery provisions 
should form part of a written submission in response to the ACCC’s call to revise the 
policy.164 Instead, the ACCC emphasised its commitment to ensuring the 
effectiveness of the Policy with the aim of encouraging people to ‘run through the 
door’ for immunity; ‘it’s not like we are rewarding someone because they’ve been 
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caught. We’re trading off their immunity for being able to take action and to detect 
and to deter.’165  
 
2 Restitution to Third Parties 
A provision requiring that cartel immunity applicants make restitution to 
parties affected by the cartel previously existed in the Immunity Policy. The first 
version of the ACCC Immunity Policy in 2003 required that 'where possible' [the 
corporation] will make restitution to injured parties.'166 In August 2005, the ACCC 
removed this requirement for restitution and set out its reasons for its removal in its 
discussion paper.167 There is no requirement for corporations to pay restitution under 
the current Policy. The interviewees were questioned as to whether the requirement 
for restitution should be re-introduced, meaning that immunity applicants would need 
to compensate those who were affected by the cartel as a condition of their 
immunity. 
Although many of the interviewees classed the issue of reintroducing 
restitution as an ‘interesting question’, there was an overall majority opinion that the 
provision should not be reintroduced, and these opinions were generally shared by 
those who act in favour of immunity applicants. In particular, there was one 
passionate interviewee who responded to the proposition with a straight out ‘No!’ 
and simply requested the next interview question.168 These discussions surrounding  
restitution called into question the role of public and private enforcement, as one 
interviewee put it: ‘Is the role of the public enforcer to compensate victims or cause 
the compensation to victims or is it to promote specific and general deterrents? And 
so what is the purpose of public enforcement?’169 
Some of the interviewees were of the strong belief that the aims of public and 
private enforcement should be kept separate, as ‘we do not need a regulator meddling 
in private rights of compensation.’170 Instead, these interviewees felt that the ACCC 
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should focus on prosecuting offenders and recovering fines instead of ‘bothering’ 
with compensation, as there is no need to ‘muddy the waters’.171 In the interviewees 
opinion, if maximising the prospects of public enforcement comes at a cost to private 
enforcement then it is a ‘fair trade in the overall balance.’172 
The primary argument against the reintroduction of the restitution 
requirement related to the difficulty in calculating the restitution amount. Given the 
complexities involved in determining resultant economic loss, many of the 
interviewees felt that it would be extremely difficult to determine key questions, such 
as where the loss lies and who will distribute it.173 The former Chairman of the 
ACCC, Graeme Samuel, stated that these difficulties were one of the main reasons 
the ACCC decided to abolish the requirement.174 
Many interviewees thus felt that the reintroduction of restitution would act as 
a significant disincentive to future immunity applications. In the words of one 
interviewee: 
 
Interviewee: I think where I sort of land on… is it would be a significant disincentive to use 
the policy if it had a restitution element which as insisted upon rather than, you know, one 
that’s there but never used. It would be hard for, quite hard for our clients to sort of make an 
upfront determination of a damages amount and agree to pay that. It might be regarded as a 
dollars and cents matter, you know, what’s the fine going to be? What’s the restitution going 
to be? Calculate. OK. Calculate. No.175 
 
In response to these arguments, the interviewees were asked whether they 
believed it was possible for restitution to be calculated in the same way that damages 
are in complex scenarios. One interviewee believed that this was not possible due to 
the inexact nature of the conduct stating that ‘you could not draw any immediate 
equals between penalties and damages… damages are purely there, I mean 
punishment obviously is deterrence but the regime is very different to the civil 
regime which is to compensate people.’176 
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In contrast, a minority of interviewees felt that these arguments against the 
restitution requirement were tenuous and that framing the issue in terms of whether 
or not the ACCC should have a condition of restitution in the immunity is too 
simplistic an approach.177 It was suggested that there are other ways that the ACCC 
could facilitate private enforcement without the introduction of the restitution 
requirement.  
One of the primary ways this could be achieved would be through the 
introduction of a condition in the Immunity Policy that requires applicants to provide 
affected third parties with information to help with quantifying their loss.178 The 
interviewee felt that any claims that this information condition would create a 
disincentive to future immunity applicants would need to be tested. Other 
interviewees believed that introducing a condition that required the immunity 
applicant’s cooperation with third parties would be ‘very difficult in practice.’179 
 
3 Derivative Immunity for Employees 
Pursuant to the Immunity Policy, if a corporation qualifies for conditional 
immunity, it may seek derivative immunity for related corporate entities and/or for 
current and former directors, officers and employees of the corporation who were 
involved in the cartel conduct, if the corporation provides a list of those who require 
protection to the ACCC.180 In this context, the interviewees were asked whether 
employees, who may not have any knowledge of the cartel’s operation, are advised 
of their rights and obligations in relation to the ACCC’s investigation and who has 
the responsibility to advise them.  Secondly, the interviewees were asked about the 
protections afforded to the employees, or former employees, who may have been 
deliberately omitted from the derivative immunity application by the corporation. 
Some of the interviewees felt that the issue of derivative immunity was a ‘complex 
issue’181 that was not well understood in the community.182 
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In response to the first question, there was a general consensus amongst the 
interviewees that employees should be advised of their rights and obligations, but 
there were mixed responses as to who should advise them of this.183 One interviewee 
stated that all employees should get individual legal representation at their own 
expense in order to understand the nature of their rights and obligations under 
derivative immunity.184  
Another suggested that the corporation should be required to pay for the 
employee’s representation. The interviewee believed that the cooperation of 
employees is paramount to the corporate immunity applicant because the employees 
may possess crucial information related to the ACCC’s investigation. The 
interviewee felt that only if an employee was just ‘so rotten’ that you would ‘send 
them off to get independent legal advice.’185 However, another interviewee was of 
the opinion that legislation186 prevents a company from indemnifying an employee 
from costs in this scenario.187 This interviewee also agreed that employees should be 
immediately informed of their rights and obligations but indicated that the fact that 
employees may require separate legal representation needed to be ‘observed in the 
policy.’188   
Representatives of the ACCC indicated that it was not the ACCC’s 
responsibility to ensure that employees were advised accordingly and that there was 
also no requirement or obligation on the corporation’s behalf to ensure it happens; it 
is ‘left to the company to deal with.’189 
In relation to the second issue, many of the interviewees acknowledged that 
there was a possibility that employees, particularly former employees, could be 
deliberately left off the immunity application and therefore not covered by derivative 
immunity. However, there was a general sense that in practice this does not often 
happen and at the very least, the Immunity Policy could be articulated with a ‘bit 
more precision’ as to what the ACCC would do in this situation.190  
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There were other interviewees who could not envisage a situation where a 
company would deliberately omit someone from derivative immunity but believed 
this situation is more likely to occur in relation to former employees.191 In fact, the 
interviewee was aware of cases where former employees had been left off the 
immunity application but have been extended derivative immunity by the ACCC and 
felt this scenario was an ‘appropriate’ response.192 
When questioned about the possibility of companies deliberately omitting 
individuals from applications, the ACCC responded by emphasising the inherent 
flexibility of the policy.193 In practice if someone is omitted from the Policy, and the 
company realises this, they have the opportunity to rectify the immunity application 
and include those employee/s initially omitted. The ACCC believes that an important 
part of the policy is that it is designed to create tension between corporations and 
individuals, as well as corporation against corporations, and the current policy 
accommodates these aims. If an employee is deliberately omitted from the immunity 
application, the ACCC stated that it would determine each situation on a case by case 
basis and potentially inform that individual of the cooperation policy, where it was 
said that it was possible for that individual to be granted full immunity.194  
However, many of the interviewees found it difficult to comment on the more 
complicated situation where a particularly culpable individual could be ‘carved out’ 
of an immunity policy, as is the practice in the United States: 
 
Interviewee: … it’s a tough one because you then get into a question about who is, you 
know, a particularly, you know, heinous employee and it really, it complicates and I don’t 
think we’ve ever gone to that. We don’t go to that level of sophistication in the policy itself 
but it might well occur as a matter of practice.195 
 
Therefore, it was clear that the cooperation policy could be extended by the 
ACCC to an employee who was deliberately left off the immunity application. In this 
case it is unlikely that the employee would be granted immunity. It was not clear 
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whether the CDPP could extend immunity to an employee who had been deliberately 
omitted from the application or whether immunity or leniency could be granted 
pursuant to the Prosecution Policy in this situation.196 The ACCC were unable to 
offer any further comment on this issue at the time of interview. 
One interviewee felt that the concept of derivative immunity should be taken 
further and that it should run both ways, in the form of ‘vicarious immunity.’197 On 
this suggestion, if an employee goes forward to the ACCC to apply for immunity, the 
corporation should also be granted immunity. The interviewee believed that it is 
inconsistent that currently an employee can ‘sort of break ranks’ with the company 
and go forward to the ACCC for immunity and that individual can be granted 
immunity but the company will be prosecuted.198  
In support of this idea, the interviewee stated: ‘It seems to me an odd result 
because if the company were to engage in a cartel it might use that same person and 
that’s it only involvement with the cartel is that one employee.’199 According to the 
interviewee, a company is vicariously liable for an employee’s action when they 
have breached the law, but this is inconsistent with the situation where an employee 
confesses its participation in a cartel and ‘somehow its precarious relationship with 
the employee’s severed and the company doesn’t benefit from vicarious 
[immunity].’200  
When this idea was put to other interviewees, one interviewee in particular was 
against it. It was the interviewee’s belief that if an employee ‘goes running’ to the 
ACCC without the cooperation or awareness of the company then this reflects poorly 
on the corporation and its culture and that is just ‘tough for the corporation.’201 
Instead it would be in everyone’s best interest for the employee to go and liaise with 
the company before applying for immunity as an individual but if not, and then the 
corporation should have sought immunity first.202 
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D Alternatives to the Immunity Policy 
 
1 Cartel Whistleblower Protection 
This issue was one of the most significant and controversial areas of 
discussion within the interviews. The interviewees were asked whether cartel 
whistleblower protections should be introduced for those individuals who may have 
been unfairly treated or dismissed as a result of revealing unlawful cartel conduct to 
the ACCC, similar to that proposed in the United States.203 The interviewees opinions 
were divided on this issue and various reasons were offered in support of their 
positions. 
For those who supported the introduction of cartel specific whistleblower 
provisions, these interviewees believed that encouraging employees to reveal 
unlawful conduct to the authorities is an important component of an enforcement 
strategy, and is an inherently more reliable strategy than the Immunity Policy, 
according to one interviewee.204 When prompted for a reason as to why these 
whistle-blower provisions have not yet been introduced, the interviewee was of the 
opinion that the provisions are not in the interests of large corporations, thus there is 
a lack of support for these types of protections. The interviewee felt this was 
attributed to the larger issue of lack of organisational transparency.205  
There were others that agreed with the important role that whistleblower 
protections could play in Australia, as individuals ‘shouldn’t be penalised as an 
employee if you did go forward and report a crime if it’s a crime.’206 However, there 
were some interviewees who believed that there is a cultural resistance to the notion 
of a whistleblower, as it is another form of ‘dobbing on one’s mate’. In spite of this, 
one interviewee felt that this cultural resistance could be overcome in time, as these 
protections ‘are necessary and will progressively be accepted because now we’re 
talking about crimes I don’t think there’s any alternative available to a 
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corporation.’207 Another interviewee felt that the introduction of cartel specific 
whistleblowing protections ‘makes sense’ but such provisions need to be 
‘appropriately balanced’ to avoid vexatious or false claims.208 
Some interviewees made the distinction between two types of whistle-
blowers: those who have been involved in the cartel conduct and those who have not. 
It was generally accepted that individuals who have not been involved in the cartel 
but have simply come across the conduct need to be ‘protected and looked after and 
the court needs to make sure that they’re not vilified and their employment 
terminated and so forth.’209 On the other hand, for those who have been involved in 
the conduct, it would be a much ‘more difficult question’ as to whether the court 
would reinstate that particular individual. It would be highly dependent upon the 
circumstances of each case and the degree of harm that has occurred and one 
interviewee believed that the court would not sanction that.210 
The ACCC representatives were asked whether they would consider 
supporting cartel specific whistleblower protections. They responded that they were 
open to the possibility of ‘increasing different ways that we can uncover cartels’ and 
‘it’s definitely something that we’d look at.’211 Again, the ACCC invited this issue to 
be submitted in a discussion paper for consideration by the ACCC in its revision of 
the Immunity Policy and indicated that this issue could not be discussed any further. 
Despite the ACCC’s indication of interest in these provisions, there was no 
discussion of whistleblower protections in the ACCC’s recent review of the Policy, 
including the discussion paper, draft policies or the most recent revision of the 
Immunity Policy.212 
One of the primary arguments made against the introduction of 
whistleblower protections was that the current system available for unfair dismissal 
and unfair treatment are already sufficient at providing redress, as there is a 
‘perfectly adequate current system that provides opportunities for individuals to 
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come forward.’213 Those who shared this view were sceptical that there would in fact 
be any individuals who were aware and had knowledge of the conduct without being 
involved. There was further scepticism of the actual need for additional protections 
above that of ‘witness and citizen’s’ protections and ‘our human resource laws.’214 
One interviewee went as far as to suggest that it is not ‘like dobbing in the Hell’s 
angels’ and in the context of cartel conduct, the interviewee did not think that 
whistleblowers need much in the way of protection.215 
Those against the introduction of whistleblower protection provisions felt that 
it would simply complicate the current system where the anti-discrimination laws are 
operating adequately.216 Some interviewees felt that these provisions would need to 
be carefully drafted to ensure that the scope of complaint is limited if they were ever 
introduced.217 One interviewee was of the opinion that the only available remedy for 
these whistleblowers should be reinstatement, as the provision for damages may lead 
to false and vexatious claims by employees who have been dismissed for other 
reasons, aside from their knowledge of the cartel.218 
Due to the risk of false and vexatious claims, one interviewee felt that the 
potential for abuse of these provisions was so high that it should prevent the 
introduction of cartel specific whistleblower protections altogether.219 This 
interviewee felt that the Immunity Policy is currently effective at encouraging people 
to reveal cartel conduct and that individuals, especially former employees, should not 
be allowed to ‘have a crack’ at the former employer in any event.220 
 
2 Cartel Informant System 
 
In addition to whistleblower protection provisions, interviewees were asked whether 
a cartel informant system should be introduced in Australia. This system offers 
monetary rewards for those who have cartel information to come forward and reveal 
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that information to the competition authority. This idea is currently being 
experimented in the United Kingdom, South Korea and Hungary.221 Along with 
cartel recidivism and the whistleblower protections, the discussion surrounding a 
cartel informant system ranked as one of the most significant and divisive issues. 
Those in favour of the introduction of such a system believed that positive 
rewards should be given for pertinent information. This idea, according to one 
interviewee, made ‘a lot more sense’ then ‘than just relying on people to figure that 
they might get in trouble and that squealing on themselves and their colleagues will 
prevent them from getting into trouble.’222 Many interviewees in favour of the 
informant system believed this should only be extended to those who were not 
directly involved in the cartel and this was primarily for ‘moral reasons’.223  
One interviewee acknowledged that the concept of a paid informant system 
was derived from American approaches and was supported in the literature.224 
However, there was concern that this system may not ‘sit well’ with Australian 
culture, in the same way that the Immunity Policy does not. In response to this, one 
interviewee did make the point of stating that a cartel informant system would be 
more ethical then the granting of immunity to ‘somebody who could have been really 
seriously involved (who) gets off Scot free.’225 The interviewee felt that any cultural 
resistance to this idea is likely to be gradually accepted and that a cartel informant 
system may be a necessary component of an anti-cartel enforcement regime. The 
interviewee believed this even though they personally felt that such a system should 
not be necessary.226 
One of the strongest arguments made in this context was that cartel informant 
systems are a commonly accepted practice in other forms of police work and 
criminal activity and that there is no clear reason that cartels should be treated any 
differently: 
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Interviewee: Well, look, the police give rewards in all sorts of situations, as you know, 
missing persons or murders, the police offer rewards and rewards have been around for as 
long as I can remember, hundreds, maybe not hundreds of years but certainly a long time and 
it’s been a very common practice in many jurisdictions to offer rewards for information and I 
don’t see really why this should be treated any differently. And in America they have, 
whistleblowers are paid 10 per cent of the compensation, which is recovered. There was an 
extraordinary case just by the by I think a couple of years ago where I think an individual 
came forward to the Department of Justice in the United States and gave them enough 
information whereby they were able to uncover a serious fraud involving hundreds and 
hundreds of millions of dollars, in fact it may have been in the billions, and this person who 
was, to some extent, involved and had knowledge of it received 10 per cent of the total. So he 
walked away with about $150 million this fellow.227 
 
The interviewee acknowledged the potential for misuse of such a system through 
false or exaggerated claims but felt that appropriate caveats could be placed within 
the system to ensure that these are complied with before any money is paid. It was 
stated that such potential misuse was no different to the problems associated with the 
Immunity Policy.228 There was a general feeling shared by those in favour of such a 
system, that now that cartel conduct is a crime, then it is more acceptable to 
introduce policies, such as a cartel informant system.229 
The ACCC was questioned about the possibility of introducing such a system, 
and again it was requested that this issue be written in a submission and submitted to 
the ACCC. Once again this issue did not appear in any of the subsequent discussion 
papers or the revised Immunity Policy.230 The ACCC did say that the idea of a cartel 
informant system was something that had been ‘thrown about’ in discussion but 
nothing has been finalised.231 
Many of the interviewees, who were against introducing a cartel informant 
system, had first reactions relating to their ‘gut instincts’ and appeared to be against 
the idea on the basis of moral or ethical reasons. One interviewee stated: ‘I don’t 
believe in paying whistleblowers even in tax. My gut reaction is against it in any 
field.’232 Many interviewees even felt these ‘instinctive’ feelings towards to notion of 
                                                
227 Interviewee 5 (Sydney 25th July 2013) 18. 
228 Ibid 19. 
229 Ibid 18; Interviewee 8 (Sydney, 15th July 2013) 21. 
230 Interviewee 11 (Sydney, 19th August 2013) 38. 
231 Ibid 39. 
232 Interviewee 10 (Sydney, 29th July 2013) 21. 
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paying people who have not been involved in the cartel, as they believed there was a 
risk of ‘distorting motivations’ as ‘I think you start to distort motivations and you 
know, positive rewarding rather than not punishing I think you start to qualitatively 
get into a different arena there….’233 There was a sense that the introduction of a 
cartel informant system is overstepping the mark and that is ‘not where we should 
go.’234 
The strongest argument put forward by those who were against the system was 
concerned with credibility. There was a suggestion that there is already sufficient 
incentive provided for people to come forward and reveal their misconduct, such as 
the prospect of gaol, and that those who are not involved should simply be ‘good 
Samaritans’: 
 
Interviewee: (It) encourages exaggerated and overblown claims, allegations and I suppose 
people should be more abiding anyway when it happens. 
 
PM: … the idea of a Good Samaritan? 
 
Interviewee: Mmm.235 
 
There was much scepticism about the quality of evidence that a person will give 
in exchange for payment, given the unlikeliness that someone with valuable 
information in relation to a cartel’s operation would not have actually been involved 
in the cartel themselves.236 Furthermore, some interviewees argued that there is no 
demonstrated need for such a system to be introduced, as there have already been a 
number of cases where people, such as suppliers, have come forward and revealed 
cartel conduct because they have felt aggrieved. In these situations, there has been no 
need to pay these people to come forward and thus there is no real need for an 
additional system to be put in place: 
 
Interviewee: We’ve never had a problem, again it’s this whole problem of 1 out of 7, but we 
never had a problem with suppliers who felt that they’ve been ripped off coming in when 
they thought they had some evidence, coming and telling us about it because they felt 
aggrieved. We didn’t have to pay them. I think it just introduces sort of a notion of, I don’t 
                                                
233 Interviewee 2 (Sydney, 22nd July 2013) 18. 
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235 Interviewee 10 (Sydney, 29th July 2013) 21-22. 
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know how to describe it but look, you know, you can hear my instinctive reaction which is 
that it’s going too far and if you say that giving immunity some people think it’s gone too far 
because it is freeing people from prosecution who engaged in the activity, then paying people 
to do it goes even further.237 
 
3 The ACCC Cooperation Policy 
As part of the anti-cartel enforcement regime, applicants who do not qualify for 
immunity will be dealt with by the ACCC pursuant to the Cooperation Policy.238 This 
policy sets out the conditions that will need to be fulfilled in order to secure a 
cooperation agreement, which can result in reduced penalties for those who 
cooperate with the ACCC. This policy only applies for civil breaches.239 Criminal 
cooperation is dealt with by the CDPP separately, pursuant to the Prosecution 
Policy.240 The Cooperation Policy received more attention by the interviewees then 
was anticipated. The responses were varied but centred upon the notions of certainty 
versus flexibility in the ACCC’s calculation of the penalty. The ACCC cannot 
ultimately decide the penalty, as this is a decision made by the court.241 Recent court 
decisions have overturned this position, which will impact upon the way the penalty 
was previously assessed.242 The interviewees were asked of their opinions in relation 
to cooperation prior to these cases and therefore their opinions reflect the position at 
the time of the interviews. 
As a result of the policy’s operation, one interviewee stated that there can be 
a number of different outcomes for any given scenario in relation to cooperation and 
this largely depends upon the quality of evidence provided.243 The interviewee had 
experienced situations where an applicant has made it difficult for the ACCC to 
obtain information because they were not the first or second in. However, it was felt 
that the ACCC was ‘generally good’ at determining what they are willing to offer in 
                                                
237 Interviewee 7 (Melbourne, 26th April 2013) 41. 
238 This policy is now combined with the ACCC Immunity Policy: Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission, above n 27, s H. Full immunity may be pursuant to this section in rare and 
exceptional circumstances at the ACCC’s discretion [76]. 
239 For more see Chapter VIII: Subsequent Applications for Immunity: Lenient Treatment of ‘Second-
in’ Cartel Offenders - Australia, pg 277. 
240 Commonwealth Department of Public Prosecutions, above n 100.  
241 This position has been recently overturned by the court: See Chapter VIII, Subsequent 
Applications for Immunity: Lenient Treatment of ‘Second-in’ Cartel Offenders - Australia, pg 277. 
242 Ibid.	
243 Interviewee 2 (Sydney, 22nd July 2013) 16. 
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exchange for cooperation. One interviewee reflected upon a positive experience in 
dealing with the ACCC: ‘[the] ACCC’s pretty good at giving recognition to 
cooperation and the court’s pretty good at accepting it, so I think the system’s 
working pretty well in terms of second order cooperation and discount on penalty.’244  
Among those positive comments regarding the cooperation policy, many 
believed that the flexibility, by way of the ACCC’s discretion in determining the 
reduced penalty for cooperation, was an understandable part of the ACCC’s 
enforcement regime and that generally it was a ‘good system.’245 It was felt that there 
was a sufficient amount of negotiation that needed to take place in order to achieve 
this workability. Another strong point made by the interviewees was that there is a 
large amount of precedent relating to the Cooperation Policy and therefore this helps 
to reduce much of the uncertainty associated with the ACCC’s determination of 
penalty.246 It was conceded that in this situation, generally the clients of the 
interviewees do prefer certainty in terms of being able to know the potential penalty, 
before they apply for immunity.247 However, related to this was the 
acknowledgement that some degree of flexibility can be beneficial in these 
circumstances: 
 
Interviewee: I suppose one of the issues with us, it could only ever be guidance as to what the 
ACCC would recommend because obviously in a lot of places overseas the regulator itself 
actually sets the penalty where here obviously the court does, so it’s up to the court to 
determine whether it’s appropriate in the circumstances, so it can only be guidance as to what 
the ACCC would be prepared to recommend to the court. But I think, you know, what you 
potentially lose from getting that certainty is the benefit of flexibility where in the particular 
circumstance of the case, you know, that level of discount may not be appropriate; it may be 
appropriate to go higher or it may be appropriate to go lower.248 
 
Despite the positive comments made in relation to the inherent flexibility of 
the cooperation policy, many interviewees still believed that the policy could benefit 
from some ‘firming up’ in terms of listing a range of deductions and being more 
specific about the types of factors the ACCC will take into consideration and how 
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this will affect the ACCC’s recommendation of penalty to the court, prior to the 
recent court decisions.249  
When asked about the cooperation policy’s current operation, the ACCC 
indicated that prior to the Barbaro decision, they could only make a recommendation 
to the court and that it was at the court’s discretion as to the final determination of 
the penalty. The ACCC indicated that it cannot be tied to a certain percentage 
discount for cooperation, as is the case in some overseas jurisdictions.250 The ACCC 
felt that the spirit of the cooperation policy is ‘more principle based than law based’ 
and acknowledged that this lack of clarity may lead to uncertainty for future 
immunity applicants.251  
However, the ACCC also recognised the possibility of applicants ‘playing the 
policy’ if they were able to determine upfront what their potential discount would 
be.252 It was said that in this context, flexibility is of paramount importance and that 
they wished to uphold the current structure of the cooperation policy, in terms of not 
setting out penalty discount percentages.253 
There was also a more radical suggestion by one interviewee that the cooperation 
policy should replace the Immunity Policy.254 The interviewee felt that the certainty 
that is associated with the upfront guarantee of the first-in immunity application 
leads to people ‘playing the policy’ and that this is an undesirable consequence.255 
Instead, by adopting a cooperation policy as the primary enforcement tool, the 
interviewee believed this would be more akin to ‘responsive regulation’ as ‘you want 
it to be a system where it’s the spirit and substance of the rules that are important, not 
the black and white of the rules.’256 The interviewee acknowledged that this view 
may be against those currently held by the legal profession but felt that the status quo 
was preferred by many lawyers as they can more easily manipulate the outcome for 
their client as a result: 
                                                
249 Interviewee 5 (Sydney, 25th July 2013) 13; Interviewee 9 (Sydney, 15th July 2013) 17-18. See 
Chapter VIII, Subsequent Applications for Immunity: Lenient Treatment of ‘Second-in’ Cartel 
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Interviewee: It’s all about the rules. I mean that’s what lawyers are interested in, the more 
rules there are, you know, and they’ll talk about it as certainty but really it’s about having 
more rule to play with so that they can bend them to do what their clients wants, it’s very 
rude, but that’s what I think, yeah. Whereas if you want to be interested in the substance then 
you worry about principles and you become less predictable but you have to bring your heart 
and soul to it…257 
 
The interviewee was of the strong opinion that having a cooperation policy 
instead of an immunity policy would encourage the regulatory enforcement agency 
to ‘do more work’ rather than simply putting out an immunity policy and ‘thinking 
everybody’s going to come running to them with the evidence.’258 
Several interviewees expressed the view that certainty is paramount in the 
context of the cooperation policy, and the current design of the policy was ‘not 
working very well.’259 Given the general nature of the cooperation policy, some 
interviewees felt that this increases the likelihood that potential immunity applicants 
will take a ‘wait and see’ approach, which would reduce the very race that the ACCC 
is seeking to create: 
 
Interviewee: So one of the huge advertised benefits of the immunity policy is up front 
certainty, right, so when I’m advising a client and the client says to me, should I go in? Then 
you weigh up the pros and cons of doing so. The pros and cons of immunity first in 
calculation are easier because the certainty is higher. Pros and cons on a second or later 
application are very hard because the certainty is much lower and so that lack of certainty 
acts as a disincentive and you’re much more likely to say well - we’ll just wait and see what 
happens, see if anyone else goes in, see how much the evidence is, see if we’re implicated, 
see how bad it gets.260 
 
Those who believed that the current cooperation policy does not offer ‘any’ level 
of certainty asserted that there was a strong need for more transparency about its 
operation. Whilst some interviewees acknowledged it would be too difficult to 
implement a system that is as accurate as those in other jurisdictions, such as the 
European Union and Japan, there was a call for more guidance surrounding the 
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calculation of the penalty to be recommended to the court.261 According to one 
interviewee, this is particularly important ‘because it is a dramatically different 
experience if you’re second in to what it is if you’re first in terms of the clarity of 
outcome.’262 These comments are largely redundant following the recent court 
decisions that will be discussed in Chapter VIII. 
In summary, a majority of the interviewees exhibited a positive view of the 
Immunity Policy and its role in cartel enforcement detection. Many expressed serious 
doubts as to whether cartel conduct could be detected without the use of an Immunity 
Policy. From these discussions, it was apparent that most of the interviewees were 
strongly in favour of the aims and objectives of the Immunity Policy. 
However, there was more divisive opinion when it came to discussion of the 
eligibility and cooperation requirements of the Immunity Policy. Whilst a majority of 
the interviewees were in favour of the removal of the ringleader exclusion, and many 
held a positive view of the new relationship between the ACCC and CDPP, there 
were stark differences in opinion in relation to whether a cartel recidivist should be 
eligible for immunity and how this would be achieved.  
These divisions in opinion were also reflected in the discussions in relation to 
confidentiality, where opinion was split on whether the ACCC should refuse to 
disclose pertinent immunity information to third parties in their pursuit of cartel 
litigation as victims of the cartel. There was also strong opinion on both sides as to 
whether restitution should be reintroduced as a condition of Immunity. 
The most controversial discussions were directed at whether cartel specific 
whistleblower protection should be introduced in Australia and whether a financial 
cartel informant system is a viable option to enhance cartel enforcement worldwide. 
There was also positive discussion in relation to the changes that need to be made to 
the ACCC Cooperation Policy. 
Although no consensus was reached in relation to many issues, the interviews 
provided valuable empirical data and insight for further development, which was 
used to scaffold the remaining chapters in the thesis. 
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The remaining chapters will critically analyse the most controversial and important 
issues to emerge from the qualitative data in relation to eligibility and cooperation; 
issues of confidentiality and the impact on third parties; and alternatives to 
immunity.263 
 
 
 
 
                                                
263 It is important to note that much of this discussion has changed given recent court decisions in 
Australia.	
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VI ELIGIBILITY AND COOPERATION IN CARTEL IMMUNITY 
 
This chapter will critically analyse the empirical findings of the eligibility and 
cooperation requirements of the Immunity Policy through a cross-comparative 
analysis of these aspects across the Canadian, United Kingdom and United States 
policies. It will conclude with a recommendation as to how the Immunity Policy 
should be adapted to these findings in accordance with the enhanced criteria of 
transparency, accountability, consistency and proportionality. 
 
A Recidivism 
 
As outlined in Chapter IV, the concept of introducing recidivism as an 
exclusionary provision in the Immunity Policy was the most controversial and 
divisive issue within the interviewee discussions.1 There were many arguments put 
forward in support of its introduction to the policy, but also discussion in relation to 
the challenges associated with the inclusion of recidivism as an automatic exclusion. 
This section will first explore the concept of recidivism generally, the difficulties 
associated with defining recidivism, and how recidivists are currently treated in 
criminal law before turning to how recidivists are treated within the context of cartel 
immunity, specifically in Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom and 
Canada.  
This section will then critically analyse the prospect of introducing recidivism 
as an automatic exclusion for immunity, drawing on the experience of the European 
Union sentencing of recidivists in cartel matters and the South Korean policy relating 
to recidivism, giving due consideration to issues of transparency, accountability, 
consistency and proportionality. Based on this assessment, this section will conclude 
that recidivism is an important matter that should be included in the criteria for cartel 
immunity and, if not, what alternative measures should be taken instead.  
 
                                                
1 See Chapter V, Cartel Recidivism, pg 134. 
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1 What is Recidivism and Why It Is Significant? 
 
One of the key points made by all interviewees during the discussions related to the 
concern as to how recidivism would be defined if it were to be implemented in the 
policy. This point is reflected most broadly in the literature, where criminologists, 
policy-makers and commentators have found it difficult to define the concept with 
any level of precision.2 In terms of the research in relation to recidivism, there is no 
consistent methodology employed in the literature to measure recidivism or the 
means by which to reduce the rates of such.  
The word recidivism is derived from the Latin term, recidere, which means to 
fall back. Although there are many technical variations of the definition of 
recidivism, the common element is ‘repetitious criminal activity.’3 The historical 
treatment of recidivists in criminal law is ideologically tied to the notion that repeat 
offenders deserve greater or more severe punishment because they have already 
broken the law, and have not rehabilitated themselves by ‘learning their lesson.’4 
Thus the concept of recidivism is intrinsically tied to the presumed greater 
culpability of an offender as a result of their repeated criminal behaviour, compared 
to an offender who has not previously breached the law.  
Although a complete or precise definition of recidivism has not been 
achieved universally, there are several key factors related to the concept. The first is 
the similarity between two or more offences; if an offender has committed several 
offences of a similar nature then it will likely be considered recidivism.5 Secondly, 
the time during which the offences were committed is relevant. The question is 
whether there should be a limitation on the time period that has connected the 
offences in question, and also a consideration of the minimal period between the 
commission of two offences, which will distinguish it as a recidivist offence, as 
                                                
2 See eg, Alexis Durham, 'Criminology: Justice in Sentencing: The Role of Prior Record of Criminal 
Involvement' (1987) 78 Journal Criminal Law & Criminology 614; Julian  Roberts, 'Punishing 
Persistence ' (2008) 48 British Journal of Criminology 468. 
3 Jason Payne, 'Recidivism in Australia: Finding and Future Research' (Australian Institute of 
Criminology, Research and Public Policy Series, 2007) 4. 
4 Michael O'Neill, Linda Maxfield and Miles Harer, 'Past as Prologue: Reconciling Recidivism and 
Culpability' (2004) 73 Fordham Law Review 245, 247.  
5 Gabriel Hallevy, 'The Recidivist Wants to Be Punished: Punishment as an Incentive to Reoffend' 
(2009) 5 International Journal of Punishment and Sentencing 120, 122. 
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opposed to a distinct and separate offence.6 There are many issues that flow from 
each of these factors and they will be discussed in greater detail below. 
This perception of recidivists, and how they have been treated in criminal 
law, is reflective of the forward-looking, utilitarian strategies that seek to prevent and 
deter crime through the use of ‘carefully designed techniques for the selective 
incapacitation of high-risk offenders.’7 This is opposed to the alternative retributive 
model of crime known as the ‘justice model,’ which focuses primarily on the 
seriousness of the offending conduct, rather than the antecedent criminal history of 
the offender. 
 There are a number of studies that attempt to measure the level of recidivism 
in general, across all aspects of crime.8 Despite the nuances that exist in the 
recidivism statistics across countries in the Western world, a cursory view of the 
research reveals that recidivism does in fact occur, and it is significant. A 
fundamental principle in nearly every common-law jurisdiction is that an offender’s 
prior record is central to sentencing.9 The prevalence of recidivism does not appear 
to be debated to a great extent in the literature, as much of the focus tends to be on 
specific areas of recidivism, and how to reduce the level of recidivism for certain 
crimes. However, there does not appear to be any consensus reached in relation to 
which methods are the most effective at reducing the rate of recidivism. That 
question is beyond the scope of this thesis, which is concerned with recidivism only 
to the limited extent of examining whether recidivists should be excluded from cartel 
immunity.  
 The treatment of recidivists in the criminal justice system has typically been 
associated with the granting of harsher sentences for repeat offenders. The United 
                                                
6 Ibid.  
7 Durham, above n 2, 617. 
8 See, eg, Payne, above n 3; Edward Latessa and Christopher Lowenkamp, 'What Works in Reducing 
Recidivism?' (2006) 3 University of St Thomas Law Journal 521; Kelly Richards, 'Technical and 
Background Paper: Measuring Juvenile Recidivism in Australia' (Australian Government - Australian 
Institute of Criminology, 2011); Linda Maxfield, 'Measuring Recidivism under the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines' (2005) 17 Federal Sentencing Reporter 166; United States Sentencing Commission, 
'Measuring Recidivism: The Criminal History Computation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines' 
(United States Sentencing Commission, 2004); Clare Ringland, 'Measuring Recidivism: Police versus 
Court Data' (2013) 175 Crime and Justice Bulletin . 
9 See eg, Darryl Plecas et al, 'Do Judges Take Prior Record into Consideration? An Analysis of the 
Sentencing of Repeat Offenders in British Columbia' (University of Fraserm Valley, 2012) 
<http://www.ufv.ca/media/assets/criminology/do+judges+consider+prior+record.pdf> : ‘The 
importance of previous criminal history should only be surpassed by the seriousness of offence 
committed.’ 
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States has consistently demonstrated that it will not tolerate recidivism in criminal 
behaviour. Since the 1970s, there has been a steady move towards mandatory 
sentencing and presumptive guidelines.10  
The Sentencing Commission in the United States utilises criminal history as a 
means to measure offender culpability, deter criminal conduct and protect the public 
from further crimes of the defendant.11 Although these guidelines are not mandatory, 
in relation to most offences, a defendant’s criminal history can approximately double 
the presumptive sentence, and potentially add on fourteen years to a gaol term.12 
Considerable weight towards criminal history in sentencing is reflected in the ‘three 
strike laws,’ which have been adopted in almost 20 states in the United States. These 
three strike laws in their original form were directed at offenders who have been 
convicted of any felony and had two or more relevant previous convictions, and as a 
result, were required to be sentenced to between twenty-five years and life 
imprisonment, regardless of how minor the third offence was. These laws have since 
been modified so that the third offence must be a serious or violent offence, although 
minor offences can still attract a large increase in prison sentences.13  
The treatment of recidivists in Australia, compared to the United States, is 
similar but not as harsh. Most jurisdictions in Australia now have statutory 
provisions that substantially increase the importance of prior convictions in 
sentencing, where ‘the offender has a record of previous convictions,’ particularly if 
the offender is being sentenced for a serious personal violence offence.14 According 
to one study, approximately 60 per cent of offenders in Australia are repeat 
offenders.15 
The United Kingdom adopts a similar approach to Australia in its treatment 
of recidivists, where nearly 50 per cent of offenders who are released from prison 
reoffend within a year and almost three quarter of those who were released from 
                                                
10 Mirko Bagaric, 'The Punishment Should Fit the Crime - Not the Prior Convictions of the Person 
That Committed the Crime: An Argument for Less Impact Being Accorded to Previous Convictions in 
Sentencing' (2014) 51 San Diego Law Review 343, 346. 	
11 Maxfield, above n 4, 166. 
12 Bagaric, above n 10, 348. 
13 Ibid 349. 
14 See eg, Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s21A (d) ‘the offender has a record of 
previous convictions (particularly if the offender is being sentenced for a serious personal violence 
offence and has a record of previous convictions for serious personal violence offences). 
15 Talina Drabsch, 'Reducing the Risk of Recidivism' (NSW Parliamentary Library Research Service 
2006) 9. 
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custody or began a community service order in the first quarter of 2000 were 
reconvicted of another offence within nine years.16 The United Kingdom has its own 
version of the United States’ three strikes laws and mandatory sentencing guidelines, 
particularly for third convictions of domestic burglary and Class A drug trafficking.17 
In a similar vein to Australia, the United Kingdom has specific provisions that are 
aimed at imposing enhanced imprisonment terms for serious sexual and violent 
offenders whose prior conviction for serious offences can be taken into account.18 
In contrast, the treatment of repeat offenders in Canada is somewhat less clear 
than the positions in the United Kingdom, United States and Australia, despite the 
recidivism rates being similar. According to one study, the reconviction rate in the 
first year out of prison was 44 per cent, with most of these reconvictions for non-
violence offences.19  Under section 727 (1), (2) and (3) of the Canadian Criminal 
Code,20 the role that prior criminal record plays in sentencing is extremely vague. 
Essentially, the position is that a more severe sentence may be imposed on the basis 
of prior record but the details relating to the conditions and the degree to which prior 
record should affect the severity of a sentence is absent from the legislation.21 
However, similar dangerous offender provisions exist which increase prison 
sentences on the basis of a third conviction.22 
 The purpose of outlining the treatment of offenders with a prior record in the 
United States, United Kingdom, Australia and Canada is to show how seriously 
recidivism is viewed in criminal law in these countries, and how this is reflected in 
their criminal legislation and sentencing practices.  As a general theme, a criminal 
recidivist is likely to receive a harsher sentence as a result of their prior record then if 
                                                
16Ministry of Justice, 'Breaking the Cycle: Effective Punishment, Rehabilitation and Sentencing of 
Offenders' (UK Ministry of Justice, 2010) 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120119200607/http:/www.justice.gov.uk/consultations/
docs/breaking-the-cycle.pdf> Section 7. 
17 Bagaric, above n 10, 351. 
18 Ibid.	
19 J Bonta, T Rugge and M Dauvergne, 'The Reconviction Rate of Federal Offenders' (Corrections 
Research - Solicitor General of Canada, 2003) <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/rcvd-
fdffndr/rcvd-fdffndr-eng.pdf> The reconviction rate for all the releases in the first year was 44 per 
cent with the reconviction rate for violence considerably lower (14 per cent). The non-violent 
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20 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46. 
21 Plecas et al, above n 9, 4. 
22 See eg, Government of Canada, 'Dangerous Offender Legislation' (Government of Canada, 2014) 
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they were a first time offender. This may seem an obvious conclusion, but in the 
context of criminal cartel conduct, it seems that regardless of an offender’s prior 
record, they may still be eligible for a full grant of immunity. This seems incongruent 
with the general treatment of criminal recidivists in these countries. 
 Repeat cartel offenders are not treated as recidivists under the Immunity 
Policy. This may be due to the fact that cartelists are not deemed to be general 
criminals, but corporations or ‘white collar criminals.’ However, researchers have 
demonstrated a consistent trend amongst corporations or ‘white collar criminals’ to 
commit similar offences repeatedly.23 
 
2 Cartel Recidivism 
 
In relation to cartel conduct specifically, there is empirical research that 
supports the existence of recidivists amongst corporate cartelists. John Connor, a 
United States economist, has generated some of the primary data relating to cartel 
recidivism. Connor’s study comprises of a market sample of 648 hard-core cartels 
over a period of 20 years; confined to cartels that have already been discovered by 
competition authorities.24  
Connor acknowledges that his results may be negatively skewed, as his 
conclusions are derived from data obtained from discovered cartels, which he 
believes only accounts for 10 to 30 percent of all cartel conspiracies.25 Connor’s 
research is comprised of instances of recidivism based on the number of times a 
company has participated in and been convicted for a unique cartel.26 Connor does 
not elaborate on this definition. Convictions for cartel offences in multiple 
jurisdictions, or where a company was granted immunity in one or more jurisdictions 
                                                
23 See, eg, Robert Wagner, 'Criminal Corporate Character' (2013) 65 Florida Law Review 1293, 1324; 
David Weisburd, Ellen Chayet and Elin Waring, 'White-Collar Crime and Criminal Careers: Some 
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for a particular offence were counted as one offence for the purposes of Connor’s 
research.27  
Furthermore, in the case of large multinational corporations that have a 
number of subsidiaries, Connor attempted to trace the controlling parent group of the 
sanctioned company on the belief that ‘punished cartelists are frequently affiliates of 
larger corporate groups’.28 Thus, in Connor’s view, tracing the ownership of these 
firms provided a more accurate account of rates of corporate recidivism. Connor also 
acknowledged a number of circumstances that may have affected the sample of this 
research. These include where competition regulators kept immunity applications 
confidential or the anonymity of convicted corporations.29 
Despite the aforementioned limitations, Connor’s research indicates that 
cartel recidivism is rising. By the end of 2009, the number of cartels detected had 
risen by 124 percent and leading recidivists tended to be highly diversified 
multinational corporations.30 One interesting observation by Connor was that ‘if 
sanctions have the power to dissuade companies to engage in repeated violations, one 
would expect to see a reduction, if not elimination, of such conduct in subsequent 
periods.’31 But instead the data showed that out of the leading recidivists that were 
sanctioned in 1990-99, not one of those corporations learned to avoid participating in 
cartel conduct in the 2000s, after being sanctioned for the same conduct discovered 
by competition-law authorities before 2000. Furthermore, for most of the top 
recidivist corporations, there is a general trend of accelerated recidivism after 1999.32  
Connor’s research has been criticised, particularly by the United States 
DOJ.33 The DOJ argued that the definition of recidivism employed by Connor in his 
research was overly broad; a flaw they claim skewed the research results and 
                                                
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid.	
30 Ibid.	
31 Ibid 39. 
32 See also Marc Barennes and Gunnar Wolf, 'Cartel Recidivism in the Mirror of EU Case Law' 
(2011) 2 Journal of European Competition law & Practice 423. If one takes into consideration the 
Commission decisions adopted over the past five years alone (between 2006 and June 2011) the rate 
of cartel recidivism exceeds 40 per cent; Douglas Ginsburg and Joshua Wright, 'Antitrust Sanctions' 
(2010) 6 Competition Policy International 3, 4, 14.  
33 Gregory Werden, Scott Hammond and Belinda Barnett, 'Recidivism Eliminated: Cartel 
Enforcement in the United States Since 1999' (Department of Justice - Antitrust Division, September 
22 2011) 
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produced misleading results.34 Furthermore, the DOJ asserted that Connor’s sample, 
dating back to 1990, is irrelevant, as they claim much had since changed in the 
enforcement practices of the DOJ, including the revision of the leniency policy, and 
increased prison sentences for culpable non-United States citizens. The DOJ states 
that after reviewing the ‘pertinent’ records: 
No company and no individual convicted in the United States of a cartel offense after July 
23, 1999 subsequently joined a cartel prosecuted in the United States. Moreover, no company 
and no individual granted conditional leniency after July 23, 1999 subsequently joined a 
cartel prosecuted in the United States.35 
Therefore, the DOJ claims that the United States is impervious to the general 
rates of rising recidivism amongst corporations for cartel conduct, as they assert that 
cartel recidivism has been eliminated from the United States due to ‘meaningful 
prison terms.’36 There are a number of other studies that acknowledge the existence 
of cartel recidivism despite the DOJ’s claims.37 Recent cases have also put the media 
focus on the prevalence of white collar recidivism, most notably the USB case, which 
has called into question the effectiveness of deferred prosecution or leniency 
agreements as enforcement tools.38  
If we accept as a general position that recidivism is a feature of human 
behaviour, and exists to some extent in the context of cartel conduct, then we must 
see what implications flow from this premise. While much attention has been 
focused on how recidivists should be sentenced, there is a lack of analysis 
                                                
34 Ibid 3. 
35 Ibid 6. 
36 Ibid 7.	
37 See, eg, D. Daniel Sokol, 'Policing the Firm' (2014) 89 Notre Dame Law Review 785, 792; Martin 
Carree, Andrea Gunster and Maarten Schinkel, 'European Antitrust Policy 1957-2004: An Analysis of 
Commission Decisions' (2010) 36 Review of Industrial Organization 97; Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, 'Promoting Compliance with Competition Law' (Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development - Policy Roundtables, 2011) 23; Ginsburg and Wright, 
above n 32; Ron Knox and Morris Schonberg, Is DG Comp More Likely to Raise a Fine Than to 
Lower It? (10 November 2010) Global Competition Review 
<http://globalcompetitionreview.com/indepth/analysis/29350/is-dg-comp-likely-raise-fine-lower-
it/>2:finding that the most common reason DG Comp increased fines between 2005 and 2010 was 
recidivism.  
38 See, eg, Brandon Garrett, Time to Crack Down on Recidivist Banks Instead of Slapping Wrists The 
Conversation <http://theconversation.com/time-to-crack-down-on-recidivist-banks-instead-of-
slapping-wrists-39285>; James Stewart, For UBS, a Record of Averting Prosecution (July 20, 2012) 
The New York Times <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/21/business/ubss-track-record-of-averting-
prosecution-common-sense.html?_r=0>; Peter Henning, Guilty Pleas and Heavy Fines Seem to Be 
Cost of Business for Wall St (May 20, 2015) New York Times 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/21/business/dealbook/guilty-pleas-and-heavy-fines-seem-to-be-
cost-of-business-for-wall-st.html>. 
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surrounding whether or not recidivists should be entitled to immunity for cartel 
behaviour.  
The immunity policies in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and 
Australia do not address the concept of recidivism and allow recidivists to be granted 
immunity for repeated cartel conduct.39 The ACCC has acknowledged that they 
would not currently refuse an immunity application on the basis of recidivism.40 
By contrast, under the 2006 leniency program of the Greek Competition Authority, 
recidivists could not receive immunity from fines.41 However, this provision was 
removed in 2011.42  
The South Korean Corporate Leniency Policy is currently the only 
jurisdiction that prohibits a corporation from receiving immunity more than once in 
five years.43 According to this policy, a cartel participant will be excluded from 
leniency where: 
1. A person who was ordered to take corrective measures and to pay a penalty surcharge for a 
violation of Article 19 (1) of the Act conducts any unfair cartel activity again in 
contravention of the relevant corrective measures within five years from the date on which 
the person was ordered to take the corrective measures; 
2. A person in whose case corrective measures or a penalty surcharge imposed under Article 
22-2 for unfair cartel activities conducted in violation of Article 19 (1) of the Act was 
mitigated or exempted conducts another unfair cartel activity in violation of Article 19 (1) of 
the Act within five years from the date on which corrective measures or a penalty surcharge 
was mitigated or exempted.44 
According to these provisions, a cartel participant who has received immunity 
in the previous five years or is subject to an existing corrective order will be unable 
                                                
39 There is potential that a recidivist could be excluded from United States leniency on the basis of the 
‘fairness’ provision pursuant to Section B (7) of the policy: ‘The Division determines that granting 
leniency would not be unfair to others, considering the nature of the illegal activity, the confessing 
corporation’s role in it, and when the corporation comes forward.’ There is no available evidence to 
suggest that this provision has been used by the DOJ to exclude recidivists from reapplying for 
leniency. 
40 Interviewee 11 (Sydney, 19th August 2013) 28. 
41 Decision N° 299/V/2006 of the Plenary of the Hellenic Competition Commission, point A.4(e): ‘the 
undertaking must not have participated in the past in a prohibited collusive practice for which a 
decision by a National Competition Authority or the European Commission has been issued’.  
42 The new leniency programme was adopted by Decision 526/VI/2011 of 30 August 2011. 
43 Korea Fair Trade Commission, 'Public Notification on Implementation of Leniency Program' (2012) 
Article 6-3; Caron Beaton-Wells, 'Immunity Policy: Revolution or Religion? An Australian Case-
Study' (2013) 2 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 126, 165. ‘The previous South Korean leniency 
policy had been seen as permitting unfair exploitation by large multinational companies operating in 
multiple markets and repeatedly applying for immunity, leaving domestic companies to ‘cop the full 
brunt of penalties time after time.’ 
44 Korea Fair Trade Commission, above n 43, Article 6-3.	
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to seek leniency. The purpose of introducing these exclusionary provisions was to 
discourage habitual offenders from engaging in cartel conduct repeatedly, by making 
it much more costly to do so.45  
In contrast, there were concerns that the provisions may drive undetected 
cartels underground where they will continue to thrive and thus undermine the 
deterrence and detection goals of the policy.46 This concern was reflected in the 
interviews, where some interviewees believed that the introduction of recidivism as 
an automatic exclusion would decrease the ‘effectiveness’ of the Immunity Policy.47 
The basis given for this concern was that such exclusion would result in fewer 
cartelists coming forward to seek immunity, due to the uncertainty of the concept and 
how it would be applied.48 These arguments are largely overstated. Whilst deterrence 
and detection are the main aims of the Immunity Policy, allowing a repeat cartel 
offender to receive immunity repeatedly does not deter that particular corporation 
from re-offending; on one view, it may even facilitate the misconduct. Thus, 
allowing recidivists to repeatedly apply for immunity arguably does not achieve 
specific deterrence.  
In terms of its impact on general deterrence, similar provisions currently exist 
in the policy that exclude cartelists on the basis of coercion or their role as the 
ringleader.49 These conditions exist to prevent particularly unscrupulous cartel 
members from receiving immunity. The competition regulators have not sought to 
remove these exclusionary provisions on the basis that they will undermine the 
detection and deterrence aims of the Immunity Policy.50  
Moreover, the DOJ will seek to ‘carve-out’ culpable employees from its 
corporate leniency policy, where these employees will potentially be subject to 
prosecution and punishment. However, this practice is not perceived by the DOJ as 
                                                
45 Yulchon LLC, Revamped Korean Leniency Regime: No More Cheap Way Out for Repeat Cartelists 
and Second-in-Line Confessors (October 31 2012) Lexology 
<http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=43c72699-15cb-4f0a-aa8b-8f39f4c2a37f>. 
46 Ibid. 
47 See Chapter V, Cartel Recidivism, pg 134. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 The ACCC had the opportunity to remove this provision in its most recent review of the policy. The 
ACCC choose to keep the provision but change the ‘ringleader test’ to a ‘coercion test.’ See Chapter 
VII, Cartel Coercion, pg 186. 
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adversely affecting the aims of the policy.51 Therefore, on this basis, if the 
introduction of recidivism as an automatic exclusionary condition would not be 
dissimilar to the existing provisions in the policy, then it is unlikely to have a 
significant impact on the detection and deterrence aims of the policy. This is 
particular the case where there are other considerations that are important to this 
assessment, aside from its impact on detection and deterrence, such as the argument 
that recidivists need to be excluded on the basis of moral reasons, given that ‘the 
visible fact of repeat offending risks weakening the moral commitment to the law of 
the spontaneous law-abiding.’52 
In light of this analysis, the focus instead should be on the way the recidivism 
condition should be implemented. There was general support amongst the 
interviewees in principle that cartel recidivists should not be entitled to immunity, 
but many were divided as to how this is could be achieved in practice.53 One concern 
was the difficulty of defining a ‘recidivist,’ particularly in the context of large, multi-
national cartels. For example: 
  
Interviewee: If you have an organisation which has two different business divisions which 
operate in separate markets, one division may have been involved in cartel conduct and 
resolved the matter. The other division, which is not in even a related market, why should 
they not get the benefit of the immunity policy and why should the authorities not get the 
benefit of the detection of it.54 
 
3 Cartel Recidivism – A Workable Model 
 
This chapter will now turn to formulating an appropriate model for the 
purposes of inclusion in immunity policies. As discussed above, there is extensive 
                                                
51 Scott Hammond, 'Measuring the Value of Second-In Cooperation in Corporate Plea Negotiations' 
(U.S Department of Justice, 2006) s D; Department of Justice, 'Statement of Assistant Attorney 
General Bill Baer on Changes to Antitrust Division's Carve-Out Practice Regarding Corporate Plea 
Agreements' (Department of Justice 2013) 
<http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2013/295747.htm>. 
52 Wouter P.J Wils, 'Recidivism in EU Antittrust Enforcement: A Legal and Economic Analysis' 
(2012) 35 World Competition 12. 
53 See Chapter V, Cartel Recidivism, pg 134. 
54 Interviewee 4 (Sydney, 17th June 2013) 18: This opinion does not consider that unincorporated 
business divisions are not subject to liability. The corporation is the entity subject to liability and the 
corporation is a repeat offender. 
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literature in relation to how recidivism should be defined, but no consensus on the 
issue.55 In addition to the Korean leniency policy, another model that can provide 
some limited insight into the way recidivism could be defined in the ACCC 
Immunity Policy is the European Union Commission’s sentencing of repeat cartel 
offenders.  
According to the 2006 Fining Guidelines,56 where an undertaking continues 
or repeats the same or similar infringements after the Commission or a national 
Competition authority has made a finding that the undertaking infringed Article 101 
or 102 TFEU, the basic amount of the fine will be increase up to 100per cent for each 
such infringement established.57 This general definition has been extensively 
discussed in European Union case law, where ‘recidivism, as understood in a number 
of national legal systems, implies that a person has committed fresh infringements 
after having been penalised for similar infringements.’58  
Therefore, on this basis, the Commission must satisfy three cumulative 
requirements in order to impose higher fines on the finding of recidivism: (1) the 
same undertaking (2) must have repeated the same or a similar competition law 
infringement (3) after a prior infringement decision was adopted.59 However, the 
European Union model is limited in its usefulness as a definition for cartel immunity, 
as a previous immunity applicant would not have been subject to an infringement 
decision for its role in the cartel. 
 
                                                
55 See Chapter V, Cartel Recidivism, pg 134. 
56 The European Fining Guidelines refine the methodology which has been applied since 1998 to set 
fines for infringements of the competition rules. They provide a framework for the setting of fines. 
57 Barennes and Wolf, above n 32, 425; Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to 
Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003. Official Journal C 210, 1.09.2006, 2-5. 
58 Wils, above n 52, 6. Wils has cited numerous case examples that discuss the concept of recidivism: 
Thyssen Stahl  v Commission (T-141/94) [1999] ECR II-347, [617]; ICI v Commission  (T-66/01) 
[2010] ECR, [378]; in other judgments the Court has added that, ‘the concept of repeated infringement 
does not necessarily imply that a fine has been imposed in the past, but merely that a finding of 
infringement has been made in the past: Groupe Danone v Commission (T-38/02) [2005] II-4407, 
[363] confirmed in P Danone v Commission (C-3/06) [2007] ECR I-1331, [41]. The European Union 
Courts have also clarified that the Commission can take account of recidivism even if the prior 
decision is still subject to review by the courts; in case of later annulment of the prior decision, the 
Commission would however be required to amend its second decision: P Lafarge v Commission (C-
413/08) [2010] ECR I-5361, [81]-[90]. As to the notion of ‘similar’ infringements, it appears from the 
case-law that an infringement of Article 101 TFEU and an infringement of Article 102 TFEU cannot 
be considered as similar: Joined Cases: BASF v Commission (T-101/05) [2007] ECR II-4949, [64]; 
Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission (T-66/01) [2010] ECR II-02631, [378]-[381].  
59 Barennes and Wolf, above n 32, 428. 
 
174 
 
(a) Key Considerations In Formulating A Workable Model For Recidivism 
 
The first question relates to defining the corporation as a recidivist. This can 
be a complex question. The reason for this is that corporations can merge with other 
corporations; individuals who controlled a corporation during an initial cartel may 
not be the same individuals who control the same corporation in a subsequent cartel; 
and finally, whether subsidiaries of a parent company could be found to be a 
recidivist when it was another subsidiary or the parent company itself that committed 
the prior cartel offence.  A competition regulator would be faced with these questions 
when determining whether the corporation applying for immunity is the same 
corporation who had previously received immunity for a cartel offence. 
The European Union courts have discussed some of these issues, particularly relating 
to the liability of parent companies in relation to their subsidiaries, although they 
have not be required to make a decision on this basis, specifically in relation to 
recidivism.60  
To address these issues, the general rule that a corporation is an entity with 
separate legal personality should be applied.61 It is a fundamental principle of 
corporations’ law that a company is a legal entity separate and distinct from its 
shareholders with its own separate legal rights and obligations. The Australian courts 
have long held the view that the corporate veil should only be pierced in exceptional 
cases.62 Many leading scholars have written extensively on piercing the corporate 
veil and the reasons for piercing it.63 It is clear that the circumstances in which the 
                                                
60 Ibid. 
61 Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22; Industrial Equity Ltd v Blackburn (1977) 137 CLR 
567; Walker v Wimborne (1975-76) 137 CLR 1.  
62 See, eg, R P Austin and I M Ramsay, Ford's Principles of Corporations Law (Lexis Nexis, 2015) 
[4.250.12]. 
63See, eg, Harvey Gelb, 'Piercing the Corporate Veil - The Undercapitalization Factor' (1982) 59 
Chicago-Kent Law Review 1; S Ottolenghi, 'From Peeping Behind the Corporate Veil, to Ignoring it 
Completely' (1990) 53 The Modern Law Review 338; Henry Hansmann and Reiner Kraakamn, 
'Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts' (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 1879; 
Robert Thompson, 'Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study' (1991) 76 Cornell Law Review 
1036; Robert Thompson, 'Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability of Corporate 
Participants for Torts of the Enterprise' (1994) 47 Vanderbilt Law Review 1; Franklin Gevertz, 
'Piercing Piercing: An Attempt to Lift the Veil of Confusion Surrounding the Doctrine of Piercing the 
Corporate Veil' (1997) 76 Oregon Law Review 853; Jennifer Payne, 'Lifting the Corporate Veil: A 
Reassessment of the Fraud Exception' (1997) 56 The Cambridge Law Journal 284; Robert Thompson, 
'Piercing the Veil Within Corporate Groups: Corporate Shareholders as Mere Investors' (1999) 13 
Connecticut Journal of International Law 379; Stephen Bainbridge, 'Abolishing Veil Piercing' (2001) 
26 Journal of Corporate Law 479; Ian Ramsay and Noakesm David, 'Piercing the Corporate Veil in 
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court has pierced the veil have produced fragmented and inconsistent results.64 There 
are also limited circumstances under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) that allow for 
the corporate veil to be pierced.65 
Given the reluctance of courts to pierce the corporate veil, there is no 
compelling case for piercing the corporate veil in the context of immunity 
applications. Thus, in the situation where a corporation applies for immunity and that 
same corporation has previously received immunity, it should not be eligible 
regardless of the circumstances surrounding the initial application. For example, if a 
group of employees orchestrated a cartel within a corporation and the corporation 
received immunity for that conduct, subsequently if a different group of employees 
from the same corporation engaged in cartel conduct, the corporation would not be 
eligible for full immunity once again. 
Secondly, the corporation must have previously received immunity in 
accordance with the ACCC Immunity Policy, which applies to cartel conduct in 
contravention of: 
1. (a) Division 1 of Part IV of the CCA which prohibits a corporation from 
making or giving effect to contracts, arrangements or understandings that 
contain a cartel provision, and/or  
2. (b) Section 45(2) of the CCA.66  
A corporation that has previously received a penalty discount in exchange for 
cooperation pursuant to the policy will therefore not be excluded on this basis. 67 It is 
important that the exclusionary provisions are not drafted so wide as to significantly 
diminish the Immunity Policy’s operation. Corporate recidivists should be excluded 
from receiving full immunity multiple times, but applicants who received lenient 
treatment for past offenses should still be eligible for full immunity. 
                                                                                                                                     
Australia' (2001) 19 Company and Securities Law Journal 250; Kurt Strasser, 'Piercing the Veil in 
Corporate Groups' (2005) 37 Connecticut Law Review 637; Robert Thompson, 'Piercing the Veil: Is 
Common Law the Problem?' (2005) 37 Connecticut Law Review 619.	
64 See eg, John Farar, 'Piercing the Corporate Veil in Favour of Creditors and Pooling of Groups - A 
Comparative Study' (2013) 25 Bond Law Review 31, 31; Helen Anderson, 'Piercing the Veil on 
Corporate Groups in Australia: The Case for Reform' (2009) 33 Melbourne University Law Review 
333, 334. 
65 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 588V provides for the lift of the corporate veil of the parent only in 
the case of insolvency of a subsidiary. The consequence of lifting the veil is that the parent company 
will be liable for the debt of the subsidiary but there is no criminal penalty involved in the case of 
insolvent trading of a subsidiary. 
66 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 'ACCC Immunity and Cooperation Policy for 
Cartel Conduct ' (2014) 2. 
67 Ibid s H.	
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In cases where the cartel participant has previously received immunity, and is 
therefore excluded on the basis of recidivism, it would be possible for the immunity 
applicant to receive lenient treatment in accordance with the cooperation section of 
the Immunity Policy.68 As previously stated, there are concerns that this may 
adversely impact on the detection and deterrence aims of the policy. These concerns 
need to be reconciled with the fact that similar exclusionary provisions, such as the 
coercion condition, currently exist in the policy. The ACCC has not indicated that 
these provisions reduce the detection or deterrence capability of the policy, which is 
reflected in their decision to retain these provisions in its most recent review of the 
policy.69 
The third consideration relates to the limitation period that should apply when 
determining whether there is recidivist conduct. This is one of the most controversial 
issues in the sentencing of cartel recidivists in the European Union. The only 
guidance offered by the Commission is that recidivism may be taken into 
consideration if ‘a relatively limited period of time separates one infringement from 
the next.’70 This is determined on a case-by-case basis. 10 years has been treated as a 
‘relatively short period of time.’71  Some Member States specify a limitation period 
for recidivism in competition law cases.72 For example, in Spain the period between 
the first finding of an infringement to the start of the second infringement is ten years 
and in France it is fifteen years.73  
On the other hand, the Korean Corporate Leniency program stipulates that 
recidivists may not be eligible for leniency if they have received leniency in the 
previous five years.74  
                                                
68 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 'ACCC Immunity and Cooperation Policy: 
Frequently Asked Questions' (2014). 
69Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n 66, ss 16 (iv), 21 (e), 24 (c), 28 (iv), 77 
(e). 
70 Barennes and Wolf, above n 32, 432.  
71 Ibid 430. 
72 Kristina Nordlander, 'The Commission's Policy on Recidivism: Legal Certainty for Repeat 
Offenders?' (2005) 2 The Competition Law Review 16. 
73 See, eg, the Spanish National Competition Commission's Communication of 6 February 2009  on 
the quantification of sanctions arising from violations of Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the Spanish  
Competition Act 15/2007 of 3 July 2007 and Articles 81 and 82 of the European Community Treaty  
(fine increase by 5 to 15 per cent, and maximum period of ten years between the first finding of  
infringement and the start of the second infringement), and the French Competition Authority's Notice  
of 16 May 2011 on the Method Relating to the Setting of Financial Penalties (fine increase by 15 to  
50 per cent, and maximum period of 15 years between the first finding of infringement and the start of 
the second infringement). 
74 Korea Fair Trade Commission, above n 43, Art 6.3. 
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In Australia, the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sets a limitation 
period of 6 years for an action for damages.75 If this factor is combined with the 
estimation that the average cartel lasts between 5-7 years,76 then this could be a 
flexible figure that the ACCC could adopt in its assessment of recidivist behaviour. 
The ACCC should exercise its discretion in determining whether the corporation 
should be excluded on the basis of recidivism given the facts of each particular 
application.77 In its determination, the ACCC could have regard to the nature of the 
firm’s previous cartel offences, whether the firm has a history of recidivist 
behaviour, the conduct to which immunity is being sought once again and the time in 
which the corporation came forward.78 The more serious and frequent the recidivistic 
behaviour, the more likely the ACCC should refuse to grant an application for 
immunity. 
Finally, there was much concern that if recidivism were implemented, as an 
automatic exclusion, then the definition of recidivism should be clear so that 
immunity applicants could readily determine their legal position in relation to the 
Immunity Policy with greater clarity. This is based on the presumption that if an 
immunity applicant has a greater awareness and ability to determine whether they 
will be granted full immunity prior to actually making the application, then the more 
likely the applicant will be to come forward and disclose their misconduct.79 
However, as this section has demonstrated, it is possible to develop a clear and 
workable model of recidivism.  
 
4 Recommendation 
The purpose of this section was to demonstrate the need for excluding cartel 
recidivists from repeatedly receiving immunity and to propose a workable model to 
achieve this. It can be seen from the economic literature and empirical studies that 
                                                
75 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 236 (2)(1). 
76 For an overview of studies regarding cartel duration, see Margaret C Levenstein and Valerie Y 
Suslow, 'What Determines Cartel Success' (2006) 44 Journal of Economic Literature 43.	
77 Yulchon LLC, above n 45. 
78 These are similar factors considered by the DOJ in determining whether the granting of leniency 
would be unfair to others: DOJ Department of Justice, 'Corporate Leniency Policy' (0091, Department 
of Justice - Antitrust Division, 1993) Section B (7). 
79 Scott D Hammond, 'Cornerstones of an Effective Leniency Program ' (Department of Justice, 2004) 
s V. 
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cartel recidivism is an issue that warrants serious consideration, even if the actual 
number of cartel recidivists remains uncertain.  
The arguments against the imposition of cartel recidivism as an automatic 
exclusion are overstated. There is little, if any evidence, aside from the anecdotal 
evidence offered by the regulator that suggests this would seriously impact on the 
‘effectiveness’ of the Policy. There are currently exclusionary provisions in the 
Immunity Policy, such as the coercion requirement, that are similarly broad in nature 
and exist to prevent highly culpable individuals from receiving immunity. Likewise, 
the recidivism requirement would be aimed at denying immunity to those whose 
culpability is especially high. 
If an individual or a corporation was found to be excluded due to recidivist 
behaviour, they nonetheless have the opportunity to rely on ACCC Cooperation 
Policy, and the relevant cooperation policies in the United States, United Kingdom 
and Canada.  
 
B Cartel Coercion 
 
According to s16 (iv) of the Immunity Policy, a corporation will be eligible 
for conditional immunity from ACCC-initiated proceedings where ‘the corporation 
has not coerced others to participate in the cartel.’ The coercion test also applies to 
individuals who have coerced others to participate in the cartel.80 This coercion test 
replaced the previous ringleader requirement where an immunity applicant could be 
automatically excluded from immunity on the basis that they were the ‘clear leader 
of the cartel.’81  
The removal of the ringleader requirement was a result of the 2014 ACCC 
review of the Policy. According to the revised FAQ, there must be ‘clear evidence’ 
that the party has coerced other members to participate in the cartel and this is 
                                                
80 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n 66, s 28 ss(IV).  
81 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 'The ACCC Immunity Policy for Cartel 
Conduct ' (2009) 
<http://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Immunity%20policy%20for%20cartel%20conduct%20and%20
interpretation%20guidelines.pdf> s 8 (iv); Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 
'ACCC Immunity Policy Interpretation Guidelines' (2009) 
<http://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Immunity%20policy%20for%20cartel%20conduct%20and%20
interpretation%20guidelines.pdf> s 3.4. 
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determined on a case-by-case basis in light of the respective roles and positions of 
each of the cartel members.82 The ACCC ‘may’ in some cases require the ‘applicant 
to demonstrate it has not coerced others’ but does not clearly stipulate that the 
immunity applicant will have the burden of proof in this respect.83  
Furthermore, it is implied that the ACCC would require a high level of 
information in order to determine that there is ‘clear evidence’ of coercion. This is 
compounded by the fact that the ACCC is ‘unlikely’ to disqualify an application on 
the basis of coercion.84 The FAQ also outlines a number of scenarios that may 
illustrate the effect of the coercion requirement.85 By providing these examples, the 
ACCC has attempted to provide further guidance and clarity regarding the operation 
of the coercion requirement and has gone beyond the information previously 
provided in relation to the ringleader requirement.  
As outlined in Chapter V, there was a general consensus amongst the 
interviewees for the removal of the ringleader requirement.86 The most common 
arguments in support of this proposition related to the uncertainty surrounding the 
definition of a ‘ringleader’ as ‘someone may start off as the ringleader and then 
someone else may assume the captain’s armband and then it moves through a 
continuum.’87  
Many of the interviewees pointed to the difficulties the ACCC would face in 
ascertaining who the ‘clear’ leader of the cartel was, given that cartels are essentially 
consensual in nature. Caron Beaton-Wells has strongly criticised the ringleader 
requirement of the Immunity Policy and advocated its removal.88 Beaton Wells 
argued that it is very difficult to envisage a situation where one participant did not 
coerce another as part of the cartel. Moreover, the ACCC’s decision in relation to 
whether the applicant is a ringleader is made at the time in which the applicant comes 
forward for immunity and therefore solely relies on the immunity applicant’s 
                                                
82 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n 68, 12. 
83 Contrast the United States Leniency Frequently asked Questions guide, which expressly stipulates 
that the applicant will have the burden of proof: Scott Hammond and Belinda Barnett, 'Frequently 
Asked Questions Regarding the Antitrust Division's Leniency Program and Model Leniency Letters ' 
(Department of Justice, November 19 2008) Q13. 
84 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n 68, Q36.  
85 Ibid 9-10. 
86 See Chapter V, Ringleader Exclusion, pg 138. 
87 Interviewee 2 (Sydney, 22nd July 2013) 10. 
88 Caron Beaton-Wells, 'The ACCC Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct: Due for Review' (2013) 41 
Australian Business Law Review 171, 185-187.  
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evidence that it was not the cartel ringleader. This becomes increasingly difficult in a 
two party cartel setting, and the Visy/Amcor89 dispute has been cited in this respect.90  
Some interviewees indicated that the ACCC generally did not seriously 
investigate whether or not the applicant is the cartel ringleader and as a result, the 
interviewees believed that the criterion was unnecessary, as ‘in practice I don’t think 
there’s any time spent at all beyond a very short time trying to tell who the ring 
leader is. It’s just not a factor in practice.’91 Furthermore, there is academic support 
for the claim by one of the interviewees that the ringleader exclusion requirement can 
lead to the maintenance of cartels, due to the fact that if the cartel ringleader is 
excluded, then the other cartel members will have more trust in that leader knowing 
that the leader is ineligible for immunity. As a result, the cartel may be perpetuated.92  
 As a result of a number of consultative discussion papers, the ACCC has 
removed the ringleader requirement and replaced it with the coercion test. The 
underlying rationale is that a particularly unscrupulous cartel member who coerced 
others to join a cartel against their will should not be awarded the benefit of 
immunity.  
However, it was also argued within the submissions made to the ACCC in 
relation to its review of the policy that the difficulties associated with the ringleader 
requirement also apply to the coercion test. The revised policy does not provide a 
clear definition of ‘coercion,’ despite providing examples of scenarios that may give 
rise to coercion.93 Therefore, if the primary criticism levelled at the ringleader 
requirement is that it is unclear and ambiguous and thus unnecessary, this is difficult 
to reconcile with the adoption of the coercion test. This is one of the main reasons 
why the coercion test needs greater clarity. 
 One interviewee expressed the more extreme belief that the coercion test 
serves a ‘moral’ purpose, in that it would be against ‘good conscience’ to allow a 
particularly unscrupulous cartel member to be eligible for immunity: 
                                                
89 See Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Visy Holdings Pty Ltd (No 3) (2007) 244 
ALR 673. 
90 Beaton-Wells, above n 88, 185: ‘Several practitioner interviewees cited the Visy/Amcor and 
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92 Interviewee 13 (Sydney, 22nd July 2013) 17; See, eg, Christopher R. Leslie, 'Antitrust Amnesty, 
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Interviewee: I think so…if you go back to sort of all the underlying moral issues about 
someone being able to escape liability for this sort of conduct, if you’re dealing with a 
situation where one participant has sort of bullied or coerced other participants into this 
illegal arrangement then I think morally I would say it’s wrong for that person to be able to 
obtain full immunity for what they’ve done.94 
 
It was clear that a majority of the interviewees supported the introduction of 
the coercion test to replace the ringleader requirement. This support for the coercion 
test is reflected in other jurisdictions, most notably in Canada, the United Kingdom 
and the United States, which will be analysed below. 
According to s15 of the Canadian Competition Bureau Immunity Policy, ‘a 
party must not have coerced others to be party to the illegal activity.’95 Similarly, 
according to Section 3.8 (e) of the CMA policy, ‘if the applicant has taken steps to 
coerce another business to take part in the cartel activity it will be eligible only for a 
reduction in fine of up to 50 per cent (Type C leniency), even if it is the first to report 
(although non-coercing employees will still be eligible for criminal immunity).’96  
In a supporting FAQ document, the Canadian Competition Bureau outlines 
that a party may be disqualified from immunity where there is clear evidence of 
coercive behaviour.97 It further states that this test may be satisfied where the party 
pressured unwilling participants to be involved in the offence. This evidence of 
coercive conduct may be express or implied. When the ‘instigator’ test was replaced 
by the coercion test in 2007, the Competition Bureau claimed that this test would 
provide a ‘clearer standard and increased predictability for potential immunity 
applicants,’98 although it did not elaborate as to how or why this is so. This coercion 
test is therefore very similar to the current revised coercion test found in the ACCC 
                                                
94 Interviewee 9 (Sydney, 15th July 2013) 12.	
95 Competition Bureau, 'Immunity Program under the Competition Act' (Competition Bureau, 7 June 
2010). 
96 Competition and Markets Authority, 'Applications for Leniency and No-Action in Cartel Cases - 
Detailed Guidance on the Principles and Process' (Competition and Markets Authority, 2013) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284417/OFT1495.pdf
> Footnote 14 of the CMA policy makes the point of saying that as of 2013, no applicants have been 
refused on the basis the coercer test.  
97 Competition Bureau, 'Immunity Program: Frequently Asked Questions' (Competition Bureau, 
2013)13.  
98 Competition Bureau, 'Adjustments to the Immunity Program and the Bureau’s Response to 
Consultation Submissions' (Competition Bureau, 11 May 2011) 5. 
 
182 
 
policy, except that the ACCC has outlined a number of scenarios that may constitute 
coercion. 
The United States DOJ policy is slightly different to the above policies, in 
that it has retained both the coercion test and the ‘clear leader’ test. According to 
section A (6), a corporation will be eligible for immunity if it ‘did not coerce another 
party to participate in the illegal activity and clearly was not the leader in, or 
originator of the activity.’ This requirement also applies to individuals who seek 
leniency.99 This policy goes even further than the other comparable jurisdictions, and 
states pursuant to Section B (7): ‘The Division determines that granting leniency 
would not be unfair to others, considering the nature of the illegal activity, the 
confessing corporation’s role in it, and when the corporation comes forward.’100 It 
also makes clear that the immunity applicant bears the onus of proof in proving the 
accuracy of the representation.101 This requirement is not apparent in the Canadian, 
Australian or United Kingdom policies.  
On the basis on this provision, the DOJ has discretion to exclude an applicant 
from leniency on the basis that it would be ‘unfair,’ given the circumstances. This 
closely resembles a proportionality assessment, where a number of factors are 
weighed in determining the grant of leniency. The incorporation of ‘fairness’ as a 
relevant factor allows for a more normative, holistic assessment in the determination 
of leniency, which moves away from the strict emphasis on the detection and 
deterrence capabilities of the policy.  
The United Kingdom CMA policy is the most comprehensive policy in 
relation to the coercion test. In contrast to the policies in Australia, Canada and the 
United States, the CMA policy states that there must have been clear, positive and 
ultimately successful steps to pressurise an unwilling participant to take part in the 
cartel.102 However, unlike the other policies, the CMA policy specifically states the 
kind of behaviour that may constitute coercive conduct such as actual physical 
violence, proven threats of violence, blackmail and strong economic pressure and 
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also clearly states what type of conduct will not constitute coercion.103 It also 
outlines how the test applies to individuals.104 
Each of the aforementioned policies clearly stipulates that the competition 
authority will construe or interpret the coercion requirement in favour of the 
immunity applicant and states that no immunity application has been refused on the 
basis of coercion. This statement likely exists as an enticement to future immunity 
applicants to help ensure that they are not dissuaded from applying for immunity on 
the basis that they may have played a coercive role in the cartel. 
Australian case law does not provide a settled definition of coercion or duress. 
The most commonly cited formulation of duress in the context of contract is 
enunciated by Lord Scarman in Universe Tankships Inc of Monrovia v International 
Transport Workers Federation: 
The authorities …reveal two elements in the wrong of duress: 
(1) pressure amounting to compulsion of the will (impaired consent); and 
(2) the illegitimacy of the pressure exerted.105 
Originally at common law it was thought that duress or coercion would 
usually require actual or threatened violence.106 The concept of duress also extends to 
the threatened detection or seizure of goods, or threatened damage to goods.107 In 
recent times, the courts have recognised cases of economic duress, where the 
defendant threatens to breach a contract unless the plaintiff enters into a modified or 
new contract on terms more favourable to the defendant.108 
 
Recommendation 
It is apparent from the recent revision of the ACCC Immunity Policy that the 
introduction of the coercion test in place of the former ringleader requirement is a 
commendable decision and will lead to greater clarity in this area of the operation of 
the policy. However, the coercion test is undefined and still creates undue 
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uncertainty. The ACCC have attempted to overcome this by including three 
hypothetical examples to illustrate how the coercion test may be applied.109  
However, when read carefully, these examples are vague and overgeneralised 
to the point that they offer no real assistance in determining what amounts to 
coercion. Therefore, the ACCC Immunity Policy should be revised to reflect the 
approach taken in the CMA policy.  That policy provides a more meaningful list of 
the factors that may lead to a finding of coercion.  
Whilst a degree of discretion is necessary in order to determine whether the 
conduct amounts to coercion, it is important that a clear and workable definition is 
formulated. As a result of the cross-comparative analysis conducted in this section, it 
is apparent that the two most common features of coercion are (1) illegitimate 
pressure; and (2) an unwillingness of the cartel participant to enter into the cartel (or 
impaired consent). Given the abstract nature of these terms, the ACCC should 
translate them into more concrete factors by adopting those factors considered by the 
CMA. These include: 
- actual physical violence or proven threats of violence which have a realistic prospect of being 
carried out, or blackmail (these would apply equally to cases of horizontal as well as vertical 
collusion) 
- such strong economic pressure as to make market exit a real risk, where, for example, a large 
player organises a collective boycott of a small player or refuses to supply key inputs to such 
a small player – these scenarios are more likely to apply in cases where there is at least a 
significant vertical element and are less likely to be relevant where an arrangement is purely 
horizontal and there are no significant cross-supplies between competitors.110 
The ACCC could then demonstrate how these factors apply in the 
hypothetical examples they provide in the policy. For example, the first hypothetical 
example the ACCC provides is: 
Example 1: Company A is a retailer of goods and services supplied by producers B, 
C and D. Company A holds a near monopoly market share in the retail market. Companies B, 
C and D also retail goods and services through other retail channels including ones that they 
own. Company A negotiates agreements between itself, B, C and D that they will not offer 
goods and services below the price that is offered by A. A threatens to no longer acquire 
goods and services from the company that does not agree. A, B, C and D enter into this price 
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fixing arrangement. Company A is likely to be disqualified in this scenario on the basis that it 
has coerced others to participate in the cartel.111 
In this scenario, the ACCC needs to indicate which factors it considers would 
amount to coercion. It is likely to include the fact that Company A holds a greater 
market share and is the dominant player in that market, meaning that the smaller 
business is likely to suffer economic loss or be forced to leave the market if they do 
not join the cartel. By listing the relevant factors that may amount to coercion and 
then demonstrating how these factors could be identified in a hypothetical example 
gives a much clearer indication of the way the ACCC will interpret coercive conduct. 
Likewise, the ACCC should state the factors that are unlikely to amount to 
coercion such as: 
- harmful market pressure which falls short of risking market exit but may reduce profit 
margins  
- mere agreed enforcement or punishment mechanisms to enforce the operation of a cartel, and  
- standard term contracts in a resale price maintenance case, even where there is a significant 
inequality of bargaining power.112 
Therefore, in Example 2, the ACCC should list why the conduct in that scenario does 
not amount to coercion: 
Example 2: Retailers A, B and C enter into a cartel arrangement. Retailer A, the market 
leader, proposed the cartel arrangement and is the most proactive participant. For example, it 
organises meetings and is the party that is the most aggressive and vocal in the cartel when it 
comes to raising prices. The ACCC is unlikely to consider Retailer A to have engaged in 
coercion in this scenario.113 
It should clearly state that conduct that is indicative of an active and vocal cartel 
participant who orchestrates cartel meetings does not amount to coercion as there is 
no evidence that the other cartel participants have unwillingly been forced into the 
cartel or face economic duress if they do not join the cartel. 
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C The Relationship between the ACCC and the CDPP 
 
Structure of The Regulatory Bodies 
 
A key factor governing the eligibility and cooperation of immunity applicants is the 
way that the applications are processed and by which regulatory body. With the 
introduction of criminal penalties for cartel conduct in 2009, it was necessary that 
criminal immunity was available for cartel offenders. The current regulatory 
structure in Australia is bifurcated. According to the Revised Memorandum of 
Understanding between the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(ACCC) and the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP) (‘Revised 
MOU’) the respective roles of the regulatory bodies are as described below: 
 The CDPP is responsible for:  
• prosecuting offences against Commonwealth law, including serious cartel offences 
under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 and State and Territory Competition Codes, 
in accordance with the Prosecution Policy of the Commonwealth; and  
• seeking associated remedies, including by taking certain proceedings under the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 1987 and Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. 
 
The ACCC is responsible for:  
• investigating cartel conduct and gathering evidence;  
• managing the immunity process, in consultation with the CDPP; and  
• referral of serious cartel conduct to the CDPP for consideration for prosecution.114  
Therefore, an immunity applicant will first seek an immunity marker from the 
ACCC. The applicant will then be required to disclose the relevant cartel information 
to the ACCC in order to obtain a proffer.115 The ACCC will then determine whether 
the applicant is eligible for conditional civil immunity based on the criteria outlined 
in the policy. Where there is ‘serious cartel conduct’, the ACCC will refer the 
application for conditional criminal immunity to the CDPP for determination of 
eligibility.  
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In determining what constitutes ‘serious cartel conduct,’ the ACCC will have 
regard to a number of factors outlined in Section 4.2 of the Revised MOU: 
The ACCC is more likely to consider conduct it is investigating to be serious cartel 
conduct if one or more of the following factors apply:  
• the conduct was covert;  
• the conduct caused, or could have caused, large scale or serious economic 
harm;  
• the conduct was longstanding or had, or could have had, a significant 
impact on the market in which the conduct occurred;  
• the conduct caused, or could have caused, significant detriment to the 
public, or a class of the public, or caused, or could have caused, significant loss 
or damage to one or more customers of the alleged participants;  
• one or more of the alleged participants has previously been found by a 
court to have participated in, or has admitted to participating in, cartel conduct 
either criminal or civil;  
• senior representatives within the relevant corporation(s) were involved in 
authorising or participating in the conduct;  
• the Government and thus, taxpayers, were victims of the conduct -even 
where the value of affected commerce is relatively low; and  
• the conduct involved the obstruction of justice or other collateral crimes 
committed in connection with the cartel activity.116  
According to Section 7 of the Immunity Policy, the CDPP will exercise an 
independent discretion when considering a recommendation by the ACCC. If the 
CDPP finds that the applicant meets the criteria outlined in the Prosecution Policy of 
the Commonwealth,117 as a result of the Immunity Policy review, it will ‘ordinarily’ 
provide a ‘letter of comfort’ to the applicant. Moreover, before a criminal 
prosecution commences, the Director will issue a written undertaking pursuant to 
section 9(6D) of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983 (Cth) (‘DPP Act’) 
granting conditional criminal immunity. 
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In Canada, the system of cartel enforcement is also bifurcated between the 
Competition Bureau and the Director of Public Prosecutions of Canada. Similarly to 
Australia, the Competition Bureau is the sole investigator of the cartel allegations 
and will be the point of contact for all cartel immunity applications.118 The DPP will 
also have the sole authority to grant conditional criminal immunity ‘on the basis of 
its own independent assessment of the public interest.’119 The DPP’s decision to grant 
immunity is made pursuant to Section 5.2 (5) of the Public Prosecution Service of 
Canada Deskbook.120  
The Bureau and the DPP have also entered into a Memorandum of 
Understanding (‘Canadian MOU’), however the information outlined in this 
agreement is far more comprehensive than the Australian version.121 The Canadian 
MOU clearly outlines in separate sections the roles and responsibilities of the Bureau 
and the Prosecutors at the investigative and prosecution stages, respectively.122 It 
further indicates the importance of confidentiality and security in the context of 
immunity and expressly recognises the need for a dispute resolution provision.123 
This aspect will be explored further in the next section.124  
A key difference between the regulatory relationships in Australia and 
Canada is that in Australia the CDPP will make a decision regarding immunity 
according to the same considerations as the ACCC, as outlined in Annexure B to the 
Prosecution Policy.125 In Canada, on the other hand, there is no such clarification as 
to what factors the DPP will have regard to in determining criminal immunity, only 
that it will be made in accordance with the principles encompassed within the 
Prosecution Service Deskbook.126 Furthermore, there is no express provision for the 
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issuing of ‘letters of comfort’ or a formal written undertaking for the granting of 
conditional criminal immunity in Canada. 
In contrast, the cartel regulatory system in the United Kingdom and the 
United States is not bifurcated: the CMA and the DOJ respectively determine both 
conditional civil and criminal immunity. This is the well-established practice of the 
DOJ where the Division’s Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Criminal 
Enforcement (‘Criminal DAAG’) reviews all leniency requests.127 In the same way, 
the CMA determines all applications for civil and criminal leniency. Therefore, 
because there is a sole regulatory body in the United States and United Kingdom for 
the granting of both civil and criminal immunity, there are no issues associated with 
the relationship in a bifurcated system of the kind that exists in Australia and Canada. 
 
(a) The Relationship In Practice 
 
The relationship between the ACCC and the CDPP received significant attention in 
the interviews conducted and was identified as a key area of concern. The operation 
of the relationship also featured in the recent review of the Immunity Policy.128 As a 
result of these discussions, there were three main areas of concern:  
1. Timing of the determination of criminal immunity 
2. Sufficiency of information for criminal immunity 
3. The credibility of accomplice evidence  
 
As a product of the recent review by the ACCC, the Immunity Policy now 
stipulates that the CDPP will ‘ordinarily’ issue a Letter of Comfort (‘LOC’) where 
the CDPP considers that the applicant meets the criteria set out in Annexure B to the 
Prosecution Policy.129 According to Q35 of the ACCC Immunity FAQ: 
The letter of comfort will recognise that the applicant has a marker from the ACCC as the first 
to apply for immunity for the cartel conduct. The letter will also state that the Director intends 
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128 See: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, ACCC Releases Discussion Paper in 
Cartel Immunity Policy Review (September 2013) <https://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/accc-
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to grant an undertaking pursuant to section 9(6D) of the DPP Act to the applicant prior to any 
prosecution being instituted against a cartel participant provided that the applicant:  
(a) maintain eligibility criteria for conditional immunity (as outlined in the Policy in paragraph 
16 for corporations and paragraph 28 for individuals)  
(b) provide full, frank and truthful disclosure, and cooperate fully and expeditiously on a 
continuing basis throughout the ACCC’s investigation and any ensuing litigation, and  
(c) maintain confidentiality regarding its status as an immunity applicant and de tails of the 
investigation and any ensuing litigation unless otherwise required by law or with the 
written consent of the ACCC.  
The letter of comfort from the CDPP will generally be provided to the immunity applicant at 
the same time as the ACCC grants conditional immunity in relation to civil proceedings.  
Prior to the commencement of any prosecution, the Director will grant an undertaking pursuant 
to section 9(6D) of the DPP Act that, subject to fulfilment of on-going obligations and 
conditions, the applicant will not be prosecuted for the cartel offence for which immunity is 
sought.130 
As part of the review, the ACCC and CDPP also released a Revised 
Memorandum of Understanding (‘Revised MOU’), which outlines how the ACCC 
and CDPP will facilitate a working relationship through ‘regular meetings’ with 
established ‘relationship managers.’131 More importantly however, there is no 
mention of the LOC or undertakings provided by the CDPP within the Revised 
MOU. Thus, according to Q35 above, the only indication as to what may be within 
the LOC provided to the applicant, is  (1) that the CDPP recognises that the applicant 
has secured the ‘first marker’ status with the ACCC in its application for immunity 
and (2) stipulates that the Director of the CDPP ‘intends to grant an undertaking.’ 
This does not resolve the major question of whether or not the LOC will provide the 
applicant with sufficient certainty to be able to fully cooperate with the CDPP in 
providing incriminating evidence before an undertaking is granted. In its current 
form, it is unclear what rights and responsibilities an applicant would have in the 
event that the CDPP decides not to grant an undertaking after it concludes its 
deliberations.  
In contrast, the United States DOJ does not offer ‘letters of comfort’ to a 
leniency applicant. The DOJ recognises that an immunity applicant may ‘want 
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assurances up front’ but believes that ‘conditional leniency letters address that 
need.’132 The DOJ FAQ points to the fact that many other voluntary disclosure 
regimes of other prosecuting agencies do not provide an upfront guarantee of non-
prosecution. The DOJ’s position is that if conditional leniency letters did not exist 
then the applicant would have no assurances of leniency until the conclusion of the 
investigation and prosecution of co-conspirators. Therefore, in the DOJ’s view, the 
conditional leniency letter itself should provide sufficient certainty and transparency 
to the applicant. This approach is said by the DOJ to have been ‘very effective’.133 
The CMA on the other hand, does provide either letters of comfort or no-
action letters regarding criminal prosecution.  No-action letters or comfort letters are 
generally issued ‘where the CMA decides only to undertake an investigation under 
the CA98 or chooses not to investigate at all.’134 However, the CMA recognises that 
a proper determination of whether a no-action letter or comfort letter will be issued is 
usually at the end or nearing the end of an investigation. At the very minimum, the 
CMA would need to examine the ‘substantial and most probative elements’ of the 
immunity application and each substantial witness would need to be interviewed at 
least once.135 In contrast to the ACCC policy, the CMA provides more guidance as to 
the contents of the comfort letter and provides a template of a standard form ‘No-
action letter’.136 Although the CMA recognises that comfort letters may not avoid 
uncertainty regarding criminal prosecution, it considers that the issuing of LOC’s 
‘has proven to be effective in achieving its objectives.’137 
On one view, the LOC provided by the ACCC can be seen as a step towards 
addressing the uncertainty surrounding the granting of conditional criminal 
immunity. The Immunity Policy states that the LOC will generally be provided at the 
same time as the ACCC grants civil conditional immunity.138 However, it remains to 
be seen whether or not this will overcome the significant delay that has been 
experienced by those awaiting the CDPP to make a decision in relation to conditional 
criminal immunity.  
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One of the strongest concerns by the interviewees was the impact that this 
delay can have on their clients when seeking immunity, on both their emotional state 
of being and the long period of uncertainty that befalls them whilst awaiting the 
CDPP’s decision. During this time, particularly for large corporations, business may 
be halted or stalled in order to comply with the immunity requirements, which can 
incur significant financial costs.  
When probed for the reasons that might explain this delay, many different 
answers were provided. Some believed that the delay was attributed to the alien 
nature of conditional full immunity to the CDPP, who usually treats accomplices 
harshly in accordance with its Prosecution Policy.139 Other explanations suggest that 
there is a cultural enforcement clash between the ACCC and the CDPP. The 
significantly divergent enforcement priorities to that of the ACCC may be a cause for 
delay:  
Interviewee: Well, again I suspect that the DPP's agenda is somewhat different to that of the 
Commission.  Like the Commission, as you know, is charged with the protection of the 
consumer and cartel is a serious problem as far as the Commission is concerned and that's 
justifiable.  One can't really readily imagine a more egregious type of conduct to wreak 
havoc on the welfare of consumers in the country, especially if it's a major cartel.  The DPP, I 
think, doesn't view that type of conduct as serious compared with some of its other major 
criminal activities which may be serious crime of which I suspect there is quite a significant 
amount that the DPP has to deal with given its risk resources and man power.  So my belief is 
that the DPP tends to put that type of conduct not in the serious basket and is more concerned 
with other conduct and we'll get round to it when it can and I think that results in a significant 
time lag.140  
 
It is hoped that the implementation of a letter of comfort may help to 
overcome the uncertainty associated with the delay in granting conditional criminal 
immunity, although there is reason to doubt that this hope will be realised. In section 
32 of the Immunity Policy, it states that ‘the CDPP and the ACCC have agreed to 
procedures that will facilitate the granting of immunity in relation to cartel offences 
at the same time as immunity in relation to civil proceedings.’141 It is not clear from 
this paragraph whether these procedures are new and yet to be published in light of 
the review, or whether they are referring to the new procedures that are outlined in 
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the Revised MOU, relating to the establishment of relationship managers and regular 
meetings between the ACCC and CDPP.142  
Another key point of concern is that it is unclear from the Immunity Policy 
and FAQ what legal rights an immunity applicant would have if the CDPP were to 
revoke the letter of comfort. The ACCC needs to publish templates of the LOC, in 
addition to publishing immunity agreement templates, in order to give applicants and 
their advisors a clear idea of the nature of the letter, including the rights and 
obligations incurred within it. This should be published on the ACCC Website.  
The DOJ Model Corporate Conditional Leniency Letter provides an 
appropriate foundational model. It states that compliance with the condition to 
provide full, continuing, and complete cooperation is subject, but not limited to, a 
range of obligations, such as providing a full exposition of facts; voluntarily 
providing all documents in its possession; ensuring the full cooperation of its current 
(and former) employees, including interviews or testimony; ensuring best efforts are 
made to ensure that employees are truthful and candid in performing their 
cooperation obligations; and providing restitution where appropriate.143 Most 
notably, the leniency letter expressly recognises that former directors, officers and 
employees are not covered by the Leniency Policy, but may be included in the 
coverage of the conditional leniency letter. However, this is dependent upon a 
number of factors, including whether the applicant company is ‘interested in 
protecting them.’144 
The Model Corporate Leniency Letter also clearly indicates the position of 
applicants where immunity is revoked: 
If at any time before Applicant is granted unconditional leniency the Antitrust 
Division determines that Applicant (1) contrary to its representations in paragraph 1 of this 
Agreement, is not eligible for leniency or (2) has not provided the cooperation required by 
paragraph 2 of this Agreement, this Agreement shall be void, and the Antitrust Division may 
revoke the conditional acceptance of Applicant into the Corporate Leniency Program. Before 
the Antitrust Division makes a final determination to revoke Applicant's conditional 
leniency, the Division will notify counsel for Applicant in writing of the recommendation of 
Division staff to revoke the conditional acceptance of Applicant into the Corporate Leniency 
                                                
142 Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions and Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission, above n 114, s 9. 
143 Department of Justice, 'Model Corporate Conditional Leniency Letter' (Department of Justice - 
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Program and will provide counsel an opportunity to meet with the Division regarding the 
potential revocation. Should the Antitrust Division revoke the conditional acceptance of 
Applicant into the Corporate Leniency Program, the Antitrust Division may thereafter initiate 
a criminal prosecution against Applicant, without limitation. Should such a prosecution be 
initiated, the Antitrust Division may use against Applicant in any such prosecution any 
documents, statements, or other information provided to the Division at any time pursuant to 
this Agreement by Applicant or by any of its current [or former] directors, officers, or 
employees. Applicant understands that the Antitrust Division's Leniency Program is an 
exercise of the Division's prosecutorial discretion, and Applicant agrees that it may not, and 
will not, seek judicial review of any Division decision to revoke its conditional leniency 
unless and until it has been charged by indictment or information for engaging in 
the anticompetitive activity being reported.145 
This paragraph states clearly the process by which the leniency applicant 
would need to take in order to address the DOJ’s decision to revoke. By signing the 
leniency letter, the applicant acknowledges that in the event the DOJ decides to 
revoke the agreement, the DOJ may initiate a criminal prosecution. This will be 
discussed further in the following section.  
The introduction of the LOCs does not directly address the underlying issues 
associated with the sufficiency of information needed for criminal immunity or the 
significant cultural differences that exist between the ACCC and the CDPP. These 
issues were prominent in the discussions with the interviewees who deemed them to 
be very important to Australia’s anti-cartel enforcement regime.146  
In terms of predicting the success of the relationship between the ACCC and 
CDPP, it is often helpful to analyse relationships of a similar nature. The closest 
bifurcated model in Australia would be the relationship between the CDPP and the 
Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC). ASIC is an independent 
Commonwealth Body responsible for the regulation of Australia’s corporate, markets 
and financial services. ASIC and the CDPP entered into a Memorandum of 
Understanding in 1992 that was updated in 1996.147  
In a similar vein to the ACCC, ASIC will refer criminal prosecution to the 
CDPP if ASIC deems there to be sufficient evidence to prosecute. In this way, ASIC 
is the investigatory body and the CDPP is the prosecuting body. The key difference 
                                                
145 Ibid s 3.	
146 See Chapter V, Relationship between the ACCC and the CDPP, pg 141. 
147 Australian Securities and Investments Commission and Commonwealth Director of Public 
Prosecutions, 'Memorandum of Understanding' (Australian Securities and Investment Commission, 
2006) <http://download.asic.gov.au/files/mou_dpp_mar_2006.pdf>.  
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is that ASIC does not offer immunity to those who come forward and disclose 
offences; indemnity can be sought in relation to criminal offences, but indemnity is 
available in relatively narrow circumstances under Section 6 of the Prosecution 
Policy. 
Despite the relationship between the CDPP and ASIC having existed over the 
past 22 years, ASIC has come under severe scrutiny for its perceived lack of criminal 
enforcement. The former Chairman of ASIC has been quoted as saying ‘Australia is 
a paradise for corporate criminals.’148 However, a number of high profile cases have 
been prosecuted successfully, for example the HIH case.149 There also exists an 
important difference between the enforcement regimes of the ACCC and ASIC, as 
ASIC does not currently have an immunity policy. This may partly explain why 
ASIC has had difficulties in bringing criminal proceedings. On the other hand, ASIC 
and the CDPP have had over 20 years to perfect their working relationship, which 
casts doubt on the presumption by some interviewees that the relationship between 
the ACCC and the CDPP simply needs time to develop. Thus far, the ACCC and 
CDPP have had five years to bring a criminal cartel case, but no prosecution has yet 
resulted.  
 
(b) The Credibility Of Accomplice Evidence 
 
One central concern for the ACCC and CDPP gearing up for the first 
contested criminal trial is the likelihood that the immunity applicant’s evidence will 
be challenged on the ground of lack of credibility. It is a long held tradition that the 
prosecution will seek the testimony of an accomplice to prove its criminal case and 
this practice is widely accepted.150 Generally this involves the prosecution offering a 
                                                
148 See eg Vicky Comino, 'The Challenge of Corporate Law Enforcement in Australia' (2009) 23 
Australian Journal of Corporate Law 233; Michelle Gordon, 'Criminalisation of Cartel Conduct' 
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‘reward’ in the form of lenient treatment or immunity for a crime, in exchange for 
the accomplice agreeing to cooperate and testify for the prosecution in a criminal 
trial.  
Although the courts may recognise that the accomplice may have the 
incentive to perjure or embellish its role in the offence, they deem that the value of 
the information obtained through such agreements outweighs the danger of its 
potential unreliability.151 Moreover, the prosecutor will argue that the accomplice 
should be believed because they will lose the benefits of the agreement should they 
fail to tell the truth.152 
On the other hand, the defence is likely to argue that the accomplice will say 
anything in order to reap the benefits of the agreement. In this way, the defence will 
seek to discredit the accomplice in order to persuade the jury that the evidence 
provided by the accomplice is self-interested and unreliable. Given that cartel 
conduct is now an offence in Australia, it is anticipated that there may be a contested 
criminal case in the future. If Australia adopts the United States approach, the 
instances of a contested criminal case are likely to be rare, given that 90per cent of 
criminal convictions in the United States are obtained by guilty plea.153 Moreover, 
the United States DOJ rarely goes to trial for corporate price-fixing, especially where 
there are large corporate defendants involved.154 
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However, the ACCC and CDPP need to prepare for the possibility that the 
immunity applicant’s evidence is likely to be challenged on the ground of lack of 
credibility, leading to possible acquittal of the defendant. Many defence lawyers in 
the United States have used this strategy in criminal cartel trials, which has resulted 
in acquittals of the defendant based on the unreliability of the immunised witness.155 
The Australian Courts have found many accomplice witnesses to be unreliable, 
which has resulted in judges instructing the jury to deem to evidence as a category 
that is inherently unreliable.156 In the United States, there are specific jury warnings 
that the court must provide the jury in cases of criminal cartel trials.157 In Australia, 
the court must instruct the jury to deem the evidence of an accomplice as unreliable:  
(2) If there is a jury and a party so requests, the judge is to: 
(a) warn the jury that the evidence may be unreliable; and 
(b) inform the jury of matters that may cause it to be unreliable; and  
(c) warn the jury of the need for caution in determining whether to accept the 
evidence and the weight to be given to it.158 
The court is not required to give this instruction if ‘there are good reasons for 
not doing it.’159 This contrasts to the position in the United States, where there are 
specific rules in criminal cartel cases that require a separate jury instruction for 
witnesses who have received immunity and testify pursuant to the DOJ leniency 
policy. The instruction states: ‘[y]ou should bear in mind that testimony from such a 
witness is always to be received with caution and weighed with great care.’160 
Given the strong possibility that the immunised testimony is likely to be 
attacked for its lack of credibility, the ACCC and CDPP should consider the potential 
consequences of this, and ensure that the evidence is sufficiently corroborated with 
information independent of the accomplice.  
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D Revocation of Cartel Immunity 
 
If the situation were to arise where the ACCC or CDPP revoked immunity, 
the consequences for the immunity applicant would be serious. This is due to the fact 
that the immunity applicant would have provided incriminating evidence in relation 
to its involvement in the cartel conduct as a result of fulfilling its obligations 
pursuant to the policy. If the circumstances and consequences of revocation are not 
clearly outlined, this dilutes the transparency of the policy and could potentially 
hinder future immunity applications, which rely on the certainty of guaranteed 
upfront immunity. Most importantly, if immunity were revoked, the ACCC or CDPP 
may take legal action against the former applicant using the incriminating evidence 
the applicant provided in their immunity application.161 
According to one interviewee, there have been some instances where an 
immunity applicant was allegedly not complying with its immunity obligations and 
the ACCC contemplated revocation of the applicant’s immunity.162 Aside from this 
situation, there has never been a formal revocation of immunity in Australia. Nor has 
there been an instance of revocation of immunity in the United Kingdom and 
Canada. The respective policies make it clear that revocation is an option of last 
resort and that the decision to revoke is taken very seriously.163  
In contrast, the United States DOJ has revoked its leniency policy in one 
instance, resulting in the Stolt-Nielsen case.164 The consequences of this case 
potentially undermine the operation of the immunity policy, as it vests sole discretion 
in the DOJ relating to its leniency decisions, leaving no room for judicial review.165 
Even if the case itself did not adversely impact the operation of the DOJ’s leniency 
policy, it provides some useful lessons for the ACCC. The consequences of this 
decision will be explored further in this section. Although the instances of revocation 
may be rare, the serious consequences of revocation warrant that this issue be given 
careful attention and clarification. 
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1 The ACCC’s Position 
Prior to the review of the policy, the process by which the ACCC would 
undertake in the event of revocation was not stated in any detail.166 Thus, it was not 
clear what would occur in the event that one of the requirements of the Immunity 
Policy was not met, or what would happen in the event there were issues of non-
compliance with the Immunity Policy criteria. It was sufficiently certain that the 
ACCC had a right to revoke immunity, but it was not clear whether the applicant 
would be entitled to seek reasons from the ACCC regarding its decision to revoke, or 
what process of review would likely be available to an applicant seeking to appeal 
the ACCC’s decision to revoke.167 
Pursuant to the ACCC review, the ACCC asked for comments in relation to 
its decision to ‘withdraw’ immunity.168 In these consultations, it was submitted that 
the current process was unclear and that further detail was needed surrounding the 
process of appealing an ACCC decision to revoke immunity and the reasons for such 
a decision.  
In response to these consultations, the Draft Immunity Policy issued by the 
ACCC stated in Section F that if the ACCC had concerns about the applicant’s 
compliance with the Immunity Policy then it would issue a written caution; if the 
dispute could not be resolved informally.169 If the ACCC was not satisfied with the 
applicant’s response, it would then request the applicant provide an explanation as to 
why their conditional immunity should not be revoked.170 If the ACCC was not 
satisfied with the applicant’s response, then it would advise them in writing that 
‘they no longer qualify for immunity.’ The only mention of the revocation of 
conditional criminal immunity was in the last line of Section F that stated: that in the 
event the ACCC revokes conditional civil immunity, it will also recommend to the 
                                                
166Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n 81, s 21. 
167 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n 81, s 3.5 (90). 
168 Australian Competition & Consumer Commission, 'Review of the ACCC Immunity Policy for 
Cartel Conduct' (Discussion Paper, ACCC, 2013) s 4.5. 
169 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 'Draft ACCC Immunity and Cooperation 
Policy for Cartel Conduct' (April 2014 2014) <https://consultation.accc.gov.au/compliance-
enforcement/draft-immunity-and-cooperation-
policy/supporting_documents/DRAFT%20ACCC%20immunity%20and%20cooperation%20policy%
2009%20April%202014%202.pdf> s F, ss 60 & 61.	
170 Ibid s F, [62]. 
 
200 
 
CDPP that conditional criminal immunity be revoked. This position in relation to 
revocation did not change in the final release of the Immunity Policy. 
In the interviews, the former Chairman of the ACCC stated that it simply 
sought to clarify in the policy what was already the well-established process for 
resolving non-compliance disputes and that an explicit revocation provision was not 
necessary.171 However, it was also submitted in the response to the Draft Policy that 
the reviewability of the ACCC’s decision to revoke was also a serious issue that 
needed clarification. Once again, this issue was not addressed in the final release of 
the Immunity Policy. The reviewability of ACCC’s decisions has featured in many of 
the discussions with the interviewees, particularly the legal character of the immunity 
policy. One interviewee questioned whether a court could review the policy:  
 
Interviewee: It is discretionary.  It’s an administrative policy, it has no force of law.  It’s a 
prosecution discretion whether to grant or not grant and it’s a prosecution discretion whether 
to withdraw it or not, so it’s not really enforceable in a sense, it’s just a policy, prosecution 
policy.  So it’s not a contract.  It’s not a legislative instrument so what its character is has 
never been tested in Australia actually.172 
 
Despite the submission, the reviewability of an ACCC immunity-related 
decision was not incorporated into the final Immunity Policy, which remains unclear 
in this respect. If an immunity applicant wishes to appeal a final revocation decision 
by the ACCC, there is no prescribed process of appeal in the policy nor is there a 
body of review specified to review the decision by the ACCC. Thus, the ACCC 
cannot be held accountable for any of its decisions relating to the Immunity Policy. 
This infringes upon one of the fundamental precepts of public policy of ensuring that 
government decisions are accountable.173 The applicant would have provided 
incriminating evidence of their involvement in the cartel conduct to the ACCC and 
CDPP174 pursuant to their immunity cooperation and disclosure obligations175 and 
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would have no clear indication of the appeal process nor does the ACCC have any 
obligation to provide reasons for its decisions. 
The potential consequences of a decision to revoke immunity are even more 
serious in the context of conditional criminal immunity. It was submitted to the 
ACCC that the position regarding the decision to revoke by the CDPP is even more 
uncertain than that of the ACCC. This uncertainty may be justified provided that the 
CDPP’s discretion is exercised consistently and fairly and is accountable to some 
extent. On the other hand, a regulator having a wide discretion to initiate proceedings 
also serves the public interest. Thus, judicial review of prosecutorial discretion could 
potentially result in multiple review claims, which could place strain on the court’s 
resources. To strike the appropriate balance, it is important that clarification is 
provided in the Immunity Policy, or in a revised Memorandum of Understanding 
between the ACCC and the CDPP, stating that the revocation of criminal immunity 
is not subject to judicial review, if that is the position the CDPP wishes to adopt. At 
present, the CDPP Prosecution Policy states that the DPP may withdraw a letter of 
comfort or revoke a written undertaking provided under section 9(6D) of the DPP 
Act: 
‘at any time during the investigation and prior to the conclusion of criminal proceedings if: 
5.1.2 the ACCC makes a recommendation to withdraw the letter of comfort or revoke the 
undertaking, and the DPP or Director, exercising an independent discretion, agrees with that 
recommendation; or 5.1.3 the DPP or Director believes on reasonable grounds that: (i) the 
recipient of the letter of comfort or undertaking has provided information to the DPP that is 
false or misleading in a relevant matter; and/or (ii) the recipient of the letter of comfort or 
undertaking has not fulfilled any condition(s) of the letter of comfort or undertaking.  
5.2 The DPP will notify the recipient in writing if a letter of comfort is to be withdrawn or an 
undertaking is to be revoked, and the recipient will be afforded a reasonable opportunity to 
make representations.176 
Essentially, the CDPP’s process of revocation mirrors that of the ACCC and does 
not prescribe a method of dispute resolution in the event an applicant seeks to appeal 
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the final decision to revoke by the CPPP. The Revised MOU does not offer any 
guidance in relation to the issue; it does not even mention the possibility of 
revocation.177 The revocation of conditional criminal immunity carries with it the 
potential for imprisonment and is therefore an area that needs to be transparent. 
Two important related questions arise in this context:  
(1) What is the process for review of an ACCC decision to revoke once a final 
decision has been made?  
(2) Is there a process for review of a CDPP decision to revoke once a final 
decision has been made?  
In order to answer these two questions, it is necessary to examine the legal 
character of the Immunity Policy by reference to: (a) Legislation (b) Administrative 
Review (c) Contract.  
This section will provide a brief analysis of the different intersections of the 
policy in relation to its legal character to highlight how unsatisfactory the current 
position is and reinforce the need for further development and transparency in this 
area.178  This section will conclude with a call for further clarification as to the legal 
character and reviewability of an ACCC and CDPP decision to revoke immunity, as 
well as an argument for the best avenue of redress.  
 
(a) Legislation  
 
Whilst the ACCC and the CDPP form part of the Executive branch of the 
government, the legal basis of the Immunity Policy is currently derived from public 
policy statements. The policy is not currently legislated. The policy itself simply 
states that it is a ‘policy document.’179 It was suggested by some of the interviewees 
that if the policy were legislated it would clarify the legal character of the policy and 
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set out the rights and obligations of an immunity applicant in the event of 
revocation.180  
There is some support for the proposal that the policy should be legislated. 
This approach could be achieved in a few ways. For instance, the firm Arnold Bloch 
Lieber, in its submission to the ACCC’s review of the policy, put forward that the 
conditions for immunity should be set out in legislation and this could be achieved in 
the following ways: 
- a statutory defence to cartel proceedings of having made an immunity application that 
satisfied the relevant conditions; or 
- a statutory power given to the ACCC to grant immunity from cartel proceedings (similar to 
the ACCC's power to authorise anticompetitive conduct prospectively).181 
In relation to these two options, the second option is preferable because it 
directly invests the ACCC with the power to grant immunity and makes it clear that 
the ACCC has this authority. 
There are two main reasons why the Immunity Policy should be legislated. 
The first is that, despite being a policy document, the decisions related to the 
granting or revocation of immunity affects the legal rights and obligations of the 
immunity applicants and therefore it should be clear where the power to affect these 
legal rights and obligations is derived from. Secondly, if the policy were to be 
legislated, it could make clear that the decision to revoke immunity is subject to 
independent judicial or merits review. This would overcome the difficulties 
associated with the current position where an applicant is left without any formal 
direction as to how to proceed with an appeal of an ACCC’s final decision to revoke 
immunity. More importantly, the ACCC could make it clear that the applicant may 
have no such right of review. 
However, as with any call for legislation there needs to be political support for its 
introduction. Despite the calls for clarification of the appeal process of ACCC 
decisions in submissions to the ACCC, the regulator has not currently shown any 
interest in legislating the policy. Instead, the ACCC chose to set out the revocation 
procedures outlined above and remained silent in relation to any right or process of 
appeal of its revocation decisions.  
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Therefore it is unlikely that there will be sufficient political support to lead to the 
introduction of a legislated Immunity Policy. This doubt was also expressed by some 
of the interviewees.182 Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States have also 
not implemented the policy into legislation.  
 
(b) Administrative Review 
 
Judicial review of an administrative decision in Australia is made pursuant to the 
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (‘ADJR Act’). Section 3 
states that a decision will be capable of judicial review pursuant to the act where the 
decision was made: 
(a) under an enactment referred to in paragraph (a), (b), (c) or (d) of the definition of enactment 
;or 
(b) by a Commonwealth authority or an officer of the Commonwealth under an enactment 
referred to in paragraph (ca) or (cb) of the definition of enactment ; other than: 
(c) a decision by the Governor-General; or 
(d) a decision included in any of the classes of decisions set out in Schedule 1.  
An “enactment” according to this section is defined as: 
(a) an Act, other than: 
(i) the Commonwealth Places (Application of Laws) Act 1970 ; or 
(ii) the Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978 ; or 
(iii) an Act or part of an Act that is not an enactment because of section 3A (certain 
legislation relating to the ACT); or 
(b) an Ordinance of a Territory other than the Australian Capital Territory or the Northern 
Territory; or] 
(c) an instrument (including rules, regulations or by-laws) made under such an Act or under such 
an Ordinance, other than any such instrument that is not an enactment because of section 3A; 
or 
(ab) an Act of a State, the Australian Capital Territory or the Northern Territory, or 
a part of such an Act, described in Schedule 3; or 
(ac) an instrument (including rules, regulations or by-laws) made under an Act or 
part of an Act covered by paragraph (ca); or 
(d) any other law, or a part of a law, of the Northern Territory declared by the regulations, in 
accordance with section 19A, to be an enactment for the purposes of this Act; and, for the 
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purposes of paragraph (a), (b), (c), (ca) or (cb), includes a part of an enactment.183 
 
Whether the decision by the ACCC to revoke the Immunity Policy is open to 
judicial review turns on the definition of a ‘decision made under an enactment.’ This 
definition appears to be broad and all encompassing, but its interpretation is complex 
and vexed and the Australian courts are yet to reach a definitive view.184 This section 
will briefly analyse the case-law that has had the most significant impact on the 
interpretation of what constitutes a ‘decision made under an enactment’ to determine 
whether the Immunity Policy would fall under this interpretation and thus be capable 
of review pursuant to the ADJR Act. 
The case of Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) concerned the 
fitness of license-holders to hold broadcasting licenses, which required a 
determination as to whether that license holder was a fit and proper person to hold 
the license. This was a preliminary determination prior to the decision as to whether 
to revoke or suspend the licenses.185 This called into question the definition of what 
constitutes a ‘decision’ for the purposes of review under the ADJR Act.  
Chief Justice Mason decided that a decision must be of a ‘final or operative 
and determinative’ quality and that it must be a decision ‘authorised or required’ by 
statute in order to be subject to review pursuant to the ADJR Act.186 This 
interpretation significantly narrowed the scope of review pursuant to the Act.187 
Applying this decision to the ACCC’s decision to revoke, the question would be 
whether the decision could be deemed to be ‘final and determinative.’ The court has 
been required to interpret the meaning of ‘final, operative or determinative’, in 
relation to the reviewability of decisions to initiate proceedings in Re Toll and 
Australian Securities Commission.188 The court held that a series of administrative 
steps could not be regarded as a decision that is capable of review: 
                                                
183 Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 3 (1). 
184 See, eg, P Keane, 'Judicial Review: The Courts and the Academy' (2008) 82 Australian Law 
Journal 623.	
185 Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321, 321-325, Daniel Stewart, 'Griffith 
University v Tang, 'Under an Enactment' and Limiting Access to Judicial Review' (2005) 33 Federal 
Law Review 525, 544. 
186 Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321, 321-325. 
187 Matthew Groves, 'Should we Follow the Gospel of the ADJR Act?' (2010) 34 Melbourne 
University Law Review 736, 742; Stewart, above n 185, 543.  
188 (1993) 29 ALD 412.  
 
206 
 
Until guilt or innocence is determined, all acts done leading up to the court's 
findings, cannot be regarded as anything other than acts done preparatory to the making of a 
decision which will be reviewable in accordance with appropriate law at an appropriate 
time.189 
On this interpretation, the decision to revoke immunity may also be seen as 
an ‘administrative step’ that is preparatory to the making of the ACCC’s decision to 
initiate proceedings and is therefore not ‘final or determinative.’ The Administrative 
Review Council has also held that decisions to initiate proceedings are inappropriate 
for merits review.190 
Thus, on the basis of the Bond decision, it is unlikely that the ACCC’s 
decision to revoke immunity would be capable of review pursuant to the ADJR Act. 
This is compounded by the fact that it is unlikely that a decision to revoke immunity 
could be ‘authorised or required’ by statute, as the Immunity Policy is not a 
legislated policy.  
In NEAT Domestic v Australian Wheat Board (AWBI)191 the definition was 
again called into question when AWBI, a company that occupied a legislative 
monopoly as the sole exporter of bulk quantities of wheat, denied consent to the 
NEAT company of an exemption to that monopoly. NEAT appealed this decision by 
seeking judicial review. The majority of the High Court analysed the respective 
statutory roles of the claimants in the relevant provisions, and found that AWBI drew 
power to grant or refuse consent by its incorporation rather than its wider statutory 
framework within which wheat export decisions were made.192  
Therefore the refusal to give consent by AWBI was not made ‘under an 
enactment’ within the meaning of the Act. The argument could be made that the 
ACCC occupies a similar position to that of the AWBI in that the ACCC does not 
draw its power to make revocation decisions from any specific statutory power. The 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) establishes the ACCC but does not 
prescribe any specific powers or functions of the ACCC, except broadly to enforce 
the Act itself.193 Furthermore, there was wide criticism of the NEAT decision, 
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asserting that it further restricted the scope of the ADJR Act since the Bond decision 
and impacted on public accountability of administrative decisions more generally.194 
However, the most recent significant decision relating to the definition of a 
‘decision made under an enactment’ was Griffith University v Tang.195 This case 
concerned a PhD student enrolled at Griffith University, whose candidature was 
revoked as a result of academic misconduct. The student sought to appeal the 
decision pursuant to the ADJR Act. The University argued that the decision to expel 
the student was made pursuant to an administrative code, and therefore did not come 
within the ambit of a ‘decision made under an enactment.’ The majority of the court 
endorsed a two-pronged test for the determination of whether a decision is made 
under an enactment: 
The determination of whether a decision is ‘made … under an enactment’ involves two 
criteria: first, the decision must be expressly or impliedly required or authorised by the 
enactment; and, secondly, the decision must itself confer, alter or otherwise affect legal rights 
or obligations, and in that sense the decision must derive from the enactment.196 
The student’s claim satisfied the first limb but failed on the second as it was 
found by the court that the relationship between the student and the University was 
based on ‘mutual consent’ and therefore did not affect legal rights and obligations.197 
As a result of this case, there has been academic comment surrounding the position 
of decisions made under ‘soft law,’ such as guidelines, policies and manuals that are 
commonly utilised in the public sector.198 According to Groves, this is due to the 
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distinction that the majority drew in Tang between the statute that established the 
University and the administrative rules under which the expulsion decision was 
made.199  
The Immunity Policy is also a ‘soft law’ decision, as it is a public policy 
document that has not been legislated. It could be argued that it is implied under the 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) that the ACCC has the power to make 
decisions in relation to the enforcement of the Act, which could include the 
development of enforcement policies that assist in achieving the aims of the Act. 
This would potentially satisfy the first limb on the Tang test. A decision to revoke 
immunity could likely be seen as affecting legal rights and obligations, pursuant to 
the second limb in Tang. However, arguably there is a distinction between the 
Competition Act establishing the ACCC and the enforcement tools that the ACCC 
chooses to utilise in enforcing its powers. This distinction is not as clear as that in the 
Tang case, thus there is likely to be a stronger case for ADJR review of the Immunity 
Policy then the administrative code in Tang. 
Of particular importance to the analysis of the Immunity Policy is the long-
standing exemption of judicial review for decisions made as a result of ‘prosecutorial 
discretion.’ According to the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC), 
‘prosecutorial discretion’ refers to the choice, by the regulator or the DPP, whether or 
not to impose an administrative penalty, to commence penalty proceedings or to 
target a particular person for investigation that may ultimately lead to the imposition 
of penalties. The exercise of this discretion may be guided by formal or informal 
agency guidelines.’200 The decisions of both the ACCC and the CDPP relating to 
immunity would be a result of an exercise of prosecutorial discretion and hence 
within the exemption of prosecutorial discretion from judicial review. 
The common law position states that decisions made pursuant to prosecutorial 
discretion are not subject to judicial review: 
It ought now be accepted, in our view, that certain decisions involved in the prosecution 
process are, of their nature, insusceptible of judicial review. They include decisions whether 
or not to prosecute, to enter a nolle prosequi, to proceed ex officio, whether or not to present 
evidence and, which is usually an aspect of one or other of those decisions, decisions as to 
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the particular charge to be laid or prosecuted. The integrity of the judicial process — 
particularly, its independence and impartiality and the public perception thereof — would be 
compromised if the courts were to decide or were to be in any way concerned with decisions 
as to who is to be prosecuted and for what.201 
Whether decisions made as a result of prosecutorial discretion will be subject to 
judicial review under the ADJR Act is not certain. There is some precedent that 
supports judicial review of prosecutorial decisions relating to civil penalties but the 
court has held that these must satisfy the test enunciated in Bond where the Act will 
only apply to decisions that are ultimate or operative determinations and not 
expressions of opinion.202 As indicated above, the Bond decision provides a very 
narrow interpretation of ‘under an enactment.’ Given that the Immunity Policy is not 
expressly stated in the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) nor it is expressly 
or even indirectly referenced as a function or power of the ACCC then it is unlikely 
to satisfy the Bond test.  
In a report by the ALRC into the scope of judicial review in Australia, there were 
a number of submissions relating to whether decisions made in the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion should be subject to judicial review.203 According to the 
report, there were mixed responses in relation to this question. ASIC in particular 
was against the position that the decision to initiate criminal, civil and administrative 
action should be subject to judicial review as ASIC believes it is not a ‘substantive 
decision because it was not final, operative and determinative’ and that allowing 
judicial review in this respect ‘might encourage a proliferation of actions that could 
delay or frustrate the process of justice.’204  
Therefore, the key argument that would need to be made by an immunity 
applicant seeking judicial review of a decision to revoke by the ACCC would be to 
show that the decision regarding revocation is ‘final, operative and determinative’ in 
accordance with the relevant case law tests. As evidenced by this discussion, it is 
unlikely that the ACCC’s decision to revoke immunity would satisfy this test, as it is 
an administrative step that could lead to the commencement of legal proceedings. 
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The path to proving the decision is ‘final or determinative’ is thus very complex and 
it is uncertain which view the courts will adopt. The situation is even more 
precarious in the context of the decision to revoke immunity by the CDPP as 
decisions relating to the criminal process are specifically excluded from the purview 
of the ADJR Act and also the Judiciary Act.205 On this basis, an immunity applicant 
would unlikely be able to seek judicial review of a decision to revoke by the CDPP. 
If this is the position that the ACCC and CDPP wish to adopt, then this should be 
expressly incorporated in the Immunity Policy, for the sake of clarity and 
transparency. 
 
(c) Contract  
(i) Is There A Binding Contract Between The ACCC/CDPP And The Immunity 
Applicant? 
The question of whether the ACCC enters into a contractual relationship with 
an immunity applicant was not addressed in the ACCC’s recent review of the policy. 
If the immunity agreement is a contract in law then a breach of that contract would 
be actionable in the Federal Court.  
In contrast to the other comparable regulators, the ACCC does not publish 
Model Immunity Agreements that list the standard terms of the agreement with an 
immunity applicant.206 Therefore it is likely that the ACCC’s Immunity Policy would 
be seen as an invitation to the whole world, in which the offeree accepts the offer by 
performing his or her side of the bargain.207 In the context of immunity, this means 
the ACCC and/or the CDPP is bound to perform the obligations pursuant to the 
Immunity Policy at the point that the immunity applicant undertakes its performance 
of its immunity obligations. The acceptance of this agreement will occur where the 
acts required for acceptance are performed on the basis of the offer.208  
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The consideration in this context would be an exchange of promises, whereby 
the immunity applicant agrees to fulfil the terms of the agreement, by providing 
information and assistance to the ACCC/CDPP in relation to the cartel investigation, 
and in return, the ACCC/CDPP promises to immunise the applicant from civil or 
criminal proceedings.209 On this basis, the ACCC’s immunity agreement would likely 
create a binding contractual agreement with the first applicant who performs the 
obligations listed in the policy on the basis of that offer. There is academic and 
judicial support for the view that plea agreements and non-prosecution agreements 
constitute contractual agreements.210 
If the ACCC enters into an agreement that is similar to those published by regulators 
in the United States, United Kingdom and Canada, this agreement would be a 
bilateral contract.211 
 
(ii) If The Immunity Policy Does Create a Contract, What Conduct Would 
Constitute A Breach? 
 
In order to establish whether there has been a breach of contract, it is 
important to look at the terms of the agreement to ascertain whether they create the 
right to terminate (or revoke) the policy. Essential conditions, or conditions that 
strike at the heart of a contract, give rise to an automatic right to terminate, even for a 
minor breach of these terms.212 The key question in ascertaining an essential 
condition would be: have the parties only entered into the contract on the 
understanding that there would be a strict compliance with the particular term.213 This 
question is determined objectively, having regard to the terms of the contract and the 
surrounding circumstances.214  
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The criteria stipulated in the ACCC policy indicate that strict compliance 
with those terms will lead to the granting of civil conditional immunity. Given the 
importance of the offer, in terms of offering upfront, complete immunity from 
prosecution, each of the criteria listed is likely to be viewed objectively by both 
parties as being essential terms of the contract.215 Therefore, a breach of any of these 
terms could give rise to the right to terminate (or revoke) the immunity agreement. 
Alternatively, the actions by the ACCC or CDPP could be seen as a 
repudiation of the immunity contract. Repudiation refers to the situation where one 
party manifests an unwillingness or inability to perform his or her obligations under 
the contract, in which event; the other party will have the right to terminate.216 
Repudiatory conduct must be fundamental to the contract.217 It can be found by a 
prosecutor’s express statement that they will revoke immunity or their conduct 
showing an inability or unwillingness to perform.218  
In the context of immunity, if the ACCC or the CDPP decide to revoke 
immunity, this could constitute repudiatory conduct. For example, consider the 
situation where the ACCC or CDPP write to the applicant stating that the applicant is 
in breach of an immunity obligation because there is evidence to suggest that an 
employee of the applicant is still in contact with the former cartel participants. If the 
immunity applicant addresses this issue, by reprimanding the employee or by 
producing proof that it is a false allegation, the applicant would then contact the 
ACCC to inform them of this. If the ACCC did not respond to the applicant within a 
reasonable timeframe, despite the applicant’s numerous attempts to contact the 
ACCC, then this may show an unwillingness to perform on the ACCC’s behalf. 
If the ACCC or CDPP take steps toward prosecuting the immunity applicant, 
by issuing a letter indicating that the applicant’s immunity has been revoked, then 
this conduct could also constitute repudiation. 
 
(iii) Remedy for Breach 
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In the context of immunity, breach of contract by the ACCC or CDPP would lead to 
the revocation of the policy and the prosecution of the applicant civilly or criminally, 
depending on the case against the applicant. The most common remedy for a breach 
of contract is a claim for damages: ‘Where a party sustains a loss by reason of a 
breach of contract, he is, so far as money can do it, to be placed in the same situation 
with respect to damages as if the contract had been performed.’219  
 In the context of the revocation of immunity, it is the threat or actual 
prosecution of the corporation that will cause the most damage to the applicant. It is 
well documented that the threat of civil or criminal proceedings can cause significant 
economic loss to a company in terms of the time and resources necessary to defend a 
case but also the publicity associated with a potential finding of guilt, which can also 
lead to significant financial loss.220 Moreover, relationships with suppliers and 
business partners may be adversely impacted where people are dissociating 
themselves from a corporation, particularly if the prosecution results in a criminal 
conviction.221 Arguably, these consequences cannot be accurately or sufficiently 
quantified, as in some cases, damage to reputation is irreparable.  Nonetheless, the 
courts will strive to quantify these losses, even where the calculations are complex.222  
If an award of damages is deemed to be inadequate, an aggrieved applicant 
may wish to appeal to the Courts discretion for an equitable award of specific 
performance or an injunction. An award of specific performance would essentially 
compel the ACCC/CDPP to continue with the immunity agreement by not 
prosecuting the applicant.223 Alternatively, an injunction would prevent the 
ACCC/CDPP from initiating proceedings against the former immunity applicant. 
The former immunity applicant would need to show the Court that an award 
of damages would be inadequate to prevent the irreparable harm caused by civil or 
criminal prosecution and that an award of specific performance or an injunction 
would be the more equitable and just remedy in the circumstances.224 
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The remedy of specific performance is not granted readily and is subject to a 
number of discretionary factors, especially where the decision may involve the 
continued supervision by the court.225 Given the serious consequences associated 
with the threat of prosecution, the court may find that this is enough to warrant a 
grant of specific performance or alternatively an injunction.  However, this decision 
would be made in the exercise of the court’s discretion. 
 
2 Recommendation 
(a) Alternative Solution: Insert Provision into Immunity Policy 
As discussed above, construing the immunity agreement in accordance with 
contractual principles provides the clearest and most easily attainable method of 
review of a decision to revoke compared to the unlikelihood that the policy will be 
legislated or the difficulties associated with seeking review via the ADJR Act. 
However, the simplest and most effective way to make a revocation decision 
reviewable would be to insert an express provision into the Immunity Policy that 
clearly stipulates who the arbitrator or mediator of an immunity dispute is to be. If 
not the court, then the ACCC/CDPP could stipulate an independent and impartial 
body or person to review the decision.  
The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘AAT’) could serve as an appropriate 
avenue for ACCC’s decisions made pursuant to the Immunity Policy to be reviewed 
on its merits. The question in merits review is whether the decision is substantively 
correct.226 Should the AAT disagree with the decision that was reached, it can 
ordinarily substitute a new decision.227  Section 63 of the Administrative Decisions 
Review Act 1997 (NSW) sets out the powers of the Tribunal: 
63   Determination of administrative review by Tribunal 
(1)  In determining an application for an administrative review under this Act of an 
administratively reviewable decision, the Tribunal is to decide what the correct and preferable 
decision is having regard to the material then before it, including the following: 
(a)  any relevant factual material, 
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(b)  any applicable written or unwritten law. 
(2)  For this purpose, the Tribunal may exercise all of the functions that are conferred or imposed 
by any relevant legislation on the administrator who made the decision. 
(3)  In determining an application for the administrative review of an administratively reviewable 
decision, the Tribunal may decide: 
(a)  to affirm the administratively reviewable decision, or 
(b)  to vary the administratively reviewable decision, or 
(c)  to set aside the administratively reviewable decision and make a decision in substitution for 
the administratively reviewable decision it set aside, or 
(d)  to set aside the administratively reviewable decision and remit the matter for reconsideration 
by the administrator in accordance with any directions or recommendations of the Tribunal. 
Alternatively, the decision could be remitted to the original decision maker 
(the ACCC) for reconsideration of the decision, subject to the directions or 
recommendations made by the AAT or another appropriate arbitrator.  
The AAT is vested with the same powers and discretions as the original 
decision-maker, the ACCC, so that the tribunal can ‘stand in the shoes’ of the ACCC 
when determining what was the correct or preferable decision based on a thorough 
consideration of the evidence.228 The ACCC currently utilises a similar process of 
review for its authorisation decisions through the Australian Competition Tribunal 
(‘ACT’).229 Similarly to the AAT, the ACT is tasked with a re-hearing of the 
application where the ACT is vested with the same functions and powers as the 
ACCC.230 Given that the ACCC is familiar with this process of review, the 
jurisdiction of the ACT could be extended to include ACCC decisions made pursuant 
to the Immunity Policy.  
Alternatively, it has been suggested that a retired judge could perform this 
function.231 Inserting an express dispute resolution provision into the Immunity 
Policy would provide for the most efficient use of time and resources in the event of 
revocation, especially when compared to the alternative avenues discussed in this 
section. Therefore, it would not only be for the benefit of the applicants but also for 
the ACCC and CDPP that they clarify the avenue for review in the Immunity Policy, 
if one does exist at all. 
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3 The Position Overseas 
 
The guidance offered by the CMA and the Competition Bureau in relation to a 
decision to revoke immunity is similar to that of the ACCC. Essentially, the regulator 
will provide the applicant with notice that they may be in breach of the Immunity 
Policy and the applicant is given time to respond to this notice.232 In the case of 
criminal immunity, the CMA may revoke leniency subject to the following 
conditions: 
• the recipient of a letter ceases to satisfy in whole or in part any of the relevant 
conditions …or  
• the recipient of a letter has knowingly or recklessly provided information that is 
false or misleading in a material particular.233  
The Competition Bureau refers to the Federal Prosecution Handbook in relation 
to the DPP’s decision to revoke conditional criminal immunity. Under s 35.8: 
It may become necessary to seek a remedy against a person previously granted immunity 
where that person: 
• withdraws promised co-operation with the Crown; 
• fails to be truthful when testifying; 
• has wilfully or recklessly misled the investigating agency or Crown counsel about 
material facts concerning the case including factors relevant to that person's 
reliability and credibility as a witness; or 
• has sought immunity by conduct amounting to a fraud or an obstruction of justice. 
Whether the person should be indicted if this occurs, either for the offence for which he or 
she sought immunity or for some other offence, will depend on the circumstances of each 
case. However, the terms of the agreement with the person and the manner in which it was 
breached will be important considerations.234 
 
Whilst the criteria relating to the revocation of conditional criminal immunity 
are more detailed than those in the ACCC policy, both of these policies do not 
stipulate an appeal process in the case where immunity is revoked and an applicant 
seeks to appeal the final decision. The position in the United States prior to the Stolt-
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Nielsen decision was similar to that currently stipulated in the immunity policies of 
the ACCC, CMA and Competition Bureau. The United States policy previously 
stated that in the event that immunity was revoked, the applicant would be afforded 
the opportunity to make representations in relation to the potential decision to 
revoke.235 
 
(a) The Consequences Of Stolt Nielsen 
 
This section will provide a brief overview of the case that resulted from the 
DOJ’s first revocation of its leniency policy: The Stolt Neilson case. It will then 
analyse the consequences of the decision with a view to formulating lessons for the 
Australian context. The case involved an immunity applicant, Samuel Cooperman, an 
executive of SNTG (Stolt-Neilson Transportation Group), requesting an immunity 
marker based on limited information about the company’s involvement in cartel 
conduct. Counsel for the applicant immediately contacted the Division (DOJ) to 
establish a marker before an internal investigation was conducted. SNTG was 
granted a marker despite the fact that the company’s internal investigation had not 
yet commenced but at that time the DOJ’s own investigation failed to turn up any 
misrepresentations by SNTG.236 However, the DOJ then sought to revoke the marker 
and leniency based on an alleged misrepresentation made at a meeting before the 
internal investigation had commenced.237 SNTG argued that the decision to revoke 
immunity should be subject to pre-indictment review.  
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with SNTG’s argument but this 
decision was overturned in the Appellate courts. The consequence of this was that 
those who enter into an immunity agreement with the DOJ are not entitled to a pre-
indictment review, meaning that the DOJ can indict an immunity applicant without 
first establishing that the applicant is actually in breach of the agreement.238 As a 
result of the decision, the DOJ inserted the following provision into the standard 
immunity agreements in order to preclude immunity decisions from judicial review: 
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28. When can an applicant or its employees judicially challenge a Division decision to 
revoke conditional leniency? 
Paragraph #3 of the model corporate and individual conditional leniency letters states that the 
applicant "understands that the Antitrust Division's Leniency Program is an exercise of the 
Division's prosecutorial discretion, and [it/he/she] agrees that [it/he/she] may not, and will 
not, seek judicial review of any Division decision to revoke [its/his/her] conditional leniency 
unless and until [it/he/she] has been charged by indictment or information for engaging in the 
anticompetitive activity being reported." Paragraph #4 of the model corporate conditional 
leniency letter also notes that "[j]udicial review of any Antitrust Division decision to revoke 
[an individual's] conditional non-prosecution protection granted [under the corporate 
conditional leniency letter] is not available unless and until the individual has been charged 
by indictment or information." The Division's leniency program is an exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion generally not subject to judicial review. Accordingly, the proper 
avenue to challenge a revocation of a leniency letter is to raise the letter as a defense post-
indictment. Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. United States, 442 F.3d 177, 183-187 (3d Cir. 2006).239 
 The DOJ has clearly expressed within the FAQ and the model leniency 
letters that decision to revoke is not subject to judicial review. This stands in contrast 
to the ACCC, Competition Bureau and CMA policies that do not contain such a 
provision. Therefore, the DOJ has the unilateral discretion to revoke its Immunity 
Policy and indict an applicant previously protected by the agreement’s terms.240 This 
approach has been criticised for failing to provide a check on the prosecutorial 
discretion of the DOJ: immunity can now be revoked at any time without an avenue 
of appeal or review process available to the previous immunity holder.241  Those 
applicants who have already provided incriminating information in relation to their 
involvement in the cartel conduct will be in a particularly precarious situation if the 
decision is revoked.242  
As a result of this case, the DOJ FAQ now states that the ‘proper avenue’ to 
challenge a revocation of a leniency letter is to raise the letter as a defense post-
indictment.243 The FAQ does not provide any further detail in relation to this. On the 
one hand, this could be seen to provide an adequate safeguard for an unjustified 
revocation of the DOJ leniency policy. On the other hand though, if the revocation 
was unjustified then the corporation would need to incur significant time and 
                                                
239 Hammond and Barnett, above n 83, Q28.  
240 Tilley, above n 181, 1.	
241 Williams, above n 237, 986.  
242 Tilley, above n 181, 401. 
243 Hammond and Barnett, above n 83, Q 28. 
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resources defending a criminal case that may have been avoided if there was another 
process of independent review of the DOJ’s initial revocation decision. 
Regardless of this issue, the position in the United States in relation to 
revocation is at least clear that it is not subject to judicial review. This provides much 
needed clarity that is currently absent from the ACCC, Competition Bureau and 
CMA policies. There has been further suggestion that the Stolt Nielsen case has 
improved other aspects of the United States leniency policy in terms of placing 
stricter requirements on the marker process.244 Instead of granting the leniency 
marker based on incomplete information, post Stolt Nielsen, the DOJ will require a 
comprehensive investigation of the alleged cartel conduct by the company seeking a 
marker.245 This is likely to prevent the situation that led to the Stolt Nielsen case, and 
ensure that the DOJ is able to grant conditional leniency based on more thorough and 
full information.246 
Despite the potential adverse consequences highlighted by the Stolt-Nielsen 
decision and the DOJ’s leniency letters, the ACCC has yet to clarify or explain in its 
own policy whether its immunity decisions should be or can be subject to judicial 
review. The ACCC should heed the Stolt Nielsen decision and pay close attention to 
the information provided in the marker process to ensure that the company has 
undertaken a proper investigation into the corporate misconduct prior to the grant of 
conditional immunity. 
 
E Concluding Remarks on the Eligibility and Cooperation Elements of the 
Immunity Policy – Applying the Enhanced Criteria 
 
The eligibility and cooperation requirements analysed in this chapter are fundamental 
to the design and operation of the Immunity Policy. The recommendations outlined 
in this chapter are aimed at providing greater clarity and coherence in the Immunity 
Policy and shifting the focus from the orthodox neo-classical framework view of 
‘effectiveness’ to wider considerations. 
In terms of transparency, this chapter has identified a number of areas that are 
currently lacking clear and detailed information in relation to the Policy’s operation. 
                                                
244 See Klawaiter and Everett, above n 165. 
245 Ibid 7.  
246 Ibid.	
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Most notably, the Immunity Policy is not clear on whether recidivists should be 
eligible for Immunity for a second or subsequent time or the process of appeal that an 
Immunity applicant would seek for judicial or merits review of an ACCC’s decision 
to revoke Immunity. Furthermore, there is no indicative criterion that clarifies how 
the coercion test is to be applied. These issues were submitted to the ACCC in its 
recent review of the policy; they are not addressed in the final revised Policy. In 
accordance with general principles of transparency,247 the ACCC needs to provide 
reasons for its decisions regarding the inclusion/exclusion of the recommendations 
but it has failed to do so. The recommendations in this chapter are aimed at 
enhancing the transparency of the Immunity Policy’s operation and, it is submitted, 
should be adopted by the ACCC. 
This consideration overlaps with the need for accountability of government 
decision-making. At present, it is not clear whether a decision made by the ACCC or 
the CDPP in relation to revoking the Immunity Policy is reviewable. Therefore, the 
ACCC cannot be held accountable for its decisions, which is a violation of a 
fundamental precept of responsible government. It is recommended that the ACCC 
insert a dispute resolution provision into the Immunity Policy to ensure that there is 
an effective accountability mechanism for its decisions. 
The principle of consistency requires that the justice system is consistent in 
the application of laws and in practice.248 This chapter has demonstrated that there 
are issues of consistency between the ACCC and CDPP’s administration of the 
Immunity Policy, particularly in relation to the timing of the grant of conditional 
criminal immunity and the sufficiency of information needed to grant such 
immunity. Whilst the ACCC and CDPP are entrusted with discretion in the exercise 
of their decision-making powers, the recommendations in this chapter need careful 
consideration to ensure that the ACCC and CDPP act consistently in the interests of 
fair administration. This includes reducing the levels of uncertainty surrounding the 
different approaches the two agencies adopt in immunity related decisions. 
In relation to the cooperation and eligibility requirements, the question is 
whether the current Immunity Policy adopts the most reasonable and proportionate 
means to achieving its aims of detection and deterrence. It is clear that the Immunity 
                                                
247 As outlined in Chapter III, Transparency, pg 89. 
248 Ibid Consistency, pg 93.	
 
221 
 
Policy is ‘rationally related’ to achieving cartel detection and deterrence, and 
therefore satisfies the first test. The second question is directed at whether the 
measures adopted are the ‘least-restrictive’ to achieve the aims of the Immunity 
Policy. The recommendations formulated in this chapter are designed to ensure that 
the Immunity Policy is still aimed at detection and deterrence, but ensures that the 
measures taken to achieve this are weighed against competing considerations. For 
instance, on one view the exclusion of recidivists from the Immunity Policy may 
adversely impact on the deterrence capabilities of the Policy. However, this factor 
needs to be weighed against the argument that allowing recidivists to continuously 
apply for immunity may facilitate cartel conduct. The exclusion of recidivists would 
thus bring the policy in line with other exclusion criteria within the policy, such as 
the coercion test, which also prevents culpable corporations from manipulating the 
policy. 
The recommendations in this chapter are therefore arguably equally effective 
in achieving the Immunity Policy’s aim, but bring the Policy in line with other 
important public policy considerations of transparency, accountability and 
consistency. In this way, the recommendations are proportionate means to achieving 
the aims of the Immunity Policy in a more comprehensive and justified way. 
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VII THE ROLE OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT – 
CONFIDENTIALITY AND THIRD PARTIES 
 
In the context of anti-cartel enforcement, there is an inherent tension between 
the role of public and private enforcement. Public enforcement efforts are claimed to 
be highly successful in the deterrence of cartel conduct by competition regulators 
internationally. At the forefront of the public enforcement regime has been the 
immunity policy, which has largely been proclaimed as the success story of public 
enforcement, given its claims of achieving cartel detection and deterrence.  
In contrast, the key aim of private enforcement is to seek compensation for 
those who have been adversely affected by cartel conduct and who seek this 
compensation through private actions for damages against the former cartel 
members. In order to successfully pursue an action in damages, third party claimants 
encounter the same evidentiary difficulties as competition regulators in attempting to 
prove the existence of the cartel. However, unlike the regulators, the third party 
claimants generally do not have access to the immunity documents that enabled the 
regulators to successfully prosecute the cartel members nor do they have the same 
investigative powers of the ACCC, such as those under s 155.1  
At the heart of the intersection of public and private enforcement is the issue 
of confidentiality. The issues associated with confidentiality emerge as two-fold: 
 
A Disclosure of Immunity Information to third party claimants; 
B Disclosure of Immunity Information to other regulators, pursuant to 
international agreements and waivers of confidentiality. 
 
At the most basic level, these issues require weighing the net benefits of 
disclosure against the costs of non-disclosure. The disclosure of immunity 
information, particularly to third party claimants, will assist them in generating a 
case against the former cartel members in order to seek compensation for the harm 
incurred as a result of the cartel.  
                                                
1 Competition and Competition Act 2010 (Cth) s 155.	
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There is much support for the role that private enforcement plays in the anti-
cartel enforcement regime, with some suggestion that private enforcement plays an 
even greater role in deterrence than that of the public enforcement regime.2 In 
contrast, one of the central tenets of the immunity policy is an upfront assurance of 
confidentiality of all information provided to the regulator, in order to entice the 
immunity applicants to come forward and cooperate with the competition 
authorities.3 Confidentiality, in this context, is particularly important as the immunity 
applicant is providing self-incriminating evidence of its involvement in the cartel, 
which puts them in a vulnerable position in relation to third party actions vis-à-vis 
the other cartel participants. If this confidential information is disclosed to third party 
claimants or disclosed in a foreign jurisdiction where the cartel participant has not 
yet sought or been granted immunity, this has the potential to undermine the very 
operation of the immunity policy.  
In essence, there is growing recognition of the importance of private 
enforcement, and with it, the perception that the roles of private and public 
enforcement should be seen as complementary, as opposed to conflicting.4 However, 
there are delicate issues associated with this interaction, of which this chapter will 
seek to analyse in order to determine where the balance should lie. 
The first section of this chapter will analyse the position in Australia 
regarding the disclosure of immunity information, before turning to the recent 
developments in the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada, which have 
significantly impacted upon the issue of disclosure of immunity information on a 
global scale and pose a threat to the effective operation of immunity policies. The 
                                                
2 See eg, Robert  Landes and Joshua Davis, 'Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement and 
Criminal Enforcement of the US' (2011) ((2)) Brigham Young University Law Review 315; Robert  
Landes and Joshua Davis, 'Defying Conventional Wisdom: The Case for Private Antitrust 
Enforcement' (2013) 48 Georgia Law Review 1; Robert  Landes and Joshua Davis, 'Toward an 
Empirical and Theoretical Assessment of Private Antitrust Enforcement' (2013) 36 Seattle University 
Law Review 1269. 
3 See eg, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 'ACCC Immunity and Cooperation 
Policy for Cartel Conduct ' (2014) s H. 
4 See eg, Sarah  Lynch, 'The Case for Increased Private Enforcement of Cartel Laws in Australia' 
(2011) 39 Australian Business Law Review 385; Stephen Kon and Amy Barcroft, 'Aspects of the 
Complementary Roles of Public and Private Enforcement of UK and EU Antitrust Law: An 
Enforcement Deficit?' (2008) 1 Global Competition Litigation Review 11; Micheal Sanders et al, 
'Disclosure of Leniency Materials in Follow-on Damages Actions: Striking "The Right Balance" 
Between the Interests of Leniency Applicants and Private Claimants?' (2013) 34 European 
Competition Law Review 174.	
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analysis will then focus on restitution as a potential solution to balance the competing 
interests of public and private enforcement.  
The second section of this chapter will focus on the information provided to 
foreign regulatory agencies pursuant to international formal and informal 
information-sharing mechanisms. The focal point of this section will be upon the 
waiver of confidentiality agreements in Australia and the aforementioned 
jurisdictions and its impact on the confidentiality assurances of an immunity policy.  
The chapter will then advocate for a more streamlined approach to international 
immunity applications and briefly analyse the proposed avenues for this to be 
achieved. 
 
A Disclosure of Immunity Information to Third Parties – The Australian 
Position 
 
The ACCC has always maintained that they will use their ‘best endeavours’ 
to protect the confidentiality of immunity information; their stated position is against 
the disclosure of immunity information to third party claimants, except as required 
by law.5 The FAQ does not elaborate on this position. In particular, there is 
insufficient guidance in respect of the criminal discovery provisions6 that may 
compel the ACCC to disclose immunity information.7 The Policy only refers to the 
‘Protected Cartel Information’ provisions set out in the Competition and Consumer 
Act 2010 (Cth), as well as the common law arguments that the ACCC may use to 
protect immunity information, namely legal professional privilege and public interest 
immunity.8  
This section will first analyse the previous case law arguments put forward by 
the ACCC to protect the confidentiality of immunity information to demonstrate that 
these arguments have produced inconsistent and unpredictable results. This analysis 
will show how difficult it is to rely on common law arguments to guarantee to 
potential immunity applicants that the information they provide to the ACCC will be 
kept confidential and not used against them in ancillary proceedings. This creates a 
                                                
5 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n 3, Step 4: Confidentiality. 
6 Federal Court Act of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) Part III, Subdivision C. 
7 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n 3, s 50. 
8 Ibid; Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 157. 	
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high level of uncertainty in relation to the operation of the ACCC Immunity Policy, 
which according the ACCC, undermines the policy’s effectiveness in achieving 
cartel detection and deterrence.  
As a result of the inconsistency in judicial interpretation, the legislature has 
attempted to address this uncertainty by introducing the ‘Protected Cartel 
Information’ (‘PCI’) scheme that is designed to give the ACCC, as opposed to a 
court, the power to determine whether immunity information should be disclosed.9  
These provisions have not yet been judicially interpreted but an analysis of the 
Prysmian10 case provides some insight into the way the court is likely to interpret 
these provisions. 
 
1 The Case Law 
Prior to the implementation of the PCI regime, the ACCC sought to withhold 
cartel information in judicial proceedings by claiming the information was protected 
by primarily two privileges, (a) public interest immunity and; (b) legal professional 
privilege.11 These legal arguments have been put forward by the ACCC in three 
significant cases, with differing results.  
(a) Legal Professional Privilege 
This common law privilege refers to the right of a client to the protection from 
disclosure of confidential information and advice passing between lawyer and 
client.12 Where information is confidential information contained in a verbal or 
written communication made with the ‘dominant purpose’ of obtaining, or giving, 
legal advice then it will be protected by legal professional privilege.13 The ACCC 
bears the onus of proof in this respect and the purpose of the communication is 
determined primarily from the document on a case-by-case basis.14 
                                                
9 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) ss 157B, 157C. 
10 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi Energia SRL (2011) 
FCA 938. (‘Prysmian’)	
11 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n  s 51. 
12 Ainslie Lamb and John Litrich, Lawyers in Australian Society (Federation Press, 2007) 258. 
13 Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49; ibid 258-259. 
14 Ibid 259; Ysaiah Ross and Peter MacFarlane, Lawyers' Responsibility & Accountability - Cases, 
Problems & Commentary (LexisNexis Butterworths, 3rd ed, 2007) 414-415. 
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In ACCC v Visy (No 2),15 concerning cartel conduct in the Australian cardboard 
box industry, the ACCC successfully claimed professional legal privilege over a 
number of documents created soon after the applicant had applied for immunity.16 It 
was held that these documents had been received at a time where litigation had been 
‘reasonably anticipated’, even though the actual commencement of legal proceedings 
was not until a year later.17 Therefore, pursuant to this analysis, information provided 
by the immunity applicant brought into existence by the ACCC for the ‘dominant 
purpose’ of use in those proceedings will be protected by legal professional 
privilege.18  
However, in the situation where the ACCC does not ‘reasonably anticipate’ 
legal proceedings, the ACCC must prove that the documents were brought into 
existence for the dominant purpose of obtaining legal advice, and not some other 
purpose.19 This is a very important distinction, as documents brought into existence 
by the ACCC for some other purpose, such as for the purpose of taking a record of 
the statement in performance of an ACCC officer's duties, are at risk of not being 
protected by legal professional privilege.20 
 
(b) Public Interest Immunity 
 
Public interest immunity refers to the situation where a court will not order the 
production of a document, even if it may be relevant or admissible, because it would 
be injurious to the public interest to do so.21 The ACCC has sought to protect 
immunity information on these grounds, with inconsistent results: 
 
                                                
15 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Visy (No 2) (2007) 239 ALR 762.	
16Ayman Guirguis, 'Risk of Disclosure of Immunity Applicant Confidential Information and 
Documents – The Position in Australia' (Corrs Chambers Westgrath, 2012) 
<http://www.corrs.com.au/assets/thinking/downloads/Cartel-Paper-Ayman-Guirguis-IBA-Annual-
Conference-Dublin.pdf>7; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Visy Holdings Pty 
Ltd (No 3) (2007) FCA 1617. 
17 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Visy (No 2) (2007) 239 ALR 762, 777 [62]-
[65]. 
18 Guirguis, above n 16, 7. 
19 Ibid; Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49. 
20 Ibid 8. 
21 See Australian Law Reform Commission ALRC, 'Uniform Evidence Law (ALRC Report 102) ' 
(Australian Law Reform Commission ALRC, 2006) <http://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/report-
102> Section 15: Privilege – Other Privileges; Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1. 
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(i) Cadbury Schweppes v Amcor22  
The claim for both public interest immunity and legal professional privilege 
failed in Cadbury Schweppes v Amcor. This case concerned an ancillary proceeding 
to the Visy case in relation to allegations of similar cartel conduct, namely price-
fixing. The central issue arose in the context of an interlocutory dispute within the 
damages proceedings brought by Cadbury against Amcor; the issue concerned 
specified documents created in connection with the ACCC proceeding that may be 
produced to Cadbury.23  
The ACCC argued that it was in the public interest to ensure that the greatest 
incentive is afforded to immunity applicants, such as Amcor, by ensuring the 
confidentiality of immunity information, as well as providing finality and certainty in 
respect of cartel proceedings.24 The Court did not accept this argument. Justice 
Gordon stated that it is both inevitable and self-evident that statements made by a 
cooperating criminal conspirator will be used against the non-cooperating 
conspirators and that these statements may be used in court proceedings.25 The claim 
for public interest immunity therefore failed. 
 
(ii) Korean Air Lines Co Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission26 
Similar issues in relation to the confidentiality of immunity information arose in 
the course of an ACCC investigation into allegations of price fixing by Korean Air 
Lines ('KAL') and other international carriers that had occurred since mid-2006. The 
central issue concerned a challenge by KAL in relation to the validity of the section 
155 ACL notice, who sought internal ACCC documents to support its argument that 
the notice had been issued for an improper purpose.27  
In contrast to the decision in Cadbury, the court held that disclosure of internal 
ACCC documents would be contrary to the public interest, given that it 'entailed a 
serious risk of adversely affecting the Commission's ongoing investigation into 
                                                
22 Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Amcor Limited (2008) FCA 88.	
23 Ibid [1]-[2]. 
24 Ibid [27]. 
25 Ibid [30]. 
26 Korean Airways Co Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2008) FCA 265.	
27 Ibid [1]–[9]. 
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conduct suspected to have been carried out by the applicant and other carriers,' as 
well as adversely affecting 'the Commission's ability to investigate other past and 
future suspected cartel activity.'28 The Court in Korean Airways acknowledged the 
importance of immunity policies in creating incentives for participants to reveal 
cartel information, and gave this factor significant weight in its assessment of public 
interest immunity. 
 
(iii) ACCC v Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi Energia SRL29  
This case concerned an interlocutory application by the ACCC to protect the 
identity of a cartel informer, Mr. ‘A,’ as well as affidavit evidence by Ms Jacquir. 
The principle proceeding concerned an alleged cartel arrangement in relation to land-
based and electrical cables and accessories supplied to customers in Australia and 
throughout the world.30  
The court held that the public interest in preventing disclosure in order to protect 
informers and encourage future immunity applications must be weighed against the 
public interest in ensuring that the Court has access to all relevant evidence; this 
balancing exercise is therefore decided on a case by case basis.31 Ultimately, the 
court found that the public interest was in favour of disclosure. Although the court 
recognised the effect that disclosure could have on deterring future cartel participants 
from coming forward and giving information about cartel conduct,32 it rejected the 
fact that the disclosure of the identity of ‘Mr A’ may result in his prosecution in other 
jurisdictions as a relevant factor in the Court's assessment:33  
‘It is not the role of this Court ... to protect Mr A from lawful prosecution in other jurisdictions. 
The adverse consequences that he might suffer in other jurisdictions for conduct that may be 
unlawful in those jurisdictions are not matters of public interest in this jurisdiction.’ 
Therefore the claim for public interest immunity failed, with the court holding 
                                                
28Ibid [66]. 
29 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi Energia SRL (2011) 
FCA 938; See also, Laura Guttuso, 'A View of the Macrocosm of International Cartel Enforcement: 
How the Boomerang of Cross-Border Disclosure Springs Back to its Domestic Context' (2015) 43 
Australian Business Law Review 27, 35.	
30 Ibid [1]-[2]. 
31 Ibid [185]. 
32 Ibid [195]. 
33 Ibid [190]. 
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that a claim pursuant to s 50 had also failed for substantially similar reasons.34 
There are significant implications that arise from this decision. The first 
relates to the fact that this order of disclosure was upheld by the court before the full 
proceedings had commenced. A second related factor is that the respondents had not 
yet submitted to the court's jurisdiction. Although the court did recognise that the 
respondent's agents may be bound by an implied undertaking to the court,35 this does 
not alter the fact that disclosure of confidential information, such as the identity of an 
informant, may be ordered by a court at a very early stage of proceedings.  
This is likely to adversely impact on future cartel immunity applications 
because, as a result of the Prysmian decision, the ACCC cannot guarantee with any 
level of certainty that the information provided by an immunity applicant, or the 
applicant’s identity, will be protected, even in preliminary proceedings. The PCI 
regime was introduced to address this uncertainty. This chapter will now turn to 
analysing the PCI regime in order to determine whether it will overcome the 
uncertainty that permeates this area of the law. 
 
2 The Legislation: Protected Cartel Information Scheme 
In light of the uncertainty of the case law, the legislature enacted specific 
provisions that deal with the confidentiality of cartel informers, encompassed within 
s 157 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (The ‘PCI’ regime). The PCI 
regime essentially invests the ACCC with broad discretionary powers to prevent the 
disclosure of immunity information.  
Section 157B requires that the Commission will not be bound to produce 
protected cartel information to the Court, unless the Court grants leave. However, in 
determining whether leave should be granted, the Court must have regard to the same 
considerations as the Commission, and must not have regard to any other matters. 
Moreover, if leave is granted by the court for disclosure of protected cartel 
information in one proceeding, the use of that information in another proceeding is 
strictly prohibited, except with the leave of the court.  
Section 157C mandates that the Commission is not required to disclose 
                                                
34 Ibid [240].	
35 Ibid [213]. 
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protected cartel information to a party when the Commission itself is not a party to 
the proceedings. However, the Commission can grant disclosure, after taking account 
of each of the outlined factors.36 Essentially, the PCI regime invests wide powers in 
the Commission to prevent disclosure of cartel information. These provisions have 
not yet been interpreted by the courts.  
 
(a) How Will the PCI Regime be Interpreted: An Analysis of Prysmian 
Many of the factors in s 157C were considered by the court in the case of 
Prysmian, in the context of the public interest immunity arguments. However, 
despite the fact that many similar factors were considered by Justice Lander, the 
disclosure of protected cartel information was still granted. Although the court 
recognised that the information was given to the ACCC in confidence37 and also 
considered the effect that the disclosure of the identity of Mr. ‘A’ may have on 
potential prosecutions overseas, namely in the United States and Brazil, it ultimately 
held that the right to a fair trial outweighed these considerations. Moreover, the court 
found that Mr. A himself would have known that his involvement with the 
competition authorities may have meant that his identity would be disclosed in the 
proceedings.38  
The court recognised the potential harm that may be caused to cartel 
informers, but distinguished this harm from the type of harm that may occur in the 
case of a police informer.39 In the court’s opinion, the most likely ‘harm’ caused to 
cartel informers as a result of the disclosure of one's identity would be the risk of 
prosecution in another jurisdiction and this factor was not considered significant in 
the court’s assessment.40  
As this case analysis has demonstrated, despite the implementation of the PCI 
regime, there is still significant uncertainty as to how these provisions will be 
interpreted by the courts. In the case of ACCC v Prysmian, it is unlikely that the 
application of the PCI provisions would have altered the decision, as the court 
considered many of the same factors required by the PCI legislation but still found in 
                                                
36 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) S 157C (5). 
37 Ibid [195]. 
38 Ibid [191]-[192].	
39 Ibid [188]. 
40 Ibid [190]. 
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favour of disclosure of the cartel information. Concerns regarding this uncertainty 
have been reflected in submissions made to Treasury in its cartel consultation 
process. In particular, the Business Council of Australia expressed concern that the 
provisions were not wide enough and could result in the disclosure of commercially 
sensitive information, which would then become available to competitors.41  
In contrast, there has been strong criticism of the PCI regime by the firm 
Maurice Blackburn in relation to the application of s 157C.42 The criticism is 
primarily directed at the situation where the ACCC is not a party to a proceeding and 
another party requests disclosure of any documents containing cartel protected 
information. The firm is concerned that the ACCC has the final decision in relation 
to this disclosure and that such a decision is not subject to the purview of the court. 
Within this context, Maurice Blackburn asserts that the cartel protection provisions 
essentially attempt to fetter judicial discretion and circumvent the public interest 
immunity privilege, so that the factors to be considered are geared in favour of non-
disclosure.43 Moreover, it is not clear whether the ACCC is required to disclose the 
reasons for its decisions and whether these reasons must be disclosed publicly.44 
 
3 Criminal Discovery of Immunity Information in Australia 
Whilst the Immunity Policy acknowledges that information provided by an 
immunity applicant will be confidential, it also states that 'disclosure obligations may 
require the CDPP to disclose such information.'45  Thus, in criminal proceedings, 
although the PCI46 scheme (above) is intended to protect confidential immunity 
information, there is a strong likelihood that the ACCC will be required to disclose 
this information pursuant to the Federal Court Act of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).  
It appears that the general powers of a court to control the conduct of criminal 
or civil proceedings, in particular with respect to abuse of process, is not affected by 
                                                
41 Business Council of Australia,  Submission No 21 to the Competition and Consumer Policy 
Division, The Treasury, Criminal Penalties for Serious Cartel Conduct, 7 March 2008, 16. 
42 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 157 C.	
43 Maurice Blackburn Pty Ltd, Submission No 13 to the Competition and Consumer Policy Division, 
The Treasury, Criminal Penalties for Serious Cartel Conduct, 4 March 2008, 10 [62]. 
44 See also, Guttuso, above n 29, 33. 
45 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, ‘ACCC Immunity policy interpretation 
guidelines,’ (ACCC 06/2010_38013, July 2009) [63]–[65]. 
46 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 157. 
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ss 157B-157C ‘except so far as that section does not expressly or impliedly provide 
otherwise’.47 Furthermore, a refusal to grant leave under s 157B of the PCI 
legislation does not prevent a court from later ordering that a criminal proceeding be 
stayed on the grounds that the refusal would have a substantial adverse effect on the 
defendant’s right to receive a fair hearing.48 
The Immunity Policy and the FAQ do not mention the potential interaction 
between the PCI scheme and the criminal discovery provisions outlined in the 
Federal Court Act or how this may adversely impact on the ACCC’s disclosure 
obligations. The discovery requirements in a criminal proceeding are far more 
onerous than that in a civil proceeding and this very significant risk of disclosure of 
an applicant’s immunity information is not addressed in the Immunity Policy. 
Section 23CE of the Federal Court of Australia Act outlines the broad nature of the 
criminal discovery obligations that must be adhered to by the prosecution: 
                   The notice of the prosecution's case must include the following: 
(a) an outline of the prosecution's case that sets out the facts, matters and circumstances on 
which the prosecution's case is based; 
(b) for each witness the prosecutor proposes to call at the trial: 
i. a copy of a signed statement by the witness that sets out the evidence the witness is 
to give at the trial; or 
ii. a written summary of the evidence the witness is to give at the trial; 
(c) for each witness: 
i. the prosecutor does not propose to call at the trial; but 
ii. who has signed a statement that sets out the evidence the witness could give at the 
trial; 
iii. a copy of the signed statement; 
(d) copies of any documents the prosecutor proposes to tender at the trial; 
(e) copies of, or an invitation to inspect, any other exhibits the prosecutor proposes to tender at 
the trial; 
(f) a copy of any report, relevant to the trial, that has been prepared by an expert witness whom 
the prosecutor proposes to call at the trial;  
(g) a copy or details of any information in the prosecutor's possession that might adversely affect 
the reliability or credibility of a prosecution witness; 
(h) a copy or details of any information, document or other thing in the prosecutor's possession 
that the prosecutor reasonably believes contains evidence that may be relevant to the 
accused's case; 
(i) if the prosecutor reasonably believes information in the prosecutor's possession suggests the 
existence of evidence that may be relevant to the accused's case--a copy or details of so much 
of that information as is necessary to suggest that existence; 
(j)  a list identifying: 
i. any information, document or other thing not in the prosecutor's possession that the 
prosecutor reasonably believes contains evidence that may be relevant to the 
accused's case; and 
ii. for each item of information, and each document or other thing, a place where the 
prosecutor reasonably believes the item, document or thing to be; 
                                                
47 s 157D(1). 
48 s 157D(2). 
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(k) a copy or details of any information, document or other thing in the prosecutor's possession 
that is adverse to the accused's credit or credibility; and may include other matters. 
 
In particular, subsections (g) and (h) are wide-reaching provisions that may require 
the prosecution to disclose immunity information, especially if that immunity 
information may ‘adversely affect’ the prosecution witness’s reliability and 
credibility. As was demonstrated in the previous chapter, in the context of contested 
cartel cases, the defence often attacks an immunity applicant’s credibility. This is due 
to the fact that immunised witnesses are deemed to be equally culpable as the 
defendant in the eyes of the jury. Furthermore, juries will often perceive informer 
evidence as self-serving and prejudiced by bias as a result of obtaining immunity.49  
The Law Council was also critical of these provisions and the meaning of 
‘prosecutor’s possession.’ As this term is undefined, it is unclear whether this 
provision extends to documents in the prosecuting agencies’ possession, such as the 
ACCC or ASIC.50 Furthermore, the Law Council asserted that the requirement for the 
prosecutor to disclose where the prosecutor ‘reasonably believes’ that such material 
may be located does not meet duty of disclosure requirements if the prosecutor 
indicates that the prosecuting authority (ACCC/ASIC) has relevant material but no 
steps are taken to make it available to the defence.51 
As there has not yet been a contested criminal trial in Australia, it is useful to 
draw upon the experiences of comparable jurisdictions to analyse the cases that have 
led to the disclosure of immunity information in criminal proceedings. This will be 
discussed in the next section.  
 
4 The Position Overseas 
This section will analyse the general provisions relating to the protection of 
confidential immunity information in the United States, United Kingdom and 
Canada, before turning to the recent developments in each jurisdiction that have 
significantly impacted upon the level of information that is being disclosed, 
                                                
49 See Chapter VI, The Credibility Of Accomplice Evidence, pg 203.  
50 Law Council of Australia, 'Law Council comments and queries regarding the Federal Court of 
Australia Amendment (Criminal Jurisdiction) Bill 2008' (2008) 
<http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/lawcouncil/images/LCA-PDF/a-z-
docs/LCACommentsontheDraftFedCourtAmendment%28CriminalJurisdiction%29Bill.pdf> s11. 
51 Ibid. 
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specifically in the context of criminal discovery. This should serve as a sharp 
warning to the ACCC as it approaches its first contested criminal cartel case. 
 
(a) The United States 
The United States is generally lauded as the ‘success story’ of private cartel 
enforcement, as private actions for damages are thriving and robust.52 It has been 
argued that private cartel enforcement in the United States is more effective at 
deterrence of cartel activity then public enforcement efforts,53 although this claim has 
been disputed.54 Section 4 of the Clayton Act allows the recovery of damages by ‘any 
person injured in his business or property by reason of anything prohibited in the 
antitrust laws.’55 The Act allows a private claimant to recover treble damages and 
costs, including reasonable legal fees.56 One of the main draw-cards of the leniency 
policy in the United States is the provision that allows for the de-trebling of damages 
for leniency applicants.57  
Pursuant to this provision, leniency applicants are only required to pay ‘actual 
damages’ in a follow-on damages claim.58 In addition to its obligations under the 
leniency policy, to be eligible for the de-trebling of damages, applicants must also 
provide ‘satisfactory cooperation’ to private plaintiffs in their civil damages claim. 
This disclosure provision will be further discussed in the section relating to 
Restitution.59  
Within the context of active private enforcement, the DOJ has sought to 
maintain the confidentiality of leniency information by holding ‘the identity of 
leniency applicants and the information they provide in strict confidence, much like 
                                                
52 Roger Gamble, 'The Cartel Penumbra: Where Public and Private Enforcement Policies Intersect' 
(2013) 42 Common Law World Review 23, 34. 
53 See Robert & Joshua Landes & Davis, 'Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement and 
Criminal Enforcement of the U.S.' (2011)  Brigham Young University Law Review; 315.  
54  Gregory Werden, Scott Hammond and Belinda Barnett, 'Deterrence and Detection of Cartels: 
Using all the Tools and Sanctions' (2011) 56 The Antitrust Bulletin 207, 227-233; Daniel Crane, The 
Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement (2011) 168-72. 
55 Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 15 U.S.C. § 15a, s 4. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004 Pub L No 108-237, tit II, 118 Stat 
661, 665 (2004) (codified as amended at 15 USC §1 note) (‘ACPERA’). 
58 See also, Guttuso, above n 29, 40. 
59 See below, Restitution, pg 254. 
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the treatment afforded to confidential informants.’60 Furthermore, the DOJ advocates 
that it will not publically disclose such leniency information, unless in the case of 
prior disclosure, by agreement with the applicant or by court order in connection 
with court proceedings.61  
According to the DOJ, the regulator has generally been successful in 
upholding these assurances of confidentiality, with most leniency information 
remaining outside the public domain.62 This is arguably due to the fact that most 
cartel proceedings are settled by way of plea agreement, with limited information 
being provided to pleading defendants or in an open court.63  
In the context of contested criminal cartel cases, the DOJ regularly seeks 
protective orders to ensure that criminal discovery is not publicly disclosed. 
However, a significant amount of leniency information will be inevitably disclosed 
in an open court setting during the course of a trial.64 These inherent risks of 
disclosure are not explicitly mentioned in the DOJ’s leniency policy or FAQ 
guidelines. 
Discovery obligations in criminal cases are framed in the United States by 
Supreme Court precedent, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the United 
States Attorneys Manual (USAM). According to United States case law, the general 
principles of disclosure in a criminal case mandate that the government has a duty to 
disclose all material evidence favourable to a criminal defendant.65 A violation of this 
duty that results in a conviction deprives the defendant of his or her liberty without 
due process of law.66 These principles were at the centre of a judicial discussion 
relating to the disclosure requirements of the prosecution in United States of America 
v Triumph Capital Group Inc.67 This high profile case, along with a number of 
                                                
60 Scott & Belinda Hammond & Barnett, 'Frequently asked Questions regarding the Antitrust 
Division's Leniency Program and Model Leniency Letters ' (Department of Justice, November 19 
2008) 27, Q 32. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid.  
63 Marc Hansen, Luca Crocco and Susan Kennedy, 'Challenges to International Cartel Enforcement 
and Multi-Jurisdictional Leniency Applications – Disclosure of Leniency Applicant Statements and 
Materials' (Latham & Watkins, 2012) 13.	
64 Ibid 14. 
65 See eg, United States v. Madori, 419 F.3d 159, 169 (2d Cir.2005) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 
United States. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)); see also Giglio v. United States, 405 
United States. 150, 154-55, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) (applying Brady to material that can 
be used to impeach prosecution witnesses). 
66 See eg, Rivas, 377 F.3d at 199. 
67 United States v. Triumph Capital Group, 544 F.3d 149 (2nd Cir. 2008)) s C. 
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others, led to a growing recognition of the failure of the prosecution to disclosure 
certain exculpatory material in criminal proceedings.68  
As a result, in January 2010, the Deputy Attorney General of the DOJ 
announced the new Guidance for Prosecutors Regarding Criminal Discovery.69 This 
memorandum was generated by a working group established by the DOJ to 
investigate the various practices in each judicial district and to develop guidance for 
prosecutors in relation to their discovery obligations and practices. The aim of the 
memorandum was to harmonise the inconsistent discovery provisions in each district 
and to establish a uniform code by which prosecutors would follow.70  
One particular area of relevance to cartel cases is the requirement that DOJ 
prosecutors review and produce ‘prior inconsistent statements’ which could possibly 
include inconsistent attorney proffers.71 These provisions could adversely impact 
upon the operation of the DOJ’s leniency policy, as the DOJ will no longer be able to 
assure confidentiality to leniency applicants of statements made in the very early 
stages of the investigation, potentially before the full extent of the cartel conduct is 
even known to the applicant. For example, a witness’s initial statements to company 
counsel may be incomplete at the early stages of the investigation and these 
statements may be admitted as prior inconsistent statements if the witness’ 
statements have changed with the benefit of full information and review of the 
relevant documentation.72 
The DOJ will seek protective orders of the leniency information that it 
provides pursuant to the discovery obligations to ensure that the information is not 
disclosed in the public domain. However, in the case where there is a large amount of 
                                                
68 Hansen, Crocco and Kennedy, above n 63, 14. 
69 David Ogden, '165 Guidance for Prosecutors Regarding Criminal Discovery' (Offices of the United 
States Attorneys, 2010) 
<http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00165.htm>. 
70 Jeffrey Bornstein, Laura Brevetti and Leanne Hartmann, 'DOJ's New Guidance on Criminal 
Discovery Practices: How Much Has Changed?' (K&L Gates, 2010) <http://www.klgates.com/dojs-
new-guidance-on-criminal-discovery-practices-how-much-has-changed-01-27-2010/>; Solomon 
Wisenberg and George Horn, 'Department of Justice Issues Guidance for Prosecutors Regarding 
Criminal Discovery' (Barnes & Thornburg LLP, 2010) 
<http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=7ea984d3-566d-402d-902e-4478bba0ffe7>. 
71 Ogden, above n 69, s 7. 
72 Hansen, Crocco and Kennedy, above n 63, 14.  
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information that is generated for the purposes of discovery in an open court setting, 
the risks of disclosure are inevitable.73  
The tension between the rights of a defendant to a fair trial against that of 
maintaining the confidentiality of leniency information is well demonstrated in this 
situation and it appears the courts, at least in the Optronics case, have leant towards 
the disclosure of leniency information in preference to confidentiality.74 On the one 
hand, this may seem to undermine the incentive to come forward and apply for 
leniency in the United States, but on the other, a leniency applicant needs to be aware 
that it is inevitable that their information will be disclosed at some point during the 
investigation or trial, despite the best efforts of the DOJ. 
 
(b) The United Kingdom  
In contrast to the United States, the United Kingdom has not been at the forefront 
of private cartel enforcement, although recent legislative initiatives indicate that the 
United Kingdom government is considering the issue more seriously.75 Pursuant to 
section 47A of the Competition Act76 any person who has suffered loss or damage as 
a result of an infringement of either a United Kingdom or European Union 
competition law may bring a claim for damages before the Competition Appeals 
Tribunal (CAT) in respect of that loss or damage.  
The CMA policy in relation to the disclosure of leniency information is 
significantly more elaborate and comprehensive than that of the DOJ. Although the 
CMA recognises the importance of confidentiality for leniency applicants, it also 
acknowledges the ‘risk that parties will conclude that the information has been 
                                                
73 See, eg, United States v. AU Optronics Corp., No. CR-09-0110 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2012), 2012 
WL 889874. 	
74 Hansen, Crocco and Kennedy, above n 63. 
75 Kon and Barcroft, above n 4, 11-14. Specifically, the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (United Kingdom) 
came into effect on the 1st of October 2015 and seeks to amend the regime for private competition 
actions in the UK. The two primary developments include the expansion of the types of competition 
cases that the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) hears, including both ‘follow on’ claims and 
standalone actions. Secondly, Part 1 of Schedule 8 of the Act also introduces ‘opt-out’ collective 
actions, which allow for a case to be brought on behalf of a group of claimants to obtain compensation 
for their losses. This is a positive development for private competition actions in the UK, and these 
changes are likely to increase the number of private actions taken by parties affected by cartel conduct 
who seek redress. See eg, Department for Business Innovation and Skills, ‘Policy Paper Consumer 
Rights Act 2015’ (United Kingdom Government, 14 August 2015) < 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/consumer-rights-act-2015>. 
76 Competition Act, RSC 1985, c C-34 (‘Competition Act’). 
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supplied by a leniency applicant, which may in turn reveal the identity of the 
applicant.’77 The CMA has dedicated a section of the policy to disclosure 
considerations in relation to a statement of objections, infringement decision and as 
part of the access to file process.78 This section acknowledges the disclosure risks 
associated with discovery provisions, and notes that these obligations may still apply 
even where proceedings are not initiated against the leniency applicant or where their 
leniency application is withdrawn.79 
As a consequence of the BA case,80 the CMA used to require that applicants 
waive legal professional privilege as a condition of immunity.81 However, the 2013 
guidance indicates that the CMA no longer requires waivers of legal professional 
privilege over any relevant information in either civil or criminal investigations as a 
condition of leniency.82 Instead, the CMA will ordinarily require a review of any 
relevant information in respect of which privilege is claimed by independent counsel 
(‘IC’).83 Where the IC deems the information to be covered by privilege then it will 
not be disclosed as part of a condition of leniency, but if it is not covered by privilege 
then it will be required to be disclosed.84 This vetting system is unique to the CMA 
policy and this is probably due to the failure of the first contested criminal cartel case 
in the United Kingdom. The reason for this is that the former OFT faced difficulties 
in obtaining earlier accounts of witnesses that were prepared by Virgin’s lawyers and 
thus privileged.85 There was also no requirement in the leniency policy that 
compelled the applicant to waive privilege as a condition of leniency.86 
In contrast to the ACCC and DOJ policies, the CMA policy specifically refers 
to the disclosure obligations in criminal prosecutions and states that ‘full disclosure 
                                                
77 Competition and Markets Authority, 'Applications for Leniency and No-Action in Cartel Cases - 
Detailed Guidance on the Principles and Process' (Competition and Markets Authority, 2013) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284417/OFT1495.pdf
> 66, s 7.1. 
78 Ibid s 7.4. 
79 Ibid s 7.8. 
80 See R v George, Burns, Burnett and Crawley (unreported) 7 December 2009; (2010) 174 JP 313; 
(2010) EWCA Crim 1148. 
81 Leniency and No-Action Guidance (OFT 803, December 2008); Hansen, Crocco and Kennedy, 
above n 63, 9. 
82 Competition and Markets Authority, above n 77, s 3.15. 
83 Ibid s 3.16. 
84 Ibid ss 3.19, 3.20. 
85 Michael O’Kane, 'International Cartel Criminalisation and Leniency: Recent Lessons from the UK 
and Global Comparisons' (2012) 8 Competition Law International 55, 56. 
86 Ibid. 
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of ‘used’ and relevant ‘unused’ material must be made to defendants, to comply with 
requirements under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 as amended 
by the Criminal Justice Act 2003, and the associated Code of Practice.’87 In this 
respect, the CMA is open and transparent in relation to its limited ability to withhold 
relevant material from a defendant in a criminal prosecution compared to that in civil 
investigations.88 
In relation to information disclosure to support private civil proceedings, the 
position of the CMA is that it will ‘firmly resist’ requests for disclosure of leniency 
material, except where compelled by court order.89 However, the court order of 
disclosure of leniency information has been a point of contention in the European 
Union, which has arguably led to the higher likelihood of disclosure of immunity 
information in the European Union, and potentially the United Kingdom. 
The key case in this respect is that of Pfleiderer90 which concerned a 
customer (Pfleiderer) of the companies involved in a cartel found by the German 
National Competition Authority in the décor paper industry, who sought disclosure 
of leniency documentation pursuant to the German criminal procedural rules to 
prepare a follow-on damages action.91 Access to the entire file was rejected and 
Pfleiderer appealed to the Amtsgericht (Local Court) in Bonn who granted full 
access to the file but sought a preliminary ruling from the European Court of Justice 
(‘ECJ’) as to whether European Union law prevents parties adversely affected by a 
cartel, and seeking damages, from being granted access to leniency applications and 
associated documentation provided pursuant to a leniency agreement.92  
The ECJ ultimately decided that the disclosure of such information requires a 
balancing of the various competing factors on a case-by-case basis, including 
weighing the impact of disclosure on the operation of leniency regimes against that 
of the rights of private claimants to seek damages, to ensure that the rules governing 
                                                
87 Competition and Markets Authority, above n 77, s 7.11; Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 
1996 (United Kingdom) c.25; Criminal Justice Act 2003 (United Kingdom) c.44. 
88 Ibid s 7.12. 
89 Ibid s 7.14. 
90 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt (C-360/09) [2011] All E.R. (EC) 979 (ECJ (Grand Chamber)) 
(‘Pfleiderer’). 
91 Pfleiderer [10]: Gianni De Stefano, 'Access of Damage Claimants to Evidence Arising Out of EU 
Cartel Investigations: A Fast Evolving Scenario' (2012) 5 Global Competition Litigation Review 
95,102. 
92 Pfleiderer [19]-[32]. 
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the right to seek access are not unduly oppressive or excessively difficult.93 
However, the ECJ did not elaborate on the criteria to be used in this ‘balancing 
exercise.’ The Pfleiderer case confirmed that there is no over-arching rule in the 
European Union that prevents the disclosure of leniency documents. Thus, leniency 
applicants will not be able to predict with any degree of certainty whether the 
information they disclose pursuant to the leniency agreement will be disclosed in the 
context of private follow-on actions for damages. The case has generated much 
discussion in relation to information disclosure and has been heavily criticised as 
undermining the effectiveness of the leniency regime due to the case-by-case basis 
nature of the assessment.94  
The Pfleiderer precedent has recently been judicially applied in the National 
Grid95 case in the United Kingdom, where the United Kingdom High Court sought to 
limit the application of the Pfleiderer principle by introducing two factors to be 
considered before disclosure is granted: (1) whether in the circumstances of the case, 
disclosure of leniency evidence would expose the leniency applicants to greater 
liability than those parties that have not sought leniency with the Commission and (2) 
whether disclosure would be proportionate in light of its potential impact on the 
leniency program by considering the relevancy of the documents to be disclosed and 
whether there are other available sources of evidence that are equally effective.96 
As a result of the unsatisfactory and inconsistent positions relating to the 
disclosure of leniency documentation, the European Union Commission issued a 
‘Directive on antitrust damages actions,’ which was signed into law on the 26th 
November 2014.  97 The European Union member states have two years to implement 
the directives.98 
                                                
93 Pfleiderer [30]-[32]; De Stefano, above n 91, 112.	
94 See eg, Charles & Vera Balmain & Coughlan, 'More Haste Less Speed: the Evolving Practice in 
Competition Damages Actions in the UK' (2011) 4 Global Competition Litigation Review 147: The 
Commission submitted observations on the claimant’s application to the High Court regarding the 
importance of safeguarding the operation of the leniency program against disclosure; Laura Guttuso, 
'The Enduring Question of Access to Leniency Materials in Private Proceedings: One Draft Directive 
and Several Court Rulings' (2014) 7 Global Competition Litigation Review 10; Natalie Harsdorf 
Enderndorf, 'The Road After Pfleiderer: Austrian Preliminary Reference Raises New Questions on 
Access to File by Third Parties in Cartel Proceedings' (2013) 34 European Competition Law Review 
78; Piet Jan Slot, 'Does the Pfleiderer Judgment Make the Fight Against International Cartels More 
Difficult?' (2013) 34 European Competition Law Review 197. 
95 National Grid Electricity Transmission Plc v ABB Ltd (2012) EWHC 869. (‘National Grid’) 
96 De Stefano, above n 91, 104. National Grid [30]-[55]. 
97 European Parliament and of the Council, 'Directive Of the European Parliament and Of the Council 
Of On Certain Rules Governing Actions for Damages Under National Law for Infringements of the 
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Articles 6-8 now govern the disclosure of leniency documents and prevent the 
disclosure of a leniency or immunity statement or settlement agreement from being 
disclosed to third parties, otherwise known as the ‘black-list.’99 The Directive 
recognises the important role that leniency policies play in anti-cartel enforcement 
and acknowledge that the disclosure of self-incriminating leniency statements may 
create a disincentive to cooperate with competition authorities.100 However, the 
Directive also recognises that the exemption from disclosure should not unduly 
interfere with injured parties’ rights to compensation, and therefore certain categories 
of evidence included in the file of a competition authority may be disclosed after the 
competition authority has closed its proceedings.101 This includes documents such as 
requests for information, statement of objectives or settlement submissions that have 
been withdrawn. Any documents that fall outside the above categories, including pre-
existing documents that could be attached or referred to in a leniency submission, 
can be disclosed by a court order at any time.102  
It is clear that the intention of the Directive was to reverse the uncertain position 
laid down by the ECJ in the Pfleiderer case, which is why the Directive now 
provides for a total exemption of leniency or settlement statements. However, in an 
attempt to balance the delicate needs of both private and public enforcement, any 
other documents not covered under this exemption could potentially be disclosed.  
It is likely that the impact of the Directive will differ across the European Union 
Member States depending on the interpretation that each member state adopts before 
implementing the provisions into domestic law. In adopting these Directives, the EU 
Member States must give effect to the aims pursued by the rules of the Directive, or 
risk infringement proceedings before the Court of Justice. However, there will still 
remain differences in the context of EU competition law in each of the EU member 
states in areas that the Directive does not seek to harmonise, such as causation and 
collective action.  
                                                                                                                                     
Competition Law Provisions of the Member States and Of the European Union' (2014) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/damages_directive_final_en.pdf>. 
98 See also, Guttuso, above n 29, 41-43. 
99 European Parliament and of the Council, above n 97, Art 6-8. 
100 Ibid [26]. 
101 Ibid [14]. 
102 Ibid Art 6, s 5. 
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 On its face, the Directive strikes a more appropriate balance between the needs 
of third parties obtaining access to information to pursue compensation on the one 
hand and recognising the importance of maintaining confidentiality for leniency 
applicants on the other. It does this by ensuring that disclosure is possible but subject 
to certain safeguards. Whilst the Directive ensures that corporate leniency statement 
and settlement submissions are not to be disclosed, it requires the court to assess 
requests for other documents on a case-by-case basis, having regard to the scope, 
cost and proportionality of the request. This is a more appropriate response to 
address the tension between public and private enforcement then exists in Australia. 
It now remains to be seen how the other European Union member states will 
legislate this Directive and whether it will overcome the uncertainty that has 
permeated this area of the law. 
(c) Canada  
The history of private cartel enforcement in Canada is similar to that of the 
United Kingdom where private enforcement has been plagued by legislative hurdles 
that have made these actions more difficult.103 There is a limited statutory right to 
private action pursuant to s36 of the Competition Act which states that any person 
who has suffered loss or damage as a result of (1) conduct contrary to any of the 
criminal offenses under the Act or (2) the failure of any person to comply with an 
order made under the Act, may bring a civil action against the person who engaged 
in the conduct or failed to comply with the order.104 
 The Competition Bureau clearly states that it will treat the identity of a party 
requesting immunity as confidential, subject to the following exceptions: 
(a) disclosure is required by law; 
(b) disclosure is necessary to obtain or maintain the validity of a judicial authorisation for the 
exercise of investigative powers; 
(c) disclosure is for the purpose of securing the assistance of a Canadian law enforcement 
agency in the exercise of investigative powers; 
(d) the party has agreed to disclosure; 
(e) there has been public disclosure by the party; or 
                                                
103 See eg, Lori Cornwall, Sandra Forbes and Mark Katz, 'Canada: Recent Developments in Private 
Antitrust Litigation' (Private Antitrust Litigation News, 2002) 
<http://www.dwpv.com/images/canadarecentdevelopmentsinprivateantitrustlitigation.pdf> . 
104 Competition Act R.S.C. c. C-34 (1985) s 36. 
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(f) disclosure is necessary to prevent the commission of a serious criminal offence.105 
The policy states that it will only provide confidential information with respect to 
private actions in response to a court order.106 In these situations, the Bureau will take 
all reasonable steps to protect the confidentiality of the information, including by 
seeking protective court orders.107 The FAQ document does not elaborate on this 
provision. To date, there have not been any price-fixing cartel cases that have gone to 
trial in Canada; instead most of the claims have been dealt with by way of 
settlement.108 
Whilst the Bureau will strive to protect the confidentiality of immunity 
applicants, for instance by sealing the applicant’s identity, information provided to 
the Bureau has been made publicly available in the court file once the Bureau has 
executed the search or obtained the civil production order.109 Private litigants have 
used this information to commence civil proceedings against cartel participants, 
including the immunity applicant, including that from affidavits. The Bureau has 
recently indicated that it will seek sealing orders to prevent the early disclosure of 
this information in appropriate cases.110  
Recent court decisions could also impact on the disclosure requirements of 
wiretap information obtained by the Bureau as part of its investigations.111 While this 
may not be a direct concern for immunity applicants, the decision did leave open the 
possibility that non-wiretap evidence may also be subject to disclosure.112 This is 
because the court relied on s29 of the Competition Act, which provides for an 
exemption for disclosure where the disclosure is ‘for the purposes of the 
                                                
105 Competition Bureau, 'Immunity Program under the Competition Act' (Competition Bureau, 7 June 
2010) s H [31].	
106 Ibid [34]. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Michael Osborne and Michael Binetti, International Comparative Legal Guides: Canada - Cartels 
& Leniency 2015, International Comparative Legal Guides (2015) s 8.6. 
109 See R. v. Nestlé Canada Inc 2015 ONSC 810 ‘Nestle’. 
110 Randal Hughes and Emrys Davis, 'Immunity, Sanctions & Settlements: Canada' (Bennett Jones 
LLP, 2014) <http://globalcompetitionreview.com/know-how/topics/79/jurisdictions/7/canada/> s14. 
111 See Imperial Oil v Jacques, 2014 SCC 66; Vincent Rochette, Supreme Court Allows Wiretap 
Evidence to be Disclosed for Purposes of a Class Action Alleging Anticompetitive Practices (October 
2014) NortonRoseFulbright 
<http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/122399/supreme-court-allows-wiretap-
evidence-to-be-disclosed-for-purposes-of-a-class-action-alleging-anticompetitive>; Borden Ladner 
Gervais LLP, Use of Information from Regulatory Investigations in Civil Litigation (21 January 2015) 
Lexology <http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=0ebe4691-a89d-422c-b560-
8f3c4de7cc41>.	
112 Rochette, above n 111. 
 
244 
 
administration or enforcement of the Act,’ to permit the disclosure of the wiretap 
evidence. Arguably, this exemption could be used to permit the disclosure of 
voluntarily submitted information pursuant to the immunity policy and therefore 
erode the confidentiality afforded by the Competition Bureau.  
Issues of disclosure have also arisen in the context of criminal cartel 
proceedings, where it was held by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice that relevant 
factual information proffered to the Crown in order to qualify for immunity is not 
protected from disclosure to accused persons by either solicitor-client or settlement 
privilege.113 
The case concerned chocolate manufacturer Canada-Cadbury (‘Cadbury’) 
which entered into an immunity agreement with the Competition Bureau on October 
19, 2007, as a result of admitting its involvement in the price-fixing of chocolate 
confectionary. Another cartel participant, Hershey, came forward to cooperate with 
the Bureau on a ‘second-in’ basis and received lenient treatment by way of a plea 
agreement and was also granted an immunity agreement for its senior officers and 
employees.  
Pursuant to the Crown’s disclosure obligations to the accused, the Crown 
sought to make disclosure of all required documentation. During this process, the 
Crown provided information to the accused, which should have been protected by 
settlement privilege, seeing as no waiver had been provided in relation to that 
information.114 The Crown asked that the records that were subject to privilege be 
destroyed or returned but the accused refused. The accused argued that they were 
entitled to these privileged documents, and also other material held back by the 
Crown on the basis of privilege.115 
The central issue was whether settlement privilege applied to the information 
in question. If settlement privilege did apply, then the secondary issues to be 
addressed by the court were (i) had the settlement privilege been waived or (ii) was 
there an exception to the settlement privilege such that the accused was entitled to 
the otherwise privileged information.116 
                                                
113 Nestlé 2015 ONSC 810. 
114 Ibid [19]. 
115 Ibid [20].  
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 The court reiterated the common law position in relation to disclosure in 
Canada as set out in R. v. Stinchcombe117 that the Crown must disclose to an accused 
person all information in its possession, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, unless 
the information is ‘clearly irrelevant’ or is protected from disclosure by privilege.118 
The court ultimately held that both arguments in relation to solicitor-client 
privilege and settlement privilege failed. In relation to Hershey’s claim for solicitor-
client privilege, the court considered that any such privilege would have been waived 
when Hershey provided that information to the Bureau in order to obtain leniency. In 
the court’s view:  
Hershey knew that a fundamental purpose of the Leniency Program was to obtain 
information from it that the Crown could use in prosecuting the accused.  With that 
knowledge, Hersey provided this information to the Crown.  That act would suggest either 
that Hershey did not view the information as privileged, or that it was content to waive the 
privilege in order to achieve its goal of receiving lenient treatment.119  
In relation to the arguments regarding settlement privilege, the court could 
find no rationale for the protection of the information provided on this basis. The 
court considered that the purpose of settlement privilege is to encourage parties to 
enter into settlement discussions without fear that their communications could be 
used against them in subsequent litigation. However, in the present case, the 
information in question was sought in the context of criminal proceedings against 
third parties, not Cadbury or Hershey themselves. Therefore, the court could not find 
that the disclosure of such information would result in any prejudice to Cadbury or 
Hershey.  
The court again relied on its previous assertions regarding the aim of 
immunity and leniency policies in general; stating that Cadbury and Hershey would 
have knowledge that any information provided pursuant to their immunity/leniency 
obligations would not be protected from disclosure. This, the court found, was 
evident throughout the entire wording of the immunity and leniency policies and 
therefore there could be no ‘reasonable expectation’ that such information would not 
be disclosed.120  
The court also relied on these arguments to find that even if settlement 
                                                
117 1991 CanLII 45 (SCC), [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326. 
118 Nestle [30]. 
119 Nestle [38].	
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privilege were to be made out, the disclosure of this information pursuant to the 
immunity and leniency policies would constitute a waiver of this privilege.121 The 
court also considered a second exception to the claim of settlement privilege and 
found that disclosure was necessary to accommodate the rights of the accused to 
make full answer and defence, where such rights are protected under the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms and must trump the interest in encouraging settlement. 
 
5 Concluding Remarks on Confidentiality in Multi-jurisdictional Immunity 
Applications 
 
The above analysis in relation to the disclosure of confidential information has 
revealed that the competition regulators in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom 
and the United States will endeavour to keep information provided by immunity 
applicants confidential. However, the ability of the regulators to protect immunity 
information has recently been tested by the courts in a number of jurisdictions, which 
has created a considerable amount of uncertainty in relation to this issue.  
Most evidently, it appears that the rights of disclosure of an accused in a 
criminal cartel trial take precedence over the potential impact that such disclosure 
may have on the incentive to apply for immunity policies. It is important that the 
courts do recognise these important rights and grant disclosure in these cases. As 
demonstrated by the recent Canadian judgment, immunity and leniency applicants 
are fully aware that the information they provide to the competition authorities is for 
the purpose of assisting with the prosecution of those allegedly involved in the 
conduct. By agreeing to the terms of immunity, these applicants cannot have any 
reasonable expectation that the information they provide will not be disclosed at 
some point during the proceedings.  
Moreover, there are those individuals and corporations who have been 
adversely affected by the conduct of the cartel participants and who face significant 
challenges in accessing information to seek compensation for the harm caused to 
them. At present, the ACCC PCI regime, whilst untested, does not seem to offer any 
opportunity for third party access to this information and thus the balance is firmly 
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planted in favour of the cartel participants. The next section will look at ways in 
which the ACCC could seek to rectify the balance by introducing a provision into the 
Immunity Policy that requires that the applicant must make some form of restitution 
to injured parties. 
 
(a) Restitution 
 
As has been demonstrated in the previous section, access of third parties to immunity 
information at least in Australia is plagued with difficulties that ultimately rest with 
the Court’s interpretation of the new PCI scheme. The ACCC have made it clear that 
it will not disclose immunity documents to enable third parties to sue for 
compensation, nor do they indicate any intention of initiating proceedings on behalf 
of these third parties who have been adversely affected by cartel conduct. This is 
compounded by the fact that the ACCC recently had an opportunity to publicly 
discuss the merits of restitution in its most recent review of the policy, but the issue 
was not presented, even within the discussion paper.122  
  Therefore, under the current system, immunity applicants will receive the 
extraordinary benefits of immunity, without any requirement to compensate victims 
for the harm they have caused them. This arguably runs counter to the philosophy 
expected of the ACCC by Parliament when the criminal cartel legislation was 
introduced to ‘disgorge’ cartel members of their ‘ill-gotten’ gains: 
Ordinary consumers can't afford expensive lawyers to ensure that competition is working in 
their interest. That's the job of the ACCC. When this legislation passes the Parliament, the 
commission will have the tools it needs to stand up for consumers against this type of theft.123 
The first version of the ACCC Immunity Policy in 2003 required that 'where 
possible' [the corporation] will make restitution to injured parties.' In August 2005, 
the ACCC set out its reasons for the removal for the requirement of restitution in its 
                                                
122 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, ACCC Releases Discussion Paper in Cartel 
Immunity Policy Review (September 2013) <https://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/accc-releases-
discussion-paper-in-cartel-immunity-policy-review>. 
123 Chris Bowen, Making Jail as Real for Cartels As the Temptation To Steal (November 5 2008) 
Sydney Morning Herald <http://www.smh.com.au/news/opinion/making-jail-as-real-for-cartels-as-
the-temptation-to-steal/2008/11/04/1225560833543.html>. 
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discussion paper.124 The interviewees were asked whether the requirement for 
restitution should be reintroduced as a condition of Immunity. A majority of the 
respondents were thoroughly against this proposition.125  
It is important to note though, out of the participants who were against 
reintroducing the provision, almost all of those generally act in favour of immunity 
applicants and therefore the requirement to pay restitution would come at a cost to 
their clients. This is arguably an important factor in the formulation of their opinion 
on the matter. 
The central arguments against the requirement of restitution as a condition of 
immunity were as follows and each will be addressed in turn: 
1. That the introduction of restitution would create a significant disincentive to 
future immunity applicants and therefore undermine the Immunity Policy; 
2. That is not the role of ACCC to impose restitution upon immunity applicants, 
as civil actions serve that purpose; 
3. That the calculation of restitution is too difficult to quantify. 
Firstly, one of the primary concerns expressed by the interviewees was that 
introducing the requirement of restitution would simply add to the cost-benefit 
analysis of coming forward for immunity and essentially ‘tip the balance’ in favour 
of cost: 
Interviewee: We do have that in our system and we also have representative actions which 
can be by the Commission or on a class action basis.  I think where I sort of land on that is it 
would be a significant disincentive to use the policy if it had a restitution element which was 
insisted upon rather than, you know, one that’s there but never used.  It would be hard for, 
quite hard for our clients to sort of make an upfront determination of a damages amount and 
agree to pay that.  It might be regarded as a dollars and cents matter, you know, what’s the 
fine going to be?  What’s the restitution going to be?  Calculate.  OK.  Calculate.  No.126 
 
This argument is based on the assumption that the added financial burden of 
restitution would dissuade ‘would-be’ applicants from applying for Immunity and 
instead these cartel participants would rather risk the prospect of an action being 
brought against them. Aside from these statements that the immunity applicants 
                                                
124 Caron Beaton-Wells and Brent Fisse, Australian Cartel Regulation: Law Policy and Practice in an 
International Context (Cambridge University Press, 1 ed, 2011) 519.  
125 See Chapter V, Restitution to Third Parties, pg 153. 
126 Interviewee 4 (Sydney, 17th June 2013) 28.	
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‘might be’ deterred from applying, there is no empirical evidence to show that 
immunity applicants ‘have been’ deterred from applying on this basis.  
There currently exists a requirement for restitution in the DOJ's corporate 
leniency program, whereby if it is 'possible, the corporation must make restitution to 
third parties.’127 This requirement is elaborated upon in the FAQ, as it states that, 
where practicable, restitution is required to be paid where conditional criminal 
immunity is granted. According to the FAQ, the requirement for restitution does not 
include foreign effects independent of and not proximately caused by any adverse 
domestic effect.128  
The DOJ has not expressed any concern that the requirement of restitution is 
adversely affecting the operation of their leniency policy; rather the DOJ consistently 
maintains that the leniency policy is ‘the most effective tool in anti-cartel 
enforcement in the world’. It is important to note that the DOJ does not actively 
enforce its restitution requirement; it will accept as a suitable alternative if the 
applicant can show it has made restitution through private litigation.129 Therefore, the 
DOJ does not actively supervise its restitutionary requirement; instead it will take it 
on the faith of the applicant that they have met their obligations by providing that 
affirmation to the DOJ prior to the granting of final immunity. There are no 
publicised cases where the DOJ has refused or withdrawn immunity due to a lack of 
restitution, although there have been instances in high profile cases where the 
company has publicly disclosed its restitutionary amount.130 Clearly, the DOJ could 
enforce this provision more aggressively; particularly because there is no substantial 
evidence that its current requirement for restitution is deterring future leniency 
applicants. This argument is strengthened by the fact that most competition 
regulators in the world have publicly asserted that criminal sanctions are by far the 
most effective deterrent of cartel activity, and is the most significant draw-card for 
                                                
127 Hammond & Barnett, above n 60, Q 3 s 5.  
128 Ibid s 22. 
129 American Bar Association, 'Comments of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law 
in Response to the Canadian Competition Bureau Request for Public Comments Regarding Immunity 
Program Review' (2006) 
<http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/antitrust_law/comments_canadian-
leniency.authcheckdam.pdf> s 6.1. 
130 See, eg, Department of Justice, Bank of America Agrees to Pay $137.3 Million in Restitution to 
Federal and State Agencies as a Condition of the Justice Department's Antitrust Corporate Leniency 
Program (December 7 2010) US Department of Justice <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bank-america-
agrees-pay-1373-million-restitution-federal-and-state-agencies-condition-justice>. 
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Immunity Policies with an active cartel enforcement regime, where criminal 
penalties form part of that regime.131 The ACCC heavily relied on this line of 
argument to support the introduction of a criminal penalty regime for cartel conduct 
in Australia.132  
If these arguments were true, then the introduction of the requirement for 
restitution would not deter immunity applicants from applying, as the predominant 
risk and therefore motivation for seeking immunity is imprisonment. This was 
confirmed by a number of the interviewees.133 These arguments may have been valid 
at the time but arguably the position has since changed materially, given that there 
has yet to be any prosecution for a cartel offence in Australia. 
Secondly, another argument that extenuates the tension between public and 
private enforcement, is that is not the role of the ACCC to facilitate restitution, when 
those who have been adversely affected by cartel conduct can sue for compensation 
by means of private civil actions for damages. This was one of the primary 
arguments put forward by the Canadian Competition Bureau for its removal of the 
requirement in 2006 and supported by the American Bar Association.134  
However, as demonstrated at the beginning of this chapter, the private action 
landscape in the United States and Canada is significantly different from that in 
Australia and although the right to private action does exist, its usefulness is 
currently undermined by the challenges associated with bringing those claims, 
particularly in relation to disclosure.135 As there is no reasonable expectation that this 
position will change in the short term, there is less force to the argument that civil 
damages actions are a sufficient means of cartel compensation. 
                                                
131 See eg, Scott D Hammond, 'Cornerstones of an Effective Leniency Program ' (Department of 
Justice, 2004); Scott Hammond, 'The Evolution of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement Over the Last Two 
Decades' (Department of Justice - ABA Criminal Justice Section and the ABA Center for Continuing 
Legal Education, 2010); Gregory C.  Shaffer and Nathaniel H. Nesbitt, 'Criminalizing Cartels: A 
Global Trend?' (2011) 12 Sedona Conference Journal 1; Julie Clarke, 'The Increasing Criminalization 
of Economic Law – A Competition Law Perspective' (2012) 19 Journal of Financial Crime 76. 
132 See eg, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 'Review of the ACCC's Leniency 
Policy for Cartel Conduct' (2005); Marcus Bezzi, 'The Conduct of Cartel Litigation: The ACCC 
Enforcement Perspective on Serious Cartels – Some Key Issues and Practical Considerations' (Paper 
presented at the Competition Law Conference, Sydney, 23 May 2009 . 
133 Interviewee 7 (Melbourne, 26th April 2013) 18; Interviewee 2 (Sydney, 22nd July 2013) 5; 
Interviewee 9 (Sydney, 15th July 2013) 23. 
134 American Bar Association, above n 129, s 61: ‘Restitution to victims is not an appropriate function 
of a public enforcement agency, in legal systems like Canada’s, where legal procedures for redress 
through civil action are available.’  
135 See eg, Stuart Clark and Christina Harris, 'Class Actions in Australia: (Still) A Work in Progress' 
(2008) 31 Australian Bar Review 63. 
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 Finally, the argument that holds the most significant weight relates to the 
difficulties associated with the calculation of the restitution amount in terms of 
identifying those adversely affected by cartel conduct and how their loss will be 
calculated.136 Presumably, in Australia, the court would ultimately determine the 
amount of restitution to be imposed. Courts have often been tasked with determining 
definitive amounts of money for conduct of an indeterminate nature, particularly in 
contract and tort law.137 If the loss is quantifiable, then an amount is able to be 
calculated even if the process would be difficult.138 It has been asserted that assigning 
this task to the ACCC would overburden an agency already subject to financial 
restraints and finite resources; however the restitutionary requirement could be 
qualified to only providing restitution only ‘where possible,’ as was done 
previously.139 
Alternatively, the ACCC could consider adopting an information sharing 
condition in the Immunity Policy to overcome the difficulties associated with 
calculating restitution and to give third parties a reasonable opportunity to recover 
compensation through damages actions. This information could be in the form of 
identifying or acknowledging any harm caused by the cartel and help with the 
identification of those likely to have suffered loss as a result of the conduct.140 The 
United States has adopted a similar policy in terms of making it a requirement of 
leniency to cooperate with civil plaintiffs in order to have their liability limited to 
‘actual damage’ caused, as opposed to treble damages. Pursuant to the Antitrust 
Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act 2004 leniency applicants must 
provide a full account of the relevant facts and provide reasonable access to 
documents and witnesses: 
(b) Requirements.- Subject to subsection (c), an antitrust leniency applicant or cooperating 
individual satisfies the requirements of this subsection with respect to a civil action described 
in  subsection (a) if the court in which the civil action is brought  determines, after 
                                                
136 See Chapter V, Restitution to Third Parties, pg 153; ACCC, ACCC Position Paper, Review of 
ACCC’s Leniency Policy for Cartel Conduct, 26 August 2005, [87], [97]. 
137 See eg, case examples where the courts have determined damages for an indeterminate nature such 
as wrongful life: Harriton v Stevens (2002) NSWSC 461; Edwards v Blomley (2002) NSWSC 460 
(Unreported, Studdert J, 12 June 2002); Waller v James (2002) NSWSC 42.  
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139 Beaton-Wells and Fisse, above n 124, 521. 
140  Caron Beaton-Wells, 'The ACCC Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct: Due for Review' (2013) 41 
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considering any appropriate pleadings from the claimant, that the applicant or cooperating 
individual, as the case may be, has provided satisfactory cooperation to the claimant with 
respect to the civil action, which cooperation shall include-- 
            (1) providing a full account to the claimant of all facts known to the applicant or 
cooperating individual, as the case may be, that are potentially relevant to the civil action; 
            (2) furnishing all documents or other items potentially relevant to the civil action that 
are in the possession, custody, or control of the applicant or cooperating individual, as the 
case may be, wherever they are located; and 
            (3)(A) in the case of a cooperating individual-- 
                    (i) making himself or herself available for such interviews, depositions, or 
testimony in connection with the civil action as the claimant may reasonably require;  
                and 
                    (ii) responding completely and truthfully, without making any attempt either 
falsely to protect or falsely to implicate any person or entity, and without intentionally 
withholding any potentially relevant information, to all questions asked by the claimant in 
interviews, depositions, trials, or any other court proceedings in connection with the civil 
action; or 
            (B) in the case of an antitrust leniency applicant, using its best efforts to secure and 
facilitate from cooperating individuals covered by the agreement the cooperation described in 
clauses (i) and (ii) and subparagraph (A).141 
This is an example of a comprehensive information sharing provision that 
does place a significant burden on the immunity applicant to comply.142 However, 
there are less onerous conditions that have been explored.143 The basic premise of the 
proposition is to draft a requirement that would enable civil plaintiffs at least the key 
information available to successfully initiate proceedings for cartel compensation. 
The introduction of such a condition would then remove any obligation on behalf of 
the ACCC to calculate restitution, provided the ACCC was satisfied that the 
applicant had provided ‘satisfactory cooperation’ to civil plaintiffs. 
Given that the ACCC has not expressed any desire to reintroduce monetary 
restitution as a requirement for Immunity,144 the implementation of an information 
sharing condition would overcome the difficulties associated with cartel victims 
                                                
141 Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act 2004 Pub L No 108-237, tit II, 118 Stat 
661, 665 [[Page 118 STAT. 667]].	
142 See Eric Mahr and Sarah Licht, 'Making ACPERA Work' (2015) 29 Antitrust 31; Bonny Sweeney, 
'Earning ACPERA's Civil Benefits: What Constitutes "Timely" and "Satisfactory" Cooperation?' 
(2015) 29 Antitrust 37. 
143 Maurice Blackburn, Position Paper for Melbourne Law School Roundtable on Private Enforcement 
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gaining access to compensation and therefore strike a more appropriate balance in 
the role of public and private enforcement. This is also due to the fact that the 
introduction of such a condition could be seen as ‘morally significant’ in terms of 
remedying the harm caused by cartel participants and demonstrating an acceptance of 
responsibility.145 This is a consideration currently missing from the debate 
surrounding restitution and the importance of offsetting the extraordinary benefit of 
immunity by at least ensuring that victims have access to compensation. This is 
especially the case where the ACCC has the power to seek damages for victims 
pursuant to the Competition Act, but does not utilise this power often.146 
 
B Confidentiality Across Borders 
  
In order to combat the global reach of cartel conduct there has been a need for 
increased international cooperation in anti-cartel enforcement. This is well-
recognised in the international community and has been met with strategies to 
harmonise the enforcement efforts across each jurisdiction, reflected in initiatives set 
up by working groups such as the International Competition Network (ICN) and the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).  
An integral aspect of increased international enforcement is the importance of 
information-sharing between competition regulatory bodies that can assist with cartel 
investigations in the affected jurisdictions.  Given the multi-national nature of most 
cartels, this international cooperation is increasingly important and has seen with it 
the proliferation of immunity policies worldwide. The sharing of information 
provided by immunity applicants in the form of waivers has largely been deemed to 
be an effective tool in allowing for the cooperation of the disclosure of information 
between competition agencies.  
However, there remains the risk that increased disclosure on an international 
scale will also increase the risks associated with such disclosure and potentially 
                                                
145 Daniel Faichney, 'Autocorrect? A Proposal to Encourage Voluntary Restitution through the White-
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adversely affect the incentives provided pursuant to immunity policies. There is a 
real possibility that multi-jurisdictional information sharing could undermine the 
confidentiality assurances provided to immunity applicants and reduce its overall 
appeal for future applicants. The risks are even greater when considered alongside 
the difficulties associated with multi-jurisdictional applications, potential third party 
damages actions, and the differences in disclosure requirements that could increase 
the liability of immunity applicants across a number of jurisdictions. 
This section will first briefly analyse the primary information-sharing 
arrangements for cartel investigations available on an international scale, namely: (1) 
formal agreements, such as Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties, Bilateral Competition 
Agreements, and the waiver requirement in Immunity Policies and (2) informal 
arrangements, such as OECD guidelines and ICN working groups. 
This section will focus on the issue most closely related to immunity policies, 
that being the requirement of a confidentiality waiver. The utility of waivers as an 
information sharing mechanism will first be analysed before turning to the risks 
associated with the increased use of waivers in international cooperation. This 
section will conclude that while information-sharing is necessary for coordinated 
global cartel enforcement, the current patchwork approach is exposing immunity 
applicants to risks that may outweigh the current benefits and that the international 
community should seriously consider a more harmonised system. 
 
1 International Information Sharing Frameworks 
(a) Formal Mechanisms – Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MILATS)147 
 
An example of a formal mechanism for international information sharing is 
through the use of MILATS. MILATS are commonly used to compel parties to assist 
others through the provision of obtaining evidence in the possession of the requested 
jurisdiction’s territory for the purposes of assisting with an investigation of the 
                                                
147 For a list of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties with Australia see Attorney-General's Department, 
'Australia's Bilateral Mutual Assistance Arrangements' (Commonwealth of Australia,  
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requesting jurisdiction. Although MILATS are generally drafted individually 
between the respective jurisdictions, there are some common features that include: 
(a) taking testimony and statements in the requested jurisdiction; 
(b) serving process; 
(c) providing documents or records located in the requested jurisdiction; 
(d) executing requests for searches and seizure; 
(e) in some cases, giving any other form of assistance ‘not prohibited by the law of the requested 
jurisdiction’ or ‘consistent with the objects of the treaty.’148 
Although MILATS are an effective way of assisting with information sharing 
given they essentially compel a jurisdiction to provide the assistance required, their 
usefulness is subject to limitations. Most notably, MILATS can only be used in 
criminal investigations, and therefore in the context of cartel investigations, can only 
be used where cartel conduct is an offence. Moreover, MILATS are not specific to 
competition law and therefore the information requests must go through formal 
processes, rather than through the competition agencies themselves.149 This can lead 
to significant time delays where information may be needed quickly, such as in the 
situation where an immunity applicant is simultaneously applying for immunity in 
several jurisdictions. 
The OECD has recognised the usefulness of investigative assistance by way of 
MILAT between the United States and Canada in the Plastic Dinnerware and 
Thermal Fax Paper cases.150 In both cases, the agencies were able to coordinate 
search warrants, share documents obtained by subpoenas, jointly interview witnesses 
and analyse documents, which led to the successful prosecution of these cartels.151  
 
(b) Competition-Specific Bilateral Agreements Between Jurisdictions 
 
                                                
148 International Competition Network, 'Cooperation Between Competition Agencies in Cartel 
Investigations' (International Competition Network - Cartels Working Group - Subgroup 1 - General 
Framework, 2006) 16. 
149 OECD, 'Improving International Cooperation in Cartel Investigations' (Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, 2012) 31; For a discussion of some of the formal processes that an 
information request must go through in Australia see, Michael Pryse, 'Handbook on 
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150 OECD, above n 149, 30. 
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There are two types of bilateral agreements in this section, that being ‘first 
generation’ bilateral agreements and ‘second-generation’ bilateral agreements. 
Essentially, the key difference between the two is that first generation agreements are 
those in which the parties agree to cooperate in relation to competition investigations, 
however there will exist a provision that excludes the disclosure of confidential 
information. Second-generation agreements, on the other hand, will allow for the 
sharing of such confidential information. These agreements are binding at 
international law and have become an established practice between agencies for the 
sharing of non-confidential in relation to cartel investigations.152 Due to the nature of 
international law however, the cooperation afforded by these agreements is largely at 
the discretion of the regulatory agency, who can choose the level of information 
sharing and cooperation they provide.  
A more integrated approach has been adopted by Australia and the United States 
who have entered into an Antitrust Mutual Assistance Agreement,153 which is 
enabled by domestic law and permits information to be provided that would not 
ordinarily be shared by regulatory agencies.154 This is one of the few agreements of 
its kind and allows for the ‘broad assistance in criminal and civil non-merger 
antitrust matters, including the exercise of compulsory power to obtain testimony and 
documentary information.’155 The agreement allows for the sharing of confidential 
information, provided that that information is not disclosed, particularly to third 
parties for the purpose of private actions.156  
 
(c) Informal Information Sharing Frameworks  
 
Although informal information sharing frameworks may not be binding, they 
serve as a vital platform for the sharing of non-confidential information and the 
development of strategies that can lead to more effective harmonisation of 
information sharing processes in general. They offer the opportunity for regulatory 
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agencies, government officials and competition law practitioners to discuss key 
issues relating to cartel investigations and work closely to implement these ideas into 
policy, otherwise known as ‘soft law.’  
A number of international bodies serve this function, such as the OECD, United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), International 
Competition Network (ICN), Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and 
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).  These types of platforms can help 
foster trust between regulatory agencies and lead to better processes of informal 
information sharing between jurisdictions, including providing an opportunity for 
certain jurisdictions to overcome any challenges they may be experiencing.  
One of the key developments in this area has been the drafting of the OECD’s 
Best Practices for the Formal Exchange of Information between Competition 
Authorities in Hard Core Cartel Investigations157 in 2005. The aim of these 
guidelines was to ‘simplify and expedite’ the process for exchanging information to 
allow for the most effective and timely information exchange.158 Most significantly, 
these guidelines recognise the importance of implementing safeguards into 
information sharing frameworks to protect the integrity of these regimes.  
Section B of the guidelines specifically relates to the provision of 
confidentiality, use and disclosure in the requesting jurisdiction, and requires that a 
requesting jurisdiction be aware of the capability of the requested jurisdiction to 
maintain confidentiality in relation to the information.159 The requesting jurisdiction 
must ensure that the privilege against self-incrimination is respected160 and that all 
necessary measures are taken to ensure that unauthorised disclosure does not 
occur.161 There is also a specific provision for the protection of legal professional 
privilege.162 All of these safeguards are integral to ensuring the confidentiality of 
information exchanged between regulatory agencies and as has been shown, is 
particularly pertinent to the operation of immunity policies worldwide. 
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2 The Requirement of Confidentiality Waivers 
 
Over the past decade, the use of waivers of confidentiality in immunity policies has 
largely been deemed a successful information sharing arrangement. In contrast to 
other formal and informal information sharing frameworks discussed above, the 
waiver is specifically used for the sharing of confidential information provided by 
the immunity applicant to other investigating agencies, with the applicant’s express 
consent.163 The scope of the information to be disclosed will depend upon the way 
the waiver is drafted but generally allows for the sharing of confidential information 
obtained from the parties following their immunity application and enables free 
communication of this information between the competent authorities dealing with 
the same cartel.164 
According to the ACCC Immunity Policy, applicants will generally be 
required to provide consent to allow for the sharing of confidential information in 
international matters.165 The ACCC will require the applicant to grant a waiver to any 
jurisdiction where it has or intends to seek immunity in that jurisdiction. Whilst a 
refusal to grant a waiver will not affect the granting of immunity, failure to provide a 
satisfactory explanation may constitute a breach of the cooperation condition of 
immunity, presumably leading to a possible revocation of the Policy.166 The FAQ 
elaborates on some possible situations where an immunity applicant’s refusal to grant 
a waiver may be held to be ‘satisfactory’ which includes: where an immunity 
applicant is not eligible for immunity in those particular jurisdictions;167 or where an 
immunity applicant may be compelled by a law enforcement agency or court of law 
to maintain confidentiality.168 
The Competition Bureau’s requirement for waiver is similar to that of the 
ACCC, by requiring the consent of the applicant before any information is provided 
to a foreign law enforcement agency.169 The Bureau also requires that a refusal to 
                                                
163 International Competition Network, above n 148, s 4.5. 
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165 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission ACCC, 'ACCC Immunity and Cooperation 
Policy for Cartel Conduct ' (2014) [48].	
166 Ibid [49]. 
167 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission ACCC, 'ACCC Immunity and Cooperation 
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grant a waiver must be met with ‘compelling reasons,’ which is seemingly a higher 
threshold requirement than that of the ACCC.170 In contrast to the ACCC, the Bureau 
outlines the scope of the waiver and expects it to ‘cover both substantive and 
procedural information.’171 Moreover, there is an expectation that the waiver is to be 
provided immediately. 
In contrast to the ACCC and the Competition Bureau’s policies, the DOJ’s 
waiver requirement is not outlined in the policy itself; rather it is described in greater 
detail in the FAQ.172 The DOJ reconfirms its commitment to confidentiality in the 
context of its leniency applications and acknowledges the potential disincentive that 
would ensue if an applicant believed the information they provide could potentially 
be used against them in foreign jurisdictions.173 The crux of the provision is 
essentially the same as the ACCC and the Competition Bureau in that confidential 
information will not be disclosed without the consent of the applicant, however it 
does not expressly mention the consequences of an applicant’s refusal to grant a 
waiver.174 
The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) does not expressly state that 
it will seek the consent of a leniency applicant before disclosing information to 
foreign enforcement agencies. Instead, it states that the (CMA) will ‘expect to be 
given 'waivers' of confidentiality so as to be able to discuss appropriate matters with 
those other jurisdiction(s).’175 Similarly to the DOJ, the CMA policy does not state 
what will happen in the event of an applicant’s refusal to grant a waiver but it does 
state that the waiver will generally be ‘limited’ to ‘information that is necessary to 
coordinate planned concerted action such as on-site investigations.’176 There is no 
further elaboration as to what kind of information is generally classified as necessary 
in this scenario. 
The international competition law community has praised the utility of 
waivers of confidentiality in assisting with the timely coordination of cartel 
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investigations between jurisdictions.177 This is particularly the case in the context of 
increased multi-jurisdictional applications for immunity. This praise has been met 
with the development of Waiver Templates by the ICN that serve as a best practice 
model for jurisdictions wishing to introduce the waiver requirement or update their 
existing requirement/s.178 It is believed that the introduction of these waivers has 
saved competition agencies considerable time and resources and will continue to do 
so.179 In a survey conducted by the ICN, one agency stated that the exchanged 
information provided pursuant to the waiver requirement was used for reasons 
including: 
- developing the background, theory and strategy for the case; 
- judging the value and credibility of witnesses;  
- preparing for witness interviews; and 
- support for a court order for a search or document production.180  
Therefore, there is clear support for the use of waivers as a tool for international 
cartel enforcement. However, the risks associated with the increased use of waivers 
and the impact this may have on future immunity applications has received far less 
attention. First and foremost, is the possibility that an immunity applicant may refuse 
to grant a waiver. It is not clear what the consequences of this decision would be. 
Both the ACCC and Competition Bureau recognise this possibility and the ACCC 
Policy states that a refusal to grant a waiver may constitute a breach of the 
cooperation condition of immunity.  
Whilst the waiver requirement is framed as a ‘voluntary’ commitment to provide 
information to foreign authorities, essentially failure to do so could constitute a 
breach of an Immunity Policy. Whilst confidentiality is seen as the bedrock of 
immunity policies in terms of ensuring that applicants have full confidence that their 
confidential information will not be disclosed, it has been asserted that the waiver 
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requirement could potentially ‘swallow’ confidentiality by compelling the disclosure 
of confidential information to foreign authorities.181 
There is a real risk that the information that is shared with a foreign regulatory 
agency will be subject to the discovery requirements in that foreign jurisdiction/s. As 
has been demonstrated in the previous section, such confidential information has 
increasingly been exposed in the context of cartel cases, despite the best efforts of the 
regulatory agency to prevent that disclosure. This is occurring even in the 
jurisdictions thought to have the most protected disclosure regimes, such as the 
United States.  
Therefore, if an immunity applicant is required to grant waivers in multiple 
jurisdictions, there is an increased risk that this information will be publicly disclosed 
in the foreign jurisdiction, which could expose the applicant to third party damages 
actions in multiple jurisdictions.182 This could serve to undermine the incentives to 
apply for immunity in the first place and adversely impact on international cartel 
enforcement.183 
These issues must also be viewed in the context of other international 
enforcement issues, namely the varied and inconsistent immunity policy 
requirements that exist across the globe and the resultant challenges associated with 
simultaneous immunity applications. Although much work has been done at the 
international level to harmonise immunity policies worldwide, there are still 
significant differences in terms of proffer requirements, timelines for the 
establishment of a marker and immunity conditions that an immunity applicant must 
have knowledge of when determining which jurisdiction/s to apply for immunity.184 
This could result in an applicant being granted immunity in one jurisdiction but not 
in another, which makes information sharing between foreign regulatory agencies in 
this context difficult.  
The ICN has recognised that this situation may also discourage the granting of 
waivers, ‘as an undertaking may have to submit more information in one jurisdiction 
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than in another in order to benefit from the respective leniency programmes, and may 
not want this additional information to be revealed to other agencies with less 
demanding leniency programmes.’185 This is exacerbated by the fact that there is no 
universally agreed upon definition of what constitutes ‘confidential information.’186 
Therefore information classified in one jurisdiction as confidential may not be 
deemed confidential in another, leading to the disclosure of that information in the 
foreign jurisdiction. 
Many of the interviewees recognised these difficulties in international cartel 
enforcement and the problems caused by inconsistent immunity policies.187 Some 
interviewees believed that these problems could be overcome by a ‘global immunity 
strategy’ where large multinational law firms coordinate to simultaneously apply for 
immunity in several jurisdictions.188 Some interviewees were of the belief that if you 
hired a ‘good lawyer’ in a large-multinational firm then this is an effective way to 
overcome the difficulties associated with multi-jurisdictional applications.189 When 
questioned further in relation to this, these interviewees acknowledged that smaller, 
or purely domestic firms, would have much more difficulty with this process.190 
The interviewees were also asked whether they believed it was feasible that a 
‘supra-national body’ could be established that would act as the global body for 
immunity marker applications.191 John Taladay suggested that either the European 
Union or United States competition agencies could act as a body for applicants to 
submit a marker for a particular cartel and this marker would recognise their ‘first in’ 
status in all subsequent jurisdictions the applicant applied in by alerting the 
jurisdictions to the fact that a marker had been placed.192 This marker system would 
provide an ‘opt-in’ mechanism for agencies that wished to be included in the global 
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marker system and also provide applicants with the opportunity to select which 
jurisdiction/s they wished to apply for a marker. An applicant would then seek 
immunity in each jurisdiction where it had applied for a marker by the normal 
processes of that jurisdiction. Therefore, there would be no change to the immunity 
requirements in each jurisdiction. 
The notion of establishing a global marker system, like most agreements at an 
international level, has been met with arguments in relation to the protection of 
sovereignty.193 In response to this argument, Taladay asserts that such a ‘marker 
clearinghouse’ would not impede on sovereignty, as it is merely a ‘convergence of 
process, not of legal substance or enforcement prerogative.’194As a result, the 
discretion as to whether or not to grant immunity or the determination as to which 
cartel to prosecute will still rest firmly with the independent jurisdictions, akin to a 
plurilateral initiative. 
In response to the growing importance of these issues, the OECD established a 
Working Group in December 2014 that discussed the feasibility of implementing a 
‘one-stop shop’ for leniency markers pursuant to Taladay’s model.195 The Working 
Group recognised that it would be necessary for participating agencies to reach an 
agreement on the information required to be submitted by the applicant to secure the 
marker. At present, marker requirements can vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
Taladay suggests that the ICN ‘Model Leniency Programme’ should act as the 
proposed model for the marker system, with the following information to be 
provided to secure a marker: 
- The Applicant’s name and address; 
- The basis for the concern which led to the leniency approach; 
- The parties to the alleged cartel; 
- The affected product(s); 
- The affected territory (-ies); 
- The duration of the alleged cartel; and 
- The nature of the alleged cartel conduct.196 
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Another suggestion that has been put forward states that the ICN could act as the 
body to take immunity applications by way of international agreement, in a similar 
framework as that adopted by the patent wide application process in the European 
Union.197 Some interviewees felt that it would be more likely for the ICN to take on 
this role, as many of the jurisdictions that have immunity policies are already 
members.  
In lieu of creating a universal immunity policy, the ICN could act as a body to 
request a marker, in the same way Taladay has suggested, which would recognise the 
‘first-in’ status of the immunity applicant. Once the marker had been recognised, the 
ICN would notify the selected jurisdictions of the applicant’s ‘first in’ status and the 
immunity applicant would seek to submit immunity applications in all of the selected 
jurisdictions. In this model, there would be no need for the development of a 
universal immunity policy, which could be fraught with political difficulties, as the 
applications would proceed as per the normal processes in that jurisdiction. It would 
essentially act as an international marker queue for immunity applications. Although 
this would not overcome the difficulties associated with globally inconsistent 
immunity requirements, it would act as a positive first step towards harmonisation of 
the policies and overcome some of the difficulties of simultaneous immunity 
applications in multiple jurisdictions.   
At a global level, it seems the momentum is growing for the implementation of a 
global marker system and the OECD working group is of the belief that it will 
provide a ‘a more efficient, more effective and more complete approach to seeking 
leniency in multiple jurisdictions for international cartels.’198 However, many of the 
interviewees believed that although this idea may be plausible in theory, in reality the 
political environment would not permit its implementation. As one interviewee put 
it: 
Interviewee: Again, just looking at the experience in relation to other aspect of competition law, 
adjudication enforcement, I think it’s unlikely.  Take for example the experience in relation to 
notification of mergers.  In that context I think there’s an even stronger argument because we’re 
trying to facilitate, you know, conduct that is essentially efficiency and welfare and I’m seeing, 
you know, engenders greater investment in global trade and so on and yet there are these very 
significant regulatory impediments associated with the fact that international mergers or 
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acquisitions will involve parties having to meet different thresholds, different notification 
requirements in multiple jurisdictions.  My work in merger control in the South East Asia region 
we’re now heading towards an economic blueprint in 2015 trying to put together a harmonised 
system competition law in the 10 ASEAN countries suggests that it’s just fanciful that these 
countries with very significant legal, political and economic landscapes are going to be able to 
agree on a uniform notification threshold and requirements.  If it’s so difficult in the context of 
mergers, as I say, where there are clear public benefits associated with having greater uniformity 
and consistency in approaches.  In the context of immunity policies where you are immunising 
self-confessed cartelists from penalties and proceedings, the prospect is even slimmer I think of 
reaching across jurisdictions on those things.199 
The OECD working group felt that the practical implementation measures, 
such as the development of procedures, guidelines and requirements should fall to 
the competition agencies and that the OECD’s role would be to assist agencies in 
understanding the implications of these structures.200 Therefore, the real risk to the 
implementation of a global marker system is the lack of political will from the 
regulatory agencies and/or jurisdictions.  
In light of this, most interviewees were of the consensus that immunity 
policies need to move towards harmonisation by means of ‘natural progression’ in 
the form of continued international discussion and development of best practice 
frameworks.201 This may well be the most likely scenario to occur at this point in 
time. It is important that regulatory agencies take the initiative to discuss a strategy to 
implement the global marker system; as such a step is necessary for the next phase of 
international cartel cooperation. 
 
C Concluding Remarks on Confidentiality and Third Parties: Application of the 
Enhanced Criteria 
 
The role of public and private enforcement in Australian competition law is delicate 
and complex. Clearly, the issues relating the Immunity Policy in this context require 
a considerable degree of consideration in formulating where the balance should lie. A 
strict application of the orthodox DOJ effectiveness criteria fails to appreciate the 
complexity of the issues that arise when public and private enforcement roles 
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intersect. Whilst the non-disclosure of immunity application may lead to greater 
certainty for immunity applicants, and therefore encourage applications, the impact 
that this policy has on the rights of third parties is also significant. Similarly, 
ensuring each domestic immunity regime is serving the needs of the competition 
regulator in that particular country needs to be observed in the greater global 
enforcement context in which it operates. Thus observing the policy in isolation fails 
to appreciate these complex intersections of the law. 
This chapter has demonstrated that there is a greater need for transparency in 
the context of third party access to immunity information. Whilst this requires a 
delicate weighing of competing factors, this chapter has shown that the balance is 
currently weighed in favour of the immunity applicant over that of cartel victims. 
Given the judicial uncertainty in this area, it is recommended that an information 
sharing provision be implemented into the policy to provide a form of restitution to 
third parties. This element of transparency will provide a more appropriate balance, 
whilst still preserving the detection and deterrence aims of the Immunity Policy. The 
United States provides a useful example of this. 
Similarly, the confidentiality of immunity applications in a multi-
jurisdictional context needs to be weighed against the requirement for a coordinated 
global approach to immunity applications. The regulators need to be explicit about 
the risks of disclosure in multi-jurisdictional immunity applications, given the recent 
developments in this area creating uncertainty. Guttoso suggests these measures 
could include ex post evaluations of the ACCC’s handling of investigation, including 
questions such as data handling and document disclosure processes, and being clear 
on the extent to which the ACCC can guarantee the immunity applicant’s 
confidentiality.202 
The ACCC, as an independent statutory authority, needs to be held 
accountable to the public for its decision-making. There are currently no published 
rights of review in relation to the sharing of confidential immunity information with 
other regulators. The sharing of information process is unclear and hence difficult to 
measure. There are no accountability mechanisms in place to prevent the ACCC 
from sharing information with a regulator in which the immunity applicant has not 
been granted immunity. Accountability is intrinsically tied to the notion of 
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transparency. Therefore, the ACCC needs to increase its levels of transparency, as 
outlined above, in order to be held to account for its decisions in relation to 
confidentiality.  
Moreover, the current treatment of third parties seeking immunity applicant 
information for the harm caused by the cartel conduct is inconsistent with the role of 
the ACCC as an institution designed to protect consumers from anti-competitive 
conduct. This is especially due to the fact that the ACCC rarely exercises its power to 
bring proceedings on behalf of those third parties who seek compensation. This is 
inconsistent with the role entrusted to the ACCC.  
Inconsistency in the context of multi-jurisdictional applications is also 
causing a considerable degree of uncertainty for the global anti-cartel enforcement 
scheme. The current patchwork immunity approach results in both immunity 
applicants and third parties unable to effectively navigate the different immunity 
requirements in each jurisdiction. This uncertainty can be overcome with a 
considered, harmonised approach to multi-jurisdictional immunity applications, as 
outlined in this chapter. 
In relation to third party access to immunity information, the ACCC needs to 
ensure that providing such confidential information does not adversely affect the 
aims of cartel detection and deterrence. Thus, its current approach is rationally 
connected to its overall enforcement aims. However, this chapter has demonstrated 
that the ACCC can implement processes to facilitate third party actions without 
compromising its enforcement objectives. This has been shown to work in the United 
States, with the information-sharing requirement.203 This method strikes a more 
appropriate balance of ensuring the enforcement needs of the ACCC are met, but 
also recognising that the rights of third parties to have access to this information is an 
important component of the public enforcement agenda, in terms of rectifying the 
harms caused to consumers at the hand of anti-competitive conduct. 
Similarly, the disclosure of immunity information to overseas regulators is a 
necessary component of a coordinated global anti-cartel enforcement strategy. Every 
immunity applicant must recognise the inherent risks associated with these 
information-sharing mechanisms. However, this chapter has demonstrated that there 
are other measures that are likely to reduce the inconsistencies of the current 
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approach and are arguably more effective at achieving cartel deterrence and detection 
on a global scale. These recommendations are the result of analysing the Immunity 
Policy as part of the wider enforcement context in which it operates with the aim of 
strengthening its current design and operation and should be adopted as a result. 
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VIII ALTERNATIVES TO IMMUNITY 
 
This thesis has thus far demonstrated that the current methodological approach and 
criteria most commonly used to assess the effectiveness of the immunity policy has 
produced a very narrow view of the operation of the policy in reality. By viewing the 
immunity policy in isolation, as one of the ‘single most effective’ methods of cartel 
detection and deterrence, fails to adequately take account of other viable methods to 
achieve these aims.  
Given the number of limitations of the ACCC Immunity Policy that has been 
exposed throughout this research, it is pertinent to analyse other key enforcement 
tools that may serve to complement the existing Policy. As part of the overall 
assessment of the immunity policy, according to the enhanced criteria, it is necessary 
to examine whether these alternative methods are likely to be at least equally 
effective at achieving cartel detection and deterrence as part of the proportionality 
assessment. 
This chapter will first analyse the position of cartel participants who are 
unable to secure immunity, by way of not being the first eligible applicant. The 
ACCC deals with these applicants by way of the Cooperation section of the 
Immunity Policy.1 This approach will be compared to the respective policies in 
Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States to reveal that the current method 
is unsatisfactory and in need of further clarification by the ACCC, especially in light 
of recent case law developments. 
Secondly, this chapter will outline the current whistleblower protection 
provisions that exist in Australia pursuant to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and 
analyse its effectiveness in providing protection for private corporate whistleblowers. 
Given that this Act does not apply directly to cartel conduct, these provisions will be 
compared to the whistleblower protection frameworks that exist in the above 
jurisdictions. This comparative analysis will demonstrate that these whistleblower 
protection frameworks are generally insufficient in providing adequate protection for 
corporate whistleblowers. 
                                                
1 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 'ACCC Immunity and Cooperation Policy for 
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Given these inadequacies, this chapter will analyse the more controversial 
approach of introducing a cartel informant scheme aimed at encouraging third parties 
who are not directly involved in the cartel to reveal pertinent information to the 
regulator in exchange for financial incentives. This analysis will draw upon the 
extensive experience of the United States in relation to these bounty-type 
arrangements and will also focus on the specific cartel informant systems in the 
United Kingdom, South Korea and Hungary in order to formulate a workable model 
for Australia. 
 
A Subsequent Applications for Immunity: Lenient Treatment of ‘Second-in’ 
Cartel Offenders - Australia 
 
Prior to the recent review of the ACCC policy, the treatment of subsequent 
applicants was dealt with pursuant to the ACCC Cooperation Policy (‘2002 
Cooperation Policy’).2 The 2002 Cooperation Policy was intended to provide a 
flexible approach to the treatment of subsequent immunity applicants, that is, any 
person who did not qualify for ‘first in’ immunity. There are a number of factors the 
Commission would have regard to when assessing the appropriate penalty for 
‘second-in’ individuals, namely: 
- The probative value of the evidence provided by the applicant, particularly 
where the Commission was either otherwise unaware or had insufficient 
evident to initiate proceedings; 
- The willingness of the applicant to provide the Commission with full and 
frank disclosure of the relevant Contravention, and evidence in support of 
this, and cooperate with the Commission’s investigation; 
- A requirement that the applicant did not use the same legal representation as 
the firm by which they were employed; and 
- The applicant was not the originator or ringleader of the cartel.3 
The Commission would consider the same factors in its assessment of a 
subsequent corporate applicant, except for three key points of difference. Firstly, 
upon discovery of the cartel, the corporation was required to take prompt and 
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effective action to terminate its participation in the cartel.4 This included taking steps 
to rectify the situation by providing an undertaking of compliance. Secondly, the 
corporation must have been prepared to make restitution, where restitution was 
possible.5 And finally, the corporation must not have had a prior record of breaches 
of the former Trade Practices Act,6 or any related offences.7 
As part of the recent review of the Policy, the ACCC fused the Immunity 
Policy and the Cooperation Policy into a single document, in an attempt to streamline 
the immunity application process.8 Section H of the Immunity Policy essentially 
reiterates the prior position adopted by the ACCC in relation to the treatment of 
subsequent applicants, where the ACCC will make joint submissions to the Court 
based on the cooperation of a party who is not first in.9 Recent case law has 
overturned this practice, which will be discussed below. 
Pursuant to section H, it is not a compulsory requirement that the party 
seeking lenient treatment make an admission of guilt in order to receive lenient 
treatment; instead there ‘may’ be a requirement to make admissions, agree to a 
statement of facts and/or provide evidence in proceedings in respect of the cartel 
conduct.10 This aspect of the policy is not in line with the treatment of subsequent 
immunity applicants in Canada and the United States, where there is a requirement 
that these parties admit their wrongdoing in order to receive lenient treatment.11 A 
subsequent immunity applicant should not be permitted to bypass this requirement, 
as this goes against the spirit of full cooperation in exchange for lenient treatment. 
Failure to admit wrongdoing can also potentially cause difficulties for third parties in 
their action for damages claims. 
As part of the Cooperation policy, it is also possible for the ACCC in ‘rare 
and exceptional circumstances’ to grant full immunity to a subsequent leniency 
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applicant.12 This is also a unique feature of the ACCC’s treatment of subsequent 
applicants. For example, the Canadian policy makes it clear that full immunity will 
only apply to the ‘first-in’ applicant.13 According to the Bureau, this practice 
encourages parties to apply for immunity as soon as possible and not wait for other 
cartel participants, to gauge what they may do, before reporting cartel conduct to the 
Bureau.14 According to this view, granting multiple cartelists full immunity will 
dilute the incentive of applying first and adversely impact on the ‘race’ for immunity. 
Another view would be that it would not be in the interests of fairness and justice to 
allow two parties to a cartel to secure the extraordinary benefit of immunity and this 
should be opposed on moral grounds.15 
The factors that the ACCC will use to assess the extent and value of the 
cooperation provided by the cartelist remained largely unchanged from that under the 
2002 Cooperation Policy. The only additions included a consideration of the 
timeliness of the party seeking to cooperate16 and whether the party had acted in 
‘good faith’ in its dealings with the ACCC.17 Most notably, the assessment as to 
whether the party has sought to provide restitution has been removed.18 
The Cooperation Policy also incorporated a new section that outlines the 
factors that the ACCC would take into account in determining whether to reach an 
agreement on civil penalties to submit to the court, banning orders or other relief and 
the terms of any such agreement: 
(a) the extent and value of the party’s cooperation with the ACCC by reference to the 
factors set out in paragraph 77; 
(b) (for corporate cooperating party) whether the contravention arose out of the conduct 
of senior management, or at a lower level; 
(c) (for corporate cooperating party) whether the corporation has a corporate culture 
conducive to compliance with the law; 
(d) the nature and extent of the party’s contravening conduct; 
(e) whether the conduct has ceased; 
(f) the amount of loss or damage caused; 
(g) the circumstances in which the conduct took place; 
(h) (for corporate cooperating party) the size and power of the corporation, and 
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(i) whether the contravention was deliberate and the period over which it extended.19 
 
In submissions to the ACCC, it was recommended that the ACCC outline 
how a cooperating party would be treated in relation to criminal cartel conduct. As a 
result, Section H subsections 80-84 were implemented to clarify this position. As is 
the case with immunity, prior to recent case law, the CDPP would make a 
recommendation for a reduced penalty for criminal cartel conduct in accordance with 
the Prosecution Policy20 and not Annexure B (which relates solely to the granting of 
immunity for cartel conduct). Similarly to the ACCC, the CDPP had the power to 
make recommendations to the Court who would determine the final penalty in 
accordance with Section 16A(2) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth).  As the CDPP made 
their recommendations based on the Prosecution Policy, the CDPP was required to 
have regard to whether the evidence the party gave was ‘considered necessary to 
secure the conviction of the defendant or is essential to fully disclose the nature and 
scope of the offending and the evidence is not available from other sources’ and the 
party ‘can reasonably be regarded as significantly less culpable than the defendant.’21 
In Australia, the determination of penalties ultimately rests with the court. 
Therefore, prior to recent case law, the lenient treatment of offenders was dealt with 
by way of joint submissions to the court, which either the ACCC or the CDPP and 
the relevant leniency parties had agreed to. In determining whether to reach an 
agreement on penalties, and the terms of such agreement, the ACCC specifically 
would take into consideration a combination of factors listed in the 2002 Cooperation 
Policy on a case-by-case basis.22 Although the court had discretion as to whether to 
accept these joint submissions and the agreed penalty, it was common practice that 
the court would generally accept these agreed penalties.23  
                                                
19 ACCC, above n 1, s 78; recent case law has changed the way the Court will determine penalties for 
cooperating parties (see below).	
20 Commonwealth Department of Public Prosecutions, 'Prosecution Policy of the Commonwealth - 
Guidelines for the Making of Decisions in the Prosecution Process' (Australia's Federal Prosection 
Service, 2014) <http://www.cdpp.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/Prosecution-Policy-of-the-
Commonwealth.pdf>. 
21 Ibid [6.6]; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission ACCC, 'ACCC Immunity and 
Cooperation Policy: Frequently Asked Questions' (2014) Q 41. 
22 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission ACCC, 'Cooperation Policy for Enforcement 
Matters' (ACCC, 2002)2, 3.  
23 See R v MacNeil-Brown (2008) 20 VR 677, 678-701: a majority of the Court of Appeal held that the 
‘making of submissions on sentencing range is an aspect of the duty of the prosecutor to assist the 
court.’ This case stands as authority supporting the practice of the prosecution providing a submission 
about the bounds of the available range of sentences. 
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However, recent case law overturns this long established practice; two cases 
are significant in this respect. The first relates to the High Court decision in Barbaro 
that held that the prosecution was not permitted or required to provide to a 
sentencing judge its view as to the bounds of the range of sentences to be imposed.24 
The court also held that such a penalty submission was not a submission of law, but a 
statement of opinion.25  
The case concerned two appellants who had pleaded guilty to serious drug-
related offences. At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge made it clear that she did 
not wish to hear a submission from any party regarding the sentencing range. As a 
result, the prosecution did not make a submission regarding the range of sentences 
that it considered might be imposed, which was against usual practice.26 The court 
stated: 
The prosecution’s statement of what are the bounds of the available range of sentences is a 
statement of opinion. Its expression advances no proposition of law or fact which a 
sentencing judge may properly take into account in finding the relevant facts, deciding the 
applicable principles of law or applying those principles to the facts to yield the sentence to 
be imposed. That being so, the prosecution is not required, and should not be permitted, to 
make such a statement of bounds to a sentencing judge.27 
 The principles in Barbaro have been confirmed in a number of cases 
following the decision28 with widespread concern that the certainty of agreed penalty 
processes had been undermined or diminished.29 Further, it was uncertain whether 
judges would continue to hear submissions from civil regulators on the appropriate 
penalty, given that Barbaro was a criminal case. 
                                                
24 Barbaro v The Queen, Zirilli v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 58 [6]. (‘Barbaro’) 
25 Ibid [7]. 	
26 This practice was developed predominantly in R v MacNeil Brown (2008) 20 VR 677. 
27	Barbaro v The Queen, Zirilli v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 58 [7].	
28 See, eg, Commissioner for Consumer Protection v Susilo (2014) WASC 50; Australian Competition 
and Consumer Commission v Flight Centre Limited (No 3) (2014) FCA 292; Australian Competition 
and Consumer Commission v Energy Australia Pty Ltd (2014) FCA 336 (distinguishing Barbaro). 
29 See eg, Mirko Bagaric, 'Bad Law Inevitably Leading to Confused Jurisprudence - The Inevitable, 
Regrettable Fallout From Barbaro v The Queen' (2015) 39 Criminal Law Journal 3, Andrew West, 
'Impermissible Submissions on Sentence' (2014) 34 Queensland Lawyer 11; Phillip Priest, 'Crime and 
Justice: Prosectors' Duties in the Wake of Barbaro' (2014) 88 Australian Law Journal 386; Samantha 
Teong, 'Stamping Out Rubber-Stamped Penalties? Determining an Appropriate Judicial Response to 
Agreed Penalties in Civil Penalty Settlements' (2015) 43 The Australian Business Law Review 48; 
Ayman Guirguis, Richard Flitcroft and Asa Lam, Where to Now for Agreed Civil Penalty Outcomes 
Following the CFMEU and Barbaro Decisions? (May 8 2015) 
<http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=4c985974-d688-471b-8f1a-
2f66fec07159&utm_source=Lexology+Daily+Newsfeed&utm_medium=HTML+email+-+Body+-
+General+section&utm_campaign=Australian+IHL+subscriber+daily+feed&utm_content=Lexology+
Daily+Newsfeed+2015-05-11&utm_term=.>. 
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 This issue was addressed by the court in the CFMEU30 decision, where the 
Full Court held unanimously that Barbaro applied in relation to pecuniary penalties 
under the Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act 2005 (Cth), and more 
broadly, in other proceedings where pecuniary penalties are sought by the 
regulator.31 The full court in CFMEU confirmed the decision in Barbaro, stating that 
courts should have: ‘no regard to the agreed figures in fixing the amounts of the 
penalties to be imposed, other than to the extent that the agreement demonstrates a 
degree of remorse and/or cooperation on the part of each respondent.’32 
To this end, the court supported its reasoning by emphasising its unfettered 
discretion in determining pecuniary penalties in both the civil and criminal context 
and that any agreements or submissions as to the quantum or range of penalties was 
no more than an expression of opinion.33 The court also heard evidence from a 
number of Commonwealth regulators, including the ACCC, regarding concerns 
about the uncertainty that will befall regulators who seek to negotiate penalty 
outcomes with applicants via cooperation agreements, such as those dealt with 
pursuant to section H of the ACCC Immunity Policy. It has been suggested that 
parties would be less willing to agree to resolve matters if the regulator cannot assure 
them of any certainty in relation to their potential penalty outcome.34 In response, the 
Court held that these concerns are considerably overstated, and that ‘it is to be the 
inevitable consequence of entrusting the pecuniary penalty process to the 
judiciary.’35 Further, the court did not believe that the consequences of the decision 
would be as ‘dire’ as the regulators suggested and that, if anything, there may be 
some short term expense incurred in cases where the regulators and respondent have 
already identified agreed penalties or agreed ranges.36 
It remains to be seen the effect that these decisions will have on the processes 
adopted by the ACCC to determine the appropriate penalty for subsequent leniency 
                                                
30 Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union 
(2015) 320 ALR 631 at 633. (‘CFMEU’) 
31 Peter Renehan and Peta Stevenson, 'Purity but at What Price: the Application of Barbaro Principles 
to Pecuniary Penalty Proceedings' (Paper presented at the Competition Law Conference, Sydney, 30 
May 2015) 10. 
32 Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union 
(2015) 320 ALR 631 at 633, [3]. 
33 Ibid [241]. 
34 Renehan and Stevenson, above n 31, 22-23. 
35 Ibid 701, [242]. 
36 Ibid [239].	
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applicants. It is likely to create considerable difficulty for any cartel participant to 
ascertain their potential penalty before approaching the ACCC, or even after 
discussions with the ACCC. The leniency applicant will not have the same level of 
certainty that the ACCC was able to offer in the past and any discount they may 
receive as a result of their cooperation will rest firmly with the court. As will be 
demonstrated below, this practice is out of line with the treatment of leniency 
applicants in Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States. In particular, this 
decision may adversely impact on the Immunity Policy, as there will be an even 
stronger incentive to be the ‘first-in’ applicant if leniency applicants decide to contest 
facts rather than cooperate with the ACCC. This may lead to an even greater reliance 
on the immunity applicant’s evidence, which has been shown in Chapter VI to be 
problematic.37  
The Commonwealth applied to the High Court for special leave to appeal 
the CFMEU decision. Special leave was granted to the Commonwealth on 18 June 
2015 and the appeal is likely to be heard in October 2015. Thus, it is too early to tell 
what the full implications will be for the ACCC Immunity Policy. There is some 
suggestion that the parliament may seek to intervene by way of a legislation solution, 
which could address the procedure as to how regulators seek pecuniary penalties.38 
Alternatively, it may be more suitable to implement delegated legislation that could 
introduce guidelines for the assessment of pecuniary penalties, which seeks to 
‘provide parties and the Court with a common starting point for assessment, thereby 
potentially reintroducing a degree of certainty to the resolution of pecuniary penalty 
proceedings.’39 This process would not be far from the process that existed prior to 
the CMFEU decision, where the ACCC would consider a number of factors in its 
assessment of the penalty to recommend to the court. Thus, this solution may serve 
as an appropriate middle ground. An analysis of the treatment of second and 
subsequent immunity applicants in Canada, the United Kingdom and the United 
                                                
37 See Chapter VI, The Credibility Of Accomplice Evidence, pg 203. See also Ayman Guirguis, Sarah 
Godden and Asa Lam, ACCC v Chopra: Penalty Submissions in the Aftermath of CFMEU and 
Barbaro (25 July 2015) Lexology <http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c501c886-f1f7-
4a2f-b37d-4a5740d73d3f&utm_source=Lexology+Daily+Newsfeed&utm_medium=HTML+email+-
+Body+-
+General+section&utm_campaign=Australian+IHL+subscriber+daily+feed&utm_content=Lexology+
Daily+Newsfeed+2015-07-28&utm_term=>. 
38 Renehan and Stevenson, above n 31, 27; Mirko Bagaric, 'The Need for Legislative Action to Negate 
the Impact of Barbaro v The Queen' (2014) 38 Criminal Law Journal 133. 
39 Renehan and Stevenson, above n 31, 27.	
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States will reveal the starkly different position in Australia as a result of these recent 
court decisions. This will exacerbate the uncertainty that permeates this area of 
competition practice. 
 
1 Lenient Treatment of Subsequent Applicants Abroad 
This section will outline the position of subsequent immunity applicants in 
Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom before turning to an analysis of 
the key similarities and differences between the regimes, namely (1) the timeliness of 
a leniency application versus its probative evidence (2) the calculation of the 
discount afforded to those not ‘first-in’ and (3) flexibility v fixed cooperation 
discounts. 
 
(a) Canada 
There are three primary conditions of eligibility for leniency in Canada, 
where the Bureau will make a recommendation for leniency in sentencing to the 
Public Prosecution Service of Canada (‘PPSC’) for an individual or business 
organisation that agrees to: 
(a) terminate its participation in the cartel; 
(b) agrees to cooperate fully and in a timely manner, at its own expense, with the Bureau’s 
investigation and any subsequent prosecution of the other cartel participants by the 
PPSC; 
(c) Agrees to plead guilty. 40 
The first step in the process for determining the appropriate penalty to 
recommend to the Court will be to formulate a ‘leniency discount.’ The Court 
determines the final penalty for leniency applicants but, unlike the position in 
Australia post-Barbaro, the Competition Bureau provides a comprehensive 
breakdown of the process by which it undertakes in formulating its sentencing 
submission to the Court, which the court will generally accept.41 The Bureau will 
determine the leniency discount by ascertaining ‘a proxy of 20 percent of the cartel 
                                                
40 Competition Bureau, above n 11, s 3[3.1][9].	
41 Ibid s 2.3(7): ‘The determination of the sentence to be imposed is at the sole discretion of the court, 
and a judge is not bound by a joint sentencing submission.’  
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participant’s affected volume of commerce in Canada.’42 The determination of the 
proxy amount is supplemented in the FAQ document.43 
The discount that an applicant may be eligible for is tiered: with the first 
leniency applicant being eligible for a 50 per cent reduction of the fine that would 
have otherwise been recommended; the second is eligible for a 30per cent reduction 
and any subsequent applicants after the second will be determined on a case-by-case 
basis and this will significantly depend on the timeliness of the application.44 The 
Policy also clearly outlines that the PPSC will have regard to mitigating and 
aggravating factors when determining the base level fine proxy in accordance with 
the Criminal Code.45 
Most importantly, when determining whether to charge a participant, the 
Bureau will have regard to the individual’s role and extent of involvement in the 
offence (as a cartel instigator or coercer); the degree to which the participant 
benefited from the offence; and whether the individual is a recidivist or has a 
criminal record.46 The policy also states that the aforementioned factors will be 
considered when recommending imprisonment and notes that the recommendation of 
prison sentences for subsequent applicants is increasing.47 These are significant 
considerations pertaining to the culpability of the cartelist that expressly recognise 
the possibility of imprisonment for subsequent applicants.  
The Policy comprehensively outlines the step-by-step approach taken by the 
Bureau to process a leniency application, commencing with an initial contact or 
marker request, through to the conclusion of Court proceedings.48 Importantly, the 
Policy indicates what will occur in the event that an applicant seeks to withdraw 
from the leniency program and states that any information provided to the Bureau up 
until that point ‘will not be used directly against it (the leniency applicant) and will 
be treated as either confidential or settlement privileged.’49 The Bureau provides the 
same level of detail for its leniency applicants as it does for immunity applicants and 
                                                
42 Ibid s 3.3. 
43 Competition Bureau, 'Leniency Program: Frequently Asked Questions' (Competition Bureau, 2010) 
Q 24.	
44 Ibid s 303 [15].  
45 Criminal Code, RSC, 1985, c C-46, s 718, 718.1, 718.2. 
46 Competition Bureau, above n 43, Q 30.  
47 Ibid.  
48 Competition Bureau, above n 11, s 3.7.  
49 Ibid s 4 [34].	
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therefore the process for the determination of penalty for subsequent applicants is 
transparent. Despite the fact that the determination of penalty still rests with the court 
in Canada, the treatment of subsequent immunity applicants by the Bureau is far 
more predictable then the position in Australia post-Barbaro.  
 
(b) The United Kingdom 
In contrast to the Competition Bureau, the CMA does not have a separate 
policy for the lenient treatment of subsequent immunity applicants. Instead, an 
applicant will be eligible for ‘Type C leniency’, which may include: 
(a) Discretionary reductions in corporate penalties of up to 50 per cent; and/or 
(b) Discretionary criminal immunity to specific individuals; and 
(c) Protection from director disqualification proceedings for all directors of the undertaking 
(if a reduction in corporate penalty is granted).50 
In order to be afforded lenient treatment by the CMA, an applicant must show 
that the information they have provided will ‘add significant value to the CMA’s 
investigation;’ meaning that is must ‘genuinely advance the investigation.’51 Contrary 
to the ACCC and the Competition Bureau, the CMA expressly recognises that a 
delicate consideration of two competing factors needs to be undertaken when 
considering the grant of lenient treatment, that being: the value of gaining additional 
information versus the consequences of granting leniency to multiple parties in a 
single investigation.52  
In this vein, the Policy states that where the CMA already has sufficient 
evidence to establish the existence of the reported cartel activity, it is ‘highly 
unlikely’ that leniency will be granted, unless it is in the public interest to do so.53 As 
a result, a subsequent applicant may not be informed of whether they will be treated 
leniently until much further along in the investigation, or may in fact, not be granted 
leniency at all.54  
                                                
50 Competition and Markets Authority, 'Applications for Leniency and No-Action in Cartel Cases - 
Detailed Guidance on the Principles and Process' (Competition and Markets Authority, 2013) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284417/OFT1495.pdf
> s 2.25. 
51 Ibid s 2.26. 
52 Ibid s 2.27. 
53 Ibid s 2.31. 
54 Ibid s 2.42, 2.43; OECD, above n 15, 8.  
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Thus, there is clearly less certainty that a subsequent leniency applicant will 
be afforded any lenient treatment at all by the CMA, in comparison to the practice of 
the ACCC and the Competition Bureau. However, at the expense of certainty, the 
CMA has established an important threshold: that leniency applicants should at a 
minimum, provide evidence that will advance the cartel investigation, not simply act 
as a method by which all cartel participants receive discounted sentences regardless 
of the evidence they provide. 
Whilst the CMA policy is not as specific as the Bureau’s, it states that Type C 
applicants can generally expect to receive discounts in the 25-50 per cent range.55 
The CMA policy also states that the queue position of leniency applications is not 
decisive. Thus, an applicant who is third in the queue may receive a discount greater 
than an applicant who was second to apply. 
In contrast to the ACCC and Competition Bureau policies, the CMA policy 
does not list the factors relevant to the assessment of a leniency discount, except for 
the overall guiding principle that the evidence adds significant value to the CMA’s 
investigation. This provides little guidance as to the other mitigating and aggravating 
factors that should be pertinent to this assessment. Further to this and similarly to the 
ACCC, there is a general lack of information regarding the process by which a 
leniency application will be dealt with.56 
 
(c) The United States 
The United States does not have a formalised leniency policy for subsequent 
applicants. In contrast to the aforementioned policies, the method by which 
subsequent immunity applicants are dealt with by the DOJ is entirely absent from its 
policy and FAQ document. Instead, the approach taken can be pieced together with 
the aid of other DOJ documents, namely ‘Measuring the Value of Second-In 
Cooperation in Corporate Plea Agreements’57 and ‘The United States Model of 
Negotiated Plea Agreements: A Good Deal with Benefits for all.’58 The DOJ leniency 
policy or the FAQ should at least reference these articles, or they should be 
                                                
55 Competition and Markets Authority, above n 50, s 6.9. 
56 The ACCC will need to rethink its handling of leniency applications post Barbaro.	
57 Scott Hammond, 'Measuring the Value of Second-In Cooperation in Corporate Plea Negotiations' 
(U.S Department of Justice, 2006). 
58 Hammond, above n 11. 
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incorporated/annexed onto these documents to help improve the process by which 
subsequent applicants are dealt with by the DOJ. 
In a similar vein to the CMA Policy, the DOJ acknowledges the criticisms 
that have been levelled at the concept of ‘plea bargaining’ and asserts that in the 
context of corporate plea agreements, the benefits outweigh the potential negative 
consequences of such a practice.59 Furthermore, the DOJ makes it clear that its 
position is not to outline fixed discounts for lenient treatment, as this would serve to 
undermine the need for proportionality in the assessment of lenient treatment for 
subsequent offenders.60 
Similarly to the Competition Bureau, the DOJ is willing to adjust the fixed 
amount of commerce affected to set a base rate for the determination of a penalty. 
The base rate will differ depending on whether the applicant was first-in or 
approached the DOJ subsequently. However, if the leniency applicant provides 
information that indicates the cartel conduct was broader than initially anticipated, a 
leniency applicant’s fine will not be increased as a result of this new information.61 
In addition to this, the DOJ will generally offer a ‘cooperation discount’ that 
seeks to reflect the overall value of the cooperation provided by the subsequent 
applicant.62 On average, the second-in applicant can expect to receive a discount in 
the range of 30-35 per cent from the bottom of the Guidelines fine range. Subsequent 
applicants can expect to receive a substantially smaller discount. 
The two primary considerations the DOJ will take into account when 
determining the ‘cooperation discount’ will be related to the timing of the application 
and the significance of the evidence provided by the applicant. To help practically 
illustrate how the DOJ considers these key factors, the DOJ provides a relevant case 
example of a leniency applicant who provided ‘extraordinary cooperation’ and 
secured a 59 per cent discount as a result. In this respect, the DOJ’s aim is to increase 
the awareness of how it will consider the timing and significance of the evidence 
when assessing the cooperation discount, which is pertinent to the transparent 
operation of the policy. 
                                                
59 Ibid 3. 
60 Hammond, above n 57, 3. ‘Measuring the value’ 
61 Ibid 5. 
62 Ibid 6. 
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Further to this, the DOJ has provided Model Plea Agreement Templates that 
outline the standard form and terms that a leniency applicant will be required to 
agree to, even prior to approaching the DOJ.63 This model agreement is a unique 
feature of the United States plea negotiation system. Although a potential subsequent 
applicant may not be able to ascertain with certainty the level of base rate fine or 
cooperation discount they may receive, the DOJ document provides a detailed 
breakdown of how the process is likely to proceed. As a result of the 
Barbaro/CFMEU decisions, the process of dealing with subsequent leniency 
applicants by the ACCC is now starkly different. It would not be possible for the 
ACCC to seek to design and implement a Model Cooperation Agreement to ensure 
that the rights and obligations pursuant to a cooperation agreement are fair and 
transparent. The ACCC is thus out of step with international practice in its treatment 
of subsequent immunity applicants. It remains to be seen whether this will reduce the 
number of immunity/leniency applications in Australia. 
 
2 An Assessment of the Key Components of Cooperation for Subsequent 
Applicants 
Pursuant to the preceding analysis of the treatment of subsequent applicants in 
Canada, United Kingdom and United States, there are three primary components of a 
leniency regime, which each jurisdiction has adopted to differing extents. In contrast, 
as a result of recent case law, the process in Australia stands in stark contrast. Given 
the widely different approach the ACCC will need to adopt in its treatment of second 
and subsequent applicants, it is out of line with current international practice. 
Cooperating parties in Australia have been stripped of the certainty that competition 
regulators claim is crucial to the operation of the Immunity Policy. As a result, the 
ACCC may find that parties who are not ‘first-in’ and granted full immunity, may 
not come forward at all, adopting a ‘wait and see’ approach. This will make it more 
difficult for the ACCC to gather evidence in relation to the cartel’s operation, as the 
                                                
63 See, Department of Justice, 'Model Corporate Conditional Leniency Letter' (Department of Justice - 
Antitrust Division, 2008) <http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/criminal/239524.htm>; Department of 
Justice, 'Model Individual Conditional Leniency Letter' (Department of Justice - Antitrust Division, 
2008) <http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/criminal/239526.htm>.	
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ACCC heavily relies on evidence gathered by way of cooperation to support its 
cases.  
The first component of leniency policies abroad relates to the key 
considerations of leniency, namely the timeliness of the application versus the 
probative value of the evidence provided by the applicant. In Canada and the United 
States, the emphasis is seemingly weighed in favour of the timeliness of the 
application, where the first-in applicant will generally be granted the highest eligible 
discount; with a tiered discount determination based on a queue. This is particularly 
emphasised in Canada, whereby the marker system acts as an indicator of the queue 
by which leniency is sought. These jurisdictions justify this approach by emphasising 
the need for timely action on behalf of leniency applicants in cartel investigations. 
In contrast, Australia and the United Kingdom place more emphasis on the 
probative value of the evidence provided by the applicant and recognise that a ‘third-
in’ applicant may provide more significant evidence than a ‘second-in’ applicant and 
this should be reflected in a greater discount recommendation. The ACCC has 
acknowledged that potential immunity or leniency applicants may continue to engage 
in beneficial cartel conduct for as long as possible on the expectation that they will 
be able to obtain a reduced penalty pursuant to the leniency program if the cartel is 
reported.64 The ACCC believes that ‘by basing the degree of leniency upon the level 
of cooperation provided by the cooperating party rather than order of application, this 
risk is minimised,’65 however it is unclear whether the court will adopt the same 
position. 
In this respect, it is important that competition regulators recognise that both 
the timeliness of the application and its probative value are equally important 
considerations, and that both carry with them the risk of strategic manipulation. The 
regulators should question the motivations for seeking leniency and the surrounding 
circumstances that led to a granting of leniency to ascertain whether there was any 
intention, or possible attempt, at strategically manipulating the leniency policy in this 
regard. 
The second component relates to the provision of an Amnesty Plus regime, 
where leniency applicants will be granted immunity, subject to conditions, for a new 
                                                
64 OECD, above n 15, 13. 
65 Ibid 24.	
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and undisclosed cartel offence, in addition to lenient treatment for the existing cartel 
offence. All of the relevant jurisdictions have adopted a similar Amnesty Plus 
program. The Amnesty Plus regime is perceived as a resource efficient way of 
securing information for a new offence and thereby aiding in the detection of cartel 
conduct.66 
The final component relates to the discount stipulated for lenient treatment. 
Canada and the United States provide a discount range for leniency applications. 
Whilst the United Kingdom is less clear about the discount range, Australia does not 
stipulate a discount range at all. Post-Barbaro this may not even be a possibility for 
the ACCC. There are those jurisdictions, such as Japan and the European 
Commission that provide a very specific calculation of penalty regime for leniency.67 
Whilst Canada and the United States do not go this far, these jurisdictions assert that 
the stipulation of penalty amount or a discount range provides the requisite 
transparency and predictability necessary for the ‘optimal functioning’ of leniency 
programs.68 For instance, the DOJ utilises the Crompton case to illustrate the 
operation of the plea agreement system.69 
In contrast, jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom, emphasise that the 
‘uncertainty’ associated with an undisclosed discount amount extenuates the ‘race for 
leniency;’ thus the cooperation discount can be tailored to the particular facts of a 
case.  
The stipulation of discount ranges would strike a more appropriate balance by 
ensuring that the process by which leniency is determined is transparent, but not so 
predictable so as to undermine the operation of immunity policies or allow for 
strategic manipulation of the policy. The ability to exercise discretion in this sense 
should be allowed, but the competition regulators should also remain vigilant of the 
fact that providing significant penalties for all cartel participants means that cartelists 
will essentially know that they can engage in cartel conduct and can expect a reduced 
sentence in return, if not full immunity. 
                                                
66 International Competition Network, 'Anti-Cartel Enforcement Manual: Chapter 2: Drafting and 
Implementing an Effective Leniency Policy' (International Competition Network, May 2009) s 2.5.2. 
67 OECD, above n 15, 7. 
68 Ibid. 
69 United States v. Crompton Corp., 399 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2005). 	
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Most importantly, the recent court decisions in relation to the calculation of 
penalty discounts in Barbaro and CFMEU marks a new challenge for the ACCC in 
the determination of penalty amounts. The long held process of the court accepting 
the ACCC agreed penalty amount has now been overturned. It is possible that there 
will now be inconsistency, and therefore great uncertainty, as to whether the court 
will accept the ACCC or CDPP’s penalty recommendations. This may have an 
adverse impact on the ability of cartel participants to assess their position in relation 
to cooperation, which may result in the adoption of a ‘wait and see’ approach. It 
remains to be seen whether the court will continue to disregard the agreed penalty 
outcomes when the decision goes to the High Court in October. The position of 
subsequent immunity applicants in Australia is thus in a state of flux. 
 
B Whistleblower Protection  
 
Whistleblowers have been an integral part of the detection of misconduct 
throughout history. It is said to be the internal position of the individual in the 
organisation that generally leads them to become aware of internal wrongdoing. 
However, it is this very position that can expose them to unfair outcomes or immense 
pressure to remain silent.70 Although there is no universally accepted definition of a 
‘whistleblower,’ one widely held view in Australia is that it relates to 'the disclosure 
by an organisation's members (former or current) of illegal, immoral or illegitimate 
practices under the control of their employers to persons that may be able to effect 
action'.71 Generally, the misconduct relates to serious wrongdoing, such as fraud, 
health and safety violations and corruption. Since cartel conduct is also serious 
wrongdoing, it is important that whistleblower protection is considered as another 
enforcement strategy, in addition to immunity. 
In the wake of large corporate collapses, such as Enron in 2001, and more 
recently the corporate misconduct that led to the Global Financial Crisis, there has 
been a greater focus on the role of the whistleblower in the detection of such 
                                                
70 A J Brown, 'Towards 'Ideal' Whistleblowing Legislation? Some lessons from Recent Australian 
Experience' (2013) 2 E-Journal of Internation and Comparative Labour Studies 4, 6. 
71 Janine Pascoe, 'Corporate Sector Whistleblower Protection in Australia - Some Regulatory 
Problems and Issues' (2008) 22 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 82, 82. 
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misconduct.72 The value of the whistleblower in the detection of corporate 
wrongdoing is reflected in a number of studies that indicate that whistleblowers are a 
significant source of fraud detection.73  
The importance of whistleblowers has also been recognised by the OECD in 
its revised (2004) Principles of Corporate Governance, which states that:  
Stakeholders, including individual employees and their representative bodies, should be able 
to freely communicate their concerns about illegal or unethical practices to the board and 
their rights should not be compromised for doing this.74 
This OECD statement also reflects the inherent risks faced by whistleblowers 
in attempting to reveal corporate wrongdoing. Absent protection, whistleblowers are 
faced with the prospect of heavy employer retaliation, leading to the loss of their 
jobs, immense distress and possibly even resulting in being blacklisted from the 
industry. These are real risks that whistleblowers must consider when deciding 
whether to reveal the corporate misconduct they have discovered. This can often lead 
to whistleblowers being deemed to be ‘traitors’ or ‘rats’ which brands them as 
dishonest or disloyal employees. 
Recognising the value of corporate whistleblowers and these inherent risks, 
governments around the world have sought to protect whistleblowers by enacting 
legislation, to differing degrees, that is aimed at preventing or compensating the 
whistleblower for the retaliation they may face after they have blown the whistle. 
This chapter will outline the whistleblower protection frameworks for corporate 
whistleblowers that exist in Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom and 
                                                
72 See, eg, Peter Yeoh, 'Whistleblowing: Motivations, Corporate Self-Regulation, and the Law' (2014) 
56 International Journal of Law and Management 459, 460-461; Stijn Claessens and Laura Kodres, 
'The Regulatory Responses to the Global Financial Crisis: Some Uncomfortable Questions' 
(International Monetary Fund - Research Department and Institute for Capacity Development, 2014) 
11-12. 
73 See eg, Matt Vega, 'Beyond Incentives: Making Corporate Whistleblowing Moral in the New Era of 
Dodd-Frank Bounty Hunting' (2012) 45 Connecticut Law Review 483, 489; Geoffrey Christopher 
Rapp, 'Four Signal Moments in Whistleblower Law: 1983-2013' (2013) 30 Hofstra Labor and 
Employment Law Journal 389, 389; William E Kovacic, 'Private Monitoring and Antitrust 
Enforcement: Paying Informants to Reveal Cartels' (2000-2001) 69 George Washington Law Review 
766, 774; Janine Pascoe and Michelle Welsh, 'Whistleblowing, Ethics and Corporate Culture: Theory 
and Practice in Australia' (2011) 40 Common Law World Review 144, 145; Vivienne Brand, Sulette 
Lombard and Jeff Fitzpatrick, 'Bounty Hunters, Whistleblowers and a New Regulatory Paradigm' 
(2013) 41 Australian Business Law Review 292, 292-293. 
74 Pascoe, above n 71, 2; OECD, 'OECD Principles of Corporate Governance' (Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, 2004) 
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf> s IV(e); See also OECD, 
'Whistleblower Protection: Encouraging Reporting' (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, 2012) <http://www.oecd.org/cleangovbiz/toolkit/50042935.pdf>. 
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Canada to demonstrate how these protections have largely been deemed ineffective 
at protecting whistleblowers. It is important to note that this chapter will focus on the 
protection afforded to private or corporate whistleblower provisions, as these 
protections are most relevant to the context of cartel whistleblowers. 
This analysis will also reveal that there is a lack of specific whistleblower 
protection for the detection of cartel conduct by third parties, particularly in 
Australia. Much of the scholarly attention has been focused on the role of immunity 
and leniency policies in anti-cartel enforcement, without recognising the important 
role that third party whistleblowers can also play, given that whistleblowers are a 
significant source of detection of corporate misconduct. Arguably, those who have 
not been involved in the cartel should be afforded greater protection than those who 
are granted immunity, as third party whistleblowers have generally not committed 
any wrongdoing. 
This section will conclude by outlining the steps that need to be taken by the 
Australian Government to legislate for the protection of cartel whistleblowers before 
proceeding to a more controversial analysis of the value of implementing a financial 
incentive or ‘bounty system’ in Australia, to further aid in the detection of cartel 
conduct. 
 
3 The Position in Australia  
As part of the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program 9 ('CLERP 9') reforms, 
specific whistleblowing provisions were introduced into the Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth) in 2004, with the insertion of Part 9.4AAA entitled 'Protection for 
Whistleblowers'. Section 1317 AA stipulates that protection will be extended to: 
(i) an officer of a company; or 
(ii) an employee of a company; or 
(iii) a person who has a contract for the supply of services or goods to a company; or 
(iv) an employee of a person who has a contract for the supply of services or goods to a 
company. 
Pursuant to this provision, a ‘discloser’ will only receive protection where the 
disclosure is made to either:75 
(i) ASIC; or 
                                                
75 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1317AA(b). 
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(ii) the company's auditor or a member of an audit team conducting an audit of the company; 
or 
(iii) a director, secretary or senior manager of the company; or 
(iv) a person authorised by the company to receive disclosures of that kind. 
 
Subsection C stipulates that a discloser is required to disclose their identity prior 
to revealing the disclosure. Subsection D requires that the discloser must have 
‘reasonable grounds’ to believe that the company, or officer or employee of that 
company, has, or may have, contravened a provision of the Corporations Legislation. 
Subsection E requires that the disclosure must have been made in ‘good faith’. 
The proceeding sections in the Act outline the protections that are afforded to 
the informant in the form of: being exempt from civil and criminal liability,76 being 
able to be reinstated if the discloser’s employer terminates the employment on the 
basis of the disclosure77 and also prohibits the victimisation of the discloser.78 If the 
court is satisfied that the person has contravened these provisions and the victim has 
suffered detriment then that person is liable to compensate the victim for the 
damage.79 
These whistleblower provisions have attracted widespread criticism, particularly 
due to their narrow application. The primary criticisms are as follows: 
(a) The Application of the Act – Who the Provisions Protect 
Most notably, the definition encompassed within the section does not extend to 
former employees, whom can provide vital information in relation to the corporate 
misconduct.80 The fact that they are no longer employed by the organisation may 
very well be due to the employee’s attempts to reveal or resolve the misconduct, 
which is why protection should be extended to former employees. This definition sits 
in direct contrast to the recently enacted Public Disclosure Act 2013 (Cth), relating to 
the disclosure of public wrongdoing, where the definition does extend to former 
public officials.81 
                                                
76 Ibid s 1317AB(1)(a).  
77 Ibid s 1317AB(3). 
78 Ibid s 1317AC.	
79 Ibid s 1317AD. 
80 Sulette Lombard and Vivienne Brand, 'Corporate Whistleblowing: Public Lessons for Private 
Disclosure' (2014) 42 Australian Business Law Review 351, 355. 
81 s 7(1)(a). 
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(b) The Scope of the Conduct to Which the Provisions Relate  
One of the most significant criticisms of the whistleblower provisions is that the 
nature of the disclosure can only relate to a contravention of the Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth). For the purposes of this thesis, this means that a third party 
whistleblower that detects cartel conduct within a corporation will not be protected 
by these provisions, due to their extremely narrow application. As will be discussed 
below, this narrow definition is not in line with other international standards, 
particularly that in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act82; an Act that extends to cases of 
corporate fraud, or the Bill currently before the United States legislature that 
specifically includes disclosure of cartel conduct.83 The public disclosure provisions 
in Australia have a wider application, and extend, for example, to the contravention 
of any law; conduct that perverts the course of justice; conduct that constitutes 
maladministration; and conduct that unreasonably results in a danger to the health or 
safety of one or more persons or the environment.84 
 
(c) No Positive Duty to Investigate 
Pursuant to the provisions, the Australian Securities and Investment Commission 
(ASIC) is the primary designated investigatory body for the disclosed misconduct. 
However, Part 9.4AAA does not place any obligation on the person or agency who 
‘receives’ the disclosure to conduct an investigation. Whistleblowers Australia was 
strongly critical of this issue in a submission to the Treasury, as part of an Options 
Paper released by the Government in 2009.85 They argue that the provisions do not 
                                                
82 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act) Pub 
L No 107-204, 116 Stat 745. 
83 Criminal Antitrust Anti-Retaliation Act of 2013, S 42, 113th Congress 2013 at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-113s42es/pdf/BILLS-113s42es.pdf. The bill was passed by the 
Senate in November 4, 2013 but has not been passed by the House of Representatives. On 17th June 
2015 the Bill was reintroduced and passed the Senate on the 22nd of June 2015. The Bill awaits 
approval from the House of Representatives: Steven Pearlman and Rachel Fischer, Antitrust 
Whistleblower Protection Bill Introduced in Senate (Again) (July 14 2015) The National Law Review 
<file:///C:/Users/pl490/Downloads/Antitrust%20Whistleblower%20Protection%20Bill%20Introduced
%20In%20Senate%20(Again)%20_%20The%20N.pdf>.	
84 Lombard and Brand, above n 80, 355; See Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (Cth). 
85 Peter Bennett, 'Submission to the Australian Treasury, Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission (ASIC) Improving Protections for Corporate Whistleblowers' (Whistleblowers Australia, 
2010) 7. 
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oblige the ‘receiver’ to conduct a proper investigation, nor does it require that the 
whistleblower be informed of the progress or outcome of the investigation. 
Most significantly, the failure of ASIC to properly investigate whistleblower 
claims in relation to the misconduct of Commonwealth Financial Planning Limited 
and the Commonwealth Bank of Australia featured prominently in the Senate 
Committee’s recent review into ASIC’s performance.86 It was claimed that ASIC’s 
inadequate investigation of the misconduct resulted in, among other things, further 
losses to ‘unsuspecting clients and enabling CFPL/the CBA to cover-up the extent of 
the misconduct at CFPL and thereby deny fair and reasonable compensation to 
victims.’87 
ASIC itself admitted that the Corporations Act does not mandate or enable 
ASIC to act on behalf of whistleblowers to ensure their rights as whistleblowers are 
protected. As ASIC noted, ‘where a whistleblower…seeks to rely on the statutory 
protections against third parties, they will generally have to enforce their own rights 
or bring their own proceedings under the relevant legislation to access any remedy. 
The legislation does not provide ASIC with a direct power to commence court 
proceedings on a whistleblower’s behalf.’88 
 
(d) The Bona Fide Requirement Should be Removed  
The bona fide requirement is another primary criticism of the current Part 9.4AAA 
whistleblower provisions. It is presumably aimed at preventing whistleblowers from 
revealing conduct based on mixed motives, such as malice or revenge. However, the 
                                                
86 Senate Economics References Committee, 'Performance of the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission' (Australian Government, 2014)X, Ch 9: the committee examined 
misconduct that occurred between 2006 and 2010 by financial advisers and other staff at 
Commonwealth Financial Planning Limited (CFPL), part of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia 
Group (CBA). Advisers deliberately neglected their duties and placed their personal interests far 
above the interests of their clients. The assets of clients with conservative risk positions, such as 
retirees, were allocated into high-risk products without their knowledge to the financial benefit of the 
adviser, who received significant bonuses and recognition within CFPL as a 'high performer'. There 
was forgery and dishonest concealment of material facts. Clients lost substantial amounts of their 
savings when the global financial crisis hit; the crisis was also used to explain away the poor 
performance of portfolios. Meanwhile, it is alleged that within CFPL there was a management 
conspiracy that, perversely, resulted in one of the most serious offenders, Mr Don Nguyen, being 
promoted. 
87 Ibid 161. 
88 Ibid 235. 
 
 
291 
 
motives of the whistleblower should not be relevant to their entitlement to protection; 
rather the focus should be on the strength of the allegations and the evidence the 
whistleblower supplies.  
Arguably, there will always be mixed motives in the context of whistleblowing 
and this requirement could unfairly lead to whistleblowers being unprotected from 
reprisals, even when part of their intention was to ‘do the right thing’ and report the 
misconduct. More importantly, this takes the focus away from the fact that the 
corporation has engaged in misconduct, which is the more significant factor. As a 
result of these criticisms, there have been calls to remove the Bona Fide requirement 
and replace it with a ‘reasonably held, honest belief’ test to be determined on an 
objective basis. This test would largely overcome the difficulties associated with the 
bona fide requirement and lead to greater protection for whistleblowers. 
 
As a result of these criticisms, the Federal Government released an Options Paper 
in 2009, which was aimed at improving the legislative protections for corporate 
sector whistleblowers.89 The Options paper revealed that only four whistleblowers 
had ever used the protection of the Part 9.4AAA provisions to provide information to 
ASIC, since the provisions were introduced in 2004.90 Moreover, further studies up 
until 2010, revealed there had been no reported cases of any person seeking 
compensation or damages caused by a contravention of the anti-retaliation 
provisions, or any reported cases of criminal prosecutions alleging a contravention of 
either the confidentiality or anti-retaliation provisions.91 Furthermore, there was no 
evidence of any enforcement activity of the whistleblower protection provisions by 
ASIC.92 These studies also revealed that only 31.5 per cent of the companies in the 
data set had whistleblower policies and procedures in place.93  
More recently, in the Senate Committee’s investigation into ASIC’s 
performance in June 2014, the Committee noted that there was a general consensus 
amongst the submissions that the current whistleblower provisions in the private 
                                                
89 See Corporations and Financial Services Division, 'Improving Protections for Corporate 
Whistleblowers - Options Paper' (Australian Treasury, 2009). 
90 Pascoe and Welsh, above n 73, 152. 
91 Ibid.	
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid 161. This study may also indicate that Australia is lagging behind countries, such as the United 
States, in terms of detecting corporate misconduct through whistleblower channels. 
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sector are out-of-date, largely inadequate and lagging behind international 
standards.94 As a result of these criticisms, ASIC have outlined a number of changes 
that have been undertaken in order to improve the regulator’s role in whistleblower 
protection, which includes providing a more centralised system for the handling of 
whistleblowing complaints; providing prompt and clear communication to 
whistleblowers in the assessment and handling of the disclosure and providing 
confidentiality within the applicable legal framework.95 
The ACCC has also called for greater protection for cartel whistleblowers in 
the context of the Competition Law Review (Harper Review).96 The ACCC 
recognises the limited protection afforded to whistleblowers within the Competition 
and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) pursuant to section 162A, in respect of intimidation or 
other coercive conduct as a result of the informant’s cooperation with the ACCC. 
The ACCC is of the view that improved protection for cartel whistleblowers will 
result in greater quality of material provided to aid in the detection of misconduct, 
such as cartel conduct.97  
This section has demonstrated that the corporate whistleblower protections in 
Australia are insufficient and in need of reform. This is particularly in the context of 
cartel whistleblowing, where there is no protection for those third parties who wish 
to come forward with information to the ACCC in relation to cartel conduct. This 
section will now turn to a brief comparative analysis before concluding with the 
recommendations needed to extend this protection adequately. 
 
4 The United States 
In the wake of the collapse of Enron and the surrounding corporate scandals, 
the United States Congress held hearings to investigate how the country's corporate 
governance system and law enforcement agencies failed to detect the widespread 
misconduct.98 Their investigations found that a number of employees knew about the 
                                                
94 Senate Economics References Committee, above n 86, 236. 
95 Ibid 242. 
96 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 'Submission to the Competition Policy Review 
- Response to the Draft Report' (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, 2014) 78. 
‘Harper Review’  
97 Ibid. Despite these comments, the Final Harper Report did not address this issue: Ian Harper et al, 
'Competition Policy Review - Final Report' (Commonwealth of Australia, 2015).	
98 See, Library of Congress, Guide to Law Online: Enron Hearings Law Library of Congress 
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corporate misconduct but chose to remain silent. It was within this context that the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200299 (‘Sarbanes-Oxley’) was enacted to implement 
whistleblower protection mechanisms for corporate whistleblowers. 
Specifically, Sarbanes-Oxley prohibits employers from discharging, 
demoting, suspending, threatening, harassing, or discriminating against an employee 
of a publicly traded company who provides information about any act that the 
employee ‘reasonably believes constitutes a violation of . . . (statutes prohibiting mail 
fraud; wire, radio, or television fraud; or commodities fraud), any rule or regulation 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission (‘SEC’), or any provision of Federal law 
relating to fraud against shareholders.’100 A whistleblower may report this 
misconduct externally, to a regulatory agency, primarily the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA), to Congress or internally, to a supervisor.101 
If a whistleblower demonstrates that they have suffered retaliation, the 
employee is entitled to reinstatement;102 back pay with interest;103 and compensation 
for legal fees, including court costs.104 These provisions are broadly similar to the 
anti-retaliation provisions in Australia, although they have a much wider application 
to corporate misconduct, as they are not tied to a contravention of any particular Act. 
However, in contrast to ASIC’s position, Sarbanes-Oxley prevents the OSHA 
from dismissing a complaint if the employee meets the low burden of making a 
prima facie case of retaliation showing that ‘[t]he employee engaged in a protected 
activity;’ (2) the employer ‘knew or suspected that the employee engaged in the 
protected activity,’ (3) ‘[t]he employee suffered an adverse action,’ and (4) ‘[t]he 
circumstances were sufficient to raise the inference that the protected activity was a 
contributing factor in the adverse action.’105 OSHA need only find reasonable cause 
to believe that the employee was retaliated against and it can issue relief. 
Due to the wide applicability of the Act, the low burden of proof for 
                                                                                                                                     
<http://www.loc.gov/law/help/guide/federal/enronhrgs.php>; See, eg, Committee of Financial 
Services, 'Wrong Numbers: The Accounting Problems at WorldCom' (US House of Representatives, 
2002) <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-107hhrg83079/html/CHRG-107hhrg83079.htm>. 
99 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. (‘Sarbanes Oxley’) 
100 SOX Id. § 1514A(a)(1).  
101 Id. § 1514A(a)(1)(A)-(C); 29 C.F.R. § 1980.103(a) -(c) (2014); Jeff Vogt, 'Don't Tell Your Boss? 
Blowing the Whistle on the Fifth Circuit's Elimination of Anti-Retaliation Protection for Internal 
Whistleblowers Under Dodd-Frank' (2015) 67 Oklahoma Law Review 353, 355. 
102 Ibid § 1514A(c)(2)(A). 
103 Ibid § 1514A(c)(2)(B). 
104 Ibid § 1514A(c)(2)(C).	
105 Ibid § 1980.104(e)(2); Vogt, above n 101, 3. 
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employees and the procedural protections afforded under the Act, many believed that 
Sarbanes-Oxley had significantly improved whistleblower protections in the United 
States, with Taxpayers Against Fraud deeming it to be ‘the single most effective 
measure possible to prevent recurrences of the Enron debacle and similar threats to 
the nation's financial markets.’106 
However, one of the greatest perceived failures of the Act is that it did not 
prevent the corporate misconduct that led to the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, 
where ‘corporate officers, government regulators, and law enforcement agencies 
ignored the warnings of employees who tried to report problems in the subprime 
mortgage industry.’107 
Despite the high expectations of Sarbanes-Oxley, the Act has been subject to 
wide criticisms in its failure to protect corporate whistleblowers. It is important to 
note within this context that the empirical studies that have been undertaken to date 
that attempt to measure the effectiveness of the Sarbanes-Oxley provisions show an 
incomplete, if not, inconsistent picture. One of the more reliable indicators of the 
success of the Act can be garnered from an analysis of whether the Act protected 
employees from reprisals and compensated them for the retaliation they had suffered 
and this can be largely determined by examining the outcomes of Sarbanes-Oxley 
retaliation cases filed with OSHA. 
An empirical study of this nature conducted by Professor Richard E. Moberly 
revealed that from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s effective date until the end of 2011, 
employees won 1.8 per cent of the 1260 cases OSHA decided.108 Significantly, 
OHSA did not decide a single case in favour of Sarbanes-Oxley claimants and found 
for employers in 488 straight decisions.109 
There are many reasons cited for these perceived failures of Sarbanes-Oxley, 
that range from: criticisms relating to the limited time period in which to file a 
retaliation claim;110 that OSHA was inexperienced in dealing with security laws 
claims, did not possess the technical knowledge required and were overburdened, 
                                                
106 Richard Moberly, 'Sarbanes-Oxley's Whistleblower Provisions: Ten Years Later' (2012) 64 South 
Carolina Law Review 1, 5.  
107 Ibid 3, 6-9. 
108 Ibid 12.	
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid; Chelsea Hunt Overhuls, 'Unfinished Business: Dodd-Frank's Whistleblower Anti-Retaliation 
Protections Fall Short for Private Companies and their Employees' (2012) 6 Journal of Business, 
Entrepreneurship and the Law 1, 7. 
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with no additional resources or personnel allocated to the whistleblower 
investigations;111 and a narrow interpretation of the Sarbanes-Oxley provisions by 
the Administrative Review Board.112 
In light of these criticisms, and the consequences of the Global Financial 
Crisis, a number of changes were implemented in an attempt to reform whistleblower 
protection in the United States. Most notably, the implementation of the Dodd-Frank 
Act provided enhanced protection amendments to Section 806 of Sarbanes-Oxley in 
two primary ways.  
The first relates to the increase in the time that a whistleblower can lodge a 
complaint, from ninety days to one hundred and eighty days.113 Secondly, retaliation 
protection was extended to protect employees of any subsidiary or affiliate of a 
public company whose financial information is included in the consolidated financial 
statements of company, or in a nationally recognised statistical rating organisation.114 
Additionally, other positive initiatives included: 
- Implementing more training and providing more resources to OSHA; 
- Providing further education in relation to whistleblower investigations and 
the creation of the revised Whistleblower Investigation Manual; and; 
- Changes in the Administrative Review Boards composition and approach to 
its interpretation of Sarbanes-Oxley.115 
(e) Introduction of Specific Cartel Whistleblower Protections 
In July 2011, the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
conducted an investigative analysis into the effects of the Antitrust Criminal Penalty 
Enhancement and Reform Act116 (ACPERA) based on a reauthorisation mandate. As 
part of this process, GAO analysed Department of Justice (DOJ) data on criminal 
                                                
111 Overhuls, above n 110, 7; Samuel Leifer, 'Protecting Whistleblower Protections in the Dodd-Frank 
Act' (2014) 113 Michigan Law Review 121, 126. 
112 Moberly, above n 106, 13. 
113 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 
922(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 1871 (2010).  
114 Ibid § 929A. 
115 Moberly, above n 106, 13.	
116 Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-237, 118 Stat. 
661. 
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cases between 1993-2010, interviewed DOJ officials and also interviewed a sample 
of plaintiffs, defence attorneys from 17 civil cases and key stakeholders.117  
One of the issues discussed within the GAO interviews was whether there 
should be protection for whistleblowers that report criminal antitrust violations and 
experience retaliation from their employees as a result of this disclosure. According 
to the study, all 16 key stakeholders who provided a response in relation to this issue 
generally supported the addition of civil whistleblower protection, although senior 
DOJ Antitrust Division officials stated they neither support nor oppose the idea.118 As 
a result, the GAO recommended that Congress consider implementing cartel 
whistleblower protection specifically. 
To this end, Senators Patrick J. Leahy (D-VT), Chairman of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, and Ranking Member Chuck Grassley (R-IA) jointly 
introduced legislation that would provide anti-retaliatory protections for price-fixing 
cartel whistleblowers. On November 4, 2013, the Senate unanimously passed this 
bill, after its reintroduction.119 The Leahy-Grassley Criminal Antitrust Anti-
Retaliation Act of 2013 amends ACPERA by adding civil whistleblower protections 
for covered individuals who provide the Federal Government information regarding 
or otherwise assisting an investigation or a proceeding relating to: 
(a) Any violation of or any act or omission the covered individual reasonably believes 
to be a violation of the antitrust laws, or 
(b) Any violation of or any act or omission the covered individual reasonably believes 
to be a violation of another criminal law committed in conjunction with a potential violation 
of the antitrust laws or in conjunction with an investigation by the DOJ of a potential 
violation of the antitrust laws.120 
The protection does not extend to a covered individual who violates or attempts to 
violate the antitrust laws, or obstructs or attempts to obstruct the DOJ’s investigation 
of any violation of the antitrust laws.121 Relief pursuant to the Act includes: 
                                                
117 See, United States Government Accountability Office, 'Criminal Cartel Enforcement - Stakeholder 
Views on Impact of 2004 Antitrust Reform Are Mixed, but Support Whistleblower Protection' (United 
States Government Accountability Office, 2011) http://www.gao.gov/assets/330/321794.pdf. 
118 Ibid 46. 
119 Criminal Antitrust Anti-Retaliation Act of 2013, S 42, 113th Congress 2013 at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-113s42es/pdf/BILLS-113s42es.pdf. The bill was passed by the 
Senate on 4 November, 2013 but has not been passed by the House of Representation. On 17 June 
2015 the Bill was reintroduced and passed the Senate on the 22 June 2015. The Bill awaits approval 
from the House of Representatives: Pearlman and Fischer, above n 83.  
120 Ibid § 216(a)(1). 
121 Ibid § 216 (a)(2). 
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(a) reinstatement with the same seniority status that the covered individual would have 
had, but for the discrimination; 
(b) the amount of back pay, with interest; and 
(c) compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of the discrimination 
including litigation costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable attorney’s fees.122 
Although the Act has passed the Senate, the House of Representatives never 
approved it.123 It has recently been reintroduced and the Senate has passed the Act 
once more.124 
5 United Kingdom 
In comparison to Australia and the United States, the United Kingdom 
provides a more comprehensive legal framework for the protection of 
whistleblowers, as the Act encompasses both public and private disclosures. It has 
been noted that it is the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 (United Kingdom) 
(‘PIDA’), rather than the United States provisions, which have been substantively 
replicated around the world.125 
PIDA sets forth a wide definition of what constitutes a ‘worker’ for the 
purposes of the Act and extends to employees, workers, contractors, trainees, agency 
staff, homeworkers, police officers and every professional in the National Health 
Service (‘NHS’).126 The only exceptions to this definition are those who are 
genuinely self-employed, volunteers, the intelligence services or the armed forces. 
The conduct that constitutes a ‘qualifying disclosure’ is also much wider than 
the provisions in Australia and the United States, as it is necessary to show that ‘in 
the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure, the information tends to 
show one or more of the following’: 
(a) that a criminal offence has been committed, is being committed or is likely to be committed, 
                                                
122 Ibid § 216 (c).  
123 The bill was passed by the Senate on 4 November, 2013 but has not been passed by the House of 
Representation. It has recently been reintroduced: See, eg, Pearlman and Fischer, above n 83.	
124 Paul Saint-Antoine et al, Senate Passes Another Criminal Antitrust Anti-Retaliation Act (31 July 
2015) Lexology 
<file:///C:/Users/pl490/Downloads/Senate%20passes%20another%20Criminal%20Antitrust%20Anti-
Retaliation%20Act%20-%20Lexology%20(1).pdf>. 
125 Jeanette Ashton, '15 Years Of Whistleblowing Protection Under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 
1998: Are We Still Shooting the Messenger?' (2015) 44 Industrial Law Journal 29, 30. 
126 Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 (United Kingdom) c 23, s 43(K).  
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(b) that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to 
which he is subject, 
(c) that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur, 
(d) that the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered, 
(e) that the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged, or 
(f) that information tending to show any matter falling within any one of the preceding 
paragraphs has been, is being or is likely to be deliberately concealed.127 
For the purposes of this section, whether the discloser ‘reasonably believes’ that 
the information tends to show one of the above factors, will be determined 
objectively, having regard to the discloser’s personal circumstances.128 
Given that cartel conduct is now criminalised in the United Kingdom, it 
would follow that an employee who reports cartel conduct to one of the prescribed 
persons would be likely be ‘protected,’ pursuant to these provisions. This 
demonstrates the much wider application that these provisions have in comparison to 
Australia and the United States.  
Disclosure can be made to a wide range of internal and external persons 
and/or bodies that range from: the employer; in the course of seeking legal advice; to 
a Minister of the Crown; to prescribed persons;129 disclosure that meets the 
conditions of section 43G;130 and disclosure of an exceptionally serious failure.131 
Similarly to Australia, the United Kingdom protections do not impose a positive duty 
to investigate upon the prescribed persons receiving the disclosure. This means that 
the prescribed person has absolute discretion as to whether or not to investigate the 
claim and furthermore, the prescribed person is not required to keep the 
whistleblower informed of the progress or outcome of their claim. This factor can 
significantly reduce the effectiveness of a whistleblower protection system.  
Based on widespread consultation in relation to this issue, the United 
Kingdom government proposes to introduce a duty on prescribed persons to report 
                                                
127 Ibid s 43B(1). 
128 Doug Pyper, 'Whistleblowing and Gagging Clauses: the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998' 
(House of Commons Library - Business and Transport Section, 2014) 
<http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN00248> 6.	
129 Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 (United Kingdom) c 23, s 43(F): This section protects 
disclosures made to a person prescribed by an order made by the Secretary of State; ibid 7. 
130 This may allow an employee to report the misconduct to the press, subject to the conditions listed 
within the section. 
131 The rationale behind this protection appears to be that, where a matter is exceptionally serious, it is 
in the public interest that its disclosure should not be delayed. Disclosures under this section are 
subject to similar conditions to disclosure under Section 43G, including the requirement of 
reasonableness. 
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annually.132 In its most recent report, the Government has stated that it will seek 
further consultation in relation to finalising the details of the matter, including 
detailed consideration as to what should be included within the annual report that 
prescribed persons will be required to submit. The Government expects that it should 
include matters such as the number of disclosures received; numbers of claims 
investigated; and of those claims investigated, the number of organisations which 
had a whistleblowing policy in place.133 
If an employee suffers detriment by his or her employer for having made a 
protected disclosure, that employee may enforce their rights by presenting a 
complaint to an employment tribunal.134 Where an employee is dismissed for having 
made a protected disclosure, the employee will be regarded as having been unfairly 
dismissed.135 Furthermore, there is no upper limit on the amount of financial 
compensation obtainable in a whistleblowing-based unfair dismissal claim.136 
Prior to the reforms of 2013, the definition of ‘qualifying disclosure’ used to 
require that the disclosure was made in ‘good faith,’ similar to the current Australian 
provisions.137 This requirement was criticised for substantially the same reasons as 
the Australian equivalent, given there was concern that the requirement would shift 
the focus away from the nature of the disclosure, toward the motivations of the 
person disclosing. 
As a result of these criticisms, the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 
2013 was enacted to introduce a number of changes into United Kingdom’s 
whistleblowing laws.138 One of the primary changes was the introduction of the 
requirement that the disclosure ‘is made in the public interest’ after ‘in the reasonable 
belief of the worker making the disclosure’139 to replace the good faith requirement. 
Instead, there now exists a provision that allows for the amount of compensation 
owed to the employee to be reduced where the disclosure is not made in good 
                                                
132 UK Department for Business Innovation & Skills, 'Whistleblowing Framework Call for Evidence - 
Government Response' (UK Department for Business Innovation & Skills, 2014) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/323399/bis-14-914-
whistleblowing-framework-call-for-evidence-government-response.pdf> 23. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Employment Rights Act 1996 (United Kingdom) c18, s 48(1A).			
135 Ibid s 103A.   
136 Ibid s124(1A).    
137 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1317AA(1)(e.) 
138 Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 (United Kingdom) c 24. 
139 See Employment Rights Act 1996 (United Kingdom) c 18, s43B. 
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faith.140  
Essentially, the introduction of a ‘public interest’ test was an attempt to 
narrow the wide application of the Act, as personal disputes would no longer be 
covered under the provisions, such as a dispute over an employment contract.141 
However, the definition of ‘public interest’ is not provided in the Act and thus the 
interpretation of this provision by the Tribunal remains to be seen. Furthermore, 
there is concern that this provision will simply act as another hurdle to be overcome 
in order for a ‘worker’ to be afforded protection pursuant to PIDA.142 
Pursuant to wide spread scrutiny of PIDA’s provisions and the wide 
interpretation adopted by the Tribunals, the United Kingdom Government released a 
consultation entitled ‘The Whistleblower Framework: call for evidence’ in July 
2013.143 On the back of this consultation, the charity Public Concern at Work (pcaW) 
set up the Whistleblowing Commission to examine the effectiveness of existing 
arrangements for workplace whistleblowing in the United Kingdom and to make 
recommendations for change.144 The final consultation report, released by the 
Commission, reveals that the vast majority of respondents were of the view that 
PIDA was not working as intended, largely due to the aforementioned criticisms.145  
The United Kingdom Government has recently released its Government 
Response paper after its review of the consultation submissions and is considering 
further changes in order to protect whistleblowers.146 The report identified five 
important themes that emerged from the submissions that informed the 
Government’s recommendations for reform: (1) the balance of power between the 
whistleblower and the employer and the support both parties receive; (2) the level of 
                                                
140 Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 (United Kingdom) c 24, s 18.  
141 Adam Lambert and Ruth Bonino, 'Changes to Protection for Whistleblowers' (Clyde & Co, 2013) 
<http://www.clydeco.com/uploads/Files/Publications/2013/CC003455_Changes_to_Protection_for_
Whistleblowers_25_06_13.pdf> 1. 
142 Ashton, above n 125, 34. 
143 See, UK Department for Business Innovation & Skills, 'The Whistleblowing Framework: Call for 
Evidence' (UK Department for Business Innovation & Skills, 2013) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/212076/bis-13-953-
whistleblowing-framework-call-for-evidence.pdf>The Whistleblower Framework: call for evidence’ 
in July 2013: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/323399/bis-14-914-
whistleblowing-framework-call-for-evidence-government-response.pdf 
144 See The Whistleblowing Commission UK, 'Report on the Effectiveness of Existing Arrangements 
for Workplace Whistleblowing in the UK' (Public Concern at Work - The Whistleblowing Charity, 
2013) <http://www.pcaw.org.uk/files/WBC%20Report%20Final.pdf> 
145 Ibid 26. 
146 UK Department for Business Innovation & Skills, above n 132, 22. 
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protection the whistleblower receives and how this will impact of the effectiveness of 
the provisions; (3) the roles that the regulators and prescribed persons play in the 
whistleblowing process and analysing how these bodies respond to whistleblower 
complaints and how this can have a significant impact on the confidence that 
whistleblowers have in the provisions; (4) the categories of worker covered by the 
provisions and who qualifies for the protections to identify groups who may witness 
malpractice but are currently not afforded a remedy and; (5) the need for cultural 
change for perceptions of the role of whistleblowers. 
The effectiveness of United Kingdom’s whistleblowing laws will be subject 
to the success of the proposed reforms. However, in comparison to the Australia and 
United States provisions, a cartel whistleblower is likely to be protected by these 
laws without the need to implement specific cartel whistleblower provisions. This 
reflects a more uniform and harmonised whistleblower framework that should be 
seriously considered by Australia. 
 
6 Canada 
In contrast to the aforementioned jurisdictions, Canada lacks adequate 
whistleblower protections in the private sector, although there are indicators of a 
growing trend towards greater protection. In a 2014 study into the whistleblower 
laws in the G20 countries, the results for Canada show that whistleblower protection 
was ‘absent’ or ‘not at all comprehensive’ in relation to all of the established criteria, 
except for breadth of retaliation.147 
The report states that the only provision relating to whistleblower protection 
of employees of private companies is encompassed within the Criminal Code RSC 
1985, c C-46 (‘Criminal Code’). Section 425.1 prohibits employers from retaliating 
or threatening to retaliate against employees who provide information to law 
enforcement officials. A violation of this section could result in up to 5 years 
imprisonment.148  
                                                
147 Simon Wolfe et al, 'Whistleblower Protection Rules in G20 Countries: The Next Action Plan - 
Public Consultation Draft' (Blueprint for Free Speech; The University of Melbourne; Griffith 
University & Transparency International Australia, 2014) <http://transparency.org.au/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/Action-Plan-June-2014-Whistleblower-Protection-Rules-G20-
Countries.pdf> 32.	
148 Criminal Code, s 425.1(2). 
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However, the scope of this provision is limited, as it only applies to employer 
wrongdoing that constitutes a criminal offence or is otherwise unlawful, and only 
protects employees who report to law enforcement officials. The Criminal Code does 
not protect employees who report wrongdoing, such as misappropriation of funds, 
internally within a company.149 Significantly, the G20 Whistleblower report indicates 
that there is no evidence or known examples where the provision has ever been 
used.150 
However, there are specific cartel whistleblower provisions that exist 
pursuant to the Competition Act, RSC 1985, c C-34.  Section 66.2 provides that: 
(1) No employer shall dismiss, suspend, demote, discipline, harass or otherwise disadvantage 
an employee, or deny an employee a benefit of employment, by reason that 
(a) the employee, acting in good faith and on the basis of reasonable belief, has 
disclosed to the Commissioner that the employer or any other person has committed or 
intends to commit an offence under this Act; 
(b) the employee, acting in good faith and on the basis of reasonable belief, has 
refused or stated an intention of refusing to do anything that is an offence under this Act; 
(c) the employee, acting in good faith and on the basis of reasonable belief, has done 
or stated an intention of doing anything that is required to be done in order that an offence 
not be committed under this Act; or 
(d) the employer believes that the employee will do anything referred to in 
paragraph (a) or (c) or will refuse to do anything referred to in paragraph (b). 
These provisions have existed since 1999 but there is no evidence to suggest 
that they have ever been used. Interestingly, the Competition Bureau did not 
advocate their introduction into the Competition Act when the bill was passed.151 
Until recently, these provisions have largely been considered dormant, until in 2013, 
the Interim Commissioner of Competition, John Pecman, announced the launch of 
the Bureau's new Whistleblowing Initiative.152  
The initiative does not involve introducing further whistleblowing protections 
into the Act but instead is directed towards educating members of the ‘public to 
                                                
149 George Avraam and Cherrine Chow, Whistleblower Protection: The Importance of Internal 
Policies (May 12 2014) Baker & McKenzie - Canadian Fraud Law 
<http://www.canadianfraudlaw.com/2014/05/whistleblower-protection-the-importance-of-internal-
policies/>. 
150 Wolfe et al, above n 147, 33.	
151 See, Mark Katz, Erika Douglas and Megan Cheerma, 'Blowing the Whistle on Cartels in Canada' 
(Canadian Bar Association, 2013) <http://www.cba.org/CBA/PracticeLink/2013-08-biz/cartels-
e.aspx>. 
152 Competition Bureau, 'Competition Bureau Launches Whistleblowing Initiative' (Competition 
Bureau, 2013) <http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03573.html>. 
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provide information to the Bureau regarding possible violations of the criminal cartel 
provisions of the Act.’153 The initiative includes the establishment of a Whistleblower 
Hotline and the assurances of confidentiality if an employee seeks these 
protections.154 
Whilst this initiative may signal a move towards greater protection for 
whistleblowers, as has been demonstrated in this section, the effectiveness of a 
whistleblower protection framework is truly tested by how it is administered. Canada 
has not demonstrated any success in its past performance of protecting corporate 
whistleblowers, categorised primarily by the patchwork whistleblower protection 
framework and the lack of utilisation of existing provisions. Additionally, the 
requirement that the disclosure be made in ‘good faith’ is another hurdle that a 
whistleblower must overcome in order to receive protection. As discussed above, that 
approach is problematic. 
 
7 Conclusion 
The analysis of corporate whistleblower protections in Australia, the United 
States, the United Kingdom and Canada have revealed that whistleblower protection 
is limited in many respects, or is still in the process of development. This is 
particularly the case for cartel whistleblower protection in Australia. One of the key 
lessons to be drawn from this analysis is that despite the establishment of a 
comprehensive whistleblower protection regime, a framework cannot be successful 
without effective administration and enforcement as support. 
The ACCC has recently recognised the lack of protection that currently exists 
in Australia and has called for the government to introduce cartel whistleblower 
protections.155 However, the ACCC asserts that these protections should be modeled 
upon those in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) Part 9AAA.156 Although, this is a 
positive development and reform in this respect is much needed, this chapter has 
                                                
153 John Pecman, 'Remarks by John Pecman, Interim Commission of Competition' (Canadian 
Competition Bureau - Canadian Bar Association Spring Speech, 2013) 
<http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03571.html#Initiative>. 
154 Competition Bureau, 'Whistleblowing Initiative - Criminal Cartel Whistleblowing Initiative' 
(Competition Bureau, 2013) <http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-
bc.nsf/eng/02819.html>.	
155Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, above n 96, 78.  
156 Ibid. The Final Harper Report did not address this issue.	
 
304 
 
demonstrated the problems apparent in Part 9AAA. There are four key components 
to be considered if the Corporations Act approach is to be taken. These components 
draw upon the public policy principles of transparency, accountability, consistency 
and proportionality to inform the model. These are: 
(1) There must be no requirement that the discloser ‘acts in good 
faith.’ Instead, a ‘reasonable, honestly held belief’ will be 
sufficient, as the focus must remain on the content of the 
disclosure, rather than the motives of the employee; 
(2) The definition should apply to a wide range of disclosers, modeled 
upon the definition of ‘worker’ in the PIDA Act. This requirement 
would increase the transparency of the provisions, leading to 
greater clarity of the framework’s applicability; 
(3) If a Corporations Act model is introduced and the ACCC is the 
regulator upon which disclosure can be made, then there must be a 
positive duty upon the ACCC to investigate the claim and provide 
the whistleblower with updated information on the 
progress/outcome of the investigation. This measure of 
accountability is necessary to ensure that whistleblowers have 
confidence that their complaints will be seriously investigated; 
(4) If the ACCC duties are to be increased in this respect, then the 
ACCC should also be provided with additional resources to 
compensate for the increased workload, so that the ACCC is not 
overburdened as the Occupational Safety Health Administration 
was in the United States with its handling of whistleblowing 
claims pursuant to the Sarbanes Oxley Act. 
Ideally, the government would seek to implement a comprehensive public 
and private whistleblower framework, modeled on the United Kingdom approach, 
for a more uniform and harmonised whistleblower system. This may be more 
difficult in Australia as the Federal Government is constitutionally restricted in this 
respect.157  If a complete system were not achievable in the near future, specific cartel 
                                                
157 Pascoe, above n 71, 90: Australia's Federal Parliament lacks a general power to implement 
comprehensive whistleblower legislation covering the public and private sectors, but has used its 
constitutional powers to provide for protection in specific areas. For example, under its corporation’s 
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whistleblower protection would be achievable in the short term. In addition to 
ensuring that the whistleblower protection framework is transparent and accountable, 
the approach should also be consistent with the developments in the public sector, 
which has recently been reformed.158 Clearly, these are complex issues that demand a 
comprehensive consultative approach. Much can be learned already from the 
consultations that have taken place in the aforementioned jurisdictions.159  
Whistleblower protection provisions can enhance the prospect that 
whistleblowers will come forward and reveal information related to undisclosed 
cartel conduct to the regulator. The ACCC could rely less on cartel investigations 
generated by immunity applications, as this information could be derived more often 
from whistleblowers. Thus, instead of overreliance on a single enforcement tool, the 
adoption of stronger whistleblower protection could provide a viable and 
proportionate alternative to immunity. 
 
C Cartel Informant System – Financial Incentives for Whistleblowers 
 
The concept of implementing financial incentives for whistleblowers, or 
‘bounty systems,’ is controversial.160 This holds true even in jurisdictions that 
currently utilise financial incentives, particularly the United States.161 The concept 
refers to the payment of money in exchange for information related to illegal conduct 
to the authorities. In this way, the payment of financial incentives goes one step 
further than simply providing protection to whistleblowers, as it seeks to entice 
informants to come forward and be ‘rewarded’ for their information.162 
                                                                                                                                     
power, pursuant to paragraph 51(xx) of the Australian Constitution, specific whistleblowing 
provisions were introduced for the first time in Australia in 2004. 
158 Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (Cth). 
159 There is empirical support for such protections, which was also reflected in the interview data: See 
Chapter V, Cartel Whistleblower Protection, pg 159. 
160 For example, this issue was one of the most divisive issues in the discussions with the 
interviewees. See Chapter V, Cartel Informant System, 161. 
161 See, eg, Heidi Hansberry, 'In Spite of Its Good Intentions, The Dodd-Frank Act Has Created An 
FCPA Monster' (2012) 102 Journal Criminal Law & Criminology 195; Jenny Lee, 'Corporate 
Corruption & the New Gold Mine: How the Dodd-Frank Act Overincentizes Whistleblowing' (2012) 
77 Brooklyn Law Review 303; Jennifer Pacella, 'Bounties for Bad Behavior: Rewarding Culpable 
Whistleblowers Under the Dodd-Frank Act and Internal Revenue Code' (2015) 17 University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 345. 
162 Gordon Schnell, 'Bring In the Whistleblowers and Pay Them—The Next Logical Step in 
Advancing Antitrust Enforcement' (2013) (2) CPI Antitrust Chronicle 1. 
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As the previous section has demonstrated, historically whistleblowers have 
been crucial in revealing large-scale fraudulent and corrupt conduct that would have 
otherwise remained undetected and thus play a pivotal role in exposing illegal 
activities.163 However, the personal and financial risks faced by whistleblowers 
currently exceed the protections afforded to them pursuant to current whistleblower 
protection regimes around the world. This is especially the case in jurisdictions such 
as Australia, which does not have adequate whistleblower protections, and further 
cannot provide any protection to cartel whistleblowers that come forward to reveal 
cartel conduct and are not directly involved in the offence. 
The United States has been the frontrunner in recognising the benefits of 
implementing a financial reward system.164 This chapter will demonstrate how these 
frameworks have operated successfully in many respects. A number of lessons can 
be drawn from these experiences to aid in the development of such a system in the 
Australian context. More specifically, there are jurisdictions, namely the United 
Kingdom, South Korea and Hungary that have implemented specific cartel informant 
systems to aid in the detection of cartel conduct. These provide a model framework 
for an Australian cartel informant incentive system.165 
This section will argue that the many criticisms levelled at the introduction of 
a financial reward system are largely overstated and can essentially be offset by 
implementing appropriate safeguards to address these issues. Moreover, many of 
these criticisms could also be directed at the immunity policy, yet the policy is seen 
to be the most effective anti-cartel enforcement tool in the world. These incongruent 
positions need to be reconciled in order to aid in the realisation that one tool should 
not dominant the entire enforcement agenda, but instead, there needs to be more 
serious consideration of adopting alternate means of detecting cartel conduct, such as 
the introduction of a financial rewards system for cartel behaviour. 
                                                
163 See above, Whistleblower Protection, pg 292. 
164 For instance there are a number of financial incentive systems in the United States such as that 
pursuant to the False Claims Act and the schemes created by the Securities Exchange Commission, 
Internal Revenue Service, and United States Customs Service: See, eg, Marsha Ferziger and Daniel 
Currell, 'Snitching for Dollars: The Economics and Public Policy of Federal Civil Bounty Programs' 
(1999)  University of Illinois Law Review 1141. 
165 These jurisdictions were chosen for this section only, as these are the only jurisdictions with 
specific cartel financial rewards systems in place. 
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This section will first provide an overview of the United States bounty 
systems, primarily those under the False Claims Act166 and the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (‘Dodd-Frank Act’).167 This overview 
will analyse the key differences between the models upon which the bounty systems 
are structured and briefly consider the utility and criticisms directed at these models. 
The section will then turn to an analysis of the specific cartel informant systems that 
exist in the United Kingdom, South Korea and Hungary before discussing the 
primary criticisms aimed at the implementation of financial incentive systems.  
This section will systematically review these arguments and show that they 
hold relatively little weight. It will then conclude by joining the call from the Senate 
Committee that Australia should seriously consider implementing financial 
incentives for whistleblowers in order to aid in greater cartel detection and 
prosecution. These conclusions will be supported by outlining a framework for the 
introduction of such a system in Australia, with appropriate safeguards in place to 
offset any significant negative consequences.168 
 
1 The United States: Evidence of Informant Systems 
The United States has incorporated many bounty systems into its enforcement 
regimes over time and is consequently deemed to be one of the most active 
jurisdictions in utilising financial rewards to bolster enforcement efforts. The United 
States experience demonstrates that there are primarily two different types of bounty 
systems. The first relates to a typical ‘reward-for-information’ bounty system, where 
an informant with pertinent information will come forward to a relevant authority to 
seek a financial reward in exchange for the provision of information to that authority. 
In contrast, the second type, is more unique, and refers to a system by which 
an informant will seek a percentage of a penalty amount imposed by that authority as 
a result of the information they have provided. However, if that authority chooses not 
to proceed with the investigation/prosecution, then the individual informant can 
choose to sue the wrongdoer on behalf of the government and as a result receive a 
                                                
166 False Claims Act, 31 United States.C, §§ 3729 – 3733. (‘False Claims Act’) 
167 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929-
Z, 124 Stat. 1376, 1871 (2010). (‘Dodd-Frank Act’)	
168 Senate Economics References Committee, above n 86, 26, Recommendation 16. 
 
308 
 
greater percentage of the penalty outcome. This is referred to as ‘qui tam’ style 
litigation. Whilst the United States has adopted numerous bounty programs, such as 
that for tax evasion169 and insider trading,170 the focus of this section will be on the 
recently enacted Dodd-Frank Act and the long standing False Claims Act. Both of 
these statutes are significant and illustrate how both types of financial incentive 
schemes operate. 
 
(a) An Overview of Dodd-Frank 
As outlined in the previous section related to whistleblower protection, the 
Dodd-Frank Act was enacted in response to the supposed failure of the Sarbanes 
Oxley provisions and the resultant Global Financial Crisis.171 In one of the most 
controversial reforms, the Act sought to implement financial incentives for any 
informant who voluntarily provides the Securities Exchange Commission (‘SEC’) 
with original information relating to a violation of securities laws that result in 
penalties of over $1 million dollars. 
Pursuant to the Act, original information refers to information that: 
• is derived from the independent knowledge or analysis of a whistleblower; 
• is not known to the SEC from any other source, unless the whistleblower is the original 
source of the information; and 
• is not exclusively derived from an allegation made in a judicial or administrative hearing, in a 
governmental report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless the 
whistleblower is a source of the information.172 
The payment of an award will be determined within the range of 10 per cent-30 per 
cent.173 In determining the award amount, the SEC must consider: 
• the significance of the information provided by the whistleblower to the success of the 
covered judicial or administrative action; 
• the degree of assistance provided by the whistleblower and any legal representative of the 
whistleblower in a covered judicial or administrative action; 
• the programmatic interest of the SEC in deterring violations of the securities laws by making 
                                                
169 Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 § 406(a)(1)(D), Pub. L. No. 109-432, 120 Stat. 2922.  
170 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §21 A 48 Stat. 881, 15 USC.	
171 Housing and Urban Affairs Senate Committee on Banking, 'Report on the Restoring American 
Financial Stability Act of 2010' (Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs - Senate 
Report 111–176 2010) <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-111srpt176/pdf/CRPT-111srpt176.pdf> 
110-112. 
172 Dodd-Frank Act, 1871. 
173 Ibid § 922(6)(1). 
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awards to whistleblowers who provide information that lead to the successful enforcement of 
such laws; and 
• such additional relevant factors as the SEC may establish by rule or regulation.174 
Awards cannot be made to a whistleblower who: 
• was a member, officer or employee of an appropriate regulatory agency, Department of 
Justice (DOJ), self-regulatory organisation, Public Company Accounting Oversight Board or 
a law enforcement organisation; 
• is convicted of a criminal violation related to the judicial or administrative action for which 
the whistleblower otherwise could receive an award under this section; 
• gains the information through the performance of an audit of financial statements required 
under the securities laws; or 
• who fails to submit information to the SEC in such form as the SEC may, by rule, require.175 
Importantly, the provisions provide an express right to review the Commission’s 
decision to grant an award by the appropriate Court of Appeals in the United 
States.176 
The SEC Final rules implementing the Whistleblower Program were approved by the 
SEC on 25 May 2011 and serve to supplement the existing provisions in relation to 
matters such as: the definition of a whistleblower; what constitutes ‘original 
information’; and the criteria for determining an award.177 
Since the inception of the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC has awarded fourteen 
whistleblowers, with nine of these awards being made in the 2014 Fiscal year.178 This 
could indicate that the provisions are beginning to take effect after an initial grace 
period, which is evidenced by the steady increase of whistleblower tips received by 
the SEC over the four-year period.179 The largest award granted at the time of writing 
was in September 2014, where a whistleblower was granted USD30 million dollars 
for providing original information that led to a successful enforcement action; an 
award amount that is double any previous award made by the SEC.180 
                                                
174 Ibid § 922 (6)(C)(1). 
175 Ibid § 922(6)(C)(2)(A). 
176 Ibid § 922 (6)(C)(2)(F).	
177 See, Securities and Exchange Commission, 'SEC Adopts Rules to Establish Whistleblower 
Program' (United States Securities and Exchange Commission, 2011) 
<https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/34-64545.pdf>. 
178 Securities and Exchange Commission, '2014 Annual Report to Congress on the Dodd-Fank 
Whistleblower Program' (US Securities and Exchange Commission, 2014) 
<http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/annual-report-2014.pdf> 10. 
179 Ibid 20. 
180 Ibid 10.	
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Given the controversial nature of these provisions, there have been a number 
of criticisms levelled at the introduction of a financial incentive scheme, namely the 
following: 
(1) the credibility of the informant as a witness; 
(2) the risk of frivolous or vexatious claims; 
(3) the resultant harm to internal compliance systems; 
(4) the resultant administrative burden and resource constraints; and 
(5) morality issues. 
These criticisms will be discussed at length in the concluding section of this chapter. 
 
(b) An Overview of the False Claims Act 
The preceding overview of the Dodd-Frank provisions provides an 
illustration of the first type of financial incentive systems that exists in the United 
States. In contrast, the False Claims Act (FCA) is an example of a ‘qui tam’ style of 
financial incentive system.181 The False Claims Act was enacted in 1863 as a result of 
Congress’ concern that suppliers of goods to the Union Army during the Civil War 
were defrauding the government.182 It seeks to enable informants (‘relators’) to sue 
on behalf of the government (‘qui tam’ action) when they detect a fraud that is not 
already the subject of a federal enforcement action.183 In order to compensate relators 
for successful qui tam actions, the Act grants an award of a share of the damages 
recovered from the defrauding parties.184 There have been a number of significant 
changes to the FCA since its inception, including increasing damages from double 
damages to treble damages and raising the penalties from USD2000 to a range of 
USD5000 to USD10 000.185 
Pursuant to the FCA, any person who knowingly submits a false claim to the 
government or causes another to submit a false claim to the government or 
knowingly makes a false record or statement to get a false claim paid by the 
                                                
181 False Claims Act, 31 United States.C. 	
182 Department of Justice, 'The False Claims Act: A Primer' (U.S Department of Justice, 2011) 
<http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/civil/legacy/2011/04/22/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Primer.pdf> 1. 
183 False Claims Act, 31 United States.C, §3730(b)(e)(3). 
184 Ibid § 3730(d). 
185 Department of Justice, above n 182, 1. 
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government will be held liable.186 A person will also be held liable where they avoid 
paying money to the government187 or if they conspire to violate the FCA.188 
Most importantly for the purposes of this chapter, are the provisions related to 
filing a qui tam complaint.189 After a qui tam complaint is filed, it is initially sealed 
for 60 days where the government is required to investigate the allegation in the 
complaint. Upon conclusion of this period, the government must then notify the court 
that it is either intervening in the action or declining to take over the action, in which 
case the relator can proceed with the action. 
If the government decides to intervene in the qui tam action, it will have 
primary responsibility for prosecuting the action,190 dismissing the action, providing 
the relator with a hearing,191 or settling the action, if the court determines this is fair 
after the relator’s hearing.192 The award to be granted will be dependent upon 
whether the government decides to intervene. If the government does intervene, then 
the relator is entitled to an award between 15 and 25 per cent of the amount 
recovered by the government. If the government declines to intervene in the action, 
the relator’s share increases to 25 to 30 per cent.193 If the court deems that the relator 
planned or initiated the fraud, the court may reduce the award without limitation. If a 
qui tam action is successful, the relator is also entitled to legal fees and other 
expenses of the action by the defendant.194 There are several exceptions to those who 
can initiate a qui tam action;195 most significantly, the relator will be barred where 
they are convicted of a criminal offense arising from their role in the FCA 
violation.196 
The qui tam provisions have been deemed to be successful in aiding the 
detection and prosecution of fraud in the United States. Awards have increased from 
USD2.3 million in 1998 to nearly USD2.8 billion in 2011.197 The reasons for its 
                                                
186 See generally, False Claims Act, § 3729. 
187 Ibid § 3729(a)(1)(G). 
188 Ibid § 3729(a)(1)(C). 
189 The qui tam provisions begin at § 3730(b) of the False Claims Act; § 3730(b)(1) states that a 
person may file a qui tam action. 
190 Ibid § 3730(c)(1). 
191 Ibid § 3730(c)(2)(A). 
192 Ibid § 3730(c)(2)(B).	
193 Ibid § 3730(d). 
194 Ibid. 
195 Ibid § 3730. 
196 Ibid § 3730(d)(3). 
197 In a study of more than 4000 qui tam cases from 1986-2011, 84 per cent of all relators were ‘one-
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success could be attributed to the valuable information that relators can provide, due 
to their relative proximity to information about fraudulent misconduct, compared to 
misconduct discovered externally, such as part of an annual audit process. 
Advocates of the qui tam provisions also believe that such actions decrease 
the likelihood that meritorious cases will remain unenforced due to the DOJ’s lack of 
awareness, negligence or deliberate policy choices.198 Furthermore, the qui tam 
provisions can also aid in conserving limited public enforcement resources, as the 
increased monitoring of fraudulent misconduct by third parties does not require 
significant additional resources.199  
One of the most notable omissions from the FCA, compared to that of 
Sarbanes Oxley provisions and Dodd-Frank, is that there are no anti-retaliation 
provisions for the whistleblower should they suffer employment retaliation. 
However, it has been suggested that the recovery available to the whistleblower as a 
result of the qui tam action may be able to offset any negative consequences that may 
result from retaliation, such as a loss of employment.200  
There is also criticism relating to the DOJ’s decision to intervene in qui tam 
cases. According to one study, the DOJ intervenes in approximately 20 percent of all 
qui tam cases201 and of these cases; the DOJ wins judgement or settles ninety-five 
percent of these.202 This finding suggests that the DOJ will decide to intervene in 
cases only where the DOJ deems the case to be likely to succeed. It is asserted that 
this can have the potential impact of creating the assumption that if the DOJ decides 
not to intervene, then the case must not be capable of or likely to succeed. Therefore, 
                                                                                                                                     
shot’ relators who had only filed one action in twenty-five years: David Freeman Engstrom, 
'Harnessing the Private Attorney General: Evidence from Qui Tam Litigation ' (2013) 112 Columbia  
Law Review 1244; The DOJ has recently indicated that it will increase its review of complaints for 
potential criminal prosecution under the False Claims Act: Leslie Caldwell, 'Remarks by Assistant 
Attorney General for the Criminal Division Leslie R. Caldwell at the Taxpayers Against Fraud 
Education Fund Conference' (US Department of Justice, 2014). 
198 William E Kovacic, 'Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits as Monitoring Devices in Government 
Contracting' (1996) 29 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 1799, 1809. 
199 Ni Qian, 'Necessary Evils: How to Stop Worrying and Love Qui Tam' (2013)  Columbia Business 
Law Review 594, 598; Contra Kovacic, above n 198, 1809. 
200 Nicholas Macrakis and Michael Legg, 'The Dodd-Frank Act whistleblower Reforms Put Bounty on 
Corporate Non-Compliance: Ramifications and Lessons for Australia' (2012) 40 Australian Business 
Law Review 26, 29. 
201 Only six to ten qui tam cases were brought each year from 1943-86: House of Representatives, 
'False Claims Act Correction Act of 2009' (US House of Representatives - House Report 111-97, 
2009) <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-111hrpt97/html/CRPT-111hrpt97.htm> 
202 See, Department of Justice, 'Fraud Statatics - Overview' (Civil Division, US Department of Justice, 
2013) <http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/civil/legacy/2013/12/26/C-
FRAUDS_FCA_Statistics.pdf> (Statistics derived from 2011 Data). 
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it is asserted that the DOJ should intervene in more cases in order to avoid this 
assumption and more effectively utilise the qui tam provisions. 
 
2 Cartel-Specific Financial Reward Systems 
(a) United Kingdom 
The CMA informant policy states that the CMA will offer financial rewards 
of up to £100 000 (in exceptional) cases for information in relation to cartel 
activity.203 The CMA justifies their policy by outlining how difficult cartels are to 
detect and even more difficult to prove.204 The policy lists a hotline number that 
enables those with cartel information to consult with the CMA in confidence. The 
policy states that the identity of the informant will be kept in strict confidence and 
that the informant will deal with ‘specially trained officers.’205 
In terms of calculating the reward, the policy clearly states that the granting 
of any financial reward is entirely at the discretion of the CMA and there is no 
requirement that the CMA gives reasons for its decision in relation to payment.206 
Furthermore, the CMA is still vested with discretion to grant any reward where the 
‘CMA has agreed to accept some information from a person and the information 
provides a credible basis for further investigation, the CMA is still free to decide, on 
the basis of other more pressing priorities, that it will not use the information given 
and will not therefore give a financial reward.’207 
Therefore, a cartel informant will have no assurance that the information they 
provide will result in any payment, despite the fact that the informant may have 
incurred significant risks in providing assistance to the CMA. This stands in stark 
contrast to the CMA’s position in relation to the granting of full immunity, where the 
CMA asserts that ‘certainty’ is paramount to the effective operation of its leniency 
                                                
203 See generally, Competition and Markets Authority, 'Rewards for Information about Cartels' (UK 
Competition and Markets Authority, 2008) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/299411/Informant_re
wards_policy.pdf>.	
204 Ibid 1. 
205 Ibid 3.  
206 Ibid. 
207 Ibid. 
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policy for cartel members, as it encourages the members to come forward and reveal 
the misconduct.208  
These positions are inconsistent, especially where the certainty of outcome is 
only assured to those who have committed wrongdoing and sought immunity. 
Furthermore, as outlined in the previous section, blowing the whistle on an employer 
can incur significant career and financial risks, even where anti-retaliation provisions 
do exist. As the CMA sets the maximum reward at £100 000, it is likely that the 
rewards actually provided are significantly less than this figure and are thus 
remarkably different to the amount an informant would likely receive in relation to 
the United States Dodd-Frank or FCA claim. One hypothetical estimate aimed at 
effectively encouraging cartel informants set the bar at USD4-5 million.209 On this 
basis, the CMA threshold falls well below an amount that will readily entice an 
informant to risk their job and reputation to report to the CMA. 
In the event that the CMA does decide to grant an award, the calculation of the 
amount is determined on a case-by-case basis, taking account of the following 
factors: 
• the value of the information in terms of what the CMA is able to achieve from it; 
• the amount of harm caused to the economy and consumers where the CMA believes that the 
information provided by the informant has helped to put a stop to and/or has helped to 
disclose; 
• the effort the informant had to invest in order to provide the CMA with the information; and 
• the risk the informant had to take in order to provide the CMA with the information.210 
As evident from the above factors, there is no established threshold or minimum 
standard of information the informant needs to provide in order for a reward to be 
granted. This stands in contrast to the CMA’s treatment of subsequent leniency 
applications, where the information provided must ‘add significant value to the 
CMA’s investigation’ meaning that is must ‘genuinely advance the investigation.’211 
This further compounds the uncertainty as to how a reward, if any, would be 
calculated by the CMA. 
                                                
208 Competition and Markets Authority, above n 50, s 1.9. 
209 See Andreas Stephan, 'Is the Korean Innovation of Individual Informant Rewards a Viable Cartel 
Detection Tool? CCP Working Paper 14-3' (ESRC Centre for Competition Policy & Norwich Law 
School, University of East Anglia, 2014).  
210 Competition and Markets Authority, above n 203, 4.  
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Another key component of the policy relates to whether a cartel member who is 
granted leniency can also claim a financial reward. Whilst the CMA states that 
ordinarily informants of this kind will not be granted a reward, it also indicates that 
there may be circumstances ‘where the CMA will consider a reward in addition to 
immunity from sanction under the leniency policy.’212 It claims that the 
circumstances in which this would occur would be in cases where the involvement of 
the informant was ‘relatively peripheral.’ However, the policy is not clear whether a 
cartel member who did not receive immunity, as they were not the first to reveal the 
conduct, will be eligible for a reward. 
 
(b) South Korea 
The Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) introduced its first informant 
reward system in February 2002, where the reward was set at 20 million won 
(approximately AUD23 000). According to the KFTC, the low reward amount did 
not generate sufficient informant interest, as there were only five cases where 
information was reported pursuant to the policy.213 As a result, the KFTC increased 
the reward amount to 100 million won (about AUD115 000).214 
The policy was further revised in 2004, which clarified the violations that the 
policy will apply to; the way in which the reward amount is calculated; and 
stipulated that the reward will only apply to the first informant to provide relevant 
evidence to the KTFC.215 Similarly to the CMA policy, there is no fixed reward 
amount, as a ‘Reward Review Committee’ determines the amount.216 The award is 
determined having regard to the level of sanction and the quality of evidence 
provided. The Committee will first determine a ‘standard amount’ calculated with 
reference to the level of sanction217 (see Table 2). 
                                                
212 Competition and Markets Authority, above n 203, 5. 	
213 Korea Fair Trade Commission, 'Recent Changes to Korea's Cartel Enforcement Regime' (Korean 
Fair Trade Commission, 2005) <http://www.ftc.go.kr/data/hwp/room_docu.doc> 5. 
214 Korea Fair Trade Commission, 'Annual Report' (Korean Fair Trade Commission, 2003) 
<file:///C:/Users/pl490/Downloads/Annual%20Report_2003.pdf> 6; Korea Fair Trade Commission, 
'Annual Report on Competition Policy Developments in Korea' (Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, 2003) <http://www.oecd.org/korea/34720758.pdf> s2(5). 
215 Korea Fair Trade Commission, 'KFTC's Launch of Reward System for Informants - Press Release' 
(Korean Fair Trade Commission, 2005) <http://www.ftc.go.kr/data/hwp/rewardsystem.doc>. 
216 Ibid. 
217 Korea Fair Trade Commission, above n 213, 5. 
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Table 2: Calculating Standard Amount for Reward 1 
 
Seriousness Standard Amount 
Case with More than Surcharge 
a) Surcharge less than 500 mil won : 5 per cent 
b) Surcharge between 500 mil won～50 bil won : 1 per cent 
c) Surcharge over 50 bil won : 0.5per cent 
* Standard Amount is a) + b) + c) 
* Minimum amount is 5 mil won 
Corrective Order or Warning ㅇ 2 million won per types of violation  1 million won for warning 
Once the standard amount has been determined, the final amount will be calculated 
on the basis of the quality of evidence provided by the informant, which is divided 
into three grades218 (see Table 3). 
Table 3: Calculating the Reward Amount 1 
 
Quality of Evidence Final Amount 
Top Quality 80 per cent-100 per cent of 'Standard Amount' 
Medium Quality 60 per cent-80 per cent of 'Standard Amount' 
Low Quality 40 per cent-60 per cent of 'Standard Amount' 
In stark contrast to the CMA policy, the calculation of the penalty amount in South 
Korea is assessed against set criteria, which ensures that the policy operates in a 
predictable and transparent manner. 
 
(c) Hungary 
The Hungarian Competition Authority introduced a ‘Cartel Informant 
Reward’ system in April 2010.219 In contrast to the CMA and Korean policies, the 
policy is set out in the Hungarian Competition Act220 and is also comprehensively 
                                                
218 Ibid. 
219 Hungarian Competition Authority, 'Regular Questions about the Cartel Informant Reward' 
(Hungarian Competition Authority, 2010) 
<http://www.gvh.hu/en/other/6429_en_regular_questions_about_the_cartel_informant_reward.html>. 
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Competition Act’) 
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supplemented by the HCA’s Frequently Asked Questions document.221 This FAQ 
document provides detailed information related to the processes and procedures that 
an informant will need to undertake in order to be granted a reward. 
Article 79/A of the Hungarian Competition Act states that any natural person 
who provides ‘indispensable’ information to the Hungarian Competition Authority 
(HCA) for an European Union Competition infringement will be entitled to obtain an 
informant reward.  The Act states that evidence can still be classified as 
‘indispensable’ even where the HCA has obtained other indispensable evidence prior 
to the informant.222 Thus, in contrast to the CMA, the granting of the award is not 
discretionary, as the HCA will grant an award where an informant meets the 
‘indispensable’ evidence threshold. What qualifies as ‘indispensable’ is further 
elaborated upon by the HCA in its FAQ document, which states that: 
As a main rule, a reward may be offered if the informant reveals evidence that can be related 
to the elements of the statement of facts concerning the hardcore cartel (e.g. the undertakings 
being parties to the cartel, the restrictive practice); it is not sufficient providing evidence that 
may facilitate the identification of the aspects relevant for sanctioning the infringement 
concerned.223 
Furthermore, the amount of award is clearly stipulated as ‘one percent of the 
fine imposed by the Competition Council proceeding in the case, but maximum 
HUF50 million.’224 This calculation method represents an approach adopted from the 
United States style of financial reward systems, where the informant receives a 
percentage of fines imposed, except that the HCA has legislatively capped the 
amount that can be recovered.  Whilst this approach may be clearer than that adopted 
in the United Kingdom, it has been asserted that this maximum amount is not 
sufficient to entice informants to report to the HCA for the reasons described 
above.225 
The Act also states that multiple informants can receive an award, provided 
they meet the indispensable evidence threshold, and that the evidence is not derived 
from a single source.226 This contrasts to the position adopted in South Korea, where 
                                                
221 See generally, Hungarian Competition Authority, above n 219. 	
222 Hungarian Competition Act, Art 79/A(2). 	
223 Hungarian Competition Authority, above n 219, Q3.  
224 Hungarian Competition Act, Art 79/A(3). 
225 Jan Palanski, 'Informant Reward Schemes in Competition Enforcement - Working Paper' (2014) 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2457450>18-19. 
226 Hungarian Competition Act, Art 79/A(6). 
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only the first informant who provides relevant evidence will receive a reward. Most 
notably, the HCA is precluded from granting financial rewards to those informants 
who have obtained evidence as a result of a crime or an offence.227 Consequently, it 
would seem that cartel participants would be ineligible to receive an informant 
award, in addition to obtaining immunity. This is confirmed in the HCA’s FAQ 
document.228  
This position more appropriately reflects the view that criminals should not 
be entitled to benefit from their crimes, especially in addition to obtaining immunity 
for their misconduct. However, the FAQ document states that any person who was 
involved in the conduct but does not seek immunity will be entitled to the reward, 
such as former employees.229 
The Act further sets a timeframe of 30 days in which an informant will be 
paid after a resolution is made230 and provides an avenue for judicial review of the 
HCA’s decision regarding the financial reward payment.231 This is an important 
aspect in ensuring the policy is delivered in a fair and transparent manner and that 
informants have a right to seek review, particularly if the decision was unfair or 
unjust. This right of review is absent from the CMA and the South Korean policies, 
which increases the uncertainty surrounding the operation of these policies. 
 
3 Key Criticisms of Financial Informant Systems – A Rebuttal 
After outlining a number of jurisdictions that have adopted financial 
informant systems, there is clearly established precedent demonstrating that the 
implementation of such systems is a viable option.  Further proof lies in the fact that 
there are a growing number of jurisdictions that are moving toward adopting such a 
model, such as Slovakia232 and Pakistan.233 
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One of the more difficult questions to arise in this context is determining 
whether these policies aid in the detection and prosecution of cartels. The KFTC has 
stated that they have provided AUD 400 000 in 46 cases between 2002 and 2011, 
with the biggest reward being AUD 200 000 in 2007 for information in relation to a 
sugar cartel.234 These statistics do not take into account the 2012 reforms, which have 
increased the maximum reward to 3 billion won. In Hungary, even though the policy 
was enacted in 2010, the HCA have claimed to receive approximately 40 approaches 
in 2011 and 2012. Although many of these approaches did not meet the requirement 
of ‘indispensable evidence,’ the HCA believes the information provided has still 
helped with their investigations.235 
One of the greatest empirical difficulties faced in attempting to assess the 
effectiveness of these programs is surrounding the lack of data available, due to each 
jurisdiction adhering to strict confidentiality assurances.236 In this respect, authorities 
could potentially publish the reward amount but at some time after the case has been 
finalised to ensure that confidentiality is still maintained. 
Despite these statistics, financial reward systems are a relatively new 
phenomenon in the context of cartels, and require adequate time to develop. This has 
been illustrated by the history of immunity policies, which have steadily grown in 
popularity after the initial slow-start in the United States at its inception. This section 
will now turn to a critical analysis of the key criticisms levelled at financial 
informant systems in order to demonstrate that these arguments are largely 
inadequate and overstated. 
 
(a) Credibility of Informants 
As part of the reauthorisation mandate for the Antitrust Criminal Penalty 
Enhancement and Reform Act (ACPERA),237 the Government Accountability Office 
                                                
234 Jae-Shin Kim, 'Cartel Regulation in Korea' (Korea Fair Trade Commission - Director, Cartel Policy 
Division, 2012) <http://www.adbi.org/files/2012.05.02.cpp.sess3.3.kim.cartel.regulation.korea.pdf> 
11.	
235 Palanski, above n 225, 19. 
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(GAO) was commissioned to study ACPERA’s effect.238 The report addresses key 
stakeholder perspectives on rewards and anti-retaliatory protection for 
whistleblowers reporting criminal antitrust offenses.  
One of the key concerns emanating from those who opposed the introduction of 
financial rewards, particularly from senior officials of the DOJ, was that the payment 
of rewards would serve to ‘jeopardise’ the credibility of a potential witness, if the 
case were to go before a jury.239 In support of this argument, it is asserted that the 
jurors will not believe a witness who stands to ‘benefit financially from successful 
enforcement action against those he implicated.’240 The DOJ believes that these 
issues are compounded in the context of a criminal cartel case, where the burden of 
proof is higher and the need for ‘insider information’ is crucial.  
Furthermore, there is concern that this lack of credibility will adversely affect 
leverage the DOJ has in obtaining plea agreements. However, one of the key 
considerations that have been overlooked in the context of these arguments is that 
these credibility issues are very similar to those that currently exist with immunised 
witnesses. As demonstrated in Chapter VI, the credibility of immunised witnesses 
can also be jeopardised by the fact that they are implicating other people in a crime 
they also committed.241 The DOJ has found ways to overcome these credibility issues 
by processes, such as corroborating evidence. Arguably, the DOJ could use these 
same practices to overcome the associated credibility issues with informant 
credibility. Either way, it would be severely incongruent to allow one policy to stand 
that has inherent credibility issues and reject introducing a new policy on the very 
same grounds.  
Moreover, as most cartel cases proceed by way of settlement, the issue of 
credibility before a jury diminishes.242 In the model that will be proposed in the 
concluding section, the informant reward system would operate concurrently with an 
immunity policy, and therefore the regulators would still have access to the crucial 
‘insider information’ needed for leverage in plea negotiations and to substantiate the 
evidence gathered. 
                                                
238 See generally, United States Government Accountability Office, above n 117. 
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(b) The Prospect of Frivolous and Vexatious Claims 
 
This concern was of paramount importance when the interviewees of this study were 
questioned over the prospect of introducing financial rewards. As the empirical 
chapter demonstrates, most of these concerns were directed at the situation where 
informants would come forward to reveal claims that were baseless, misguided or 
designed with an ulterior motive, such as revenge or simply to make some extra 
money.243 These are valid concerns with any policy that seeks to introduce financial 
rewards, as these situations can and do arise. However, this factor alone cannot be 
seen as a bar to introducing such a policy. Rather, there is a need to implement 
appropriate safeguards in order to minimise these risks. In fact, the very same risks 
can arise in the context of immunity, where an immunity applicant can downplay the 
role they have played in the cartel and exaggerate the roles played by others. These 
safeguards exist in other financial incentive schemes around the world, namely the 
United States. These include: 
i. Processes to corroborate evidence; 
ii. Ensuring the reward is not paid until successful prosecution, 
such as qui tam style litigation; 
iii. A requirement that the informant declare, under the penalty of 
perjury, that the information they submit is true and correct to 
the best of their knowledge and belief;244 
iv. Threshold of evidence to apply: The regulator could introduce 
a threshold of evidence, such as the SEC’s ‘original 
information’ requirement to filter out frivolous or misguided 
claims;245 and 
                                                
243 See Chapter V, Alternatives to the Immunity Policy, pg 159. 
244 Macrakis and Legg, above n 200, 32. 
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v. A more onerous suggestion has been to require that in the 
event of a frivolous claim, the court costs would revert back to 
the informant.246 
 
(c) Harm Internal Compliance Systems 
Opponents of the financial rewards system claim that such payments essentially 
encourage informants to bypass internal compliance and reporting systems, to report 
directly to the regulator to obtain an award.247 These opponents also argue that the 
rewards, particularly those based on a percentage amount, act as an incentive for the 
informant to intentionally delay reporting to the regulator in order for their reward 
amount to increase as the scale of the misconduct grows larger.248 These are valid 
concerns that should not be overlooked. However, proponents have argued that 
where informants bypass internal reporting systems, this is simply evidence of an 
ineffective compliance system or corporate culture that is not conducive to 
reporting.249 In this vein, proponents assert that the introduction of financial rewards 
can have the effect of creating an incentive for companies to improve their internal 
reporting systems and build a better corporate culture surrounding reporting.  
The introduction of financial rewards could also have the effect of increasing the 
costs associated with operating a cartel, as its members would need to ‘pay more 
people off’ in order to keep employee informants from reporting, which can help 
increase cartel instability.250 Moreover, there are appropriate safeguards that can be 
implemented in order to minimise the risks associated with this issue. In the United 
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States, the SEC has introduced incentives to encourage informants to first report the 
misconduct to the company. Firstly, those informants who do report to the company 
before turning to the SEC will receive an increase in their reward.251 Secondly, if the 
employee first reports to the company, from the date in which they report, the SEC 
will classify the informant’s evidence as ‘original evidence,’ even if the SEC has 
received evidence pertaining to the misconduct after this date.252 Thirdly, in the event 
that the employee first reports to the company and the company then reports to the 
SEC, the employee is still eligible for the reward.253 Finally, a more controversial 
suggestion has been to introduce penalties for those employees who intentionally 
delay the reporting of the misconduct.254 However, it would seem that any employee 
who does intentionally delay reporting in the United States may be at risk of not 
meeting the ‘original evidence’ requirement of the SEC and thus be ineligible for a 
reward. 
 
(d) Administrative Burden 
Opponents of financial reward systems have consistently argued that the introduction 
of such a system would overburden the resources of regulatory agencies, as the 
regulator would need to invest additional time and resources in order to investigate 
the increased number of claims.255 This is an important consideration for any 
jurisdiction that intends to introduce such a system, as the system is unlikely to be 
successful where adequate administrative support does not exist. In order to 
accommodate for this, the SEC final rules introduced a range of measures to improve 
information management, such as the establishment of the Office of the 
Whistleblower and a dedicated web page with standardised forms and 
communication procedures.256 Moreover, it is asserted that the costs associated with 
the introduction of the financial rewards system could reduce the need to grant high 
leniency reductions to obtain evidence, which could help offset these costs.257 
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(e) Morality issues 
This was another key argument advocated by the interviewees when questioned 
about financial reward systems. There were claims that payment in exchange for 
money was ‘against good conscience’ and that people should instead just be ‘good 
Samaritans.’258 Many opponents find support in a study conducted by Yuval Feldman 
and Orly Lobel in 2010, which examined the role incentives play in whistleblower’s 
decisions to report illegal activity.259 The study found that in cases where an 
informant has a ‘greater ethical stake in the outcome’ monetary incentives might be 
unnecessary and counterproductive because they may offset the whistleblower’s 
internal ethical motivations.260  
Essentially, this research points to the suggestion that where the misconduct 
has significant ethical and moral implications, an informant does not need monetary 
incentives to induce them to report the misconduct, but with less severe misconduct, 
financial incentives could encourage reporting. Whilst this research may have 
adverse implications for fraudulent misconduct, a recent Australian study has shown 
that the Australian public does not deem cartel conduct to be ‘morally wrong.’ The 
results of this study may suggest that financial incentives can act as an incentive in 
the cartel context.261  
Moreover, whilst the interviewees of this study were quick to identify the 
moral ambiguities that surround the introduction of a financial rewards system, many 
of these same interviewees could not perceive the requisite moral ambiguity in 
relation to immunity policies. This is despite the fact that at the crux of both of these 
policies, the idea is the same: an incentive, either money or immunity, in exchange 
for information.262 Arguably, these two policies sit on the same moral grounds and it 
is difficult to reconcile how the immunity policy can be held in such high regard by 
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Law and Enforcement ' (The University of Melbourne, 2010) 
<http://cartel.law.unimelb.edu.au/go/project-news/project-survey>. 
262 Richard Miller, 'Price Fixing and Whistleblowing: A 'Bounty' for A Mutiny on the Good Ship 
Collusion?' (1978) 10 Antitrust Law & Economics Review 87, 92.	
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authorities worldwide, whilst a policy based on a very similar idea, can cause such 
controversy and opposition. These policies are complementary incentive schemes 
designed to improve the enforcement efforts of competition regulators and should be 
recognised as such. 
 
D Key Recommendations for a Financial Rewards Model 
The preceding analysis has demonstrated that opposition to a financial rewards 
system is largely overstated and does not constitute a sufficient basis to prevent its 
implementation. Whilst some of the criticisms may be valid, as has been asserted, the 
associated risks can be minimised through the introduction of appropriate safeguards. 
This section will conclude by outlining the key recommendations for such a model in 
Australia, which would require careful consideration and consultation by the 
legislature in order to be successfully implemented. It is important to note that this 
model should be introduced in addition to the introduction of cartel-specific 
whistleblower protection provisions. This model will be informed by the public 
policy principles of transparency, accountability, consistency and proportionality. 
 
1 Administration   
If the Parliament envisages a cartel specific rewards system, then presumably the 
ACCC would oversee the administration of the system. A key component of the 
success of the model would be attributed to ensuring there is sufficient and 
appropriate administrative support to deal with an increase in informant tips. This 
would require an increase in resources to the ACCC to account for the additional 
time and costs associated with investigating informant tips. By its very nature, the 
ACCC already receives a number of tips regarding competition and consumer 
matters and may well have processes that have been adopted to accommodate this 
purpose. However, as the SEC and ASIC have done, it is important to establish a 
Whistleblower Office whose role would be to overseer the handling and investigation 
of the informant tips.263 This would need to be met with appropriate training and the 
                                                
263 See, eg, Securities and Exchange Commission, 'Office of the Whistleblower' (US Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 2010) <https://www.sec.gov/whistleblower>; Senate Economics References 
Committee, above n 86, s 14.44-14.52. 
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introduction of information management processes, including a dedicated online 
portal for such tips. There have also recently been developments of an App that 
allows for the confidential disclosure of corporate misconduct.264 
 
2 Reward Amount  
This is a key consideration that will strike at the heart of the program’s success and it 
is important that this aspect is transparent. As demonstrated, the threshold reward 
amount needs to be an amount that will offset the risks associated with reporting.265 
At present, the amounts in the United Kingdom, South Korea and Hungary are 
arguably not sufficient, as the low maximum threshold have resulted in relatively 
small rewards provided. Furthermore, like the FCA and Dodd-Frank, Australia 
should adopt a percentage range qui tam style of reward system, where the scope can 
be adjusted dependent on the quality of information provided. As Australia does not 
currently have treble damages, the fines imposed and therefore the reward is likely to 
be significantly lower than in the United States. There have been a number of calls 
for Australia to consider implementing treble damages and this could form part of the 
review.266  The Harper Review was intended as a comprehensive review of 
Australian competition policy and practice. The final report was released in March 
2015 and did not address the issue of treble damages. Thus, it is unlikely such a 
proposal will be implemented in Australia in the near future. 
3 Evidence Threshold  
The ACCC should establish a minimum threshold of evidence to apply to ensure that 
the quality of evidence that is provided is high and to minimise the risks of frivolous 
or vexatious claims. The SEC’s ‘original information’ requirement is a lower 
threshold requirement than HCA’s ‘indispensable evidence’ and strikes a more 
                                                
264 See eg, Liam Tung, Whistleblower App FraudSec Features Anonymising Encrypted Messaging 
(May 15 2015) The Age <http://www.theage.com.au/it-pro/business-it/whistleblower-app-fraudsec-
features-anonymising-encrypted-messaging-20150511-1mzc51.html>.	
265 Stephan, above n 209, 15-18; Kovacic, above n 250, 9-10; Kovacic, above n 198, 1819. 
266 See eg, Australian Securities & Investment Commission, 'Penalties for Corporate Wrongdoing - 
Report 387' (Australian Securities & Investment Commission, 2014) 
<http://download.asic.gov.au/media/1344548/rep387-published-20-March-2014.pdf>; R Tomasic, 
Casino Capitalism? Insider Trading in Australia (Australian Institute of Criminology, 1 ed, 1991) 
Chapter 9. 
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appropriate balance between securing quality evidence and ensuring that the 
informant program can successfully generate rewards.  
The informant will need to show that there is a ‘reasonable belief’ that their claim 
is sound and must sign a document to attest to this, with the penalty being perjury. 
Once the threshold has been met, the ACCC could develop criteria in order to 
determine where the reward lies in the percentage range, in a similar fashion to the 
SEC. Factors such as the value of evidence provided, the role in the offence (if any), 
and the promptness in disclosure could be included. This could be conducted in 
similar way to the way in which the ACCC currently administers its Cooperation 
Policy, with many of these existing factors being relevant to the assessment. The 
criteria should be clear and published in order to increase its transparent operation. 
 
4 Eligibility 
The policy should be open to anyone who can meet the minimum threshold 
requirement, in order to encourage wide reporting. The main exceptions to this 
would be: (1) Any person who qualifies for immunity (2) Any person who had a 
legal duty to report or the misconduct is discovered as part of their employment role, 
such as auditors (3) Any person who coerced or orchestrated the cartel or those who 
are found guilty of an offence or breach of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 
(Cth). These exclusions are necessary safeguards to ensure that those who have 
committed wrongdoing are not rewarded for their misconduct, especially in addition 
to receiving immunity.267 In this way, the informant model would be designed to 
complement the Immunity Policy, as opposed to undermining it. 
 
5 Judicial Review  
An integral aspect of ensuring a policy is delivered in a fair and transparent manner 
is ensuring that there is a right to have the decision reviewed by an independent 
judicial body and is therefore accountable. Thus, the decision by the ACCC to grant 
a reward should be subject to judicial review in the same way that immunity 
decisions should also have a right of review. In this vein, Australia should adopt the 
                                                
267 See eg, Hungarian Competition Act, Art 79/A(5); Dodd-Frank Act, § 922(6)(c)(2)(b). 
 
328 
 
approach of the HCA by creating an express right,268 or the ACCC should consider 
another appropriate administrative body to independently review its decisions by 
way of agreement. 
 
6 Confidentiality  
Confidentiality assurances are paramount to the successful operation of any 
informant program, as the risks associated with anti-retaliation have been well 
demonstrated. Therefore, the ACCC should afford the highest levels of 
confidentiality to informants, and where requested, maintain the anonymity of 
informants in the most delicate manner. These assurances should be consistent with 
those afforded to immunity applicants to ensure certainty and confidence in the cartel 
informant system. 
 
7 Qui Tam  
Finally, if no action is taken by the ACCC within a set period, such as 60 days, then 
the informant should be given the right to initiate a qui tam action on behalf of the 
government.269 The Senate Committee has recently recommended that the 
Government consider the introduction of qui tam style provisions and the 
Government should adopt this recommendation.270 
 
In addition to the whistleblower protection provisions, the introduction of a cartel 
informant model would improve cartel detection and deterrence, by providing 
another avenue for cartel whistleblowers to reveal information pertaining to cartel 
conduct. This diversification of enforcement tools would help strengthen the existing 
anti-cartel enforcement regime, as it does not solely rely on cartel participants 
applying for immunity. In light of its criticisms, the outlined financial rewards model 
                                                
268 See, eg, Hungarian Competition Act, Art 79/A(4). 
269 Department of Justice, above n 182, 2: The qui tam complaint is initially sealed for 60 days. The 
government is required to investigate the allegations in the complaint; if the government cannot 
complete its investigation in 60 days, it can seek extensions of the seal period while it continues its 
investigation. The government must then notify the court that it is proceeding with the action 
(generally referred to as ‘intervening’ in the action) or declining to take over the action, in which case 
the relator can proceed with the action.	
270 Senate Economics References Committee, above n 86, Recommendation 16.  
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has been designed with appropriate safeguards, in line with the enhanced criteria, to 
ensure the measures are proportionate to its aims.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This thesis has argued that the current method commonly used to assess the 
effectiveness of the immunity policy is flawed; producing an unduly narrow and 
unconvincing approach. This is due to the fact that the rational actor model upon 
which the policy is theoretically based is not an accurate reflection of human 
behaviour. Whilst the Behavioural Economics (‘BE’) approach cannot yet provide a 
cogent set of criteria to assess the immunity policy, it does indicate that there are 
serious flaws in the rational actor model. It has been this overreliance on economic 
assumptions and methods of assessment that has led to the policy being viewed in a 
vacuum; isolated from the enforcement context in which it operates.  
This thesis has overcome these limitations in two primary ways. Firstly, the 
development of enhanced criteria to assess the effectiveness of the immunity policy 
in line with widely accepted public policy principles of transparency, accountability, 
consistency and proportionality allows the policy to be viewed within the wider anti-
cartel enforcement context in which it operates. This approach enables one to assess 
the policy’s interaction and impact on other areas of the law. Importantly, assessing 
the policy in its wider context leads to the recognition that the ACCC Immunity 
Policy is but one enforcement tool that can be utilised by the ACCC. Whilst the 
immunity policy undeniably plays an important role in cartel detection and 
deterrence, it is not deserving of the title ‘most effective cartel enforcement tool in 
the world’1, unless viable alternatives to immunity are also seriously considered and 
adopted within Australia. This thesis has developed two alternate models to 
immunity for Australia in the form of cartel specific whistleblower protection and a 
cartel informant system, which could serve this purpose. 
 The second contribution this thesis has provided is a shift away from the neo-
classical economic emphasis on quantitative methods to assess the operation and 
effectiveness of the policy, instead utilising a qualitative approach to inform the 
design of the research and the recommendations within each chapter. This qualitative 
                                                
1 See, eg, Gary Spratling, 'Detection and Deterrence: Rewarding Informants for Reporting Violations' 
(2001) 69 George Washington Law Review 798, 799: the United States Corporate Leniency Policy has 
been the ‘most effective generator of cartel cases and is believed to be the most successful program in 
United States history for detecting large commercial crimes’. 
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approach is necessary to overcome some of the uncertainty that plagues researchers 
in this area, particularly given that the number of cartels operating at any time is 
unknown, and the fact that competition authorities are not forthcoming and 
transparent in providing immunity application information.  
The qualitative interviews provided much-needed insight into the nuances of 
the policy that are not readily apparent from the little information available in 
relation to immunity applications. For instance, there has not been a criminal cartel 
case in Australia, despite cartel conduct being criminalised in 2009. Knowing this 
information does not help to explain the reasons that may lie behind this fact. 
However, the qualitative data revealed that there are a number of issues associated 
with the relationship between the ACCC and the CDPP, including cultural and 
institutional differences, that impact upon the likelihood of a criminal cartel case. 
The qualitative data can aid in explaining the gaps left by this quantitative data. 
These qualitative semi-structured interviews provided valuable empirical insight into 
the design and operation of the Immunity Policy. These findings were complemented 
by a cross-comparative analysis of the respective policies in Canada, the United 
Kingdom and the United States to help inform recommendations for best practice. 
Chapter II sets the context for the immunity policy; it provided an overview 
of the origin and design of the policy within the United States Department of Justice 
(‘DOJ’). This chapter showed that the policy is based on an adaptation of game 
theory and the prisoner’s dilemma and at its heart lie the rational actor model. The 
chapter proceeded to demonstrate that the assumptions upon which the policy is 
based, and how it is intended to operate, are based on largely speculative and 
overgeneralised assumptions. Importantly, this chapter demonstrated that the 
immunity policy was designed at a time when neo-classical influence was at its peak 
at the DOJ, which clearly informed the way it was designed and intended to operate. 
Chapter III then built upon this analysis by tracing the concept of rationality 
and its impact on competition law development. It provided an overview of the most 
influential theoretical developments in competition law, namely the Chicago School 
of neo-classical economic thought, and more recently the Post-Chicago and Neo-
Chicago theories and demonstrated how each theory was premised on the rational 
actor model. The Chapter then turned to an analysis of the behavioural economics or 
BE approach to shed light on the limitations of the rational actor model and to 
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question whether the BE approach was a more appropriate theoretical model for the 
immunity policy. It concluded that whilst the BE approach is useful at demonstrating 
the limitations of the rational actor model, it does not provide a cogent set of criteria 
to assess the effectiveness of the immunity policy.  
This was accompanied by the recognition that this overreliance on economic 
assumptions to assess the effectiveness of the immunity policy produced an overly 
narrow and unconvincing approach and that the assessment of the policy needed to 
be more holistic in two primary ways (1) the criteria to assess the policy (2) the 
method used to inform the research into the policy’s design and operation. The 
chapter concluded by enhancing the orthodox DOJ criteria to include an assessment 
of widely held public policy principles, namely transparency, accountability, 
consistency and overall proportionality. 
Chapter IV focused on the second approach to enhancing the assessment of 
the immunity policy by outlining a qualitative, rather than a quantitative method to 
inform the design and form of the research. As a result, this chapter outlined the key 
empirical findings that informed the structure and development of the remaining 
chapters of the thesis. These findings revealed specific and nuanced considerations in 
relation to the design and operation of the immunity policy, which were previously 
unavailable in the context of the ACCC Immunity Policy. 
As a result of these findings, Chapter V outlined a number of 
recommendations that would strengthen the ACCC Immunity Policy in relation to its 
eligibility and cooperation requirements. This included recommending an automatic 
exclusion provision for recidivists from reapplying for immunity for a second or 
subsequent time within a 6-7 year period; clarifying and expanding the definition of 
‘coercion’; shedding light on the limitations of the bifurcated model of enforcement 
between the ACCC and CDPP, including indicating areas in need of particular 
attention leading up to Australia’s  first contested cartel case; and the need for the 
right of appeal in relation to an ACCC immunity related decision. 
Chapter VI focussed on the tension between the roles of public and private 
enforcement and how these roles intersect with the Immunity Policy. The chapter 
analysed the delicate balance that exists between ensuring that confidentiality is 
afforded to immunity applicants versus allowing third parties access to this 
information to seek compensation for harm caused to them. An analysis of the 
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common law and newly enacted statutory provisions demonstrated that these 
provisions are currently inadequate in providing access to immunity information and 
how this adversely affects the victims of cartel conduct. The balance is currently 
tipped in favour of the immunity applicants, despite the fact that the ACCC has the 
power to bring proceedings on behalf of those victims, but chooses not to.2 This 
chapter argues that the balance can be restored by implementing a restitutionary 
provision that allows for the sharing of immunity information, which would assist 
third parties pursue their action for damages.  
Furthermore, this chapter outlined the problems associated with the sharing of 
confidential immunity information between competition authorities, and how this can 
lead to exposure in areas in which the applicant has not yet applied for immunity. 
The chapter concluded by outlining a number of ways in which greater 
harmonisation can be achieved, particularly through the implementation of a global 
marker system with the ICN. 
Finally, Chapter VII, in reflection of all of the inadequacies of the current 
approach, outlines viable alternatives to immunity that have been proven to work in 
other jurisdictions. This included firming up the existing cooperation policy, which 
has fallen into disarray as a result of recent court decisions; the implementation of 
cartel specific whistleblower provisions given the inadequacies of current Australian 
corporate whistleblower provisions; and the introduction of cartel specific informant 
system and/or qui tam provisions. 
Overall, this thesis has demonstrated that the ACCC Immunity Policy is not 
operating in accordance with standards widely expected of public policy. The ACCC 
has not been readily transparent in relation to several areas relating to the Immunity 
Policy. For instance, the ACCC has not published the consultations that were 
submitted by various stakeholders in the ACCC’s recent review of the policy. The 
regulator has also failed to provide reasons for the inclusion and exclusion of the 
recommendations in its final version of the Immunity Policy. Additionally, this thesis 
has demonstrated a number of areas in need of further clarification in order for the 
ACCC to meet the democratic requirement for openness. 
Furthermore, the ACCC is largely unaccountable for its decisions in relation 
to the Immunity Policy. This is most evidently reflected in the fact that there is no 
                                                
2 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 87 (1A) (b). 
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right or process of review stipulated in the Policy in the event that an applicant 
wishes to appeal the ACCC’s decision to revoke immunity. The ACCC should be 
accountable for the manner in which it exercises its discretion in relation to 
immunity, as the ACCC is not a directly elected body and should be held accountable 
for its decisions in other ways.3 
There are also many areas where the policy is operating inconsistently against 
the interests of fair administration, creating high levels of uncertainty. The issues 
associated with the relationship between the ACCC and CDPP, in terms of their 
cultural and institutional differences, is creating inconsistencies in the way each 
authority perceives and processes immunity applications. This has led to 
considerable delay in the determination of conditional criminal immunity. It remains 
to be seen whether the implementation of a ‘letter of comfort’ can overcome these 
inconsistencies and provide the certainty required to encourage immunity applicants 
to apply. Furthermore, the inconsistent requirements that exist in the context of 
multi-jurisdictional immunity applications can also create a considerable degree of 
uncertainty. The ACCC should attempt to resolve this inconsistency by calling for a 
global marker system as a first step towards harmonisation in this area. 
Overall, it is important that the immunity policy be proportionate to its aims 
of cartel detection and deterrence. As part of this assessment, there is a need to 
consider whether there are equally effective measures that can also achieve the 
policy’s aims.4 This thesis has demonstrated that there are two primary alternatives to 
Immunity, in the form of cartel specific whistleblower protection and a cartel 
informant system, which could be implemented to reduce the overreliance on the 
immunity policy and increase the number of tools available to the ACCC to achieve 
its aims of cartel detection and deterrence.  
These conclusions could not be drawn by simply focusing on the 
predictability of the immunity policy, the threat of sanctions or the fear of detection; 
the three factors that currently categorise the model used to assess the policy’s 
effectiveness. These conclusions could also not be drawn from a purely quantitative 
assessment of the immunity policy on the basis of overgeneralised economic 
                                                
3 Arnold Bloch Leibler, 'Competition Policy Review - Final Report' (Australian Government - The 
Treasury, 2015)56-58. 
4 See also, Gordon Schnell and Aymeric Dumas-Emard, 'How to Catch A Thief - Corporate Leniency 
and the Irrepressible Challenge of Cartel Detection; Finding a Better Way' (2011) 9 CPI Antitrust 
Chronicle 1. 
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assumptions of the rational actor model or incomplete information in relation to 
immunity. Instead, this thesis has contributed to a new approach to the assessment of 
the Immunity policy, but firstly enhancing the criteria used to assess the policy’s 
effectiveness and secondly, by employing a qualitative and cross-comparative 
approach to inform the research.   
In line with this new approach, what is needed is further empirical research, 
such as that undertaken by Professor Caron Beaton-Wells, who commenced a similar 
study during the time of this research, into the design and operation of the ACCC 
Immunity Policy and the way it is assessed.5 There is a particular need for this type 
of research in further comparative study, or in jurisdictions that have newly 
implemented an immunity policy or may do so in the future. The assessment of the 
immunity policy also needs to be accompanied by a greater focus on corporate 
compliance, which could not be achieved within this research. For instance, 
Professor Brent Fisse has recently suggested that an adequate corporate compliance 
program should be a condition of corporate immunity.6  
Despite the recent review of the ACCC Immunity Policy, this thesis has 
demonstrated that many components of the policy’s design and operation still remain 
highly unsatisfactory. This may be due to the fact that the review was narrowly 
defined and largely inadequate in comprehensively addressing the number of issues 
associated with the policy or its impact and interaction with other areas of the law. 
As a result, the ACCC should seek to implement the recommendations outlined in 
this thesis in order to strengthen the Immunity Policy. Most importantly, the ACCC 
should seriously consider the adoption of alternative methods to immunity, as this is 
a key area that has been overlooked by the regulator. This should be accompanied by 
a comprehensive public consultation to arrive at the model that will best fit the 
Australian anti-cartel enforcement context. In its assessment of these measures, the 
ACCC should adopt the new approach to assessing the Immunity Policy argued in 
                                                
5 See Caron Beaton-Wells, 'The ACCC Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct: Due for Review' (2013) 
41 Australian Business Law Review 171; Caron Beaton-Wells, 'Immunity Policy: Revolution or 
Religion? An Australian Case-Study' (2013) 2 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 126. 
6 Brent Fisse, Reconditioning Corporate Leniency: The Possibility of Making Compliance Programs a 
Condition of Immunity Brent Fisse 
<http://www.brentfisse.com/images/Fisse_Compliance_Programs_as_Condition_of_Corporate_Immu
nity_201114.pdf>.	
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this thesis by employing the enhanced criteria of assessment and by utilising the 
qualitative and cross-comparative method to inform their review. 
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APPENDIX A 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
1. Demographic/introductory questions 
a. History of the institution 
b. Role of the individual 
c. Professional background 
d. Personal experience with the immunity policy 
 
2. General views on the immunity policy 
a. What is your opinion of the immunity policy for cartel conduct generally? 
1. What role do you think the immunity policy plays in cartel 
enforcement? 
2. Has your opinion changed since the policy was first implemented? 
3. What/Who do you believe has had the biggest influence on the 
enforcement of the immunity policy in Australia? 
4. What about influences outside of Australia? 
5. Cartel Project Survey – Almost 50per cent of public disagreed 
with the use of an immunity policy – what is your opinion of this? 
6. Difficulties of locating information regarding immunity – what is 
your experience of this? (ie is it counterintuitive to deterrence as 
one of goals) 
7. OVERRELIANCE – suggestion that the ACCC over-relies on the 
policy – what is your opinion on that? 
 
3. Theory underpinning the immunity policy 
a. What theory do you believe informs the design and operation of the immunity 
policy? 
1. What is your opinion of this theory’s operation? 
2. Explain this part – anomalies in immunity policy with greater 
understanding of “rationality.” 
 
4.  Practical components of the immunity policy 
a. What elements do you think are the most successful in the immunity policy? 
b. What do you see as the most challenging aspects of enforcement of the immunity 
policy and why? 
1. Eligibility/Administration 
a. What is your opinion of the relationship between the 
ACCC and the CDPP in relation to the granting of 
immunity? 
b. Exclusion -How is a cartel ‘ringleader’ defined? 
c. How can immunity be revoked?  
d. Is there an appeal process for refused/revoked 
applications for immunity? 
e. How do you feel about cartel recidivists being excluded 
from immunity applications? 
f. What do you think of the ‘carve out’ policy? (Found 
mostly in the U.S.) 
g. What is your opinion of the use of the ‘omnibus 
question’? This occurs at the end of the interview, where 
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a witness may be asked if they are aware of any other 
cartels or illegal anticompetitive practices that they have 
not been questioned over and about which they can 
provide information. 
i. What is the position in Australia regarding the 
use of the ‘omnibus’ question? 
 
2. Cooperation 
a. What is required to fulfill the “ongoing disclosure” 
requirement? 
b. What is your opinion of the “ongoing disclosure” 
requirement? 
c. What do you think of the Amnesty Plus/Minus policy 
found in the U.S and Canada? 
i. Would you recommend this policy be 
implemented in Australia? 
d. What do you think of the U.S requirement that immunity 
applicants must provide restitution to injured parties? 
e. What is your opinion of the ACCC Cooperation Policy? 
i.  How does it compare to the U.S/Canada 
/European Union process?  
 
3. Confidentiality 
a. How is the Protected Cartel Information Scheme (PCI) 
intended to operate? 
b. Does the PCI scheme strike the appropriate balance 
between ensuring victims of cartel behaviour have access 
to information to establish their case versus ensuring a 
high level of confidentiality is afforded to immunity 
applicants? 
c. Should the identity of immunity applicants be maintained 
before and after the court decision, as is the practice of 
the United States and Canada? 
 
4. Alternatives to an Immunity Policy 
a. What is your opinion of a ‘Cartel informant system’ such 
as those that currently exist in South Korea and United 
Kingdom? 
b. What other proactive enforcement tools could the ACCC 
focus on as part of its cartel enforcement efforts? 
 
5. Miscellaneous 
a. What is your opinion regarding the credibility of 
immunity applicants in cartel cases?  
i. Is your opinion the same regarding contested 
criminal cartel cases, as opposed to civil cases? 
ii. How do you feel about Model Jury Directions 
being used in this context? 
b. What happens in the event that immunity is obtained in 
one jurisdiction and then refused in another?  
c. What is your opinion of the idea of establishing a “one-
stop global shop for leniency – such as a clearinghouse 
marker system suggested by John Taladay? 
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i. What consequences does this have for 
international cartel enforcement? 
d. How is derivative immunity for employees of corporate 
immunity applicants achieved? 
i. What is your opinion on this process? 
ii. Are employees advised of the application, and 
their rights and obligations? If so, when? 
Former employees? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
390 
 
APPENDIX B 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Researcher  
Miss Pariz Marshall, LLB (Hons), PhD Candidate, Sessional Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of 
Wollongong. Ph 0423 450 145 Email: pl490@uowmail.edu.au. 
 
The Project 
The ACCC Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct: A Critical Legal Analysis 
 
This project aims to undertake qualitative semi-structured interviews of various stakeholders who 
have expert knowledge and/or experience with the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct. This research will be conducted with a view to 
critiquing its theoretical and practical design and operation. This project aims to generate much 
needed empirical evidence regarding this policy, specifically in Australia and the United States, with 
the purpose of assisting with the policy’s development and refinement.  
 The ACCC Immunity policy was first implemented in Australia in 2005 and revised in 
July 2009. It is largely deemed by regulators worldwide as the ‘single most effective cartel 
enforcement tool’. The policy works by offering immunity to the first cartel participant to come 
forward and reveal their conduct, subject to a number of conditions. Despite its heavy endorsement, 
the policy has not been subject to any substantial critical review regarding its theoretical and practical 
operation in Australia, particularly as compared to other jurisdictions such as the United States, the 
United Kingdom and Canada.  
The aims of this Project include the generation of empirical evidence to better understand the way 
the policy operates in order to assess its effects and identify the challenges involved in its 
enforcement.  Specifically, the Project will: 
• undertake a critical legal analysis of the theoretical underpinnings of the immunity policy and 
assess its utility in the context of the way in which business people interact with the law; 
• critically analyse the practical components of the immunity policy including issues relating to 
eligibility, cooperation, administration and alternatives to immunity; 
• assess the likely impact of the immunity policy on cartel deterrence and compliance with the 
law; 
• compare the ACCC Immunity policy and  its enforcement with the immunity policies in the 
United States, United Kingdom and Canada; and  
• make recommendations that will further help to strengthen the immunity policy and cartel 
enforcement more generally. 
 
Obtaining the views of senior people in various stakeholder organisations, including enforcement 
agencies, the legal profession, the business sector and cartel experts is crucial to fulfilling these aims.   
Purpose of the interview 
The purpose of this interview is to gain an understanding of how people involved in 
stakeholder organisations such as the enforcement agencies, the legal profession, and cartel experts 
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view the immunity policy for cartel conduct.  Data from these stakeholder interviews will provide 
empirical evidence to enable the researcher to make recommendations and draw conclusions about the 
issues set out above.   
Comparing responses of Australian stakeholders with stakeholders in the United States, said to be the 
‘father’ of cartel law, will assist in comparing and contrasting the position in each country as to: its 
theoretical design, its practical components and operation and ultimately inform recommendations to 
shed light on the policy’s limitations and strengthen its enforcement. 
 
Why are you being asked to participate in this Project? 
As a senior member of a stakeholder organization in the United States, the researcher 
believes that you would be able to comment on cartel immunity and some or all of the issues relevant 
to this Project. 
The researcher identified you as a potential interviewee through your extensive knowledge 
and experience regarding competition policy in the United States as a leading international 
competition lawyer and as the Co-Chair of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law's 
Presidential Transition Report Task Force. 
As a highly esteemed lawyer in the field of competition policy, you are well placed to offer 
comments from an operational and policy point of view regarding the Immunity Policy in the United 
States which will be extremely valuable to the research on Australia’s immunity policy. The interview 
questions will include questions, as relevant, about: 
• Demographic/Introductory questions, 
• Government Industry relations/views on immunity policies, 
• The theory underpinning the immunity policy, 
• The practical design and operation of the policy including issues relating to eligibility, 
cooperation, administration and alternatives to immunity, 
• The effectiveness of the policy and its potential limitations, 
• Patterns in cartel enforcement relating to the immunity policy, 
• Any other points you think it important for us to understand. 
 
Your comments and views will be used in the researcher’s analysis of the theoretical and practical 
design and operation of the immunity policy, including its strengths and limitations. Additionally, 
your comments and views will also inform practical recommendations the researcher will make in 
respect of the implementation and enforcement of the ACCC Immunity policy, which will form the 
final chapter of the researcher’s thesis.   
 
What is involved in agreeing to participate? 
Participating will involve you giving us an interview which should take approximately 1- 1.5 hours.  
If you agree, the researcher would like to record and transcribe the interview so that the researcher can 
analyse it later. The researcher will discuss the time and place for the interview with you and arrange a 
mutually convenient time and place. 
 
Will my information be kept confidential? 
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The data from this research project will be published in a thesis and potentially will be used in 
journals and presented at conferences; however, your identity will be kept confidential and published 
only with your permission. Although I will report direct quotations from the interview, if requested, 
you will be given a pseudonym, and all identifying information (including relevant possibilities such 
as the name of the institution, the participant’s position, etc.) will be removed from the published 
material. Or if you would prefer, we can use a generic description of your position rather than your 
name.  Some people, who have knowledge of your organisation, may still be able to identify you from 
your responses.  If you choose to keep your identity confidential, then we will not disclose your name 
unless we are required to by law. We will set out the detail of any confidentiality arrangements in the 
consent form. 
 
If you agree, can you change your mind later? 
Participating in this Project is entirely up to you.  You may change your mind about participating at 
any time and withdraw your data from the study without having to give an explanation, up until the 
point that the data is analysed.  
 
What will happen to the information you give to the Project? 
The record of your interview will only be available to members of the research team as set out above.  
The researcher will keep the physical records in a locked filing cabinet and the electronic records in a 
password protected electronic file and we will not disclose any confidential information unless 
required by law. 
Information from your interview will only be published in accordance with any 
confidentiality terms we agree with you.  Audio recordings of your interview will not be released so 
you will not be identified by your voice. Audio recordings will be kept for a period of at least 5 years 
after the Project is completed and they will be identifiable, however the researchers will work from 
transcriptions of the recordings.  
The researcher may use information provided in your interview in their publications about 
the immunity policy and cartel enforcement more generally. Publications are expected to take the 
form primarily in a doctrinal thesis, but potentially also journal articles, conferences and scholarly 
books. You will be sent a transcript of the interview and asked to confirm its accuracy. You will not 
be quoted directly from the transcript prior to this confirmation being provided. 
 
How do you take part in the Project or find further information about the Project? 
The researcher will discuss your participation with you.  You are welcome to contact any of the 
research team at any time to talk about the Project and ask any questions.  You can contact us as set 
out below. 
If you agree to participate in the Project then the researcher will arrange for you to sign a consent 
form. 
 
What if you have concerns about the Project? 
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We are happy to talk about any queries or concerns that you may have.  You may contact the 
researchers as below. 
• Pariz Marshall, 0423 450 145, pl490@uowmail.edu.au 
 
If you still have concerns about the Project after we have discussed them with you then you can 
contact the Ethics Manager, Human Research Ethics, The University of Wollongong, Australia – 
Eve Steinke Ph: (02) 4221 4457 Email: eves@uow.edu.au 
Thank you for your time in reviewing our Project materials so far. 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Miss Pariz Marshall LLB (Hons) 
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APPENDIX C 
CONSENT FORM - STAKEHOLDERS 
 
The ACCC Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct: A critical legal analysis 
This document indicates that you consent to participate in an interview to assist with research 
into the Project ‘The ACCC Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct: A critical legal analysis’ and how 
your interview will be dealt with.   
You may withdraw your consent to your involvement in this Project at any time and may also 
withdraw any unprocessed data. 
All the interview data will be kept securely for at least 5 years after publication of the results 
and may be used by the research team in further research during or after that time. 
If the data from your interview will be used without identifying you, then we will not publish your 
name or other identifying information unless required to by law.  However, it may still be possible for 
readers to identify you from your responses to some of the interview questions.    
A record of the interview will be made as indicated below.  You will be identified as indicated below. 
 
Miss Pariz Marshall  
0423 450 145  
pl490@uowmail.edu.au  
I consent to be interviewed for the Research Project ‘The ACCC Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct: 
A critical legal analysis.’ I have been given a copy of this consent form and the Participant 
Information Sheet to keep. What I say in the interview may be recorded and used by the research team 
in publications. 
 I consent to the interview being recorded …………Y/N 
 I consent to being named in publications …………Y/N 
 I consent to my position being described in publications …Y/N 
 The special identification arrangements for my interview are (please  describe) 
 
Signed:…………………………………….  Signed:……………………………………. 
 (participant signature) 
 
Name: ……………………………………..  Name: ……………………………………..  
 (Print name)     (Print name) 
Date: ……………………………………… Date:  ……………………………………… 
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APPENDIX D 
INTERVIEWEE LIST 
 
1. Professor Christine Parker – Monash University (9.07.2013) 
2. Andrew Christopher  - Webb Henderson – Partner (22.07.2013) 
3. Professor Caron-Beaton Wells – Melbourne University (26.04.2013) 
Melbourne 
4. Bruce Lloyd – Clayton Utz – Partner (17.06.2013) 
5. Simon White SC – Sixth Floor – Barrister (25.07.2013) 
6. Carolyn Oddie – Allens – Partner (23.07.2013) 
7. Graeme Samuel – Former Chairman of the ACCC (26.04.2013) - Melbourne 
8. Murray Deakin – K & L Gates – Partner (15.07.2013) 
9. Georgina Foster – Baker & McKenzie – Partner (15.07.2013) 
10. Michael Gray – Herbert Smith Freehills (29.07.2013) 
11. Louie Lou – Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(19.08.2013) 
12. Trudy Hall – Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(19.08.2013) 
13. Nick McHugh – Norton Rose Fulbright – Head of Antitrust and Competition 
(22.07.2013) 
14. Ross Zaurrini – Ashurst – Partner  (23.08.2013) 
15. Elizabeth Sarofim – Ashurst – Senior Associate (23.08.2013) 
16. Melissa Fraser – Ashurst – Senior Associate (23.08.2013) 
 
 
